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THE 

ANALOGY 

OF 

RELIGION, 

NATURAL  AND  REVEALED, 

TO   THE 

CONSTITUTION  AND  COURSE  OF  NATURE. 

TO  WHICH  ARE  ADDED, 

TWO  BRIEF  DISSERTATIONS : 

I.    ON    PERSONAL   IDENTITY.        I!.  ON   THE   NATURE   OF  VIRTUE. 
TOGETHER  WITH 

A    CHARGE, 

DELIVERED  TO  THE  CLERGY  OF  THE  DIOCESE  OF  DURHAM,  AT  THE   PRIMARY 
VISITATION,  IN  THE  YEAR   1751. 

-V1 — 

BY  JOSEPH  BUTLER,  LL.  D, 

LATE    LORD   BISHOP  OF  DURHAM. 


EJUS  (ANALOGUE)  HJEC  VIS  EST,  UT  ID  QUOD  DUBIUM  EST,  AD  AIASUID  SIMILE  DE 
QUO  NON  QU/ERITUR,  REFERAT  ;    UT  INCERTA  CERTIS  PROBET. 

QUINT.  INST.  ORAT.   J..  I.  C.  6. 


SECOND  AMERICAN  EDITION. 

TO  WHICH  IS   PREFIXED 

A  LIFE  OF  THE  AUTHOR, 

BY  DR.  KIPPIS ; 

WITH  A  PREFACE,  GIVING   SOME  ACCOUNT  OF   HIS  CHARACTER, 
AND  WRITINGS, 

BY  SAMUEL  HALIFAX,  D.  D. 

LATE    LORD    BISHOP    OF    GLOUCESTER. 


BOSTON: 

PUBLISHED    BY    DAVID    WEST,    NO.    56,    CORNHIIT 


^.   G.   house;   PRINTTR. 

1 809, 


N 


ADVERTISEMENT 

«■©    THE   FIRST  AMERICAN  EDITION  QF  DR.  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY. 


The  Editor  has  so  far  presumed  on  the  taste  of 
persons  attache  to  .science,  and  reyjkaled  reli- 
gion, in  the  United  States  of  America,  as  to  publish 
the  following  Work,  without  soliciting  the  previ- 
ous encouragement  of  subscription.  The  very  hon- 
ourable testimonials  which  it  has  received  from  those 
the  most  distinguished  for  piety  and  learning  in  Eu- 
rope, and  in  our  own  country,  have  prompted  him  to 
the  attempt.  The  several  editions  through  which  it 
has  passed  beyond  the  Atlantic,  are  a  proof  of  the 
publick  sentiment  in  its  favour. 

At  a  period  in  which  infidelity  is  attempting  to 
propagate  its  principles  in  this  western  world,  this  ela- 
borate defence  of  our  koly  religion  has  a  claim  to 
the  patronage  of  its  sincere  friends,  especially  of  our 
venerable  Clergy,  and  of  young  Students  in  Divinity. 
The  very  respectable  characters  which  preside  over 
our  different  Universities,  and  the  other  gentlemen  of 
virtue  and  science,  to  whom  the  academical  education 
of  our  youth  is  committed,  will  cheerfully  embrace  an 


is  ADVERTISEMENT. 

opportunity  of  recommending  to  their  pupils  this  inval- 
uable antidote  against  Deism.  The  dying  testimony 
of  a  BOWDOIN,  the  learned  and  the  good,  who,  as 
a  Magistrate,  a  Philosopher,  a  Christian,  lately  shone 
as  a  star  of  the  first  magnitude  in  the  American  hem- 
isphere, cannot  fail  to  operate  as  an  extensive  recom- 
mendation of  the  work.* 

A  handsome  edition  of  the  Analogy,  with  two  brief 
Dissertations  by  the  same  excellent  Prelate,  at  two 
thirds  of  the  price  of  the  English  edition,  now  offers 
itself  to  the  publick.  The  celebrity  of  the  Author, 
the  novelty  and  uncommon  force  of  his  arguments, 
and  the  importance  of  the  cause  which  he  advocates, 
will  not  solicit  its  patronage  in  vain. 

*  "  He  mentioned,  during  his  last  sickness,   that  the  perusal  of  Bishop 

*  BUTLER's  ANALOGY  had  been  of  great  use  to  him  in  satisfying  his 
"  doubts,  and  confirming  his  mind  on  the  subject  of  Christianity.  "From  the 
"  time  of  my  reading  that  book,"  said  he,  "  I  have  been  an  humble  follower 

•  of  the  blessed  JESUS."     See  Dr.  Thacher'*  Sermm  on  the    death  of  the  Hon. 

JaMSC  B0WD0IN,£/f. 


tTHfi  LlFfe 


UF 


Dr.  BUTLER 


THE  LIFE 


Dr.  BUTLER. 


Dr.  Joseph  Butler,  a  prelate  of  the  most  dis- 
tinguished character  and  abilities,  was  born  at  Wan- 
tage, in  Berkshire,  in  the  year  1692.  His  father, 
Mr.  Thomas  Butler,  who  was  a  substantial  and  repu- 
table shopkeeper  in  that  town,  observing  in  his  son 
Joseph*  an  excellent  genius  and  inclination  for  learn- 
ing, determined  to  educate  him  for  the  ministry,  a- 
mong  the  Protestant  dissenters  of  the  presbyterian 
denomination.  For  this  purpose,  after  he  had  gone 
through  a  proper  course  of  grammatical  literature,  at 
the  free-grammar  school  of  his  native  place,  under  the 
care  of  the  Rev.  Mr.  Philip  Barton,  a  clergyman  of 
the  church  of  England,  he  was  sent  to  a  dissenting 
academy,  then  kept  at  Gloucester,  but  which  was 
soon  afterwards  removed  to  Tewkesbury.  The  prin- 
cipal tutor  of  this  academy  was  Mr.  Jones,  a  man  of 
uncommon  abilities  and  knowledge,  who  had  the  hon- 

*  He  was  the  youngest  of  eight  children, 


THE  LIFE  OF 


our  of  training  up   several  scholars,  who  became  of 
great  eminence,  both  in  the  established   church  and 
among  the  dissenters.     At  Tewkesbury,  Mr.  Butler 
made  an  extraordinary  progress  in  the  study  of  tiivin- 
ity  ;  of  which  he  gave  a  remarkable  proof,  in  the  let- 
ters addressed  by  him,  while  he  resided  at  Tewkesbury, 
to  Dr.  Samuel  Clarke,  laying  before  him  the  doubts, 
that  had  arisen  in  his  mind,  concerning  the  conclusive- 
ness of  some  arguments  in  the  Doctor's  demonstration 
of  the  being  and  attributes  of  God.     The  first  of  these 
letters  was  dated   the  4th  November  1713;  and  the 
sagacity  and  depth  of  thought  displayed  in  it,  immedi- 
ately excited  Dr.   Clarke's   particular   notice.     This 
condescension  encouraged  Mr.  Butler  to  address  the 
Doctor  again  upon  the  same  subject,  which   likewise 
was  answered  by  him  ;  and  the  correspondence  being 
carried  on  in  three  other  letters,  the  whole  was  an- 
nexed to  the  celebrated   treatise  before  mentioned, 
and  the  collection  has  been  retained  in  all  the  subse- 
quent editions  of  that  work.     The  management  of  this 
correspondence  was  intrusted  by  Mr.  Butler,   to  his 
friend  and  fellow-pupil,  Mr.  Seeker,  who,  in  order  to 
conceal  the  affair,  undertook  to  convey  the  letters  to 
the  post-office  at  Gloucester,  and  to  bring  back  Dr. 
/   Clarke's  answers.     When  Mr.  Butler's  name  was  dis- 
covered to  the  Doctor,  the  candour,  modesty,  and 
good  sense  with    which  he  had  written,  immediately 
procured  him  the  friendship  of  that  eminent  and  ex- 
cellent man.     Our  young  student  was  not,  however, 
during  his  continuance  at  Tewkesbury,  solely  employ- 
ed in  metaphysical  speculations  and  inquiries.     An- 


DR.  BUTLER.  £ 

other  subject  of  his  serious  consideration  was,  the  pro- 
priety of  his  becoming  a  dissenting  minister.  Accord- 
ingly, he  entered  into  an  examination  of  the  princi* 
pies  of  non-conformity  ;  the  result  of  which  was, 
such  a  dissatisfaction  with  them,  as  determined  him  to 
conform  to  the  established  church.  This  intention 
was,  at  first,  disagreeable  to  his  father,  who  endeav- 
oured to  divert  him  from  his  purpose  ;  and,  with  that 
view,  called  in  the  assistance  of  some  eminent  presby- 
terian  divines ;  but  finding  his  son's  resolution  to  be 
fixed,  he  at  length  suffered  him  to  be  removed  to  Ox- 
ford, where  he  was  admitted  a  commoner  of  Oriel 
college  on  the  17th  March  1714.  At  what  time  he 
took  orders  doth  not  appear,  nor  who  the  bishop  was 
by  whom  he  was  ordained  ;  but  it  is  certain  that  he 
entered  into  the  church  soon  after  his  admission  at  Ox- 
ford, if  it  be  true,  as  is  asserted,  that  he  sometimes 
assisted  Mr.  Edward  Talbot  in  the  divine  service,  at 
his  living  of  Hendred,  near  Wantage.  With  this  gen- 
tleman, who  was  the  second  son  of  Dr.  William  Tal- 
bot, successively  bishop  of  Oxford,  Salisbury,  and. 
Durham,  Mr.  Butler  formed  an  intimate  friendship  at 
Oriel  college  ;  which  friendship  laid  the  foundation 
of  all  his  subsequent  preferments,  and  procured  for  him 
a  very  honourable  situation  when  he  was  only  twen- 
ty-six years  of  age.  For  it  was  in  1718  that,  at  the 
recommendation  of  Mr.  Talbot,  in  conjunction  with 
that  of  Dr.  Clarke,  he  was  appointed  by  Sir  Joseph  \ 
Jekyll  to  be  preacher  at  the  Rolls.  This  was  three 
years  before  he  had  taken  any  degree  at  the  universi- 
ty, where  he  did  not  go  out  bachelor-of-law  till  the 


6 


THE  LIFE  OF 


10th  June  1721,  which,  however,  was  as  soon  as  that 
degree  could  suitably  be  conferred  upon  him.  Mi% 
Butler  continued  at  the  Rolls  till  1726 ;  in  the  begin- 
ning of  which  year  he  published,  in  one  volume  octa- 
vo, "  Fifteen  Sermons  preached  at  that  Chapel."  In 
the  meanwhile,  by  the  patronage  of  Dr.  Talbot,  bishop 
of  Durham,  to  whose  notice  he  had  been  recommend- 
ed (together  with  Mr.  Benson  and  Mr.  Seeker)  by- 
Mr.  Edward  Talbot,  on  his  death-bed,  our  author  had 
been  presented  first  to  the  rectory  of  Haughton,  near 
Darlington,  and  afterwards  to  that  of  Stanhope,  in  the 
same  diocese.  The  benefice  of  Haughton  was  given 
to  him  in  1722,  and  that  of  Stanhope  in  1725.  At 
Haughton,  there  was  a  necessity  for  rebuilding  a  great 
part  of  the  parsonage-house,  and  Mr.  Butler  had  nei- 
ther money  nor  talents  for  that  work.  Mr.  Seeker  5 
therefore,  who  had  always  the  interest  of  his  friends  at 
heart,  and  acquired  a  very  considerable  influence  with 
Bishop  Talbot,  persuaded  that  prelate  to  give  Mr.  But- 
ler, in  exchange  for  Haughton,  the  rectory  of  Stan- 
hope, which  was  not  only  free  from  any  such  incum- 
brance, but  was  likewise  of  much  superior  value,  be- 
ing indeed  one  of  the  richest  parsonages  in  England. 
Whilst  our  author  continued  preacher  at  the  Rolls- 
chapel,  he  divided  his  time  between  his  duty  in  town 
and  country  ;  but  when  he  quitted  the  Rolls,  he  re- 
sided, during  seven  years,  wholly  at  Stanhope,  in  the 
conscientious  discharge  of  every  obligation  appertain- 
ing to  a  good  parish  priest.  This  retirement,  howev- 
er, was  too  solitary  for  his  disposition,  which  had  in  it 


DR.  BUTJLEK,  y. 

a  natural  cast  of  gloominess.     And  though  his  recluse 
hours  were  by  no  means  lost,  either  to  private  im- 
provement or  public  utility,  yet  he  felt  at  times,  very 
painfully,  the  want  of  that  select  society  of  friends  to 
which  he  had  been  accustomed,  and  which  could  in- 
spire him  with  the  greatest  chearfulness.     Mr.  Seeker, 
therefore,  who  knew  this,  was  extremely  anxious  to 
draw  him  out  into  a  more  active  and  conspicuous 
scene,  and  omitted  no  opportunity  of  expressing  this 
desire  to  such  as  he  thought  capable  of  promoting  it. 
Having   himself  been   appointed  king's  chaplain  in 
1732,  he  took  occasion,   in  a  conversation  which  he  ' 
had  the  honour  of  holding  with  Queen  Caroline,  to 
mention  to  her  his  friend   Mr.  Butler.     The   queen 
said  she  thought  he  had  been  dead.     Mr.  Seeker  as- 
sured her  he  was  not.     Yet,  her  majesty   afterwards 
asked  Archbishop  Blackburn  if  he  was  not  dead  ;  hi& 
answer  was,  "  No,  madam  ;  but  he  is  buried."     Mr* 
Seeker  continuing  his  purpose  of  endeavouring  to 
bring  his  friend  out  of  his  retirement,  found  means? 
upon  Mr.  Charles  Talbot's  being  made  lord-chancel- 
lor, to  have  Mr.  Butler  recommended  to  him  for  his 
chaplain.     His  lordship  accepted,  and  sent  for  him  j 
and  this  promotion  calling  him  to  town,  he  took  Ox- 
ford in  his  way,  and  was  admitted  there  to  the  degree 
of  doctor-of-law,  on  the  8th  December  1733.     The 
lord-chancellor,  who  gave  him  also  a  prebend  in  the 
church  of  Rochester,  had  consented  that  lie  should 
reside  at  his  parish  of  Stanhope  one  half  of  the  year. 
Dr.  Butler  being  thus  brought  back  into  the  world. 


g  THE  LIFE  OF* 

his  merit  and  his  talents  soon  introduced  him  to  par* 
ticular  notice,  and  paved  the  way  for  his  rising  to  those 
high  dignities  which  he  afterwards  enjoyed.     In  1736, 
he  was  appointed   clerk-of-the-closet  to  queen  Caro- 
line ;  and,  in  the  same  year,  he  presented  to  her  ma- 
jesty a  copy  of  his  excellent  treatise,  entitled,  "  The 
Analogy  of  Religion,  Natural  and  Revealed,   to  the 
Constitution  and  Course  of  Nature."     His  attendance 
upon  his  royal  mistress,   by  her  especial  command, 
was  from  seven  to  nine  in  the  evening  every  day  :  and 
though  this  particular  relation  to  that  excellent  and 
learned  queen  was    soon  determined  by  her  death  in 
1737,  yet  he  had  been  so  effectually  recommended  by 
her,  as  well  as  by  the  late  lord-chancellor  Talbot,  to 
his  majesty's  favour,  that,  in  the  next  year,  he   was 
raised  to  the  highest  order  of  the  church,  by  a  nomi- 
nation to  the  bishopric   of  Bristol ;  to  which  see  he 
was   consecrated   on   the  third   of  December    1738. 
King  George  II.  not  being  satisfied  with  this  proof  of 
his  regard  to  Dr.  Butler,  promoted  him,  in  1740,  to 
/ the   deanry  of  St.   Paul's,  London;    into  which  he 
was  installed  on  the  24th  of  May  in  that  year.     Find- 
ing the  demands  of  this  dignity  to  be  incompatible  with 
his  parish-duty  at  Stanhope,  he  immediately  resigned 
that  rich  benefice.     Besides  our  prelate's  unremitted 
attention  to  his  peculiar  obligations,  he  was  called  up- 
on to  preach  several  discourses   on  public  occasions, 
which  were  afterwards    separately  printed,  and  have 
since  been  annexed  to  the  latter  editions  of  the  Ser* 
mons  at  the  Rolls-chapeL 


DR,  BUTLER,  g 

In  1746,  upon  the  death  of  Dr.  Egerton,  bishop  of     • 
Hereford,  Dr.  Butler  was  made  clerk-of-the-closet  to 
the  king  ;  and  on  the  16th  October  1750,  he  received 
another  distinguished  mark  of  his  majesty's  favour, 
by  being  translated  to  the  see  of  Durham*     This  was 
on  the  16th  of  October  ;  in  that  year,  upon  the  de- 
cease of  Dr.  Edward   Chandler,  our   prelate,  being 
thus  appointed  to  preside  over  a  diocese  with  which 
he  had  long  been  connected,  delivered  his  first,  and 
indeed  his   last  charge  to  his  clergy,  at  his  primary 
visitation  in  1751.     The  principal  object  of  it  was, 
u  External  Religion.''     The  bishop  having  observed,   K' 
with  deep  concern,  the  great  and  growing  neglect  of 
serious  piety  in  the  kingdom,  insisted  strongly  on  the 
usefulness  of  outward  forms  and  institutions,  in  fixing 
and  preserving  a  sense  of  devotion  and  duty   in   the 
minds  of  men.     In  doing  this,  he  was  thought  by  sev- 
eral persons  to  speak  too  favourably   of  Pagan   and 
Popish  ceremonies,  and  to  countenance,  in  a  certain 
degree,  the  cause  of  superstition.     Under  that  appre- 
hension, an  able  and  spirited  writer,  who  was  under- 
stood to  be  a  clergyman  of  the  church  of  England, 
published  in  1 752,  a  pamphlet,  entitled,  "  A  serious 
Enquiry   into  the  Use  and  Importance  of  External 
Religion  :  occasioned  by  some  passages  in  the  Right 
Rev.  the  Lord  Bishop   of  Durham's  Charge   to  the 
Clergy  of  that  Diocese  ; — Humbly  addressed  to  his 
Lordship."     Many  persons,  however,  and  we  believe 
the  greater  part  of  the  clergy  of  the  diocese,  did  not 
think  our  prelate's  charge  so  exceptionable  as  it  ap- 

b  -. 


10  THE  LIFE  OF 

peared  to  this  author.  The  Charge,  being  printed  at 
Durham,  and  having  never  been  annexed  to  any  of 
Dr.  Butler's  other  works,  is  now  become  extremely 
scarce  ;  and  it  is  observable,  that  it  is  the  only  one  of 
his  publications  which  ever  produced  him  a  direct 
literary  antagonist. 

By  this  promotion,  our  worthy  bishop  was  furnish- 
ed with  ample  means  of  exerting  the  virtue  of  charity  ; 
a  virtue  which  eminently  abounded  in  him,  and  the 
exercise  of  which  was  his  highest  delight.  But  this 
gratification  he  did  not  long  enjoy.  He  had  been  but 
a  short  time  seated  in  his  new  bishopric,  when  his 
health  began  visibly  to  decline ;  and  having  been 
complimented,  during  his  indisposition,  upon  account 
of  his  great  resignation  to  the  Divine  will,  he  is  said  to 
have  expressed  some  regret,  that  he  should  be  taken 
from  the  present  world  so  soon  after  he  had  been  ren- 
dered capable  of  becoming  much  more  useful  in  it. 
In  his  last  illness,  he  was  carried  to  Bristol,  to  try  the 
waters  of  that  place  ,  but  these  proving  ineffectual,  he 
removed  to  Bath,  where,  being  past  recovery,  he  died 
on  the  16th  of  June,  1752.  His  corpse  was  conveyed 
to  Bristol,  and  interred  in  the  cathedral  there,  where 
a  monument,  with  an  inscription,  is  erected  to  his 
memory. 

On  the  greatness  of  Bishop  Butler's  character  we 
need  not  enlarge  ;  for,  his  profound  knowledge,  and 
the  prodigious  strength  of  his  mind,  are  amply  dis- 
played in  his  incomparable  writings.  His  piety  was 
of  the  most  serious  and  fervent,  and,  perhaps,  some- 


DR.  BUTLER.  ,  , 

what  of  the  ascetic  kind.     His  benevolence  was  warm, 
generous,   and  diffusive.     Whilst   he  was  bishop  of 
Bristol,  he  expended,  in  repairing  and  improving  the 
episcopal  palace,  four  thousand  pounds,  which  is  said 
to  have  been  more   than  the  whole  revenues  of  the 
bishopric  amounted  to,  during  his  continuance  in  that 
see.     Besides  his  private  benefactions,  he  was  a  con- 
tributor to  the  infirmary  at  Bristol,  and  a  subscriber 
to  three  of  the  hospitals  at  London.     He  was  likewise 
a  principal  promoter,  though  not  the  first  founder,  of 
the  infirmary  at  Newcastle,  in  Northumberland.     In 
supporting  the  hospitality  and  dignity  of  the  rich  and 
powerful  diocese  of  Durham,  he  was  desirous  of  imi- 
tating the  spirit  of  his  patron,  Bishop  Talbot.     In  this 
spirit,  he  set  apart  three  days  every  week  for  the  re- 
ception and  entertainment  of  the  principal  gentry  of 
the  country.     Nor  were  even  the  clergy  who  had  the 
poorest  benefices,  neglected  by  him.     He  not  only  oc- 
casionally invited  them  to  dine  with  him,  but  conde- 
scended to  visit  them  at  their  respective  parishes.     By 
his  will  he  left  five  hundred  pounds  to  the  society  for 
propagating  the  gospel  in  foreign  parts,  and  some  lega- 
cies to  his  friends  and  domestics.     His  executor  and 
residuary  legatee  was  his  chaplain,  the  Rev.  Dr.  Na- 
thaniel Forster,  a  divine  of  distinguished  literature, 
Bishop  Butler  was  never  married.     Soon  after  his  de- 
cease, the  following  lines,  by  way  of  epitaph,  were 
written  concerning  him  ;  and  were  printed  first,  if  we 
recollect  aright,  in  the  London  Magazine. 


THE  LIFE  OF  DR.  BUTLER, 

Beneath  this  marble  Butler  lies  entombed, 
Who,  with  a  soul  inflamed  by  love  divine, 

His  life  in  presence  of  his  God  consumed, 
Like  the  bright  lamps  before  the  holy  shrine. 

His  aspect  pleasing,  mind  with  learning  fraught, 
His  eloquence  was  like  a  chain  of  gold, 
That  the  wild  passions  of  mankind  controlled  ; 

Merit,  wherever  to  be  found,  he  sought. 

Desire  of  transient  riches  he  had  none  ; 

These  he,  with  bounteous  hand,  did  well  dispense  ; 
Bent  to  fulfil  the  ends  of  Providence  ; 

His  heart  still  fixed  on  an  immortal  crown. 
His  heart  a  mirror  was,  of  purest  kind, 
Where  the  bright  image  of  his  Maker  shined  ; 

Reflecting  faithful  to  the  throne  above, 

The  irradiant  glories  of  the  Mystic  Dove. 


TO    THE    REVEREND 


DR.  THOMAS  BALGUY, 

archdeacon  and  prebendary  of  winchester,  &c. 

Dear  Sir, 

I  trust   you  will  excuse  the  liberty  I  have  taken  of 
prefixing  your  name  to  the  following  sheets  ;  the  lat- 
ter part  of  which,  I  am  confident,  will  not  be  thought 
undeserving  of  your  approbation  ;  and  of  the  former 
part  you  will  commend  the  intention  at  least,   if  not 
the  execution.     In  vindicating  the  character  of  Bishop 
Butler  from  the  aspersions  thrown  upon  it  since  his 
death,  I  have  but  discharged  a  common  duly  of  hu- 
manity, which  survivors  owe  to  those  who  have  de- 
served well  of  mankind  by  their    lives    or  writings, 
when  they  are  past  the  power  of  appearing  in  their 
own  defence.     And  if  what  I  have  added,  by  way  of 
opening  the  general  design  of  the  works  of  this  great 
Prelate,  be  of  use  in  exciting  the  younger  class  of  stu- 
dents in  our  universities  to  read,  and  so  to  read  as  to 
understand,  the  two  volumes  prepared  and  publish- 
ed by  the  Author  himself ;  I   flatter  myself  I  shall 
have  done  no  inconsiderable  service  to  morality  and 
religion.     Your  time  and  studies  have  been  long  suc- 
cessfully devoted  to  the  support  of  the  same  great 


14 


cause ;  and  in  what  you  have  lately  given  to  the 
world,  both  as  an  author  and  an  editor,  you  have 
largely  contributed  to  the  defence  of  our  common 
Christianity,  and  of  what  was  esteemed  by  one,  who 
was  perfectly  competent  to  judge,  its  best  establish- 
ment, the  Church  of  England.  In  the  present 
publication  I  consider  myself  as  a  fellow-labourer  with 
you  in  the  same  design,  and  tracing  the  path  you  have 
trod  before,  but  at  great  distance,  and  with  unequal 
paces.  When,  by  his  Majesty's  goodness,  I  was 
raised  to  that  station  of  eminence  in  the  church,  to 
which  you  had  been  first  named,  and  which,  on  ac- 
count of  the  infirmity  of  your  health,  you  had  desired 
to  decline  ;  it  was  honour  enough  for  me  on  such  an 
occasion  to  have  been  thought  of  next  to  you  :  And  I 
know  of  no  better  rule  by  which  to  govern  my  con- 
duct, so  as  not  to  discredit  the  royal  hand  which  con- 
ferred on  me  so  signal  and  unmerited  a  favour,  than 
in  cases  of  difficulty  to  put  the  question  to  myself, 
how  you  would  probably  have  acted  in  the  same  situa- 
tion*  You  see,  Sir,  I  still  look  up  to  you,  as  I  have 
been  wont,  both  as  my  superior  and  my  example. 
That  I  may  long  reap  the  benefit  of  your  advice  and 
friendship  ;  and  that  such  a  measure  of  health  and 
strength  may  be  continued  to  you,  as  may  enable  you 
to  pass  the  evening  of  your  days  with  comfort,  and 
enjoy  the  blessings  of  the  life  you  love,  is  the  cordial 
wish  of, 

Dear  Sir, 

Your  very  affectionate 

and  faithful  Servant, 

S.  GLOUCESTER 

nouth-Straet,  Westminster, 
lfthMay,  1786. 


£ 


PREFACE 


EDITOR. 


*  When  I  consider  how  light  a  matter  very  often  subjects  the  best 
"  established  characters  to  the  suspicions  of  posterity,  posterity 
"  often  as  malignant  to  virtue  as  the  age  that  saw  it  was  envious  of 
"its  glory  ;  and  how  ready  a  remote  age  is  to  catch  at  a  low  revi- 
"  ved  slander,  which  the  times  that  brought  it  forth  saw  despised 
"  and  forgotten  almost  in  its  birth  ;  I  cannot  but  think  it  a  matter 
"that  deserves  attention." — Letter  to  the  Editor  of  the  Letters  on 
the  Spirit  of  Patriotism,  &c.  by  Bishop  War  burton.  See  his 
Works,  Vol.  VII.  p.  547. 

Ihe  Charge  to  the  Clergy  of  the  Diocese  of  Bur- 
ham,  which  is  subjoined  to  the  present  volume,  was 
printed  and  published  in  the  year  1751,  by  the  learn- 
ed Prelate,  whose  name  it  bears  ;  and,  together  with 
the  Sermons  and  Analogy  of  the  same  writer,  both 
too  well  known  to  need  a  more  particular  description, 
completes  the  collection  of  his  works.  It  has  long 
been  considered  as  a  matter  of  curiosity,  on  account 
of  its  scarceness  ;  and  it  is  equally  curious  on  other 
accounts,  its  subject,  and  the  calumny  to  which  it  gave 
occasion,  of  representing  the  Author  as  addicted  to 
superstition,  as  inclined  to  popery,  and  as  dying  in  the 
communion  of  the  church  of  Rome.  The  improved  edi- 
tion of  the  Biographia  Britannica,  now  publishing*  un- 
der the  care  of  Dr.  Kippis,  having  unavoidably  brought 
this  calumny  again  into  notice  ;  it  may  not  be  unsea- 
sonable to  offer  a  few  reflections  in  this  place,  by  way 


j  q  PREFACE 

of  obviating  any  impressions  that  may  hence  arise,  to 
the  disadvantage  of  so  great  a  character  as  that  of  the 
late  Bishop  Butler  ;  referring  those  who  desire  a 
more  particular  account  of  his  life,  to  the  third  volume 
of  the  same  entertaining  work,  printed  in  1784.  Art*.. 
Butler  (Joseph. J 

I.  The  principal  design  of  the  Bishop,  in  his  Charge, 
is  to  exhort  his  Clergy  to  "  do  their  part  towards  re- 
viving a  practical  sense  of  religion  amongst  the  people 
committed  to  their  care  ;"  and,  as  one  way  of  effect- 
ing this,  to  "  instruct  them  in  the  importance  of  exter- 
nal religion"  or  the  usefulness  of  outward  observances 
in  promoting  inward  piety.  Now,  from  the  com- 
pound nature  of  man,  consisting  of  two  parts,  the 
body  and  the  mind,  together  with  the  influence  which 
these  are  found  to  have  on  one  another,  it  follows, 
that  the  religious  regards  of  such  a  creature  ought  to 
be  so  framed,  as  to  be  in  some  way  properly  accom- 
modated to  both.  A  religion  which  is  purely  spirit- 
ual, stripped  of  every  thing  that  may  affect  the  senses, 
and  considered  only  as  a  divine  philosophy  of  the 
mind,  if  it  do  not  mount  up  into  enthusiasm,  as  has 
frequently  been  the  case,  often  sinks,  after  a  few  short 
fervours,  into  indifference  :  an  abstracted  invissible 
object,  like  that  which  natural  religion  offers,  ceases 
to  move  or  interest  the  heart ;  and  something  further 
is  wanting  to  bring  it  nearer,  and  render  it  more  pres- 
ent to  our  view,  than  merely  an  intellectual  contempla- 
tion. On  the  other  hand,  when,  in  order  to  remedy 
this  inconvenience,  recourse  is  had  to  instituted  forms 
and  ritual  injunctions  ;  there  is  always  danger  lest  men 
be  tempted  to  rest  entirely  on  these,  and  persuade 
themselves  that  a  painful  attention  to  such  observances 
will  atone  for  the  want  of  genuine  piety  and  virtue. 
Yet  surely  there  is  a  way  of  steering  safely  between 


BY  THE  EDITOR. 


17 


these  two  extremes  ;  of  so  consulting  both  the  parts 
of  our  constitution,  that  the  body  and  the  mind  may- 
concur  in  rendering  our  religious  services  acceptable 
to  God,  and  at  the  same  time  useful  to  ourselves. 
And  what  way  can  this  be,  but  precisely  that  which 
is  recommended  in  the  charge  ;  such  a  cultivation  of 
outward  as  well  as  inward  religion,  that  from  both 
may  result,  what  is  the  point  chiefly  to  be  laboured 
after,  and  at  all  events  to  be  secured,  a  correspondent 
temper  and  behaviour  ;  or,  in  other  words,  such  an 
application  of  the  forms  of  godliness  as  may  be  sub- 
servient in  promoting  the  power  and  spirit  of  it  ?  No 
man  who  believes  the  Scriptures  of  the  Old  and  New 
Testament,  and  understands  what  he  believes,  but 
must  know,  that  external  religion  is  as  much  enjoin- 
ed, and  constitutes  as  real  a  part  of  revelation,  as  that 
which  is  internal.  The  many  ceremonies  in  use 
among  the  Jews,  in  consequence  of  a  divine  com- 
mand ;  the  baptism  of  water,  as  an  emblem  of  moral 
purity ;  the  eating  and  drinking  of  bread  and  wine, 
as  symbols  and  representations  of  the  body  and  blood 
of  Christ,  required  of  Christians,  are  proofs  of  this. 
On  comparing  these  two  parts  of  religion  together, 
one,  it  is  immediately  seen,  is  of  much  greater  impor- 
tance than  the  ottnr  ;  and,  whenever  they  happen  to 
interfere,  is  always  to  be  preferred  :  but  does  it  follow 
from  hence,  that  therefore  that  other  is  of  little  or  no 
importance,  and,  in  cases  where  there  is  no  compe- 
tition, may  entirely  be  neglected  ?  Or  rather  is  not 
the  legitimate  conclusion  d  rectly  the  reverse,  that 
nothing  is  to  be  looked  upon  as  of  little  importance, 
which  is  of  any  use  at  all  in  preserving  upon  our  minds 
a  sense  of  the  Divine  Authority  which  recals  to  our 
remembrance  the  obligations  we  are  under,  and  helps 
to  keep  us,  as  the  scripture  expresses  it,  in  the  fear  of 

c 


2  g  PREFACE 

the  Lord  all  the  day  long  ?*  If,  to  adopt  the  instance 
mentioned  in  the  charge,  the  sight  of  a  Church 
should  remind  a  man  of  some  sentiment  of  piety  ;  if, 
from  the  view  of  a  material  building  dedicated  to  the 
service  of  God,  he  should  be  led  to  regard  himself,  his 
own  body,  as  a  living  temple  of  the  Holy  Ghost ,t  and 
therefore  no  more  than  the  other  to  be  profaned  or 
desecrated  by  any  thing  that  defileth  or  is  impure  ; 
could  it  be  truly  said  of  such  a  one  that  he  was  super- 
stitious,  or  mistook  the  means  of  religion  for  the  end  ? 
If,  to  use  another,  and  what  has  been  thought  a  more 
obnoxious  instance,  taken  from  the  bishop's  prac- 
tice, a  Cross,  erected  in  a  place  of  public  worship,]; 
should  cause  us  to  reflect  on  him  who  died  on  a  cross 
for  our  salvation,  and  on  the  necessity  of  our  own  dy- 
ing to  sin..§  and  of  crucifying  the  flesh  with  its  affections 
and  lusts  ;||  would  any  worse  consequences  follow  from 
such  sentiments  so  excited,  than  if  the  same  sentiments 
had  been  excited  by  the  view  of  a  picture,  of  the  cru- 
cifixion suppose,  such  as  is  commonly  placed,  and 
with  this  very  design,  in  foreign  churches,  and  indeed 
in  many  of  our  own  ?  Both  the  in  tances  here  ad- 
duced, it  is  very  possible,  may  be  far  from  being  ap- 
proved, even  by  those  who  are  under  the  most  sincere 
convictions  of  the  importance  of  true  religion  ;  and  it 
is  easy  to  conceive  how  open  to  scorn  and  censure  they 
must  be  from  others,  who  think  they  have  a  talent  for 
ridicule,  and  have  accustomed  themselves  to  regard  all 
pretensions  to  piety  as  hypocritical  or  superstitious. 
But  wisdom  is  justified  of  her  children.^  Religion  is 
what  it  is,  whether  men  will  hear,  or  whether  they  will 
forbear  ;**  and  whatever  in  the  smallest  degree  pro- 

•  Prov.  xxiii.  17.  f  1  Cor.  vi.  19. 

\  See  note  [A],  at  the  end  of  this  Preface. 
§  Rom.  vi.  11.  ||   Gal.  v.  24. 

\  Matth.  xi.     1&  **  Ezek,  U.  5. 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  j^ 

motes  its  interests,  and  assists  us  in  performing  its 
commands,  whether  that  assistance  be  derived  from 
the  medium  of  the  body  or  the  mind,  ought  to  be 
esteemed  of  great  weight,  and  deserving  of  our  most 
serious  attention. 

However,  be  the  danger  of  superstition  what  it  may, 
no  one  was  more  sensible  of  that  danger,  or  more  ear- 
nest in  maintaining  that  external  acts  of  themselves 
are  nothing,  and  that  moral  holiness,  as  distinguished 
from  bodily  observances  of  every  kind,  is  that  which 
constitutes  the  essence  of  religion,  than  Bishop  But- 
ler. Not  only  the  charge  itself,  the  whole  inten- 
tion of  which  is  plainly  nothing  more  than  to  enforce 
the  necessity  of  practical  religion,  the  reality  as  well  as 
form,  is  a  demonstration  of  this  ;  but  many  passages 
besides,  to  the  same  purpose,  selected  from  his  other 
writings.  Take  the  two  following  as  specimens.  In 
his  Analogy  he  observes  thus :  "  Though  mankind 
have,  in  all  ages,  been  greatly  prone  to  place  their  re- 
ligion in  peculiar  positive  rites,  by  way  of  equivalent 
for  obedience  to  moral  precepts  ;  yet,  without  mak- 
ing any  comparison  at  all  between  them,  the  nature 
of  the  thing  abundantly  shews  all  notions  of  that  kind 
to  be  utterly  subversive  of  true  religion  :  as  they  are, 
moreover,  contrary  to  the  whole  general  tenor  of  scrip- 
ture ;  and  likewise  to  the  most  express  particular  dec- 
larations of  it,  that  nothing  can  render  us  accepted  of 
God,  without  moral  virtue."*  And  to  the  same  pur- 
pose in  his  Sermon,  preached  before  the  Society  for  the 
Propagation  of  the  Gospel,  in  February,  1738-9. 
"  Indeed  amongst  creatures  naturally  formed  for  re- 
ligion, yet  so  much  under  the  power  of  imagination  as 
men  are,  superstition  is  an  evil,  which  can  never  be  out 

*  Analogy,  Part  II.  Chap,  h 


2q  PREFACE 

of  sight.  But  even  against  this,  true  religion  is  a  great 
security,  and  the  only  one.  True  religion  takes  up 
that  place  in  the  mind,  which  superstition  would  usurp, 
and  so  leaves  little  room  for  it  ;  and  likewise  lays  us 
under  the  strongest  obligations  to  oppose  it.  On  the 
contrary,  the  danger  of  superstition  cannot  but  be  in- 
creased by  the  prevalence  of  irreligion  ;  and  by  its 
general  prevalence,  the  evil  will  be  unavoidable.  For 
the  common  people,  wanting  a  religion,  will  of  course 
take  up  with  almost  any  superstition  which  is  thrown 
in  their  way  ;  and,  in  process  of  time,  amidst  the  in- 
finite vicis  itucies  of  the  political  world,  the  leaders  of 
parties  will  certainly  be  able  to  serve  themselves  of  that 
superstition,  whatever  it  be,  which  is  getting  ground  ; 
and  will  not  fail  to  carry  it  to  the  utmost  length  their 
occasions  require.  The  general  nature  of  the  thing 
shews  this  ;  and  history  and  fact  confirm  it.  It  is 
therefore  wonderful,  those  people  who  seem  to  think 
there  is  but  one  evil  in  life,  that  of  superstition,  should 
not  see  that  atheism  and  profaneness  must  be  the  in- 
troduction of  it."* 

He  who  can  think  and  write  in  such  a  manner,  can 
never  be  said  to  mistake  the  nature  of  real  religion  : 
and  he,  who,  after  such  proofs  to  the  contrary,  can 
persist  in  asserting  of  so  discreet  and  learned  a  person, 
that  he  was  addicted  to  superstition,  must  himself  be 
much  a  stranger  both  to  truth  and  charity. 

And  here  it  may  be  worth  our  while  to  observe, 
that  the  same  excellent  prelate,  who  by  one  set  of  men 
was  suspected  of  superstition,  on  account  of  his  charge, 
has  by  another  been  represented  as  leaning  to  the  op- 
posite extreme  of  enthusiasm^  on  account  of  his  twro  dis- 
courses On  the  Love  of  God.     But  both  opinions   are 

'  Serm.  XVI.  p.  33'J,  840.    Ed.  -lth,  17495. 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  21 

equally  without  foundation.  He  was  neither  super- 
stitious  nor  an  enthusiast.  His  mind  was  much  too 
strong,  and  his  habits  of  thinking  and  reasoning  much 
too  strict  and  severe,  to  suffer  him  to  descend  to  the 
weaknesses  of  either  character.  His  piety  was  at  once 
fervent  and  rational.  When,  impressed  with  a  gener- 
ous concern  for  the  declining  cause  of  religion,  he  la- 
boured to  revive  its  dying  interests,  nothing  he  judged 
would  be  more  effectual  to  that  end,  among  creatures 
so  much  engaged  with  bodily  things,  and  so  apt  to  be 
affected  with  whatever  strongly  solicits  the  senses  as 
men  are,  than  a  religion  of  such  a  frame  as  should  in 
its  exercise  require  the  joint  exertions  of  the  body  and 
the  mind.  On  the  other  hand,  when  penetrated  with 
the  dignity  and  importance  of  the  first  and  great  com- 
mandment,* Love  to  God,  he  set  himself  to  inquire, 
what  those  movements  of  the  heart  are,  which  are  due 
to  him,  the  Author  and  Cause  of  all  things  ;  he  found, 
in  the  coolest  way  of  consideration,  that  God  is  the 
natural  object  of  the  same  affections  of  gratitude,  rev- 
erence, fear,  de^re  of  approbation,  trust,  and  depend- 
ence ;  the  same  affections  in  kind,  though  doubtless 
in  a  very  disproportionate  degree,  which  any  one  would 
feel  from  contemplating  a  perfect  character  in  a  crea- 
ture, in  which  goodness  with  wisdom  and  power  are 
supposed  to  be  the  predominant  qualities,  with  the 
further  circumstance  that  this  creature  was  also  his 
governor  and  friend.  This  subject  is  manifestly  a 
real  one  ;  there  is  nothing  in  it  fanciful  or  unreason- 
able. This  way  of  being  affected  towards  God  is  piety, 
in  the  strictest  sense  :  this  is  religion,  considered  as  a 
habit  of  mind  ;  a  religion,  suited  to  the  nature  and 
condition  of  mamf 

*  Matth  xxli.     38. 

t   See  note  [B],  at  the  the  end  of  this  Preface. 


22  PREFACE 

II.  From  superstition  to  popery  the  transition  is 
easy.  No  wonder  then,  that,  in  the  progress  of  de- 
traction, the  simple  imputation  of  the  former  of  these, 
with  which  the  attack  on  the  character  of  our  author 
was  opened,  should  be  followed  by  the  more  aggra- 
vated imputation  of  the  latter.  Nothing,  I  think, 
can  fairly  be  gathered  in  support  of  such  a  suggestion 
from  the  charge ,  in  which  popery  is  barely  mentioned, 
and  occasionally  only,  and  in  a  sentence  or  two  ;  yet 
even  there,  it  should  be  remarked,  the  bishop  takes 
care  to  describe  the  peculiar  observances  required  by 
it,  "  some  as  in  themselves  wrong  and  superstitious, 
and  others  of  them  as  being  made  subservient  to  the 
purposes  of  superstition."  With  respect  to  his  other 
writings,  any  one  at  all  conversant  with  them  .needs 
not  to  be  told,  that  the  matters  treated  of  both  in 
his  Sermons  and  his  Analogy  did,  none  of  them,  direct- 
ly lead  him  to  consider,  and  much  less  to  combat,  the 
opinions,  whether  relating  to  faith  or  worship,  which 
are  peculiar  to  the  church  of  Rome  :  it  might  there- 
fore have  happened,  yet  without  any  just  conclusion 
arising  from  thence,  of  being  himself  inclined  to  favour 
those  opinions,  that  he  had  never  mentioned,  so  much 
as  incidentally,  the  subject  of  popery  at  all.  But  for- 
tunately for  the  reputation  of  the  bishop,  and  to  the 
eternal  disgrace  of  his  calumniators,  even  this  poor 
resource  is  wanting  to  support  their  malevolence.  In 
his  >ermon  at  St.  Brides,  before  the  Lord  Mayor,  in 
1740,  after  having  said  that  "  our  laws  and  whole 
constitution  go  more  upon  supposition  of  an  equality 
amongst  mankind,  than  the  constitution  and  laws  of 
other  countries  *,"  he  goes  on  to  observe,  that  "  this 
plainly  requires,  that  more  particular  regard  should  be 
had  to  the  education  of  the  lower  people  here,  than  in 
places  where  they  are  born  slaves  of  power,  and  to  be 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  23 

made  slaves  of  superstition  :"*     meaning  evidently  in 
this  place  by  the  general  term  superstition,  the  partic- 
ular errors  of  the  Romanists.     This  is  something  ;  but 
we  have  a  still  plainer  indication  what  his  sentiments 
concerning  popery  really  were,  from  another  of  his 
Additional  Sermons,  I  mean  that  before  the  House  of 
Lords,  on  June  the  11th,  1747,  the  anniversary  of  his 
late  Majesty's  accession.     The  passage  alluded  to  is  as 
follows,  and  my  readers  will  not  be  displeased  that  I 
give  it  them  at  length.     "  The  value  of  our  religious 
establishment  ought    to  be  very  much    heightened  in 
our  esteem,  by  considering  what  it  is  a  security  from  ; 
I  mean  that  great  corruption  of  Christianity,  popery, 
which  is  ever  hard  at   work  to  bring  us  again  under 
its  yoke.  Whoever  will  consider  the  popish  claims 
to  the  disposal  of  the  whole  earth,  as  of  divine  right, 
to  dispense  with  the  most   sacred  engagements,   the 
claims  to  supreme  absolute  authority  in  religion  ;  in 
short,  the  general  claims  which  the  Canonists  express 
by  the  words,  plenitude  of  power — whoever,  I  say,  will 
consider  popery   as  it  is  professed  at  Rome^  may  see, 
that  it  is  manifest,  open  usurpation  of  all  human  and 
divine  authority.     But  even  in  those  Roman-catholic 
Countries  where  these  monstrous  claims   are  not  ad- 
mitted, and  the  civil  power   does,  in  many  respects, 
restrain  the  papal  ;  yet  persecution  is  professed,  as  it 
is  absolutely  enjoined  by  what  is  acknowledged  to  be- 
their  highest  authority,   a  general  council,   so  called, 
with  the  pope  at  the   head  of  it  ;  and  is  practised  in 
all  of  them,  I  think,  without  exception,  where  it  can 
be  done  safely.     Thus  they  go  on  to  substitute  force 
instead  of  argument,  and  external  profession  made  by 
force  instead  of  reasonable  conviction.      And   thus 

*  Sena.  XVII.  p.  3€7. 

V 


24,  PREFACE 

corruptions  of  the  grossest  sort  have  been  in  vogue;, 
for  many  generations,  in  many  parts  of  Christendom  ; 
and  are  so  still,  even  where  popery  obtains  in  its  least 
absurd  form  :  and  their  antiquity  and  wide  extent 
are  insisted  upon  as  proofs  of  their  truth  ;  a  kind  of 
proof  which  at  bsst  can  only  be  presumptive,  but 
which  loses  all  its  little  weight,  in  proportion  as  the 
long  and  large  prevalence  of  such  corruptions  have 
been  obtained  by  force."*  In  another  part  of  the 
same  sermon,  where  he  is  again  speaking  of  our  ec- 
clesiastical constitution,  he  reminds  his  audience  that 
it  is  to  be  valued,  "  not  because  it  leaves  us  at  liberty 
to  have  as  little  religion  as  we  please,  without  being 
accountable  to  human  judicatories  ;  but  because  it 
exhibits  to  our  view,  and  enforces  upon  our  con- 
sciences, genuine  Christianity,  free  from  the  supersti- 
tions with  which  it  is  defiled  in  other  countries  ;" 
which  superstitions,  he  observes,  "  naturally  tend  to 
abate  its  force."f  The  date  of  this  sermon  should 
here  be  attended  to.  It  was  preached  in  June,  1747  ; 
that  is,  four  years  before  the  delivery  and  publication 
of  the  charge,  which  was  in  the  year  1751  ;  and  ex- 
actly five  years  before  the  author  died,  which  was  in 
June,  1752.  We  have  then,  in  the  passages  now 
laid  before  the  reader,  a  clear  and  unequivocal  proof., 
brought  down  to  within  a  few  years  of  Bishop  But- 
ler's death,  that  popery  was  held  by  him  in  the  ut- 
most abhorrence,  and  that  he  regarded  it  in  no  other 
light  than  as  the  great  corruption  of  Christianity,  and  a 
manifest,  open  usurpation  of  all  human  and  divine  author- 
ity. The  argument  is  decisive  ;  nor  will  any  thing  be 
of  force  to  invalidate  it,  unless  from  some  after-act 
during  the  short  remainder  of  the  bishop's  life,  besides 

*  Term.  XX.  p.  410—442.  j  P.  449. 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  0 j 

that  of  delivering  and  printing  his  Charge,  "(which, 
after  what  I  have  said  here,  and  in  the  Notes  added 
to  this  Preface  and  to  the  Charge,  I  must  have  leave 
to  consider  as  affording  no  evidence  at  all  of  his  in- 
clination to  papistical  doctrines  or  ceremonies)  the 
contrary  shall  incontrovertibly  appear. 

III.  One  such  after- act,  however,  has  been  alleged, 
which  would  effectually  demolish  all  that  we  have 
urged  in  behalf  of  our  Prelate,  were  it  true,  as  is  pre- 
tended, that  he  died  in  the  communion  of  the  church  vf 
Rome,  Had  a  story  of  this  sort  been  invented  and 
propagated  by  Papists,  the  wonder  might  have  been 
less  : 

Hoc  Ithacus  velit,  &  magno  mereentur  Atridaj. 

But  to  the  reproach  of  protestantism,  the  fabrication 
of  this  calumny,  for  such  we  shall  find  it,  originated 
from  among  ourselves.  It  is  pretty  remarkable,  that 
a  circumstance  so  extraordinary  should  never  have 
been  divulged  till  the  year  1767,  fifteen  years  after  the 
Bishop's  decease.  At  that  time  Dr.  Thomas  Secker 
was  Archbishop  of  Canterbury  ;  who  of  all  others 
was  the  most  likely  to  know  the  truth  or  falsehood  of 
the  fact  asserted,  having  been  educated  with  our  author 
in  his  early  youth,  and  having  lived  in  a  constant  hab- 
it of  intimacy  with  him  to  the  very  time  of  his  death. 
The  good  Archbishop  was  not  silent  on  this  occasion  : 
with  a  virtuous  indignation  he  stood  forth  to  protect 
the  posthumous  character  of  his  friend  ;  and  in  a  pub- 
lic newspaper,  under  the  signature  of  Misopssudes^  cal- 
led upon  his  accuser  to  support  what  he  had  advanced, 
by  whatever  proofs  he  could.  No  proof,  however,  nor 
any  thing  like  a  proof,  appeared  in  reply  ;  and  every 
man  of  sense  and  candour  at  that  time  was  perfectly 
convinced  the  assertion  was  entirely  groundless.*     As 

*  See  note  [C],at  the  end  of  this  Preface. 
D 


2(5  PREFACE 

a  further  confirmation  of  the  rectitude  of  this  judg- 
ment, it  may  not  be  amiss  to  mention,  there  is  yet  in 
existence  a  strong  presumptive  argument  at  least  in  its 
favour,  drawn  from  the  testimony  of  those  who  attend- 
ed our  author  in  the  sickness  of  which  he  died.  The 
last  days  of  this  excellent  Prelate  were  passed  at  Bath  ; 
Dr.  Nathanael  Forster,  his  chaplain,  being  con- 
tinually with  him  ;  and  for  one  day,  and  at  the  very 
end  of  his  illness,  Dr.  Martin  Benson  also,  the  then 
Bishop  of  Gloucester,  who  shortened  his  own  life 
in  his  pious  haste  to  visit  his  dying  friend.  Both  these 
persons  constantly  wrote  letters  to  Dr.  Secker,  then 
Bishop  of  Oxford,  containing  accounts  of  Bishop 
Butler's  declining  health,  and  of  the  symptoms  and 
progress  of  his  disorder,  which,  as  was  conjectured, 
soon  terminated  in  his  death.  These  letters,  which 
are  still  preserved  in  the  Lambeth  library,*  I  have  read ; 
and  not  the  slenderest  argument  can  be  collected  from 
them,  in  justification  of  the  ridiculous  slander  we  are 
here  considering.  If  at  that  awful  season  the  Bishop 
was  not  known  to  have  expressed  any  opinion,  tending 
to  shew  his  dislike  to  popery  ;  neither  was  he  known 
to  have  said  any  thing,  that  could  at  alt  be  construed 
in  approbation  of  it :  and  the  natural  presumption  is, 
that  whatever  sentiments  he  had  formerly  entertained 
concerning  that  corrupt  system  of  religion,  he  contin- 
ued to  entertain  them  to  the  last.  The  truth  is,  nei- 
ther the  word  nor  the  idea  of  popery  seems  once  to 
have  occurred  either  to  the  Bishop  himself,  or  to  those 
who  watched  his  parting  moments  :  their  thoughts 
were  otherwise  engaged.  His  disorder  had  reduced 
him  to  such  debility,  as  to  render  him  incapable  of 
speaking  much  or  long  on  any  subject  ;  the  few  bright 

*  See  note  [D],  at  the  end  of  this  Preface, 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  27 

intervals  that  occurred  were  passed  in  a  state  of  the  ut~ 
most  tranquillity  and  composure  ;  and  in  that  compo- 
sure he  expired.  Mark  the  perfect  man>  and  behold  the 
upright  ;  for  the  end  of  that  man  is  peace.* — Let  me  die 
ihe  death  of  the  righteous,  and  let  my  last  end  be  like 
his!\ 

Out   of  pure    respect  for  the  virtues  of  a  man, 
whom  I  had  never  the  happiness  of  knowing,  or  even 
of  seeing,  but  from  whose  writings  I  have  received  the 
greatest  benefit  and  illumination,  and  which  I  have  rea- 
son to  be  thankful  to  Providence  for  having  early 
thrown  in  my  way ;  I  have  adventured,  in  what  I  have 
now  offered  to  the  public,  to  step  forth  in  his  defence, 
and  to  vindicate  his  honest  fame  from  the  attacks  of 
those,  who,  with  the  vain  hope  of  bringing  down   su- 
perior characters  to  their  own  level, are  for  ever  at  work 
in  detracting  from  their  just  praise.     For  the  literary- 
reputation  of  Bishop  Butler,  it  stands  too  high  in  the 
opinion  of  the  world,  to  incur  the  danger  of  any  dimi- 
nution ;  but  this  in  truth  is  the  least  of  his  excellen- 
cies.    He  was  more  than  a  good  writer,  he,  was  a  good 
man  ;  and,  what  is  an  addition  even  to  this  eulogy,,  he 
was  a  sincere  Christian.     His  whole  study  was  directed 
to  the  knowlege  and  practice    of  sound  morality  and 
true  religion  :     these  he  adorned  by  his  life,  and  has 
recommended  to  future  ages  in  his  writings ;  in  which, 
if  my  judgment  be  of  any  avail,  he  has  done  essential 
service  to  both  ;  as  much,  perhaps,  as  any  single  per- 
son, since  the  extraordinary  gifts  of  the  word  of  wis- 
dom  and  the  word  of  knowledge  \    have  been  with- 
drawn. 

*  Ps.  xxxvii.  37.  f  Numb,  xxiii.  10.  {  1  Cor.  xii.  8. 


ng  PREFACE 

IN  what  follows,  I  propose  to  give  a  short  account 
of  the  Bishop's  Moral  and  Religious  Systems, 
as  these  are  collected  from  his  works. 

I.  His  way  of  treating  the  subject  of  morals  is  to  be 
gathered  from  the  volume  of  his  Sermons,  and  par- 
ticularly from  the  three  first,  and  from  the  preface  to 
that  volume. 

"  There  is,"  as  our  Author  with  singular  sagacity 
has  observed, "  a  much  more  exact  correspondence  be- 
tween the  natural  and  moral  world,  than  we  are  apt  to 
take  notice  of."*  The  inward  frame  of  man  answers 
to  his  outward  condition.  The  several  propensities, 
passions,  and  affections,  implanted  in  our  hearts  by  the 
Author  of  nature,  are  in  a  peculiar  manner  adapted  to 
the  circumstances  of  life  in  which  he  hath  placed  us. 
This  general  observation,  properly  pursued,  leads  to 
several  important  conclusions.  The  original  internal 
constitution  of  man,  compared  with  his  external  con- 
dition, enables  us  to  discern  what  course  of  action  and 
behaviour  that  constitution  leads  to,  what  is  our  duty 
respecting  that  condition,  and  furnishes  us  besides  with 
the  most  powerful  arguments  to  the  practice  of  it. 

What  the  inward  frame  and  constitution  of  man  is, 
is  a  question  of  fact,  to  be  determined,  as  other  facts 
are,  from  experience,  from  our  internal  feelings  and 
external  senses,  and  from  the  testimony  of  others. 
Whether  human  "nature,  and  the  circumstances  in 
which  it  is  placed,  might  not  have  been  ordered  other- 
wise, is  foreign  to  our  inquiry,  and  none  of  our  con- 
cern :  our  province  is,  taking  both  of  these  as  they 
are,  and  viewing  the  connexion  between  them,  from 
that  connexion  to  discover,  if  we  can,  what  course  of 
action  is  fitted  to  that  nature  and  those  circumstances. 
From  contemplating  the  bodily  senses,  and  the  organs 

•  Serm.  VI. 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  0q 

or  instruments  adapted  to  them,  we  learn  that  the  eye 
was  given  to  see  with,  the  ear  to  hear  with.  In  like 
manner,  from  considering  our  inward  perceptions  and 
the  final  causes  of  them,  we  collect  that  the  feeling  of 
shame,  for  instance,  was  given  to  prevent  the  doing  of 
things  shameful  ;  compassion,  to  carry  us  to  relieve 
others  in  distress  ;  anger,  to  resist  sudden  violence  of- 
fered to  ourselves.  If,  continuing  our  inquiries  in  this 
way,  it  should  at  length  appear,  that  the  nature,  the 
whole  nature  of  man,  leads  him  to  and  is  fitted  for  that 
particular  course  of  behaviour,  which  we  usually  dis- 
tinguish by  the  name  of  virtue  ;  we  are  authorized  to 
conclude,  that  virtue  is  the  law  we  are  born  under,  that 
it  was  so  intended  by  the  Author  of  our  being  ;  and 
we  are  bound  by  the  most  intimate  of  all  obligations,  a 
regard  to  our  own  highest  interest  and  happiness,  to 
conform  to  it  in  all  situations  and  events. 

Human  nature  is  not  simple  and  uniform,  but  made 
up  of  several  parts  ;  and  we  can  have  no  just  idea  of  it 
as  a  system  or  constitution,  unless  we  take  into  our  view 
the  respects  and  relations  which  these  parts  have  to  each 
other.  As  the  body  is  not  one  member,  but  many, 
so  our  inward  structure  consists  of  various  instincts, 
appetites,  and  propensions.  Thus  far  there  is  no  dif- 
ference between  human  creatures  and  brutes.  But 
besides  these  common  passions  and  affections,  there  is 
another  principle,  peculiar  to  mankind,  that  of  con- 
science, moral  sense,  reflection,  call  it  what  you  please. 
by  which  they  are  enabled  to  review  their  whole  con- 
duct, to  approve  of  some  actions  in  themselves,  and  to 
disapprove  of  others.  That  this  principle  will  of  course 
have  some  influence  on  our  behaviour,  at  least  at  times, 
will  hardly  be  disputed  :  but  the  particular  influence 
which  it  ought  to  have,  the  precise  degree  of  power  in 
the  regulating  of  our  internal  frame  that  is  assigned  it 


JO 


PREFACE 


by  him  who  placed  it  there,  is  a  point  of  the  utmost 
consequence  in  itself,  and  on  the  determination  of 
which  the  very  hinge  of  our  Author's  moral  system 
turns.  If  the  faculty  here  spoken  of  be  indeed,  what 
it  is  asserted  to  be,  in  nature  and  kind  superior  to  every 
other  passion  and  affection  ;  if  it  be  given,  not  merely 
that  it  may  exert  its  force  occasionally,  or  as  our  pres- 
ent humour  or  fancy  may  dispose  us,  but  that  it  may 
at  all  times  exercise  an  uncontrollable  authority  and 
government  over  all  the  rest ;  it  will  then  follow,  that 
in  order  to  complete  the  idea  of  human  nature,  as  a 
system,  we  must  not  only  take  in  each  particular  bias, 
propension,  instinct,  which  are  seen  to  belong  to  it,  but 
we  must  add,  besides  the  principle  of  conscience,  to- 
gether with  the  subjection  that  is  due  to  it  from  all  the 
other  appetites  and  passions  ;  just  as  the  idea  of  a  civil 
constitution  is  formed,  not  barely  from  enumerating 
the  several  members  and  ranks  of  which  it  is  composed, 
but  from  these  considered  as  acting  in  various  degrees 
of  subordination  to  each  other,  and  all  under  the  di- 
rection of  the  same  supreme  authority,  whether  that 
authority  be  vested  in  one  person  or  more. 

The  view  here  given  of  the  internal  constitution  of 
man,  and  of  the  supremacy  of  conscience,  agreeably 
to  the  conceptions  of  Bishop  Butler,  enables  us  to 
comprehend  the  force  of  that  expression,  common  to 
him  and  the  ancient  moralists,  that  virtue  consists  in 
following  nature.  The  meaning  cannot  be,  that  it 
consists  in  acting  agreeably  to  that  propensity  of  our 
nature  which  happens  to  be  the  strongest ;  or  which 
propels  us  towards  certain  objects,  without  any  regard 
to  the  methods  by  which  they  are  to  be  obtained  ;  but 
the  meaning  must  be,  that  virtue  consists  in  the  due 
regulation  and  subjection  of  all  the  other  appetites  and 
affections  to  the  superior  faculty  of  conscience  ;  from 


BY  THE  EDITOR. 


31 


a  conformity  to  which  alone  our  actions  are  properly 
natural,  or  correspondent  to  the  nature,  to  the  whole 
nature  of  such  an  agent  as  man.  From  hence  too  it 
appears,  that  the  Author  of  our  frame  is  by  no  means 
indifferent  to  virtue  and  vice,  or  has  left  us  at  liberty 
to  act  at  random,  as  humour  or  appetite  may  prompt 
us  ;  but  that  every  man  has  the  rule  of  right  within 
him  ;  a  rule  attended  in  the  very  notion  of  it  with  au- 
thority, and  such  as  has  the  force  of  a  direction  and  a 
command  from  him,  who  made  us  what  we  are,  what 
course  of  behaviour  is  suited  to  our  nature,  and  which 
he  expects  that  we  should  follow.  This  moral  faculty 
implies  also  a  pre-sentiment  and  apprehension,  that  the 
judgment  which  it  passes  on  our  actions,  considered  as 
of  good  or  ill  desert,  will  hereafter  be  confirmed  by  the 
unerring  judgment  of  God  ;  when  virtue  and  happi- 
ness, vice  and  misery,  whose  ideas  are  now  so  closely 
connected,  shall  be  indissolubly  united,  and  the  divine 
government  be  found  to  correspond  in  the  most  exact 
proportion  to  the  nature  he  has  given  us.  Lastly,  this 
just  prerogative  or  supremacy  of  conscience  it  is,  which 
Mr.  Pope  has  described  in  his  Universal  Prayer,  though 
perhaps  he  may  have  expressed  it  rather  too  strongly, 
where  he  says, 

n  What  conscience  dictates  to  be  done, 

"  Or  warns  me  not  to  do, 
<r  This  teach  me  more  than  Hell  to  shun, 

"  That  more  than  Heaven  pursue."- 

The  reader  will  observe,  that  this  way  of  treating 
the  subject  of  morals  by  an  appeal  to  facts  does  not  at 
all  interfere  with  that  other  way,  adopted  by  Dr. 
Samuel  Clarke,  and  others,  which  begins  with  inquir- 
ing into  the  relations  and  fitnesses  of  things,  but  rather 
illustrates  and  confirms  it.  That  there  are  essential 
differences  in  the  qualities  of  human  actions,  establish- 
ed by  nature,  and  that  this  natural  difference  of  things. 


32  PREFACE 

prior  to  and  independent  of  all  will,  creates  a  natural 
fitness  in  the  agent  to  act  agreeably  to  it,  seems  as  little 
to  be  denied,  as  that  there  is  the  moral  difference  before 
explained,  from  which  we  approve  and  feel  a  pleasure  in 
what  is  right,  and  conceive  a  distaste  to  what  is  wrong. 
Still,  however,  when  we  are  endeavouring  to  establish 
either  this  moral  or  that  natural  difference,  it  ought 
never  to  be  forgotten,  or  rather  it  will  require  to  be 
distinctly  shewn,  that  both  of  these,  when  traced  up  to 
their  source,  suppose  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature 
and  moral  Ruler  of  the  world  ;  who  originally  ap- 
pointed these  differences,  and  by  such  an  appoint- 
ment has  signified  his  will  that  we  should  conform 
to  them,  as  the  only  effectual  method  of  securing  our 
happiness  on  the  whole  under  his  government.* 
And  of  this  consideration  our  Prelate  himself  was  not 
unmindful  ;  as  may  be  collected  from  many  expres- 
sions in  different  parts  of  his  writings,  and  particularly 
from  the  following  passages  in  his  Xlth  Sermon.  "  It 
may  be  allowed,  without  any  prejudice  to  the  cause  of 
virtue  and  religion,  that  our  ideas  of  happiness  and  mis- 
ery are,  of  all  our  ideas,  the  nearest  and  most  important 
to  us;  that  they  will,  nay,  if  ycu  please,  that  they  ought 
to  prevail  over  those  of  order,  and  beauty,  and  harmo- 
ny, and  proportion,  if  there  should  ever  be,  as  it  is  im- 
possible there  ever  should  be,  any  inconsistencebetween 
them."  And  again,  "  Though  virtue  or  moral  recti- 
tude does  indeed  consist  in  affection  to  and  pursuit  of 
what  is  right  and  good,  as  such ;  yet,  when  we  sit  down 
in  a  cool  hour,  we  can  neither  justify  to  ourselves  this 
or  any  other  pursuit,  till  we  are  convinced  that  it  will 
be  for  our  happiness,  or  at  least  not  contrary  to  it."t 
Besides  the  general  system  of  morality  opened  above, 
our  Author  in  his  Volume  of  Sermons  has  stated  with 

*  Sec  note  [I7],  at  the  end  of  this  Preface.  f  Serm.  XI.  p.  229. 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  gg 

accuracy  the  difference  between  self-love  and  benevo* 
lence ;  in  opposition  to  those,  who  on  the  one  hand 
make  the  whole  of  virtue  to  consist  in  benevolence,* 
and  to  those,  who  on  the  other  assert  that  every  par- 
ticular affection  and  action  is  resolvable  into  self-love. 
In  combating  these  opinions,  he  has  shewn,  I  think  un- 
answerably, that  there  are  the  same  kind  of  indications 
in  human  nature  that  we  were  made  to  promote  the 
happiness  of  others,  as  that  we  were  made  to  promote 
our  own  :  that  it  is  no  just  objection  to  this,  that  we 
have  dispositions  to  do  evil  to  others  as  well  as  good  | 
for  we  have  also  dispositions  to  do  evil  as  well  as  good 
to  ourselves,  to  our  own  most  important  interests  eVen 
in  this  life,  for  the  sake  of  gratifying  a  present  passion  : 
that  the  thing  to  be  lamented  is,  not  that  men  have 
too  great  a  regard  to  their  own  real  good,  but  that 
they  have  not  enough  :  that  benevolence  is  not  more 
at  variance  with  or  unfriendly  to  self-love,  than  any 
other  particular  affection  is  ;  and  that,  by  consulting 
the  happiness  of  others,  a  man  is  so  far  from  lessening 
his  own,  that  the  very  endeavour  to  do  so,  though  he 
should  fail  in  the  accomplishment,  is  a  source  of  the 
highest  satisfaction  and  peace  ofmind.f  He  has  also, 
in  passing,  animadverted  on  the  philosopher  of  Malms- 
bury,  who  in  his  book  Of  Human  Nature  has  advanced, 
as  discoveries  in  moral  science,  that  benevolence  is  on- 
ly the  love  of  power,  and  compassion  the  fear  of  future 
calamity  to  ourselves.  And  this  our  Author  has  done, 
not  so  much  with  the  design  of  exposing  the  false  rea- 
soning of  Mr.  Hobbes,  but  because  on  so  perverse  an 
account  of  human  nature  he  has  raised  a  system,  sub- 
versive of  all  justice  and  honesty. { 

*  See  the  2d  Dissertation  On  the  Nature  of  Virtue,  at  the  end  of  the  Analogy 
f  See  Sermons  I.  and  XI.  and  the  Preface  to  the  Volume  of  Sermons. 
$  See  the  Notes  to  Sermon  I.  and  V. 

E 


34  PREFACE 

II.  The  Religious  System  of  Bishop  Butler  is 
chiefly  to  be  collected  from  the  treatise,  entitled  The 
Analogy  of  Religion,  Natural  and  Revealed,  to  the  Con- 
stitution and  Course  of  Nature, 

All  things  are  double  one  against  another,  and  God  hath 
made  nothing  imperfecta  On  this  single  observation  of 
the  Son  of  Sirach,  the  whole  fabric  of  our  Prelate's 
defence  of  religion,  in  his  Analogy,  is  raised.  Instead 
of  indulging  to  idle  speculations,  how  the  world  might 
possibly  have  been  better  than  it  is  ;  or,  forgetful  of 
the  difference  between  hypothesis  and  fact,  attempting 
to  explain  the  divine  economy  with  respect  to  intelli- 
gent creatures  from  pre-conceived  notions  of  his  own  ; 
he  first  inquires  what  the  constitution  of  nature,  as 
made  known  to  us  in  the  way  of  experiment,  actually 
is  ;  and  from  this,  now  seen  and  acknowledged,  he  en- 
deavours to  form  a  judgment  of  that  larger  constitu- 
tion, which  religion  discovers  to  us.  If  the  dispensa- 
tion of  Providence  we  are  now  under,  considered  as 
inhabitants  of  this  world,  and  having  a  temporal  in- 
terest to  secure  in  it,  be  found,  on  examination,  to  be 
analogous  to,  and  of  a  piece  with  that  further  dispen- 
sation, which  relates  to  us  as  designed  for  another 
world,  in  which  we  have  an  eternal  interest,  depend- 
ing on  our  behaviour  here  ;  if  both  may  be  traced 
up  to  the  same  general  laws,  and  appear  to  be  carried 
on  according  to  the  same  plan  of  administration  ;  the 
fair  presumption  is,  that  both  proceed  from  one  and 
the  same  Author.  And  if  the  principal  parts  objected 
to  in  this  latter  dispensation  be  similar  to,  and  of  the 
same  kind  with  what  we  certainly  experience  under 
the  former,  the  objections,  being  clearly  inconclusive 
in  one  case,  because  contradicted  by  plain  fact,  must, 

*  Ecclus.  xlii.  24. 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  o  r 

in  all  reason,  be  allowed  to  be  inconclusive  also  in 
the  other. 

This  way  of  arguing  from  what  is  acknowledged  to 
what  is  disputed,  from  things  known  to  other  things 
that  resemble  them,  from  that  part  of  the  divine  estab- 
lishment which  is  exposed  to  our  view,  to  that  more 
important  one  which  lies  beyond  it,  is  on  all  hands 
confessed  to  be  just.  By  this  method  Sir  Isaac  New- 
ton has  unfolded  the  System  of  Nature  ;  by  the  same 
method  Bishop  Butler  has  explained  the  System  of 
Grace,  and  thus,  to  use  the  words  of  a  writer,  whom  I 
quote  with  pleasure,  "  has  formed  and  concluded  a 
happy  alliance  between  faith  and  philosophy."* 

And  although  the  argument  from  analogy  be  al- 
lowed to  be  imperfect,  and  by  no  means  sufficient  to 
solve  all  difficulties  respecting  the  government  of  God, 
and  the  designs  of  his  Providence  with  regard  to  man- 
kind, (a  degree  of  knowledge,  which  we  are  not  fur- 
nished with. faculties  for  attaining,  at  least  in  the  pres- 
ent state)  yet  surely  it  is  of  importance  to  learn  from 
it,  that  the  natural  and  moral  world  are  intimately 
connected,  and  parts  of  one  stupendous  whole  or  sys- 
tem ;  and  that  the  chief  objections,  which  are  brought 
against  religion,  may  be  urged  with  equal  force  against 
the  constitution  and  course  of  nature,  where  they  are 
certainly  false  in  fact.  And  this  information  we  may 
derive  from  the  work  before  us ;  the  proper  design  of 
which,  it  may  be  of  use  to  observe,  is  not  to  prove  the 
truth  of  religion  either  natural  or  revealed,  but  to  con- 
firm that  proof,  already  known,  by  considerations  from 
analogy. 

After  this  account  of  the  method  of  reasoning   em- 
ployed by  our  Author,  let  us  now  advert  to  his   man- 

*  Mr.  Mainivqfings  Dissertation,  prefixed  to  his  Volume  of  Sermons. 


aft  PREFACE 

ner  of  applying  it,  first  to  the  subject  of  Natural  Re- 
ligion, and  secondly  to  that  of  Revealed. 

1.  The  foundation  of  all  our  hopes  and  fears  is  a 
future  life ;  and  with  this  the  treatise  begins.  Nei- 
ther the  reason  of  the  thing,  nor  the  analogy  of  nature, 
according  to  Bishop  Butler,  give  ground  for  imagin- 
ing, that  the  unknown  event,  death,  will  be  our  de- 
struction. The  states  in  which  we  have  formerly  ex- 
isted, in  the  womb  and  in  infancy,  are  not  more  differ- 
ent from  each  other  than  from  that  of  mature  age  in 
which  we  now  exist :  therefore  that  we  shall  continue 
to  exist  hereafter,  in  a  state  as  different  from  the  present 
as  the  present  is  from  those  through  which  we  have 
passed  already,  is  a  presumption  favoured  by  the  anal- 
ogy of  nature.  All  that  we  know  from  reason  con- 
cerning death,  is  the  effects  it  has  upon  animal  bodies  : 
and  the  frequent  instances  among  men  of  the  intel- 
lectual powers  continuing  in  high  health  and  vigour, 
at  the  very  time  when  a  mortal  disease  is  on  the  point 
of  putting  an  end  to  all  the  powers  of  sensation,  in- 
duce us  to  hope  that  it  may  have  no  effect  at  all  on 
the  human  soul,  not  even  so  much  as  to  suspend  the 
exercise  of  its  faculties ;  though  if  it  have,  the  sus- 
pension of  a  power  by  no  means  implies  its  extinction, 
as  sleep  or  a  swoon  may  convince  us.* 

The  probability  of  a  future  state  once  granted,  an 
important  question  arises,  how  best  to  secure  our  in- 
terest in  that  state.  We  find  from  what  passes  daily 
before  us,  that  the  constitution  of  nature  admits  of 
misery  as  well  as  happiness  ;  that  both  of  these  are 
the  consequences  of  our  own  actions  ;  and  these  con- 
sequences we  are  enabled  to  foresee.  Therefore,  that 
our  happiness  or  misery  in  a  future  world  may  depend 
on  our  own  actions  also,  and  that  rewards  or  punish* 

*  Part  I.  Chap.  1. 


BY  THfi  EDITOR.  g* 

ments  hereafter  may  follow  our  good  or  ill  behaviour 
here,  is  but  an  appointment  of  the  same  sort  with 
what  we  experience  under  the  divine  government,  ac- 
cording to  the  regular  course  of  nature.* 

This  supposition  is  confirmed  from  another  circum- 
stance, that  the  natural  government  of  God,  under 
which  we  now  live,  is  also  moral ;  in  which  rewards 
and  punishments  are  the  consequences  of  actions, 
considered  as  virtuous  and  vicious.  Not  that  every 
man  is  rewarded  or  punished  here  in  exact  proportion 
to  his  desert  ;  for  the  essential  tendencies  of  virtue 
and  vice  to  produce  happiness  and  the  contrary  are 
often  hindered  from  taking  effect  from  accidental 
causes.  However,  there  are  plainly  the  rudiments  and 
beginnings  of  a  righteous  administration  to  be  dis- 
cerned in  the  constitution  of  nature  ;  from  whence 
we  are  led  to  expect,  that  these  accidental  hindrances 
will  one  day  be  removed,  and  the  rule  of  distributive 
justice  obtain  completely  in  a  more  perfect  state.f 

The  moral  government  of  God,  thus  established, 
implies  in  the  notion  of  it  some  sort  of  trial,  or  a 
moral  possibility  of  acting  wrong  as  well  as  right,  in 
those  who  are  the  subjects  of  it.  And  the  doctrine 
of  religion,  that  the  present  life  is  in  fact  a  state  of 
probation  for  a  future  one,  is  rendered  credible,  from 
its  being  analogous  throughout  to  the  general  con- 
duct of  Providence  towards  us  with  respect  to  this 
world  ;  in  which  prudence  is  necessary  to  secure  our 
temporal  interest,  just  as  we  are  taught  that  virtue  is 
necessary  to  secure  our  eternal  interest ;  and  both  are 
trusted  to  ourselves.J 

But  the  present  life  is  not  merely  a  stateof  probation, 
implying  in  it  difficulties  and  danger  ;  it  is  also  a  state 
of  discipline  and  improvement  ;  and  that  both  in  our 

*  Part  I.  Chap.  f>,  f  Ch.  3.  J  Ch.  4. 


gg  PREFACE 

temporal  and  religious   capacity.     Thus  childhood   is 
a  state  of  discipline  for  youth;  youth  for  manhood, 
and  that  for  old  age.     Strength  of  body,  and  matu- 
rity of  understanding,  are  acquired  by  degrees  ;  and 
neither  of  them  without  continual  exercise  and  atten- 
tion on  our  part,  not  only  in  the  beginning   of  life, 
but  through  the  whole  course  of  it.     So   again  with 
respect  to  our  religious  concerns,  the  present  world  is 
fitted  to  be,  and  to  good  men  is  in  event,  a  state  of 
discipline  and  improvement  for  a  future  one.     The 
several  passions  and   propensions,   implanted  in  our 
hearts,  incline  us,  in  a  multitude  of  instances,  to  for- 
bidden pleasures  :  this  inward  infirmity  is  increased 
by  various  snares  and  temptations,  perpetually  occur- 
ring from  without.     Hence  arises  the  necessity  of  re- 
collection  and  self-government,  of  withstanding   the 
calls  of  appetite,  and  forming  our  minds  to  habits  of 
piety  and  virtue ;  habits,  of  which  we  are  capable, 
and    which  to  creatures  in  a  state  of  moral  inperfec- 
tion,  and  fallen  from  their  original  integrity,  must  be 
of  the  greatest  use,  as  an  additional  security,  over  and 
above  the  principle  of  conscience,  from  the   dangers 
to  which  we  are  exposed.* 

Nor  is  the  credibility  here  given,  by  the  analogy  of 
nature,  to  the  general  doctrine  of  religion,  destroyed 
or  weakened  by  any  notions  concerning  necessity. 
Of  itself  it  is  a  mere  word,  the  sign  of  an  abstract 
idea  ;  and  as  much  requires  an  agent,  that  is,  a  neces- 
sary agent,  in  order  to  effect  any  thing,  as  freedom  re- 
quires a  free  agent.  Admitting  it  to  be  speculatively 
true,  if  considered  as  influencing  practice,  it  is  the  same 
as  false  ;  for  it  is  matter  of  experience,  that,  with  re- 
gard to  our  present  interest,  and  as  inhabitants  of  this 
world,  we  are  treated  as  if  we  were  free  ;  and  there- 

*  Ch.  5. 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  39 

fore  the  analogy  of  nature  leads  us  to  conclude,  that, 
with  regard  to  our  future  interest,  and  as  designed  for 
another  world,  we  shall  be  treated  as  free  also.  Nor 
does  the  opinion  of  necessity,  supposing  it  possible,  at 
all  affect  either  the  general  proof  of  religion,  or  its 
external  evidence. * 

Still  objections  may  be  made  against  the  wisdom 
and  goodness  of  the  divine  government,  to  which 
analogy,  which  can  only  shew  the  truth  or  credibility 
of  facts,  affords  no  answer.  Yet  even  here  analogy  is 
of  use,  if  it  suggest  that  the  divine  government  is  a 
scheme  or  system,  and  not  a  number  of  unconnected 
acts,  and  that  this  system  is  also  above  our  compre- 
hension. Now  the  government  of  the  natural  world 
appears  to  be  a  system  of  this  kind  ;  with  parts,  re- 
lated to  each  other,  and  together  composing  a  whole  ; 
in  which  system  ends  are  brought  about  by  the  use 
of  means,  many  of  which  means,  before  experience, 
would  have  been  suspected  to  have  had  a  quite  con- 
trary tendency  ;  which  is  carried  on  by  general  laws, 
similar  causes  uniformly  producing  similar  effects ;  the 
utility  of  which  general  laws,  and  the  inconveniences 
which  would  probably  arise  from  the  occasional  or 
even  secret  suspension  of  them,  we  are  in  some  sort 
enabled  to  discern  ;t  but  of  the  whole  we  are  incom- 
petent judges,  because  of  the  small  part  which  comes 
within  our  view.  Reasoning  then  from  what  we 
know,  it  is  highly  credible,  that  the  government  of 
the  moral  world  is  a  system  also,  carried  on  by  general 
laws,  and  in  which  ends  are  accomplished  by  the  in- 
tervention of  means  ;  and  that  both  constitutions,  the 
natural  and  the  moral,  are  so  connected,  as  to  form  to- 
gether but  one  scheme.     But  of  this  scheme,   as  of 

*   Ch.  6. 

f  See  a  Treatise  on  Divine  Benevolence,  by  Dr.    Thomas  Balguy,    Part  II. 


.q  PREFACE 

that  of  the  natural  world  taken  alone,  we  are  not 
qualified  to  judge,  on  account  of  the  mutual  respect 
of  the  several  parts,  to  each  other  and  to  the  whole, 
and  our  own  incapacity  to  survey  the  whole,  or,  with 
accuracy,  any  single  part.  All  objections  therefore 
to  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  the  divine  government 
may  be  founded  merely  on  our  ignorance  ;*  and  to 
such  objections  our  ignorance  is  the  proper  and  a  sat- 
isfactory answer.! 

2.  The  chief  difficulties  concerning  Natural  Re- 
ligion being  now  removed,  our  Author  proceeds,  in 
the  next  place,  to  that  which  is  Revealed  ;  and  as 
an  introduction  to  an  inquiry  into  the  credibility  of 
Christianity,  begins  with  the  consideration  of  its  im- 
portance. 

The  importance  of  Christianity  appears  in  two 
respects.  First,  in  its  being  a  republication  of  Nat- 
ural Religion,  in  its  native  simplicity,  with  authority, 
and  with  circumstances  of  advantage ;  ascertaining, 
in  many  instances  of  moment,  what  before  was  only 
probable,  and  particularly  confirming  the  doctrine  of 
a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments.  J  Second- 
ly, as  revealing  a  new  dispensation  of  Providence, 
originating  from  the  pure  love  and  mercy  of  God,  and 
conducted  by  the  mediation  of  his  Son,  and  the  guid- 
ance of  his  Spirit,  for  the  recovery  and  salvation  of 
mankind,  represented  in  a  state  of  apostacy  and  ruin. 
This  account  of  Christianity  being  admitted  to  be 
just,  and  the  distinct  offices  of  these  three  Divine  Per- 
sons being  once  discovered  to  us,  we  are  as  much 
obliged  in  point  of  duty  to  acknowledge  the  relations 

•  See  note  |F],  at  the  end  of  this  Preface] 

f  Ch.  7. 

J.  See  note  [G],  at  the  end  of  this  Preface. 


£Y  THE  EDIT0&. 


41 


we  stand  in  to  the  Son  and  Holy  Ghost,  as  our  Me- 
diator and  Sanctifier,  as  we  are  obliged  in  point  of  du- 
ty to  acknowledge  the  relation  we  stand  in  to  God  the 
Father ;  although  the  two  former  of  these  relations 
be  learnt  from  revelation  only,  and  in  the  last  we  are 
instructed  by  the  light  of  nature ;  the  obligation  in 
either  case  arising  from  the  offices  themselves,  and  not 
at  all  depending  on  the  manner  in  which  they  are 
made  known  to  us.* 

The  presumptions  against  revelation  in  general  are, 
that  it  is  not  discoverable  by  reason,  that  it  is  unlike 
to  what  is  so  discovered,  and  that  it  was  introduced 
and  supported  by  miracles.  But  in  a  scheme  so  large 
as  that  of  the  universe,  unbounded  in  extent,  and  ev- 
erlasting in  duration,  there  must  of  necessity  be  num* 
berless  circumstances  which  are  beyond  the  reach  of 
our  faculties  to  discern,  and  which  can  only  be  known 
by  divine  illumination.  And  both  in  the  natural  and 
moral  government  of  the  world,  under  which  we  live, 
we  find  many  things  unlike  one  to  another,  and  there- 
fore ought  not  to  wonder  if  the  same  unlikeness  ob- 
tain between  things  visible  and  invisible  ;  although  it 
be  far  from  true,  that  revealed  religion  is  entirely 
unlike  the  constitution  of  nature,  as  analogy  may 
teach  us.  Nor  is  there  any  thing  incredible  in  reve- 
lation, considered  as  miraculous  ;  whether  miracles  be 
supposed  to  have  been  performed  at  the  beginning  of 
the  world,  or  after  a  course  of  nature  has  been  estab- 
lished. Not  at  the  beginning  of  the  world  ;  for  then 
there  was  either  no  course  of  nature  at  all,  or  a  power 
must  have  been  exerted  totally  different  from  what 
that  course  is  at  present.  All  men  and  animals  cannot 
have  been  born,  as  they  are  now  ;  but  a  pair  of  each 
sort  must  have  been  produced  at  first,  in  a  way  alto- 

*  Part  II.  Ch.  1. 


42 


PREFACE 


getfier  unlike  to  that  in  which  they  have  been  since  pro- 
duced ;  unless  we  affirm,  that,  men  and  animals  have 
existed  from  eternity  in  an  endless  succession  :  one 
miracle  therefore  at  least  there  must  have  been,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  world,  or  at  the  time  of  man's  crea- 
tion. Not  after  the  settlement  of  a  course  of  nature^  on 
account  of  miracles  being  contrary  to  that  course,  or, 
in  other  words,  contrary  to  experience :  for  in  or- 
der to  know  whether  miracles,  worked  in  attestation 
of  a  divine  religion,  be  contrary  to  experience  or 
not,  we  ought  to  be  acquainted  with  other  cases,  sim- 
ilar or  parallel  to  those,  in  which  miracles  are  alleged 
to  have  been  wrought.  But  where  shall  we  find  such 
similar  or  parallel  cases  ?  The  world  which  we  inhabit 
affords  none.  We  know  of  no  extraordinary  revela- 
tions from  God  to  man,  but  those  recorded  in  the  Old 
and  New  Testament  ;  all  of  which  were  established  by 
miracles.  It  cannot  therefore  be  said  that  miracles  are 
incredible,  because  contrary  to  experience,  when  all 
the  experience  we  have  is  in  favour  of  miracles,  and  on 
the  side  of  religion.  *  Besides,  in  reasoning  concerning 
miracles,  they  ought  not  to  be  compared  with  com- 
mon natural  events,  but  with  uncommon  appearances, 
such  as  comets,  magnetism,  electricity  ;  which  to  one 
acquainted  only  with  the  usual  phenomena  of  nature, 
and  the  common  powers  of  matter,  must,  before  proof 
of  their  actual  existence,  be  thought  incredible.! 

The  presumptions  against  revelation  in  general  be- 
ing dispatched,  objections  against  the  Christian  reve- 
lation in  particular,  against  the  scheme  of  it,  as  distin- 
guished from  objections  against  its  evidence,  are  con- 
sidered next.  Now,  supposing  a  revelation  to  be  re- 
ally given,  it  is  highly    probable  beforehand,  that  it 

*  See  note  [H],  at  the  end  of  this  Preface, 
f  Ch.  2, 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  4g 

must  contain  many  things,  appearing  to  us  liable  to 
objections.  The  acknowledged  dispensation  of  nature 
is  very  different  from  what  we  should  have  expected  ; 
reasoning  then  from  analogy,  the  revealed  dispensation, 
it  is  credible,  would  be  also  different.  Nor  are  we  in 
any  sort  judges  at  what  time,  or  in  what  degree,  or 
manner,  it  is  fit  or  expedient  for  God  to  instruct  us,  in 
things  confessedly  of  the  greatest  use,  either  by  natural 
reason,  or  by  supernatural  information.  Thus,  argu- 
ing on  speculation  only,  and  without  experience,  it 
would  seem  very  unlikely  that  so  important  a  remedy 
as  that  provided  by  Christianity  for  the  recovery  of 
mankind  from  a  state  of  ruin,  should  have  been  for 
so  many  ages  withheld  ;  and,  when  at  last  vouchsafed, 
should  be  imparted  to  so  few  ;  and,  after  it  has  been 
imparted,  should  be  attended  with  obscurity  and 
doubt.  And  just  so  we  might  have  argued,  before 
experience,  concerning  the  remedies  provided  in  na- 
ture for  bodily  diseases,  to  which  by  nature  we  are  ex- 
posed :  for  many  of  these  were  unknown  to  man- 
kind for  a  number  of  ages ;  are  known  but  to  few 
now;  some  important  ones  probably  not  discovered 
yet  ;  and  those  which  are,  neither  certain  in  their  ap- 
plication, nor  universal  in  their  use.  And  the  same 
mode  of  reasoning  that  would  lead  us  to  expect  they 
should  have  been  so,  would  lead  us  to  expect  that  the 
necessity  of  them  should  have  been  superseded,  by 
there  being  no  diseases  ;  as  the  necessity  of  the  Chris- 
tian scheme,  it  may  be  thought,  might  also  have  been 
superseded,  by  preventing  the  fall  of  man,  so  that  he 
should  not  have  stood  in  need  of  a  redeemer  at  all.-* 

As  to  objections  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness 
of  Christianity,  the  same  answer  may  be  applied  to 
them  as  was  to  the  like  objections  against  the  consti- 

*  Ch.  3. 


A*  PREFACE 

tution  of  nature.  For  here  also,  Christianity  is  a 
scheme  or  economy,  composed  of  various  parts,  form- 
ing a  whole  ;  in  which  scheme  means  are  used  for  the 
accomplishing  of  ends  ;  and  which  is  conducted  by 
general  laws  ;  of  all  of  which  we  know  as  little  as  we 
do  of  the  constitution  of  nature.  And  the  seeming 
want  of  wisdom  or  goodness  in  this  system  is  to  be 
ascribed  to  the  same  cause,  as  the  like  appearances  of 
defects  in  the  natural  system  ;  our  inability  to  discern 
the  whole  scheme,  and  our  ignorance  of  the  relation 
of  those  parts  which  are  discernible  to  others  beyond 
our  view. 

The  objections  against  Christianity  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  and  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  it,  hav- 
ing been  obviated  together,  the  chief  of  them  are  now 
to  be  considered  distinctly.     One  of  these,  which  is 
levelled  against  the  entire  system  itself,  is  of  this  sort : 
the  restoration  of  mankind,  represented  in  Scripture 
as  the  great  design  of  the  Gospel,  is  described  as  re- 
quiring a  long  series  of  means,  anpl  persons,  and  dis- 
pensations, before  it  can  be  brought  to  its  completion  ; 
whereas  the  whole    ought  to  have  been   effected  at 
once.     Now  every  thing  we  see  in  the  course  of  na- 
ture shews  the  folly  of  this  objection.     For  in  the  nat- 
ural course  of  Providence,  ends  are  brought  about  by 
means,  not   operating   immediately  and  at  once,  but 
deliberately  and  in  a  way  of  progression  ;  one  thing 
being  subservient  to  another,  this  to  somewhat  further. 
The    change   of  seasons,  the  ripening  of  fruits,  the 
growth  of  vegetable  and  animal  bodies,  are  instances 
of  this.     And  therefore  that    the   same  progressive 
method   should   be  followed  in  the  dispensation  of 
Christianity,  as  is  observed  in  the  common  dispensa- 
tion of  Providence,  is  a  reasonable    expectation,  justi- 
fied by  the  analogy  of  nature.* 

*  Ch.  4. 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  ^ 

Another  circumstance  objected  to  in  the  Christian 
scheme  is,  the  appointment  of  a  Mediator,  and  the 
saving  of  the  world  through  him.  But  the  visible  gov- 
ernment of  God  being  actually  administered  in  this  way, 
or  by  the  mediation  and  instrumentality  of  others,  there 
can  be  no  general  presumption  against  an  appoint- 
ment of  this  kind,  against  his  invisible  government 
being  exercised  in  the  same  manner.  We  have  seen 
already  that,  with  regard  to  ourselves,  this  visible  gov- 
ernment is  carried  on  by  rewards  and  punishments  ; 
for  happiness  and  misery  are  the  consequences  of  our 
own  actions,  considered  as  virtuous  and  vicious,  and 
these  consequences  we  are  enabled  to  foresee.  It  might 
have  been  imagined,  before  consulting  experience,  that 
after  we  had  rendered  ourselves  liable  to  misery  by  our 
own  ill  conduct,  sorrow  for  what  was  past,  and  behav- 
ing well  for  the  future,  would,  alone  and  of  themselves, 
have  exempted  us  from  deserved  punishment,  and  re- 
stored us  to  the  divine  favour.  But  the  fact  is  other- 
wise ;  and  real  reformation  is  often  found  to  be  of  no 
avail,  so  as  to  secure  the  criminal  from  poverty,  sick- 
ness, infamy,  and  death,  the  never-failing  attendants 
on  vice  and  extravagance,  exceeding  a  certain  degree. 
By  the  course  of  nature  then  it  appears,  God  does  not 
always  pardon  a  sinner  on  his  repentance.  Yet  there 
is  provision  made,  even  in  nature,  that  the  miseries, 
which  men  bring  on  themselves  by  unlawful  indulgen- 
ces, may  in  many  cases  be  mitigated,  and  in  some  re- 
moved ;  partly  by  extraordinary  exertions  of  the  of- 
fender himself,  but  more  especially  and  frequently  by 
the  intervention  of  others,  who  voluntarily,  and  from 
motives  of  compassion,  submit  to  labour  and  sorrow, 
such  as  produce  long  and  lasting  inconveniences  to 
themselves,  as  the  means  of  rescuing  another  from  the 
wretched    effects  of  former  imprudences.     Vicarious 


4g  PREFACE 

punishment,  therefore,  or  one  person's  sufferings  con- 
tributing to  the  relief  of  another,  is  a  providential  dis- 
position, in  the  economy  of  nature  :*  and  it  ought 
not  to  be  matter  of  surprise,  if  by  a  method  analogous 
to  this  we  be  redeemed  from  sin  and  misery,  in  the 
economy  of  grace.  That  mankind  at  present  are  in  a 
state  of  degradation,  different  from  that  in  which  they 
were  originally  created,  is  the  very  ground  of  the 
Christian  Revelation,  as  contained  in  the  Scriptures. 
Whether  we  acquiesce  in  the  account,  that  our  being 
placed  in  such  a  state  is  owing  to  the  crime  of  our  first 
parents,  or  choose  to  ascribe  it  to  any  other  cause,  it 
makes  no  difference  as  to  our  condition  ;  the  vice  and 
unhappiness  of  the  world  are  still  there,  notwithstand- 
ing all  our  suppositions  ;  nor  is  it  Christianity  that 
hath  put  us  into  this  state.  We  learn  also  from  the 
§ame  Scriptures,  what  experience  and  the  use  of  ex- 
piatory sacrifices  from  the  most  early  times  might 
have  taught  us,  that  repentance  alone  is  not  sufficient 
to  prevent  the  fatal  consequences  of  past  transgres- 
sions ;  but  that  still  there  is  room  for  mercy,  and 
that  repentance  shall  be  available,  though  not  of  it- 
self, yet  through  the  mediation  of  a  Divine  Person, 
the  Messiah  ;  who,  from  the  sublimest  principles  of 
compassion,  when  we  were  dead  in  trespasses  and  sins,\ 
suffered  and  died,  the  innocent  for  the  guilty,  the  just 
for  the  unjust ,J  that  we  might  have  redemption  through 
his  blood,  even  the  forgiveness  of  sins.§  In  what  way 
the  death  of  Christ  was  of  that  efficacy  it  is  said 
to  be,  in  procuring  the  reconciliation  of  sinners,  the 
Scriptures  have  not  explained  :  it  is  enough  that  the 
doctrine  is    revealed  ;  that  it  is  not  contrary  to  any 

*  See  note  [I],  at  the  end  of  this  Preface. 

f  Ephes.  ii.  1.  \  Pet.  iii.  18. 

§  Coloss.  i.14. 


BY  THE  EDITOR. 


47 


truths  which  reason  and  experience  teach  us  ;  and 
that  it  accords  in  perfect  harmony  with  the  usual 
method  of  the  divine  conduct  in  the  government  of  the 
world.* 

Again  it  hath  been  said,  that  if  the  Christian  reve- 
lation were  true,  it  must  have   been  universal,  and 
could  not  have  been  left   upon  doubtful   evidence. 
But  God,  in  his  natural  Providence,  dispenses  his  gifts 
in  great  variety,  not  only  among  creatures  of  the  same 
species,  but  to  the  same  individuals  also  at  different 
times.     Had   the  Christian  revelation  been  universal 
at  first,  yet  from  the  diversity  of  men's  abilities,  both 
of  mind  and  body,  their   various  means  of  improve- 
ment, and  other   external  advantages,   some  persons 
must  soon  have  been  in  a  situation,  with  respect  to 
religious  knowledge,  much  superior  to  that  of  others, 
as  much  perhaps  as  they  are  at  present :  and  all  men 
will  be  equitably  dealt  with  at  last  ;  and  to  whom 
little  is  given,  of  him  little  will  be  required.     Then 
as  to  the   evidence   for   religion  being  left  doubtful, 
difficulties  of  this  sort,  like  difficulties  in  practice,  af- 
ford scope  and  opportunity  for  a  virtuous  exercise  of 
the  understanding,  and  dispose  the  mind  to  acquiesce 
and  rest    satisfied  with  any  evidence  that  is  real.     In 
the  daily  commerce  of  life,  men  are  obliged  to  act 
upon  great  uncertainties,  with  regard  to  success   in 
their  temporal  pursuits  ;  and  the  case  with  regard  to 
religion  is  parallel.     However,  though  religion  be  not 
intuitively  true,  the  proofs  of  it  which  we  have  are 
amply  sufficient  in  reason  to  induce  us  to  embrace  it  ; 
and  dissatisfaction  with  those  proofs  may  possibly  be 
men's  own  fault.f 

Nothing  remains  but  to  attend  to  the  positive  evi- 
dence there  is  for  the  truth   of  Christianity.     Now, 

*  Ch.  5.  f  Ch.  6. 


48 


PREFACE 


besides  its  direct  and  fundamental  proofs,  which  are 
miracles  and  prophecies,  there  are  many  collateral  cir- 
cumstances, which  may  be  united  into  one  view,  and 
all  together  may  be  considered  as  making  up  one  ar- 
gument. In  this  way  of  treating  the  subject,  the 
revelation,  whether  real  or  otherwise,  may  be  supposed 
to  be  wholly  historical  :  the  general  design  of  which 
appears  to  be,  to  give  an  account  of  the  condition  of 
religion,  and  its  professors,  with  a  concise  narration  of 
the  political  state  of  things,  as  far  as  religion  is  affect- 
ed by  it,  during  a  great  length  of  time,  near  six  thou- 
sand years  of  which  are  already  past.  More  particu- 
larly it  comprehends  an  account  of  God's  entering 
into  covenant  with  one  nation,  the  Jews,  that  he 
would  be  their  God,  and  that  they  should  be  his 
people  ;  of  his  often  interposing  in  their  affairs  ;  giv- 
ing them  the  promise,  and  afterwards  the  possession, 
of  a  flourishing  country  ;  assuring  them  of  the  greatest 
national  prosperity,  in  case  of  their  obedience,  and 
threatening  the  severest  national  punishment,  in  case 
they  forsook  him  and  joined  in  the  idolatry  of  their 
pagan  neighbours.  It  contains  also  a  prediction  of  a 
particular  person,  to  appear  in  the  fulness  of  time,  in 
whom  all  the  promises  of  God  to  the  Jews  were  to  be 
fulfilled  :  and  it  relates  that,  at  the  time  expected,  a 
person  did  actually  appear,  assuming  to  be  the  Saviour 
foretold  ;  that  he  worked  various  miracles  among 
them,  in  confirmation  of  his  divine  authority  ;  and, 
as  was  foretold  also,  was  rejected  and  put  to  death  by 
the  very  people  who  had  long  desired  and  waited  for 
his  coming  ;  but  that  his  religion,  in  spite  of  all  op- 
position, was  established  in  the  world  by  his  disciples, 
invested  with  supernatural  powers  for  that  purpose  ; 
of  the  fate  and  fortunes  of  which  religion  there  is  a 
prophetical  description,  carried  down  to  the  end  of 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  ^ 

time.  Let  any  one  now,  after  reading  the  above  his- 
tory, and  not  knowing  whether  the  whole  were  not  a 
fiction,  be  supposed  to  ask,  whether  all  that  is  here 
related  be  true  ?  And  instead  of  a  direct  answer,  let 
him  be  informed  of  the  several  acknowledged  facts, 
which  are  found  to  correspond  to  it  in  real  life  ;  and 
then  let  him  compare  the  history  and  facts  together, 
and  observe  the  astonishing  coincidence  of  both  i 
such  a  joint  review  must  appear  to  him  of  very  great 
weight,  and  to  amount  to  evidence  somewhat  more 
than  human.  And  unless  the  whole  series,  and 
every  particular  circumstance  contained  in  it,  can 
be  thought  to  have  arisen  from  accident,  the  truth 
of  Christianity  is  proved.* 

The  view  here  given  of  the  moral  and  religious 
systems  of  Bishop  Butler,  it  will  immediately  be 
perceived,  is  chiefly  intended  for  younger  students, 
especially  for  students  in  divinity  ;  to  whom  it  is  ho- 
ped it  may  be  of  use,  so  as  to  encourage  them  to  pe- 
ruse, with  proper  diligence,  the  original  works  of  the 
author  himself.  For  it  may  be  necessary  to  observe, 
that  neither  of  the  volumes  of  this  excellent  Prelate 


*  Ch.  7.  To  the  Analogy  are  subjoined  Two  Dissertations,  both  original- 
ly inserted  in  the  body  of  the  work.  One  on  Personal  Identity,  in  which  are 
contained  some  strictures  on  Mr.  Lode,  who  asserts  that  consciousness  makes 
or  constitutes  personal  identity  ;  whereas,  as  our  Author  observes,  conscious- 
ness makes  only  personality,  or  is  necessary  to  the  idea  of  a  person,  i.  e.  a 
thinking  intelligent  being,'  but  presupposes,  and  therefore  cannot  constitute 
personal  identity  ;  just  as  knowledge  presupposes  truth,  but  does  not  consti- 
tute it.  Consciousness  of  past  actions  does  indeed  shew  us  the  identity  of 
ourselves,  or  gfves  us  a  certain  assurance  that  we  are  the  same  persons  or 
living  agents  now,  which  we  were  at  the  time  to  which  our  remembrance 
can  look  back  ;  but  still  we  should  be  the  same  persons  as  we  were,  though 
this  consciousness  of  what  is  past  were  wanting,  though  all  that  had  been 
done  by  us  formerly  were  forgotten  ;  unless  it  be  true,  that  no  person  has 
existed  a  single  moment  beyond  what  he  can  remember.  The  other  Disser- 
tation is  On  the  Nature  of  Virtue,  ;vhich  properlv  belongs  to  the  moral  system 
of  our  Author,  already  explained. 


£Q  PREFACE  BY  THE  EDITOR. 

are  addressed  to  those,  who  read  for  amusement,  of 
curiosity,  or  to  get  red  of  time.  All  subjects  are  not 
to  be  comprehended  with  the  same  ease  ;  and  moral- 
ity and  religion,  when  treated  as  sciences,  each  ac- 
companied with  difficulties  of  its  own,  can  neither  of 
them  be  understood  as  they  ought,  without  a  very  pe- 
culiar attention.  But  morality  and  religion  are  not 
merely  to  be  studied  as  sciences,  or  as  being  specula- 
tively true  ;  they  are  to  be  regarded  in  another  and 
higher  light,  as  the  rule  of  life  and  manners,  as  con- 
taining authoritative  directions  by  which  to  regulate 
our  faith  and  practice.  And  in  this  view,  the  infinite 
importance  of  them  considered,  it  can  never  be  an 
indifferent  matter  whether  they  be  received  or  reject- 
ed. For  both  claim  to  be  the  voice  of  God ;  and 
whether  they  be  so  or  not,  cannot  be  known,  till  their 
claims  be  impartially  examined.  If  they  indeed  come 
from  him,  we  are  bound  to  conform  to  them  at  our 
peril  ;  nor  is  it  left  to  our  choice,,  whether  we  will 
submit  to  the  obligations  they  impose  upon  us  or 
not ;  for  submit  to  them  we  must  in  such  a  sense,  as 
to  incur  the  punishments  denounced  by  both  against 
wilful  disobedience  to  their  injunctions. 


*The  following  Epitaph,  said  to  be  written  by  Dr.  Nathanael  Forster,  is 
inscribed  on  a  flat  marble  stone,  in  the  cathedral  church  of  Bristol, 
placed  over  the  spot  where  the  remains  of  Bishop  Butler  are  de- 
posited ;  and  which,  as  it  is  now  almost  obliterated,  it  may  be  worth 
.while  here  to  preserve. 


H.  S. 

Jleverendus  admodum  in  Christo  Pater 
JOSEPHUS  BUTLER,  LL.D. 

Hujusce  primo  Diceceseos 
Deinde  Dunelmensis  Episcopus. 

Qualis  quantusq  ;>  Vir  erat 

Sua  libentissime  agnovit  astas  : 

!£t  si.quid  Praesuliaut  Scriptori  ad  famam  valent 

Mens  altissima, 

Ingenii  perspicacis  et  subacti  Vis, 

Animusq  ;  pius,  simplex,  candidus,  liberalis, 

Mortui  hand  facile  evanescet  memoria. 

Obiit  Bathonias  1 6  Kalend.  Julii, 

A.D,  1752. 

Annos  natus  60. 


NOTES  TO  THE  PREFACE, 


THE  EDITOR, 


Page  18.     [A]. 

Dr.  Butler,  when  Bishop  of  Bristol,  put  up  a  cross,  a  plain  piece 
of  marble  inlaid,  in  the  chapel  of  his  episcopal  house.  This,  which 
was  intended  by  the  blameless  Prelate  merely  as  a  sign  or  memorial, 
that  true  Christians  are  to  bear  their  cross,  and  not  to  be  ashamed  of 
following  a  crucified  Master,  was  considered  as  affording  a  presump- 
tion that  he  was  secretly  inclined  to  popish  forms  and  ceremonies,  and 
had  no  great  dislike  to  popery  itself.  And,  on  account  of  the  offence 
it  occasioned,  both  at  the  time  and  since,  it  were  to  be  wished,  in  pru- 
dence, it  had  not  been  done. 

Page  21.     [B]. 

Many  of  the  sentiments,  in  these  two  discourses  of  Bishop  Butler, 
concerning  the  sovereign  good  of  man  ;  the  impossibility  of  procuring 
it  in  the  present  life  ;  the  unsatisfactoriness  of  earthly  enjoyments  ;  to- 
gether with  the  somewhat  beyond  and  above  them  all,  which  once  at- 
tained, there  will  rest  nothing  further  to  be  wished  or  hoped  ;  and 
which  is  then  only  to  be  expected,  when  we  shall  have  put  off  this  mor- 
tal body,  and  our  union  with  God  shall  be  complete  ;  occur  in  Hook' 
er^s  Ecclesiastical  Polity,  Book  I.  §  xi. 

Page  25.     [C]. 

When  the  first  edition  of  this  Preface  was  published,  I  had  in  vain 
endeavoured  to  procure  a  sight  of  the  papers,  in  which  Bishop  But* 
ler  was  accused  of  having  died  a  papist,  and  Archbishop  Secker's 
replies  to  them  ;  though  1  well  remembered  to  have  read  both,  when 
they  first  appeared  in  the  public  prints.  But  a  learned  professor  in 
the  university  of  Oxford  has  furnished  me  with  the  whole  controversy 
in  its  original  form  ;  a  brief  history  of  which  it  may  not.be  unaccept- 
able to  offer  here  to  the  curious  reader. 


54?  NOTES  TO  THE  PREFACE, 

The  attack  was  opened  in  the  year  1767,  in  an  anonymous  pam- 
phlet, entitled  The  Root  of  Protestant  Errors  examined  ,*  in  which  the 
author  asserted,  that  "  by  an  anecdote  lately  given  him,  that  *  some 
Prelate,'  (who  at  the  bottom  of  the  page  is  called  B — p  of  D — m)  is 
said  to  have  died  in  the  communion  of  a  church,  that  makes  use  of 
saints,  saint  days,  and  all  the  trumpery  of  saint  worship/'  When  this 
remarkable  fact,  now  first  divulged,  came  to  be  generally  known,  it 
occasioned,  as  might  be  expected,  no  little  alarm  ;  and  intelligence  of 
it  was  no  sooner  conveyed  to  Archbishop  Secker,  than  in  a  short  let- 
ter, signed  Misopseudes,  and  printed  in  the  St.  James's  Chronicle  of  May 
5),  he  called  upon  the  writer  to  produce  his  authority  for  publish- 
ing "  so  gross  and  scandalous  a  falsehood."  To  this  challenge  an  im- 
mediate answer  was  returned  by  the  author  of  the  pamphlet,  who, 
mow  assuming  the  name  of  Phileleutheros,  informed  Misopseudesy 
through  the  channel  of  the  same  paper,  that  "  such  anecdote  had  been 
given  him  ;  and  that  he  was  yet  of  opinion  there  is  not  anything  im«- 
probable  in  it,  when  it  is  considered  that  the  same  Prelate  put  up  the 
popish  insignia  of  the  cross  in  his  chapel,  when  at  Bristol ;  and  in  his 
last  episcopal  Charge  has  squinted  very  much  towards  that  supersti- 
tion." Here  we  find  the  accusation  not  only  repeated,  but  supported 
by  reasons,  such  as  they  are  ;  of  which  it  seemed  necessary  that  some 
notice  should  be  taken  :  nor  did  the  Archbishop  conceive  it  unbecom- 
ing his  own  dignity  to  stand  up,  on  this  occasion,  as  the  vindicator  of 
innocence  against  the  calumniator  of  the  helpless  dead.  Accordingly, 
in  a  second  letter  in  the  same  newspaper  of  May  23,  and  subscribed 
Misopseudes,  as  before,  after  reciting  from  BishopBuTLER's  Sermon  be- 
fore the  Lords  the  very  passage  here  printed  in  the  Preface,  and  obser- 
ving that  "there  are,  in  the  same  Sermon,  declarations,  as  strong  as 
can  be  made,  against  temporal  punishments  for  heresy,  schism,  or  even 
for  idolatry,"  his  Grace  expresses  himself  thus  :  "  now  he  (Bishop 
Butler)  was  universally  esteemed,  throughout  his  life,  a  man  of 
strict  piety  and  honesty,  as  well  as  uncommon  abilities.  He  gave  all 
the  proofs,  public  and  paivate,  which  his  station  led  him  to  give,  and 
they  were  decisive  and  daily,  .of  his  continuing  to  the  last  a  sincere 
member  of  the  church  of  England.  Nor  had  ever  any  of  his  acquaint- 
ance, or  most  intimate  friends,  nor  have  they  to  this  day,  the  least 
doubt  of  it."  As  to  putting  up  a  cross  in  his  chapel,  the  archbishop 
frankly  owns,  that  for  himself  he  wishes  he  had  not  ;  and  thinks  that 
in  so  doing  the  Bishop  did  amiss.  But  then  he  asks,  "  can  that  be 
opposed,  as  any  proof  of  popery,  to  all  the  evidence  on  the  other 
side  ;  or  even  to  the  single  evidence  of  the  above-mentioned  Sermon  ? 
Most  of  our  churches  have  crosses  upon  them  :  are  they  therefore 
popish  churches  ?  The  Lutherans  have  more  than  crosses  in  theirs  : 
are  the  Lutherans  therefore  papists  ?#"  And  as  to  the  Charge^  no 
papist,  his  Grace  remarks,  would  have  spoken  as  Bishop  Butler 
there  docs,  of  the  observances  peculiar  to  Roman  catholics,  some  of 


BY  THE  EDITOR.  £5 

which  he  expressly  censures  as  wrong  and  superstitious,  and  others 
as  made  subservient  to  the  purposes  of  superstition,  and,  on  these  ac- 
counts, abolished  at  the  reformation.  After  the  publication  of  this 
letter,  Phileleuiheros  replied  in  a  short  defence  of  his  own  conduct,  but 
without  producing  any  thing  new  in  confirmation  of  what  he  had  ad- 
vanced. And  here  the  controversy,  so  far  as  the  two  principals  were 
concerned,  seems  to  have  ended. 

But  the  dispute  was  not  suffered  to  die  away  quite  so  soon.  For 
in  the  same  year,  and  in  the  same  newspaper  of  July  2 1 ,  another  letter 
appeared  ;  in  which  the  author  not  only  contended  that  the  cross  in 
the  episcopal  chapel  at  Bristol,  and  the  charge  to  the  clergy  of  Durham 
in  1751,  amount  to  full  proof  of  a  strong  attachment  to  the  idolatrous 
communion  of  the  church  of  Rome,  but,  with  the  reader's  leave,  he 
would  fain  account  for  the  bishop's  "  tendency  this  way."  And  this 
he  attempted  to  do,  "  from  the  natural  melancholy  and  gloominess 
of  Dr.  Butler's  disposition  ;  from  his  great  fondness  for  the  lives 
of  Romish  saints,  and  their  books  of  mystic  piety  ;  from  his  drawing 
his  notions  of  teaching  men  religion,  not  from  the  New  Testament, 
but  from  philosophical  and  political  opinions  of  his  own  ;  and  above 
all,  from  his  transition  from  a  strict  dissenter  amongst  the  presbyteri- 
ans  to  a  rigid  churchman,  and  his  sudden  and  unexpected  elevation 
to  great  wealth  and  dignity  in  the  church."  The  attack  thus  renew- 
ed excited  the  archbishop's  attention  a  second  time,  and  drew  from 
him  a  fresh  answer,  subscribed  also  Misopseudes,  in  the  St.  James's 
Chronicle  of  August  4.  In  this  letter  our  excellent  Metropolitan,  first 
of  all  obliquely  hinting  at  the  unfairness  of  sitting  in  judgment  on  the 
character  of  a  man  who  had  been  dead  fifteen  years,  and  then  remind- 
ing his  correspondent,  that  "full  proof  had  been  already  published, 
that  bishop  Butler  abhorred  popery  as  a  vile  corruption  of  Chris- 
tianity, and  that  it  might  be  proved,  if  needful,  that  he  held  the  Pope 
to  be  Antichrist,"  (to  which  decisive  testimonies  of  undoubted  aver- 
sion from  the  Romish  church  another  is  also  added  in  the  postscript, 
his  taking,  when  promoted  to  the  see  of  Durham,  for  his  domestic 
chaplain,  Dr.  Nath.  Forster,  who  had  published,  not  four  years  be- 
fore, a  sermon,  entitled,  Popery  destructive  of  the  evidence  of  Christian- 
ity) proceeds  to  observe,  "  That  the  natural  melancholy  of  the  bish- 
op's temper  would  rather  have  fixed  him  amongst  his  first  friends,  than 
prompted  him  to  the  change  he  made  :  that  he  read  books  of  all  sorts, 
as  well  as  books  of  mystic  piety,  and  knew  how  to  pick  the  good  that 
was  in  them  out  of  the  bad :  that  his  opinions  were  exposed  without  re- 
serve in  his  Analogy  and  his  Sermons,  and  if  the  doctrine  of  either  be 
popish  or  unscriptural,  the  learned  world  hath  mistaken  strangely  in 
admiring  both  :  that  instead  of  being  a  strict  dissenter,  he  never  was 
a  communicant  in  any  dissenting  assembly  ;  on  the  contrary,  that  he 
went  occasionally,  from  his  early  years,  to  the  established  worship, 
and  became  a  constant  conformist  to  it,  when  he  was  barely  of  age, 
and  entered  himseff,  in  1714,  of  Oriel  College  :  that  his  elevation  to 


56  NOTES  TO  THE  PREFACE, 

great  dignity  in  the  church,  far  from  being  sudden  and  unexpected, 
was  a  gradual  and  natural  rise,  through  a  variety  of  preferments,  and 
a  period  of  thirty  two  years  :  that  as  bishop  of  Durham  he  had  very 
little  authority  beyond  his  brethren,  and  in  ecclesiastical  matters  had 
none  beyond  them  ;  a  larger  income  than  most  of  them  he  had  ;  but 
this  he  employed,  not,  as  was  insinuated,  in  augmenting  the  pomp  of 
worship  in  his  cathedral,  where  indeed  it  is  no  greater  than  in  others, 
but  for  the  purposes  of  charity,  and  in  the  repairing  of  his  houses." 
After  these  remarks,  the  letter  closes  with  the  following  words :  "  Up- 
on the  whole,  few  accusations,  so  entirely  groundless,  have  been  so 
pertinaciously,  I  am  unwilling  to  say  maliciously,  carried  on,  as  the 
present  ;  and  surely  it  is  high  time  for  the  authors  and  abettors  of  it, 
in  mere  common  prudence,  to  shew  some  regard,  if  not  to  truth,  at 
least  to  shame. " 

It  only  remains  to  be  mentioned,  that  the  above  letters  of  archbishop 
Seeker  had  such  an  effect  on  a  writer,  who  signed  himself  in  the  St. 
James's  Chronicle,  of  August  25,  A  Dissenting  Minister,  that  he  declared 
it  as  his  opinion,  that  "  the  author  of  the  pamphlet,  called  The  Root  of 
Protestant  Errors  examined,  and  his  friends,  were  obliged  in  candour,  in 
justice,  and  in  honour,  to  retract  their  charge,  unless  they  could  estab- 
lish it  on  much  better  grounds  than  had  hitherto  appeared  :"  and  he  ex- 
pressed his  "  hopes  that  it  would  be  understood  that  the  dissenters  in 
general  had  no  hand  in  the  accusation,  and  that  it  had  only  been  the 
act  of  two  or  three  mistaken  men."  Another  person  also,  "  a  for- 
eigner by  birth,"  as  he  says  of  himself,  who  had  been  long  an  admirer 
of  bishop  Butler,  and  had  perused  with  great  attention  all  that  had 
been  written  on  both  sides  in  the  present  controversy,  confesses  he 
had  been  "  wonderfully  pleased  with  observing,  with  what  candour 
and  temper,  as  well  as  clearness  and  solidity,  he  was  vindicated  from 
the  aspersions  laid  against  him.,,  All  the  adversaries  of  our  prelate, 
however,  had  not  the  virtue  or  sense  to  be  thus  convinced  ;  some  of 
whom  still  continued,  under  the  signatures  of  Old  Martin,  Latimer, 
An  Impartial  Protestant,  Paulinus,  Misonothos,  to  repeat  their  confuted 
falsehoods  in  the  public  prints  ;  as  if  the  curse  of  calumniators  had 
fallen  upon  them,  and  their  memory,  by  being  long  a  traitor  to  truth, 
had  taken  at  last  a  severe  revenge,  and  compelled  them  to  credit  their 
own  lie.  The  first  of  these  gentlemen,  Old  Martin,  who  dates  from 
N-c-st-e,  May  29,  from  the  rancour  and  malignity  with  which  his  let- 
ter abounds,  and  from  the  particular  virulence  he  discovers  towards  the 
characters  of  bishop  Butler  and  his  defender,  I  conjecture  to  be  no 
other  than  the  very  person  who  had  already  figured  in  this  dispute,  so  ear- 
ly as  the  year  1752  ;  of  whose  work  entitled,  A  serious  inquiry  into  the 
use  and  importance  of  external  Religion,  the  reader  will  find  some  ac- 
count in  the  notes  subjoined  to  the  bishop's  charge,  at  the  end  of  this 
volume. 


BY  THE  EDITOR, 


57 


Page  26.     [D]. 

The  letters,  with  a  sight  of  which  I  was  indulged  by  the  favour  of? 
our  present  most  worthy  Metropolitan,  are  all,  as  I  remember,  wrap- 
ped together  under  one  cover  ;  on  the  back  of  which  is  written,  in 
Archbishop  Secker's  own  hand,  the  following  words,  or  words  to 
this  effect,  Presumptive  arguments  that  Bishop  Butler  did  not  die  a  pa- 
pist. 

Page  32.     [E]. 

"  Far  be  it  from  me,"  says  the  excellent  Dr.  T.  Balguy,*  "  to  dis- 
pute the  reality  of  a  moral  principle  in  the  human  heart.  I  feel 
its  existence  :  I  clearly  discern  its  use  and  importance.  But  in  no 
respect  is  it  more  important,  than  as  it  suggests  the  idea  of  a  moral 
Governor,  Let  this  idea  be  once  effaced,  and  the  principle  of  con-< 
science  will  soon  be  found  weak  and  ineffectual.  Its  influence  on 
men's  conduct  has,  indeed,  been  too  much  undervalued  by  some  philo- 
sophical inquirers.  But  be  that  influence,  while  it  lasts,  more  or  less, 
it  is  not  a  steady  and  permanent  principle  of  action.  Unhappily  we 
always  have  it  in  our  power  to  lay  it  asleep. — Neglect  alone  will  sup- 
press and  stifle  it,  and  bring  it  almost  into  a  state  of  stupefaction  : 
nor  can  any  thing  less  than  the  terrors  of  religion  awaken  our  minds 
from  this  dangerous  and  deadly  sleep.  It  can  never  be  matter  of  in- 
difference to  a  thinking  man,  whether  he  is  to  be  happy  or  miserable 
beyond  the  grave.'' 

Page  40.    [F]. 

The  ignorance  of  man  is  a  favourite  doctrine  with  bishop  Butler.  IC 
occurs  in  the  second  part  of  the  Analogy ;  it  makes  the  subject  of  hi* 
fifteenth  Sermon  ;  and  we  meet  with  it  again  in  his  charge.  Whethei 
sometimes  it  be  not  carried  to  a  length  which  is  excessive,  may  admit 
of  doubt. 

Page  40.     [G.] 

Admirable  to  this  purpose  are  the  words  of  Dr.  T.  Balguy>  in  the 
iXth  of  his  Discourses,  already  referred  to.  «  The  doctrine  of  a  life 
to  come,  some  persons  will  say,  is  a  doctrine  of  natural  religion  ;  and 
can  never  therefore  be  properly  alleged  to  shew  the  importance  of 
revelation.  They  judge  perhaps  from  the  frame  of  the  world,  that 
the  present  system  is  imperfect  :  they  see  designs  in  it  not  yet  complet- 
ed ;  and  they  think  they  have  grounds  for  expecting  another  state,  in 
which  these  designs  shall  be  farther  earned  on,  and  brought  to  a  con- 
clusion, worthy  of  Infinite  Wisdom.  I  am  not  concerned  to  dispute 
the  justness  of  this  reasoning  ;  nor  do  I  wish  to  dispute  it.  But  how 
far  will  it  reach  i  Will  it  lead  us  to  the  Christian  doctrine  of  a  judg- 

*  Discourse  IX. 

H 


33  NOTES  TO  THE  PREFACE. 

ment  to  come  ?  Will  it  give  us  the  prospect  of  an  eternity  of  happi- 
ness ?  Nothing  of  all  this.  It  shews  us  only,  that  death  is  not  the  end 
of  our  beings  ;  that  we  are  likely  to  pais  hereafter  into  other  systems, 
more  favourable  than  the  present  to  the  great  ends  of  God's  Providence, 
the  virtue  and  the  happiness  of  his  intelligent  creatures.  But  into  what 
systems  we  are  to  be  removed  ;  what  new  scenes  are  to  be  presented 
to  us,  either  of  pleasure  or  pain  ;  what  new  parts  we  shall  have  to  act, 
and  to  what  trials  and  temptations  we  may  yet  be  exposed ;  on  all 
these  subjects  we  know  just  nothing.  That  our  happiness  for  ever 
depends  on  our  conduct  here,  is  a  most  important  proposition,  which 
we  learn  only  from  revelation." 

Page  42.  [H]. 
"  In  the  common  affairs  of  life,  common  experience  is  sufficient  to 
direct  us.  But  will  common  experience  serve  to  guide  our  judgment 
concerning  the  fall  and  redemption  of  mankind  ?  From  what  we  see 
every  day,  can  we  explain  the  commencement,  or  foretel  the  dissolution 
of  the  world  ?  To  judge  of  events  like  these,  we  should  be  conversant 
in  the  history  of  other  planets  ;  should  be  distinctly  informed  of 
God's  various  dispensations  to  all  the  different  oraers  of  rational  be- 
ings. Instead  then  of  grounding  our  religious  opinions  on  what  ive 
call  experience,  let  us  apply  to  a  more  certain  guide,  let  us  hearken  to 
the  testimony  of  God  himself.  The  credibility  of  human  testimony,  and 
the  conduct  of  human  agents,  are  subjects  perfectly  within  the  reach  of 
our  natural  faculties ;  and  we  ought  to  desire  no  firmer  foundation  for 
our  belief  of  religion,  than  for  the  judgments  we  form  in  the  common 
affairs  of  life  ;  where  we  see  a  little  plain  testimony  easily  outweighs 
the  most  specious  conjectures,  and  not  seldom  even  strong  probabili- 
ties." Dr.  Balgirfs  4th  Charge.  See  also  an  excellent  pamphlet,  en- 
titled, Remarks  on  Mr.  Hume's  Essay  on  the  Natural  History  of  Reli- 
gion, §  v.    And  the  6th  of  Dr.  Powell's  Discourses. 

Page  46.  [I]. 
Dr.  Arthur  Ashley  Sykes,  from  whose  writings  some  good 
may  be  collected  out  of  a  multitude  of  things  of  a  contrary  tendency, 
in  what  he  is  pleased  to  call  The  Scripture  Doctrine  of  Redemption,*  op- 
poses what  is  here  advanced  by  Bishop  Butler  ;  quoting  his  words, 
but  without  mentioning  his  name.  If  what  is  said  above  be  not 
thought  a  sufficient  answer  to  the  objections  of  this  author,  the  reader 
may  do  well  to  consult  a  charge  On  the  use  and  abuse  of  Philosophy  in 
the  study  of  Religion,  by  the  late  Dr.  Powell,  who  seems  to  me  to  have 
had  the  observations  of  Dr.  Sykes  in  his  view,  where  he  is  confuting 
the  reasonings  of  certain  philosophizing  divines  against  the  doctrine 
of  the  atonement.     Powell's  Discourses,  Charge  III.  p.  342 — 348. 

*  See  the  Observations  on  the  texts  cited  in  his  first  chapter,  and  also  in 
chapter,  the  fifth  and  sixth. 


THE 

ANALOGY  OF  RELIGION, 

NATURAL  AND  REVEALED, 

TO    THJB 

CONSTITUTION  AND  COURSE  OF  NATURE. 


RIGHT    HONOURABLE 

CHARLES,  LORD  TALBOT, 

BARON    OF    HENSOL, 

LORD    HIGH    CHANCELLOR   OF    GREAT    BRITAIN, 

THE    FOLLOWING 

TREATISE 

IS,  WITH  ALL  RESPECT,  INSCRIBED, 

IN  ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  OF  THE  HIGHEST  OBLIGA- 
TIONS TO  THE  LATE 

LORD  BISHOP  OF  DURHAM  AND  TO 
HIMSELF, 

BY    HIS    LORDSHIP'S    MOST    DUTIFUL, 

MOST    DEVOTED, 

AND    MOST    HUMBLE    SERVANT, 

JOSEPH  BUTLER. 


ADVERTISEMENT. 


If  the  reader  should  meet  here  with  any  thing  which 
he  had  not  before  attended  to,  it  will  not  be  in  the 
observations  upon  the  constitution  and  course  of  na- 
ture, these  being  all  obvious,  but  in  the  application 
of  them ;  in  which,  though  there  is  nothing  but  what 
appears  to  me  of  some  real  weight,  and  therefore  of 
great  importance,  yet  he  will  observe  several  things 
which  will  appear  to  him  of  very  little,  if  he  can  think 
things  to  be  of  little  importance,  which  are  of  any  real 
weight  at  all  upon  such  a  subject  as  religion.  How* 
ever,  the  proper  force  of  the  following  treatise  lies 
in  the  whole  general  analogy  considered  together. 

It  is  come,  I  know  not  how,  to  be  taken  for  grant- 
ed by  many  persons,  that  Christianity  is  not  so  much 
as  a  subject  of  inquiry,  but  that  it  is  now  at  length 
discovered  to  be  fictitious.  And  accordingly  they 
treat  it  as  if,  in  the  present  age,  this  were  an  agreed 
point  among  all  people  of  discernment,  and  nothing 
remained  but  to  set  it  up  as  a  principal  subject  of 


64 


ADVERTISEMENT. 


mirth  and  ridicule,  as  it  were  by  way  of  reprisals 
for  its  having  so  long  interrupted  the  pleasures  of 
the  world.  On  the  contrary,  thus  much,  at  least, 
will  be  here  found,  not  taken  for  granted,  but  prov- 
ed, that  any  reasonable  man,  who  will  thoroughly 
consider  the  matter,  may  be  as  much  assured  as  he 
is  of  his  own  being,  that  it  is  not,  however,  so  clear 
a  case  that  there  is  nothing  in  it.  There  is,  I  think, 
strong  evidence  of  its  truth  ;  but  it  is  certain  no  one 
can,  upon  principles  of  reason,  be  satisfied  of  the 
contrary.  And  the  practical  consequence  to  be 
drawn  from  this  is  not  attended  to  by  every  one  who 
is  concerned  in  it. 

May,  1736. 


CONTENTS. 


Page 
INTRODUCTION  |7 

PART  I. 

OF  NATURAL  RELIGION. 

CHAP.  I. 
Of  a  Future  Life  •  79 

CHAP.  II. 
Of  the   Government  of  God  by  Rewards  and  Punishments  ; 
and  particularly  of  the  latter  -  -.  -         100 

CHAP.  III. 
Of  the  Moral  Government  of  God  -  »  113 

CHAP.  IV. 

Of  a  State  of  Probation,   as  implying  Trial,  Difficulties  and 
Danger  -  -  -  »  .  14& 

CHAP.  V. 

®f  a  State  of  Probation,  as  intended  for  Moral  Discipline  and 
Improvement  -  -  .  .  149 

CHAP.  VI. 

Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity,  considered  as  influencing  Prac- 
tice -  -  -  „  m  176 

CHAP.  VII. 

Of  the  Government  of  God,  considered  as  a  Scheme  or  Consti- 
tution, imperfectly  comprehended  .  .  193 

CONCLUSION  -  o05 

PART  II. 

OF  REPEALED  RELIGION. 

CHAP.  I. 

Of  the  importance  of  Christianity  -  '    .  ojg 

t 


66  CONTENTS. 

CHAP.  II. 
Of  the  supposed  Presumption  against  a  Revelation,  considered 
as  miraculous  -  23S 

CHAP.  III. 

Of  our  Incapacity  of  judging,  what  were  to  be  expected  in  a 
Revelation  ;  and  the  Credibility,  from  Analogy,  that  it  must 
contain  Things  appearing  liable  to  Objections  -  241 

CHAP.  IV. 

Of  Christianity,  considered  as  a  Scheme  or  Constitution,  imper- 
fectly comprehended  -  258 

CHAP.  V. 
Of  the  particular  System  of  Christianity  j  the  Appointment  of 
a  Mediator,  and  the  Redemption  of  the  World  by  him  *67 

CHAP.  VI. 

Of  the  want  of  Universality  in  Revelation  j  and  of  the  suppos- 
ed Deficiency  in  the  Proof  of  it  -  -  288 

CHAP.  VII. 

Of  the  particular  Evidence  for  Christianity  »  -  310 

CHAP.  VIII. 

Of  the  Objections  which  may  be  made  against  arguing  from 
the  Analogy  of  Nature  to  Religion  -  -  851 

CONCLUSION  364 

DISSERTATION  I. 

Of  Personal  Identity  -  -  ■  -         377' 

DISSERTATION  II. 
Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue  -  -  •  385 

A  Charge  to  the  Clergy  of  the  Dioeese  of  Durham,  1751  397 


INTRODUCTION 


Jl  rob  able  evidence  is  essentially  distinguished 
from  demonstrative  by  this,  that  it  admits  of  degrees  ; 
and  of  all  variety  of  them,  from  the  highest  moral 
certainty,  to  the  very  lowest  presumption.  We  can- 
not indeed  say  a  thing  is  probably  true  upon  one 
very  slight  presumption  for  it,  because,  as  there  may 
be  probabilities  on  both  sides  of  a  question,  there 
may  be  some  against  it ;  and  though  there  be  not, 
yet  a  slight  presumption  does  not  beget  that  degree  of 
conviction  which  is  implied  in  saying  a  thing  is  prob- 
ably true.  But  that  the  slightest  possible  presump- 
tion is  of  the  nature  of  a  probability,  appears  from 
hence,  that  such  low  presumption,  often  repeated, 
will  amount  even  to  moral  certainty.  Thus  a  man's 
having  observed  the  ebb  and  flow  of  the  tide  today, 
affords  some  sort  of  presumption,  though  the  lowest 
imaginable,  that  it  may  happen  again  tomorrow  ;  but 
the  observation  of  this  event  for  so  many  days,  and 
months,  and  ages  together,  as  it  has  been  observed  by 
mankind,  gives  us  a  full  assurance  that  it  will. 

That  which  chiefly  constitutes  probability  is  ex- 
pressed in  the  word  likely,  i.  e.  like  some  truth,*  or 
true  event  $  like  it,  in  itself,  in  its  evidence,  in  some 

*  Verisimile. 


£g  INTRODUCTION. 

more  or  fewer  of  its  circumstances.     For  when  we  de- 
termine a  thing  to  be  probably  true,  suppose  that  an 
event  has  or  will  come  to  pass,  it  is  from  the  mind's 
remarking  in  it  a  likeness  to  some  other  event,  which 
we  have  observed  has  come  to  pass.     And  this  obser- 
vation  forms,  in  numberless  daily  instances,  a  presump- 
tion, opinion,   or  full  conviction,  that  such  event  has 
or  will  come  to  pass,  according  as  the  observation  is, 
that  the  like  event  has  sometimes,  most  commonly,  or 
always  so  far  as  our  observation  reaches,  come  to  pass 
at   like  distances  of  time,  or  place,  or  upon  like  occa- 
sions.    Hence  arises  the  belief  that  a  child,  if  it  lives 
twenty  years,  will  grow  up  to  the  stature  and  strength 
of  a  man  ;  that  food  will  contribute  to  the  preserva- 
tion of  its  life,  and  the  want  of  it  for  such  a  number 
of  days,  be  its  certain  destruction.     So  likewise  the 
rule  and  measure  of  our  hopes  and  fears  concerning 
the  success  of  our   pursuits  ;  our  expectations  that 
others  will  act  so  and  so  in  such  circumstances  ;  and 
our  judgment  that  such  actions  proceed  from  such 
principles  ;  all  these  rely  upon  our  having  observed 
the  like  to  what  we  hope,  fear,  expect,  judge ;  I  say 
upon  our  having  observed  the  like,   either  with  re- 
spect to  others  or  ourselves.     And  thus,  whereas  the 
prince*  who  had  always  lived  in  a  warm  climate,  nat- 
urally concluded  in  the  way  of  analogy,  that  there  was 
no  such  thing  as  water's  becoming  hard,  because  he 
had  always  observed  it  to  be  fluid  and  yielding, — we 
on  the  contrary,  from  analogy  conclude,  that  there  is 
no  presumption  at  all  against  this  ;  that  it  is  supposa- 
ble  there  may   be  frost  in  England  any  given  day  in 
January  next ;  probable  that  there  will  on  some  other 
day  of  the  month  ;  and  that  there  is  a  moral  certain- 

t  The  story  is  told  by  Mr.  Locke  in  the  Chapter  of  Probability. 


INTRODUCTION.  g9 

ty,  i.  e.  ground  for  an  expectation  without  any  doubt 
of  it,  in  some  part  or  other  of  the  winter. 

Probable  evidence,  in  its  very  nature,  affords  but 
an  imperfect  kind  of  information,  and  is  to  be  consid- 
ered as  relative  only  to  beings  of  limited  capacities. 
For  nothing  which  is  the  possible  object  of  knowledge, 
whether  past,  present,  or  future,  can  be  probable  to  an 
infinite  Intelligence,  since  it  cannot  but  be  discerned 
absolutely  as  it  is  in  itself,  certainly  true,  or  certainly 
false.      But  to  us,  probability  is  the  very  guide  of  life. 

From  these  things  it  follows,  that  in  questions  of 
difficulty,  or  such  as  are  thought  so,  where  more  satis- 
factory evidence  cannot  be  had,  or  is  not  seen  ;  if 
the  result  of  examination  be,  that  there  appears  upon 
the  whole,  any  the  lowest  presumption  on  one  side, 
and  none  on  the  other,  or  a  greater  presumption  on 
one  side,  though  in  the  lowest  degree  greater ;  this  de- 
termines the  question,  even  in  matters  of  speculation  ; 
and  in  matters  of  practice,  will  lay  us  uncjer  an  abso- 
lute and  formal  obligation,  in  point  of  prudence  and 
of  interest,  to  act  upon  that  presumption  or  low  prob- 
ability, though  it  be  so  low  as  to  leave  the  mind  in 
very  great  doubt  which  is  the  truth.  For  surely  a 
man  is  as  really  bound  in  prudence  to  do  what  upon 
the  whole  appears,  according  to  the  best  of  his  judg- 
ment, to  be  for  his  happiness,  as  what  he  certainly 
knows  to  be  so.  Nay,  further,  in  questions  of  great 
consequence,  a  reasonable  man  will  think  it  concerns 
him  to  remark  lower  probabilities  and  presumptions 
than  these  ;  such  as  amount  to  no  more  than  showing 
one  side  of  a  question  to  be  as  supposable  and  cred- 
ible as  the  other  ;  nay,  such  as  but  amount  to  much 
less  even  than  this.  For  numberless  instances  might 
be  mentioned  respecting  the  common  pursuits  of  life, 
where  a  man  would  be  thought,  in  a  literal  sense,  dis- 


>j0  INTRODUCTION. 

tracted,  who  would  not  act,  and  with  great  applica- 
tion too,  not  only  upon  an  even  chance,  but  upon 
much  less,  and  where  the  probability  or  chance  was 
greatly  against  his  succeeding.* 

It  is  not  my  design  to  inquire  further  into  the  nature, 
the  foundation,  and  measure  of  probability  ;  or  whence 
it  proceeds  that  likeness  should  beget  that  presump- 
tion, opinion,  and  full  conviction,  which  the  human 
mind  is  formed  to  receive  from  it,  and  which  it  does 
necessarily  produce  in  every  one ;  or  to  guard  against 
the  errors,  to  which  reasoning  from  analogy  is>  liable. 
This  belongs  to  the  subject  of  logic  ;  and  is  a  part  of 
that  subject  which  has  not  yet  been  thoroughly  consid- 
ered. Indeed  I  shall  not  take  upon  me  to  say,  how 
far  the  extent,  compass,  and  force  of  analogical  rea- 
soning can  be  reduced  to  general  heads  and  rules, 
and  the  whole  be  formed  into  a  system  :  but  though 
so  little  in  this  way  has  been  attempted  by  those  who 
have  treated  of  our  intellectual  powers,  and  the  exer- 
cise of  them,  this  does  not  hinder  but  that  we  may 
be,  as  we  unquestionably  are  assured,  that  analogy  is 
of  weight,  in  various  degrees,  towards  determining 
our  judgment  and  our  practice.  Nor  does  it  in  any 
wise  cease  to  be  of  weight  in  those  cases,  because  per- 
sons, either  given  to  dispute,  or  who  require  things 
to  be  stated  with  greater  exactness  than  our  facul- 
ties appear  to  admit  of  in  practical  matters,  may 
find  other  cases  in  which  it  is  not  easy  to  say,  whether 
it  be  or  be  not  of  any  weight ;  or  instances  of  seem- 
ing analogies,  which  are  really  of  none.  It  is  enough 
to  the  present  purpose  to  observe,  that  this  general 
way  of  arguing  is  evidently  natural,  just,  and  conclu- 
sive. For  there  is  no  man  can  make  a  question  but 
that  the  sun  will  rise  tomorrow  ;  and  be  seen,  where 

*  See  Ch.  vi.  Part  II. 


INTRODUCTION.  ^ 

it  is  seen  at  all,  in  the  figure  of  a  circle,  and  not  in 
that  of  a  square. 

Hence,  namely  from  analogical  reasoning,  Origen* 
has  with  singular  sagacity  ob  erved,  that  he  who  be- 
lieves the  Scripture  to  have  proceeded  from  him  who  is 
the  Author  of  nature ',  may  well  expect  to  find  the  same 
sort  of  difficulties  in  it,  as  are  found  in  the  constitution  of 
nature.  And  in  a  like  way  of  reflection  it  may  be 
added,  that  he  who  denies  the  Scripture  to  have  been 
from  God  upon  account  of  these  difficulties,  may,  for 
the  very  same  reason,  deny  the  world  to  have  been 
formed  by  him.  On  the  other  hand,  if  there  be  an 
analogy  or  likeness  between  that  system  of  things  and 
dispensation  of  Providence,  which  revelation  informs 
us  of,  and  that  system  of  things  and  dispensation  of 
Providence,  which  experience,  together  with  reason, 
informs  us  of,  i.  e.  the  known  course  of  nature  ;  this  is 
a  presumption,  that  they  have  both  the  same  author 
and  cause;  at  least  so  far  as  to  answer  objections  against 
the  former's  being  from  God,  drawn  from  any  thing 
which  is  analogical  or  similar  to  what  is  in  the  latter  s 
which  is  acknowledged  to  be  from  him  ;  for  an  Au- 
thor of  nature  is  here  supposed. 

Forming  our  notions  of  the  constitution  and  gov- 
ernment of  the  world  upon  reasoning,  without  foun- 
dation for  the  principles  which  we  assume,  whether 
from  the  attributes  of  God  or  any  thing  else,  is  build- 
ing a  world  upon  hypothesis,  like  Des  Cartes.  Form- 
ing  our  notions  upon  reasoning  from  principles  which 
are  certain,  but  applied  to  cases  to  which  we  have  no 
ground  to  apply  th?m,  (like  those  who  explain  the 
structure  of  the  human  body,  and  the  nature  of  dis- 

*'  Xpn  /uiv  roi  yz  rov  a.Tct£  TretpstSi^ciiuivcv  fu  crTjWvrof  tgv  Kitr/mov  livau  taCtu 
tolc  yzfLtyoLS  7ri7ritT^aii,  on  ota  7rtpt  th'c  jcrjVe&Jc  ivrwroi  rots  ftrxcrt  ?cv  t?o;  atorr 
x6yov,,ToLura,  k*\  Trsfi  t«v  ypzth.     Philocal.  p,  23.  Ed.  Cant-. 


72 


INTRODUCTION. 


eases  and  medicines,  from  mere  mathematics,  without' 
sufficient  data)  is  an  error  much  a-kin  to  the  former  \ 
since  what  is  assumed  in  order  to  make  the  reasoning 
applicable,  is  hypothesis.  But  it  must  be  allowed  just, 
to  join  abstract  reasonings  with  the  observation  of  facts, 
and  argue  from  such  facts  as  are  known,  to  others  that 
are  like  them  ;  from  that  part  of  the  divine  government 
over  intelligent  creatures  which  comes  under  our  view, 
to  that  larger  and  more  general  government  over  them, 
which  is  beyond  it ;  and  from  what  is  present,  to  collect 
what  is  likely,  credible*  or  not  incredible,  will  be  here- 
after. 

This  method  then  of  concluding  and  determining 
being  practical,  and  what,  if  we  will  act  at  all,  we  can- 
not but  act  upon  in  the  common  pursuits  of  life  ;  be- 
ing evidently  conclusive,  in  various  degrees,  propor- 
tionable to  the  degree  and  exactness  of  the  whole  anal- 
ogy or  likeness  \  and  having  so  great  authority  for  its 
introduction  into  the  subject  of  religion,  even  reveal- 
ed religion  ;  my  design  is  to  apply  it  to  that  subject  in 
general,  both  natural  and  revealed  ;  taking  for  proved, 
that  there  is  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature,  and  nat- 
ural Governor  of  the  world.  For  as  there  is  no  pre- 
sumption against  this  prior  to  the  proof  of  it,  so  it  has 
been  often  proved  with  accumulated  evidence  ;  from 
this  argument  of  analogy  and  final  causes ;  from  ab- 
stract reasonings  ;  from  the  most  ancient  tradition 
and  testimony,  and  from  the  general  consent  of  man- 
kind. Nor  does  it  appear,  so  far  as  I  can  find,  to  be 
denied,  by  the  generality  of  those  who  profess  them* 
selves  dissatisfied  with  the  evidence  of  religion. 

As  there  are  some,  who,  instead  of  thus  attending  to 
what  is  in  fact  the  constitution  of  nature,  form  their 
notions  of  God's  government  upon  hypothesis  ;  so 
there  are  others,  who  indulge  themselves  in  vain  and 
idle  speculations,  how  the  world  might  possibly  have 


INTRODUCTION.  73 

been  framed  otherwise  than  it  is  ;  and  upon  supposi- 
tion that  things  might,  in  imagining  that  they  should, 
have  been  disposed  and  carried  on  after  a  better  mod- 
el than  what  appears  in  the  present  disposition  and 
conduct  of  them.  Suppose  now  a  person  of  such  a 
turn  of  mind,  to  go  on  with  his  reveries,  till  he  had  at 
length  fixed  upon  some  particular  plan  of  nature,  as  ap- 
pearing to  him  the  best ;  one  shall  scarce  be  thought 
guilty  of  detraction  against  human  understanding,  if 
one  should  say,  even  beforehand,  that  the  plan  which 
this  speculative  person  would  fix  upon,  though  he  were 
the  wisest  of  the  sons  of  men,  probably  would  not  be 
the  very  best,  even  according  to  his  own  notions  of 
best  ;  whether  he  thought  that  to  be  so,  which  afford- 
ed occasions  and  motives  for  the  exercise  of  the  great- 
est virtue,  or  which  was  productive  of  the  greatest  hap- 
piness, or  that  these  two  were  necessarily  connected, 
and  run  up  into  one  and  the  same  plan.  However,  it 
may  not  be  amiss  once  for  all  to  see,  what  would  be 
the  amount  of  these  emendations  and  imaginary  im- 
provements upon  the  system  of  nature,  or  how  far  they 
would  mislead  us.  And  it  seems  there  could  be  no 
stopping,  till  we  came  to  some  such  conclusions  as 
these  :  that  all  creatures  should  at  first  be  made  as 
perfect  and  as  happy  as  they  were  capable  of  ever  be- 
ing:  that  nothing,  to  be  sure,  of  hazard  or  danger 
should  be  put  upon  them  to  do  ;  some  indolent  persons 
would  perhaps  think  nothing  at  all ;  or  certainly,  that 
effectual  care  should  be  taken,  that  they  should,  wheth- 
er necessarily  or  not,  yet  eventually  and  in  fact,  always 
do  what  was  right  and  most  conducive  to  happiness, 
which  would  be  thought  easy  for  infinite  power  to  ef- 
fect ;  either  by  not  giving  them  any  principles  which 
would  endanger  their  going  wrong,  or  by  laying  the 
right  motive  of  action  in  every  instance  before  their 

K 


74 


INTRODUCTION. 


minds  continually  in  so  strong  a  manner,  as  would 
never  fail  of  inducing  them  to  act  conformably  to 
it ;  and  that  the  whole  method  of  government  by 
punishments  should  be  rejected  as  absurd,  as  an- 
awkward  round-about  method  of  carrying  things 
on  ;  nay,  as  contrary  to  a  principal  purpose,  for 
which  it  would  be  supposed  creatures  were  made, 
namely  happiness. 

Now,  without  considering  what  is  to  be  said  in  par- 
ticular to  the  several  parts  of  this  train  of  folly  and  ex- 
travagance, what  has  been  above  intimated,  is  a  full, 
direct,  general  answer  to  it,  namely,  that  we  may  see 
beforehand  that  we  have  not  faculties  for  this  kind  of 
speculation.     For  though  it  be  admitted,  that   from 
the  first  principles  of  our  nature,  we  unavoidably  judge 
or  determine  some  ends  to  be  absolutely  in  themselves 
preferable  to  others,  and  that  the  ends  now  mentioned, 
or  if  they  run  up  into  one,  that  this  one  is  absolutely 
the  best  ;  and  consequently    that  we  must  conclude 
the  ultimate  end  designed,  in  the  constitution  of  na- 
ture and  conduct  of  Providence,  is  the  most  virtue  and 
happiness  possible  :  yet  we  are  far  from  being  able  to 
judge,  what  particular  disposition  of  things  would   be 
most  friendly  and  assistant  to  virtue  ;  or  what  means 
might  be  absolutely  necessary  to  produce    the  most 
happiness  in  a  system  of  such  extent  as  our  own  world 
may  be,  taking  in  all  that  is  past  and  to  come,  though 
we  should  suppose  it  detached  from   the  whole  of 
things.     Indeed  we  are  so  far  from  being  able  to  judge 
of  this,  that  we  are  not  judges  what  may  be  the  neces- 
sary means  of  raising  and  conducting  one  person  to  the 
highest  perfection  and  happiness  of  his  nature.     Nay, 
even  in  the  little  affairs  of  the  present  life,  we  find  men 
of  different  educations  and  ranks  are  not  competent 
judges  of  the  conduct  of  each  other.     Our  whole  na- 


INTRODUCTION. 


75 


ture  leads  us  to  ascribe  all  moral  perfection  to  God, 
and  to  deny  all  imperfection  of  him-  And  this  will 
for  ever  be  a  practical  proof  of  his  moral  character,  to 
such  as  will  consider  what  a  practical  proof  is ;  because 
it  is  the  voice  of  God  speaking  in  us.  And  from  hence 
we  conclude,  that  virtue  must  be  the  happiness,  and 
vice  the  misery  of  every  creature  ;  and  that  regularity 
and  order  and  right  cannot  but  prevail  finally  in  a  uni- 
verse under  his  government.  But  we  are  in  no  sort 
judges,  what  are  the  necessary  means  of  accomplishing 
this  end. 

Let  us  then,  instead  of  that  idle  and  not  very  inno- 
cent employment  of  forming  imaginary  models  of  a 
world,  and  schemes  of  governing  it,  turn  our  thoughts 
to  what  we  experience  to  be  the  conduct  of  nature 
with  respect  to  intelligent  creatures ;  which  may  be 
resolved  into  general  laws  or  rules  of  administration, 
in  the  same  way  as  many  of  the  laws  of  nature  respect- 
ing inanimate  matter  may  be  collected  from  experi- 
ments. And  let  us  compare  the  known  constitution 
and  course  of  things,  with  what  is  said  to  be  the  moral 
system  of  nature  ;  the  acknowledged  dispensations  of 
Providence,  or  that  government  which  we  find  our- 
selves under,  with  what  religion  teaches  us  to  be- 
lieve and  expect  ;  and  see  whether  they  are  not 
analogous  and  of  a  piece.  And  upon  such  a  com- 
parison, it  will  I  think  be  found,  that  they  are  very 
much  so  ;  that  both  may  be  traced  up  to  the  same 
general  laws,  and  resolved  into  the  same  principles  of 
divine  conduct. 

The  analogy  here  proposed  to  be  considered  is  of 
pretty  large  extent,  and  consists  of  several  parts  ;  in 
some  more,  in  others  less  exact.  In  some  few  in- 
stances, perhaps,  it  may  amount  to  a  real  practical 
proof ;  in   others  not  so.     Yet  in  these  it  is  a  con- 


JQ  INTRODUCTION. 

firmation  of  what  is  proved  other  ways.  It  will  un- 
deniably show,  what  too  many  want  to  have  shown 
them,  that  the  system  of  religion,  both  natural  and 
revealed,  considered  only  as  a  system,  and  prior  to  the 
proof  of  it,  is  not  a  subject  of  ridicule,  unless  that  of 
nature  be  so  too.  And  it  will  afford  an  answer  to  al- 
most all  objections  against  the  system  both  of  natural 
and  revealed  religion  ;  though  not  perhaps  an  answer 
in  so  great  a  degree,  yet  in  a  very  considerable  degree 
an  answer,  to  the  objections  against  the  evidence  of  it : 
for  objections  against  a  proof,  and  objections  against 
what  is  said  to  be  proved,  the  reader  will  observe  are 
different  things. 

Now  the  divine  government  of  the  world,  implied 
in  the  notion  of  religion  in  general  and  of  Christianity, 
contains  in  it, — That  mankind  is  appointed  to  live  in  a 
future  state  ;*  that  there,  every  one  shall  be  rewarded 
or  punished  ;t  rewarded  or  punished  respectively  for 
all  that  behaviour  here,  which  we  comprehend  under 
the  words,  virtuous  or  vicious,  morally  good  or  evil  :| 
that  our  present  life  is  a  probation,  a  state  of  trial, § 
and  of  discipline,]]  for  that  future  one;  notwithstand- 
ing the  objections,  which  men  may  fancy  they  have, 
from  notions  of  necessity,  against  there  being  any  such 
moral  plan  as  this  at  all  ;**  and  whatever  objections 
may  appear  to  lie  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of 
it,  as  it  stands  so  imperfectly  made  known  to  us  at 
present  :ft  that  this  world  being  in  a  state  of  apos- 
tacy  and  wickedness,  and  consequently  of  ruin,  and  the 
sense  both  of  their  condition  and  duty  being  greatly 
corrupted  amongst  men  ;  this  gave  occasion  for  an  ad- 
ditional dispensation  of  Providence  ;  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance jJJ  proved  by  miracles  ;§§  but  containing  in 

*  Ch.  i.  f  Ch.  ii.  }  Ch.  Hi.  §  Ch.  iv.  ||  Ch.  v. 

••  Ch.  vi.         -If  Ch.  vii.         ||  Part  IL  Ch.  i.  $§  Ch.  ii. 


INTRODUCTION. 


77 


it  many  things  appearing  to  us  strange  and  not  to 
have  been  expected  ;*  a  dispensation  of  Providence, 
which  is  a  scheme  or  system  of  things  ;f  carried  on 
by  the  mediation  of  a  divine  person,  the  Messiah,  in 
order  to  the  recovery  of  the  world  ;  J  yet  not  revealed 
to  all  men,  nor  proved  with  the  strongest  possible  evi- 
dence to  all  those  to  whom  it  is  revealed  ;  but  only  to 
such  a  part  of  mankind,  and  with  such  particular  evi- 
dence as  the  wisdom  of  God  thought  fit.§  The  de- 
sign then  of  the  following  Treatise  will  be  to  shew, 
that  the  several  parts  principally  objected  against  in 
this  moral  and  Christian  dispensation,  including  its 
scheme,  its  publication,  and  the  proof  which  God  has 
afforded  us  of  its  truth  ;  that  the  particular  parts  prin- 
cipally objected  against  in  this  whole  dispensation,  are 
analogous  to  what  is  experienced  in  the  constitution 
and  course  of  nature,  or  providence  ;  that  the  chief 
objections  themselves  which  are  alleged  against  the 
former,  are  no  other  than  what  may  be  alleged  with 
like  justness  against  the  latter,  where  they  are  found  in 
fact  to  be  inconclusive  ;  and  that  this  argument  from 
analogy  is  in  general  unanswerable,  and  undoubtedly 
of  weight  on  the  side  of  religion, ||  notwithstanding  the 
objections  which  may  seem  to  lie  against  it,  and  the 
real  ground  which  there  may  be  for  difference  of  opin- 
ion, as  to  the  particular  degree  of  weight  which  is  to 
be  laid  upon  it.  This  is  a  general  account  of  what 
may  be  looked  for  in  the  following  Treatise ;  and  I 
shall  begin  it  with  that  which  is  the  foundation  of 
all  our  hopes  and  of  all  our  fears,  all  our  hopes  and 
fears   which   are    of  any  consideration i  I  mean  a  fu- 


ture, life. 


f  Ch.  iv.  f  Ch.  v.  §  Ch.  vl.  vii. 


0 

ANALOGY 


RELIGION 


CONSTITUTION  AND  COURSE  OF  NATURE, 


PART    I. 

OF  NATURAL  RELIGION. 


CHAP.   I. 

Of  a  Future  Life. 

qtrange  difficulties  have  been  raised  by  some  con- 
cerning personal  identity,  or  the  sameness  of  living 
agents,  implied  in  the  notion  of  our  existing  now  and 
hereafter,  or  in  any  two  successive  moments  ;  which, 
whoever  thinks  it  worth  while,  may  see  considered  in 
the  first  Dissertation  at  the  end  of  this  Treatise.  But 
without  regard  to  any  of  them  here,  let  us  consider 
what  the  analogy  of  nature,  and  the  several  changes 
which  we  have  undergone,  and  those  which  we  know 
we  may  undergo  without  being  destroyed,  suggest,  as 
to  the  effect  which  death  may  or  may  not  have  upon 
us  ;  and  whether  it  be  not  from  thence  probable,  that 
we  may  survive  this  change,  and  exist  in  a  future  state 
of  life  and  perception. 


80  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  L 

I.  From  our  being  born  into  the  present  world  in 
the  helpless  imperfect  state  of  infancy,  and  having  ar- 
rived from  thence  to  mature  age,  we  find  it  to  be  a 
general  law  of  nature  in  our  own  spedtte,  that  the  same 
creatures,  the  same  individuals,  should  exist  in  de- 
grees of  life  and  perception,  with  capacities  of  action, 
of  enjoyment  and  suffering,  in  one  period  of  their  be- 
ing, greatly  different  from  those  appointed  them  in 
another  period  of  it.  And  in  other  creatures  the 
same  law  holds.  For  the  difference  of  their  capaci- 
ties and  states  of  life  at  their  birth  (to  go  no  higher) 
and  in  maturity  ;  the  change  of  worms  into  flies,  and 
the  vast  enlargement  of  their  locomotive  powers  by 
such  change  ;  and  birds  and  insects  bursting  the  shell, 
their  habitation,  and  by  this  means  entering  into  a 
new  world,  furnished  with  new  accommodations  for 
them,  and  finding  a  new  sphere  of  action  assigned 
them  ;  these  are  instances  of  this  general  law  of  nature. 
Thus  all  the  various  and  wonderful  transformations  of 
animals  are  to  be  taken  into  consideration  here.  But 
the  states  of  life  in  which  we  ourselves  existed  formerly 
in  the  womb  and  in  our  infancy,  are  almost  as  different 
from  our  present  in  mature  age,  as  it  is  possible  to 
conceive  any  two  states  or  degrees  of  life  can  be. 
Therefore,  that  we  are  to  exist  hereafter  in  a  state  as 
different  (suppose)  from  our  present,  as  this  is  from 
our  former,  is  but  according  to  the  analogy  of  na- 
ture ;  according  to  a  natural  order  or  appointment 
of  the  very  same  kind  with  what  we  have  already  ex- 
perienced. 

II.  We  know  we  are  endued  with  capacities  of  ac- 
tion, of  happiness  and  misery  ;  for  we  are  conscious 
of  acting,  of  enjoying  pleasure,  and  suffering  pain. 
Now  that  we  have  these  powers  and  capacities  before 
death,  is  a  presumption  that   we  shall  retain  them 


Chap.  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  81 

through  and  after  death  ;  indeed  a  probability  of  it 
abundantly  .sufficient  to  act  upon,  unless  there  be  some 
positive  reason  to  think  that  death  is  the  destruction 
of  those  living  powers;  because  there  i   in  every  case 
a  probability,   that  all  things  will  continue  as  we  ex- 
perience they   are,  in  all   respects,  except  those   in 
which  we  have  some  reason  to  think  they  will  be  al- 
tered.    This  is  that  kind*  of  presumption  or  proba- 
bility from  analogy,  expressed  in  the  very  word  contin* 
uance^  which  seems  our  only  natural  reason  for  believ- 
ing the  course  of  the  world  will  continue  tomorrow, 
as  it  has  done  so  far  as  our  experience  or  knowledge 
of  history  can  carry  us  back      Nay,  it  seems  our  only 
reason  for  believing  that  any  one  substance  now  ex- 
isting will  continue  to  exist  a  moment  longer,  the 
self-existent  substance  only  excepted.     Thus  if  men 
were  assured  that  the  unknown  event,  death,  was  not 
the  destruction  of  our  faculties   of  perception  and  of 
action,  there  would  be  no  apprehension  that  any  other 
power  or  event  unconnected  with  this  of  death,  would 
destroy  these  faculties  just  at  the  instant  of  each  crea- 
ture's death,  and  therefore  no  doubt  but  that  they 
would  remain  after  it  ;  which  shows  the  high  proba- 
bility that  our  living  powers  will  continue  after  death, 
unless  there  be  some  ground  to  think  that  death   is 
their  destruction.!     For,  if  it  would  be  in  a  manner 
certain  that  we  should  survive  death,  provided  it  were 

*  I  say  kind  of  presumption  or  probability  ;  for  T  do  not  mean  to  affirm 
that  there  is  the  same  degree  of  conviction,  that  our  living  powers  will  con- 
tinue after  death,  as  there  is,  that  our  suhstances  will. 

f  Detraction  of  living  powers,  is  a  manner  of  expression  unavoidably  am- 
biguous ;  and  may  signify  either  the  destruction  of  a  living  bting,  so  as  that  the 
same  living  being  shall  be  uncapable  of  ever  perceiving  or  acting  again  at  all  ;  or,  the 
destruction  of  those  means  and  instruments  by  which  it  is  capable  of  its  present  life,  of 
its  present  state  af  perception  and  of  action.  It  is  here  used  in  the  former  sense. 
When   it  is  used  in  the  latter,   the  epithet  present  is  added.    The  loss  of  a 

L 


32  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  I. 

certain  that  death  would  not  be  our  destruction,  it 
must  be  highly  probable  we  shall  survive  it,  if  there 
be  no  ground  to  think  death  will  be  our  destruction. 

Now,  though  I  think  it  must  be  acknowledged, 
that  prior  to  the  natural  and  moral  proofs  of  a  future 
life  commonly  insisted  upon,  there  would  arise  a  gen- 
eral confused  suspicion,  that  in  the  great  shock  and 
alteration  which  we  shall  undergo  by  death,  we,  i.  e. 
our  living  powers,  might  be  wholly  destroyed  ;  yet, 
even  prior  to  those  proofs,  there  is  really  no  particu- 
lar distinct  ground  or  reason  for  this  apprehension  at 
all,  so  far  as  I  can  find.  If  there  be,  it  must  arise 
either  from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  or  from  the  analogy 
of  nature. 

But  we  cannot  argue  from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  that 
death  is  the  destruction  of  living  agents,  because  we 
know  not  at  all  what  death  is  in  itself ;  but  only 
some  of  its  effects,  such  as  the  dissolution  of  flesh, 
skin,  and  bones.  And  these  effects  do  in  no  wise  ap- 
pear to  imply  the  destruction  of  a  living  agent.  And 
besides,  as  we  are  greatly  in  the  dark,  upon  what  the 
exercise  of  our  living  powers  depends,  so  we  are  whol- 
ly ignorant  what  the  powers  themselves  depend  up- 
on ;  the  powers  themselves  as  distinguished,  not  only 
from  their  actual  exercise,  but  also  from  the  present 
capacity  of  exercising  them  ;  and  as  opposed  to  their 
destruction  :  for  sleep,  or  however  a  swoon,  shews  us, 
not  only  that  these  powers  exist  when  they  are  not  ex- 
ercised, as  the  passive  power  of  motion  does  in  inani- 
mate matter  ;  but  shews  also  that  they  exist,  when 

man's  eye,  is  a  destruction  of  living  powers  in  the  latter  sense.  But  we  have 
no  reason  to  think  the  destruction  of  living  powers  in  the  former  sense.  t» 
be  possible.  We  have  no  more  reason  to  think  a  being  endued  with  living 
powers  ever  loses  them  during  its  whole  existence,  than  to  believe  that  a 
stone  ever  acquires   them. 


Chap.  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  S3 

there  is  no  present  capacity  of  exercising  them  ;  or 
that  the  capacities  of  exercising  them  for  the  present, 
as  well  as  the  actual  exercise  of  them,  may  be  sus- 
pended, and  yet  the  powers  themselves  remain  unde- 
stroyed.  Since  then  we  know  not  at  all  upon  what 
the  existence  of  our  living  powers  depends,  this  shews 
further,  there  can  no  probability  be  collected  from 
the  reason  of  the  thing,  that  death  will  be  their  de- 
struction ;  because  their  existence  may  depend  upon 
somewhat  in  no  degree  affected  by  death,  upon  some- 
what quite  out  of  the  reach  of  this  king  of  terrors. 
So  that  there  is  nothing  more  certain,  than  that  the 
reason  ef  the  thing  shews  us  no  connexion  between 
death,  and  the  destruction  of  living  agents.  Nor  can 
we  find  any  thing  throughout  the  whole  analogy  of 
nature,  to  afford  us  even  the  slightest  presumption, 
that  animals  ever  lose  their  living  power  ;  much  less, 
if  it  were  possible,  that  they  lose  them  by  death  ;  for 
we  have  no  faculties  wherewith  to  trace  any  beyond  or 
through  it,  so  as  to  see  what  becomes  of  them.  This 
event  removes  them  from  our  view.  It  destroys  the 
sensible  proof,  which  we  had  before  their  death,  of 
their  being  possessed  of  living  powers,  but  does  not 
appear  to  afford  the  least  reason  to  believe  that  they 
are,  then,  or  by  that  event,  deprived  of  them. 

And  our  knowing  that  they  were  possessed  of  these 
powers,  up  to  the  very  period  to  which  we  have  facul- 
ties capable  of  tracing  them,  is  itself  a  probability  of 
their  retaining  them  beyond  it.  And  this  is  confirm- 
ed, and  a  sensible  credibility  is  given  to  it,  by  observing 
the  very  great  and  astonishing  changes  which  we  have 
experienced  ;  so  great,  that  our  existence  in  another 
state  of  life,  of  perception  and  of  action,  will  be  but 
according  to  a  method  of  providential  conduct,  the 
like  to  which  has  been  already  exercised  even  with  re- 


34  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  L 

gard   to  ourselve   ;  according  to  a  course  of  nature, 
the  like  to  which  we  have  already  gone  through. 

However,  as  one  cannot  but  be  greatly  sensible 
how  difficult  it  is  to  silence  imagination  enough  to 
make  the  voice  of  reason  even  distinctly  heard  in  this 
Case  ;  as  we  are  accustomed,  from  our  youth  up,  to  in- 
dulge rhat  forward  delusive  faculty,  ever  obtruding 
beyond  its  sphere  ;  of  some  assistance  indeed  to  appre- 
hension, but  the  author  of  all  error  ;  as  we  plainly  lose 
ourselves  in  gross  and  crude  conceptions  of  things, 
taking  for  granted  that  we  are  acquainted  with  what 
indeed  we  are  wholly  ignorant  of ;  it  may  be  proper  to 
consider  the  imaginary  presumptions,  that  death  will 
be  our  destruction,  arising  from  these  kinds  of  early 
and  lasting  prejudices ;  and  to  shew  how  little  they 
can  really  amount  to,  even  though  we  cannot  wholly 
divest  ourselves  of  them.     And, 

I  All  presumption  of  death's  being  the  destruc- 
tion of  living  beings,  must  go  upon  supposition  that 
they  are  compounded,  and  so  discerptible.  But  since 
consciousness  is  a  single  and  indivisible  power,  it  should 
seem  that  the  subject  in  which  it  resides  must  be  so 
too.  For  were  the  motion  of  any  particle  of  matter 
absolutely  one  and  indivisible,  so  as  that  it  should  im- 
ply a  contradiction  to  suppose  part  of  this  motion  to 
exist,  and  part  not  to  exist,  i.  e  part  of  this  matter  to 
move,  and  part  to  be  at  rest,  then  it*  power  of  motion 
would  be  indivisible  ;  and  so  also  would  the  subject  in 
which  rhe  power  inheres,  namely,  the  particle  of  mat- 
ter :  for  if  this  could  be  divided  into  two,  one  part 
might  be  moved  and  the  other  at  rest,  which  is  con- 
trary to  the  supposition.  In  like  manner  it  has  been 
argued,*  and,  for  any  thing  appearing  to  the  contrary, 
justly,  that  since  the  perception  or  consciousness,  which 

*  See  Dr.  Clarke's  Letter  to  Mr.  DoJivelL  and  the  defences  of  it. 


vChap.  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  85 

we  have  of  our  own  existence,  is  indivisible,  so  as  that 
it  i  a  contradiction  to  suppose  one  part  of  it  should  be 
here  and  the  other  there,  the  perceptive  power,  or  the 
power  of  consciousness,  is  indivisible  too  ;  and  conse- 
que  tly  the  subject  in  which  it  resides,  i.  e.  the  con- 
scious being.  Now  upon  supposition  that  living  agent 
each  man  calls  himself,  is  thus  a  single  being,  which 
there  is  at  least  no  more  difficulty  in  conceiving  than  in 
conceiving  it  to  be  a  compound,  and  of  which  there  is 
the  proof  now  mentioned,  it  follows,  that  our  organ- 
ized bodies  are  no  more  ourselves  or  part  of  ourselves, 
than  any  other  matter  around  us.  And  it  is  as  easy 
to  conceive  how  matter,  which  is  no  part  of  ourselves, 
may  be  appropriated  to  us  in  the  manner  which  our 
present  bodies  are,  as  how  we  can  receive  impressions 
from,  and  have  power  over  any  matter.  It  is  as  easy 
to  conceive  that  we  may  exist  out  of  bodies,  as  in 
them ;  that  we  might  have  animated  bodies  of  any 
other  organs  and  senses  wholly  different  from  these 
now  given  us,  and  that  we  may  hereafter  animate  these 
same  or  new  bodies  variously  modified  and  organized, 
as  to  conceive  how  we  can  animate  such  bodies  as  our 
present.  And  lastly,  the  dissolution  of  all  these  several 
organized  bodies,  supposing  ourselves  to  have  succes- 
sively animated  them,  would  have  no  more  conceiva- 
ble tendency  to  destroy  the  living  beings  ourselves,  or 
deprive  us  of  living  faculties,  the  faculties  of  percep- 
tion and  of  action,  than  the  dissolution  of  any  foreign 
matter,  which  we  are  capable  of  receiving  impressions 
from,  and  making  use  of  for  the  common  occasions  oi' 
life. 

II.     The  simplicity  and  absolute  oneness  of  a  living  ' 
agent  cannot,  indeed,  from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  be 
properly  proved  by   experimental  observations.     But 
as   these  fall  in  with  the  supposition   of  its  unity,  sq 


S&  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  L 

they  plainly  lead  us  to  conclude  certainly,  that   our 
grobs  organized  bodies,  with  which  we  perceive  the 
objects  of  sense,  and  with  which  we  act,  are  no  part  of 
ourselves  ;  and  therefore  show   us,  that  we  have  no 
reason  to  believe  their  destruction  to  be   ours,  even 
without  determining  whether  our  living  substances  be 
material  or  immaterial.     For  we  see   by  experience, 
that  men  may  lose  their  limbs,  their  organs  of  sense, 
and  even  the  greatest  part  of  these  bodies,  and  yet  re- 
main the  same  living  agents.     And  persons  can  trace 
up  the  existence  of  themselves   to  a  time,  when   the 
bulk  of  their  bodies  was  extremely  small,  in  compari- 
son of  what  it  is  in  mature  age  ;  and  we  cannot   but 
think  that  they  might  then  have  lost   a  considerable 
part  of  that  small  body,  and  yet  have  remained   the 
same  living  agents  ;  as  they  may   now  lose  great  part 
of  their  present  body,  and  remain  so.     And  it  is  cer- 
tain that  the  bodies  of  all   animals  are  in  a  constant 
flux,  from  that  never  ceasing  attrition  which  there  is 
in.  every  part  of  them.     Now  things  of  this  kind  un- 
avoidably teach  us  to  distinguish  between  these  living 
agents  ourselves,  and  large  quantities   of  matter,   in 
which  we  are  very  nearly  interested  ;  since  these  may 
be  alienated,  and  actually  are  in  a  daily  course  of  suc- 
cession, and  changing  their  owners  ;  whilst  we  ?re  as- 
sured, that  each  living  agent  remains  one  and  the  same 
permanent  bt- ing  *    And  this  general  observation,  leads 
us  on  to  the  following  ones. 

First,  That  we  have  no  way  of  determining  by  ex- 
perience, what  is  the  certain  bulk  of  the  living/being 
each  man  calls  himself  ;  and  yet,  till  it  be  determined 
that  it  is  larger  in  bulk  than  the  solid  elementary  par- 
ticles of  matter,  which  there  is  no  ground  to  think  any 

*  See  Biticrtation  1 . 


Chap.  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  87 

natural  power  can  dissolve,  there  is  no  sort  of  reason 
to  think  death  to  be  the  dissolution  of  it,  of  the  living 
being,  even  though  it  should  not  be  absolutely  indis- 
cerptible. 

Secondly \  From  our  being  so  nearly  related  to  and 
interested  in  certain  systems  of  matter,  suppose  our 
flesh  and  bones,  and  afterwards  ceasing  to  be  at  all  re- 
lated to  them,  the  living  agents  ourselves  remaining 
all  this  while  undestroyed,  notwithstanding  such  alie- 
nation ;  and  consequently  these  systems  of  matter  not 
being  ourselves,  it  follows  further,  that  we  have  no 
ground  to  conclude  any  other,  suppose  internal  systems 
of  matter,  to  be  the  living  agents  ourselves  ;  because 
we  can  have  no  ground  to  conclude  this,  but  from 
our  relation  to  and  interest  in  such  other  systems  df 
matter ;  and  therefore  we  can  have  no  reason  to  con- 
clude, what  befalls  thot>e  systems  of  matter  at  death,  to 
be  the  destruction  of  the  living  agents.  We  have  al- 
ready several  times  over  lost  a  great  part  or  perhaps 
the  whole  of  our  body,  according  to  certain  common 
established  laws  of  nature,  yet  we  remain  the  same 
living  agents  ;  when  we  shall  lose  as  great  a  part,  or 
the  whole,  by  another  common  established  law  of  na- 
ture, death,  why  may  we  not  also  remain  the  same  :? 
That  the  alienation  has  been  gradual  in  one  case,  and 
in  the  other  will  be  more  at  once,  does  not  prove  any- 
thing to  the  contrary.  We  have  passed  undestroyed 
through  those  many  and  great  revolutions  of  matter, 
so  peculiarly  appropriated  to  us  ourselves ;  why  should 
we  imagine  death  will  be  so  fatal  to  us  ?  Nor  can  it 
be  objected,  that  what  is  thus  alienated  or  lost,  is  no 
part  of  our  original  solid  body,  but  only  adventitious 
matter  ;  because  we  may  lose  entire  limbs,  which 
must  have-contained  many  solid  parts  and  vessels  of  the 
originafbody  ;  or  if  this  be  not  admitted,  we  have  no 


88  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  L 

proof,  that  any  of  these  solid  parts  are  dissolved  or  al- 
ienated by  death.  Though,  by  the  way,  we  are  very 
nearly  related  to  that  extraneous  or  adventitious  mat- 
ter, whilst  it  continues  united  to  and  distending  the  seve- 
ral parts  of  our  solid  body.  But  after  all,  the  relation  a 
person  bears  to  those  parts  of  his  body  to  which  he  is 
the  most  nearly  related,  what  does  it  appear  to  amount 
to  but  this,  that  the  living  agent  and  those  parts  of  the 
body  mutually  affect  each  other  ?  And  the  same  thing, 
the  same  thing  in  kind,  though  not  in  degree,  may  be 
said  of  all  foreign  matter,  which  gives  us  ideas,  and 
which  we  have  any  power  over.  From  these  obser- 
vations, the  whole  ground  of  the  imagination  is  re- 
moved, that  the  dissolution  of  any  matter  is  the  destruc- 
tion of  a  living  agent  from  the  interest  he  once  had  in 
such  mattery 

Thirdly ,  If  we  consider  our  body  somewhat  more 
distinctly,  as  made  up  of  organs  and  instruments  of 
perception  and  of  motion,  it  will  bring  us  to  the  same 
conclusion.  Thus  the  common  optical  experiments 
show,  and  even  the  observation  how  sight  is  assisted  by 
glasses  shows,  that  we  see  with  our  eyes  in  the  same 
sense  as  we  see  with  glasses.  Nor  is  there  any  reason 
to  believe,  that  we  see  with  them  in  any  other  sense  ; 
any  other,  I  mean,  which  would  lead  us  to  think  the 
eye  itself  a  percipient.  The  like  is  to  be  said  of  hear- 
ing ;  and  our  feeling  distant  solid  matter  by  means  of 
somewhat  in  our  hand,  seems  an  instance  of  the  like 
kind  as  to  the  subject  we  are  considering.  All  these 
are  instances  of  foreign  matter,  or  such  as  is  no  part  of 
our  body,  being  instrumental  in  preparing  objects  for, 
and  conveying  them  to  the  perceiving  power,  in  a 
manner  similar  or  like  to  the  manner  in  which  our 
organs  of  sense  prepare  and  convey  them.  Both  are 
in  a  like  way  instruments  of  our  receiving  such  ideas 


Chap.  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  89 

* 
from  external  objects,  as  the  Author  of  nature  ap- 
pointed  those  external    objects  to  be   the  occasions  of* 
exciting  in  us.     However*  glasses   are  evidently    in* 
stances  of  this  ;  namely  of  matter  which  i    no  part  of 
our  body,  preparing  objects    for  and  conveying  them 
towards  the  perceiving  power,  in  like  manner  as  our 
bodily  organs  do.     And  if  we  see  with  our  eyes  only 
in  the  same  manner  as  we   do   with  glasses,  the  like 
may  justly  be  concluded,  from  analogy,  of  all  our  oth- 
er senses.     It  is  not  intended,  by  any  thing  here  said, 
to  affirm,   that  the  whole  apparatus    of  vision,  or  of 
perception  by  any  other  of  our  senses,  can  be  traced* 
through  all  its    steps,  quite  up  to  the  living  power  of 
seeing,  or  perceiving  ;  but  that  so  far  as  it  can  be  tra- 
ced by  experimental  observations,  so  far  it  appears,  that 
our  organs  of  sense  prepare  and  convey  on  objects,  in 
order  to  their  being  perceived,  in  like  manner  as   for- 
eign matter  does,  without  affording  any  shadow  of  ap- 
pearance that  they  themselves  perceive.     And  that  we 
have,  no  reason  to  think  our  organs    of  sense  percipi- 
ents, is  confirmed  by  instances  of  persons  losing  some 
of  them,  the  living  beings  themselves,  their  former 
occupiers,  remaining    unimpaired.      It  is   confirmed 
also  by  the  experience  of  dreams  ;  by  which  we  find 
we  are  at  present  possessed  of  a  latent,  and,  what  would 
other wie  be,  an  unimagined,  unknown  power  of  per- 
ceiving sensible  objects,  in  as  strong  and  lively  a  man- 
ner without  our  external  organs  of  sense  as  with  them* 
So  also  with  regard  to  our  power  of  moving,  or  di- 
recting motion  by  will  and  choice  :  upon  the  destruc- 
tion of  a  limb,  this  active    power    remains,  as  it  evi- 
dently seems,  unlessened  ;  so  as  that  the  living  beings 
who   has  suffered  this  loss,  would  be  capable  of  mov- 
ing as  before,  if  it  had  another  limb  to  move  with* 
It  can  walk  by  the  help  of  an  artificial  leg  j  just  as  it 

M 


90  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  I. 

can  make  use  of  a  pole  or  a  leaver,  to  reach  towards 
itself,  and  to  move  things,  beyond  the  length  and  the. 
power  of  its  natural  arm  ;  and  this  last  it  does  in  the 
same  manner  as  it  reaches  and  moves,  with  its  natural 
arm,  things  nearer  and  of  less  weight.  Nor  is  there 
so  much  as  any  appearance  of  our  limbs  being  endu- 
ed with  a  power  of  moving  or  directing  themselves, 
though  they  are  adapted,  like  the  several  parts  of  a 
machine,  to  be  the  instruments  of  motion  to  each 
other,  and  some  parts  of  the  ^ame  limb,  to  be  instru- 
ments of  motion  to  other  parts  of  it. 

Thus  a  man  determines,  that  he  will  look  at  such 
an  object  through  a  microscope  ;  or  being  lame  sup- 
pose, that  he  will  walk  to  such  a  place  with  a  staff  a 
week  hence.  His  eyes  and  his  feet  no  more  deter- 
mine in  these  cases,  than  the  microscope  and  the 
staff.  Nor  is  there  any  ground  to  think  they  any 
more  put  the  determination  in  practice  ;  or  that  his 
eyes  are  the  seers  or  his  feet  the  movers,  in  any  other 
sense  than  as  the  microscope  and  the  staff  are.  Upon 
the  whole  then,  our  organs  of  sense  and  our  limbs  are 
certainly  instruments,  which  the  living  persons  our- 
selves make  use  of  to  perceive  and  move  with  ;  there 
is  not  ary  probability  that  they  are  any  more,  nor  con- 
sequently, that  we  have  any  other  kind  of  relation  to 
them  than  what  we  may  have  to  any  other  foreign 
matter  formed  into  instruments  of  perception  and 
motion,  suppose  into  a  microscope  or  a  staff ;  (I  say 
any  other  kind  of  relation,  for  I  am  not  speaking  of 
the  degree  of  it)  nor  consequently  is  there  any  proba- 
bility, that  the  alienation  or  dissolution  of  these  in- 
struments is  the  destruction  of  the  perceiving  and 
moving  agent. 

And  thus  our  finding,  that  the  dissolution  of  mat- 
ter, in  which  living  beings  were  most  nearly  interested, 


Chap.  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  91 

is  not  their  dissolution,  and  that  the  destruction  of 
several  of  the  organs  and  instruments  of  perception  and 
of  motion  belonging  to  them,  is  not  their  destruction, 
shows  demonstratively,  that  there  js  no  ground  to 
think  that  the  dissolution  of  any  other  matter,  or  de- 
struction of  any  other  organs  and  instruments,  will  be 
the  dissolution  or  destruction  of  living  agents,  from 
the  like  kind  of  relation.  And  we  have  no  reason  to 
think  we  stand  in  any  other  kind  of  relation  to  any 
thing  which  we  find  dissolved  by  death. 

But  it  is  said  these  observations  are  equally  applicable 
to  brutes  ;  and  it  is  thought  an  insuperable  difficulty, 
that  they  should  be  immortal,  and  by  consequence  ca- 
pable of  everlasting  happiness.  Now  this  manner  of 
expression  is  both  invidious  and  weak  ;  but  the  thing 
intended  by  it,  is  really  no  difficulty  at  all,  either  in  the 
way  of  natural  or  moral  consideration.  For  first,  sup- 
pose the  invidious  thing,  designed  in  such  a  manner  of 
expression,  were  really  implied,  as  it  is  not  in  the  lea>t 
in  the  natural  immortality  of  brutes  ;  namely,  that 
they  must  arrive  at  great  attainments,  and  become  ra- 
tional and  moral  agents ;  even  this  would  be  no  diffi- 
culty, since  we  know  not  what  latent  powers  and  ca- 
pacities they  may  be  endued  with.  There  was  once, 
prior  to  experience,  as  great  presumption  against  hu- 
man creatures,  as  there  is  against  the  brute  creatures, 
arriving  at  that  degree  of  understanding,  which  we  have 
in  mature  age.  For  we  can  trace  up  our  own  exist- 
ence to  the  same  original  with  theirs.  And  we  find  it 
to  be  a  general  law  of  nature,  that  creatures  endued 
with  capacities  of  virtue  and  religion,  should  be  placed 
in  a  condition  of  being,  in  which  they  are  altogether 
without  the  use  of  them,  for  a  considerable  length  of 
their  duration  ;  as  in  infancy  and  childhood.  And 
great  part  of  the  human  species  go  out  of  the  present 


92  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  I, 

world,  before  they  come  to  the  exercise  of  these  ca- 
pacities in  any  degree  at  all.  But  then,  secondly,  the 
n  tural  immortality  of  brutes  does  not  in  the  least  im» 
ply,  that  they  are  endu-d  with  any  latent  capacities  of 
a  rational  or  moral  nature.  And  the  economy  of  the 
universv  might  require,  that  there  should  be  living  crea- 
tures without  any  capacities  of  this  kind.  And  all  dif- 
ficulties as  to  the  manner  how  they  are  to  be  disposed 
of,  are  so  apparently  and  wholly  founded  in  our  igno- 
rance, that  it  is  wonderful  they  should  be  in  isted  upon 
by  any,  but  such  as  are  weak,  enough  to  think  they  are 
acquainted  with  the  whole  system  of  things.  There  is 
th  n  absolutely  nothing  at  all  in  this  objection  which  is 
so  rhetorically  urged  against  the  greatest  part  of  the 
na'ural  proofs  or  presumptions  of  the  immortality  of 
human  minds  :  I  say  the  greatest  part ;  fork  is  less 
applicable  to  the  following  observation,  which  is  more 
p  culiar  to  mankind  : 

//flT.  That  as  it  is  evident  our  present  powers  3nd  ca- 
paciti.s  of  reason,  memory  and  affection,  do  not  de- 
pend upon  our  gross  body  in  the  manner  in  which  per- 
ception by  our  organs  of  sense  does  ;  so  they  do  not 
appear  to  depend  upon  it  at  all  in  any  such  manner, 
as  to  give  ground  to  think,  that  the  dissolution  of  this 
t>-">dy,  wrill  be  the  destruction  of  these  our  present  pow- 
ers of  reflection,  as  it  will  of  our  powers  of  sensation  ; 
or  to  g've  ground  to  conclude  even  that  it  will  be  so 
much  as  a  suspension  of  the  former. 

Human  creatures  exist  at  present  in  two  states  of 
life  and  perception,  greatly  different  from  each  other  ; 
each  of  which  has  its  own  peculiar  laws,  and  its  own 
peculiar  enjoyments  and  sufferings.  When  any  of  our 
senses  are  affected  or  appetites  gratified  with  the  ob- 
j  cts  of  them,  we  may  be  said  to  exist  or  live  in  a  state 
gf  ben.ation.     When  none  of  our  senses  are  affected  or 


Chap.  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  93 

appetites  gratified,  and  yet  we  perceive  and  reason  and 
act,  we  may  be  said  to  exist  or  live  in  a  state  of  reflec- 
tion. Now  it  is  by  no  means  certain,  that  any  thing 
which  is  dissolved  by  death,  is  any  way  necessary  to  the 
living  being  in  this  its  state  of  reflection,  alter  ideas  are 
gained.  For,  though  from  our  present  constitution 
and  condition  of  being,  our  external  organs  of  sense 
are  necessary  for  conveying  in  ideas  to  our  reflecting 
powers  as  carriages  and  leavers  and  scaffolds  are  in 
architecture  ;  yet  when  these  ideas  are  brought  in,  we 
are  capable  of  reflecting  in  the  most  intense  degree,  and 
of  enjoying  the  greatest  pleasure,  and  feeling  the  great- 
est pain  by  means  of  that  reflection,  without  any  as- 
sistance from  our  senses  ;  and  without  any  at  all,  which 
we  know  of,  from  that  body  which  will  be  dissolved  by 
death*  It  does  not  appear  then,  that  the  relation  of 
this  gross  body  to  the  reflecting  being,  is,  in  any  de- 
gree, necessary  to  thinking1;  to  our  intellectual  enjoy- 
ments or  sufferings  :  nor,  consequently,  that  the  dis- 
solution or  alienation  of  the  former  by  death,  will  be 
the  destruction  of  those  present  powers,  which  render 
us  capable  of  this  state  of  reflection.  Further,  there 
are  instances  of  mortal  diseases,  which  do  not  at  all  af- 
fect our  present  intellectual  powers  ;  and  this  affords 
a  presumption,  that  those  diseases  will  not  destroy  these 
present  powers.  Indeed,  from  the  observations  made 
above,*  it  appears,  that  there  is  no  presumption,  from 
their  mutually  affecting  each  other,  that  the  dissolu- 
tion of  the  Body  is  the  destruction  of  the  living  agent. 
And  by  the  same  reasoning,  it  must  appear  too,  that 
there  is  no  presumption,  from  their  mutually  affecting 
each  other,  that  the  dissolution  of  the  body  is  the  de- 
struction of  our  present  reflecting  powers  ;  but  instan- 

*  P.  86,  87,  88. 


94  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  L 

ces  of  their  not  affecting  each  other,  afford  a  presump- 
tion of  the  contrary.  Instances  of  mortal  diseases  not 
impairing  our  present  reflecting  powers,  evidently  turn 
our  thoughts  even  from  imagining  such  diseases  to  be 
the  destruction  of  them.  Several  things  indeed  great- 
ly affect  all  our  living  powers,  and  at  length  suspend 
the  exercise  of  them  ;  as  for  instance  drowsiness,  in- 
creasing till  it  ends  in  sound  sleep  ;  and  from  hence 
we  might  have  imagined  it  would  destroy  them,  till 
we  found  by  experience  the  weakness  of  this  way  of 
judging.  But  in  the  diseases  now  mentioned,  there  is 
not  so  much  as  this  shadow  of  probability,  to  lead  us 
to  any  such  conclusion,  as  to  the  reflecting  powers 
which  we  have  at  present  ;  for  in  tho;  e  diseases,  per- 
sons the  moment  before  death  appear  to  be  in  the 
highest  vigour  of  life  ;  they  discover  apprehension, 
memory,  reason,  all  entire  ;  with  the  utmost  force  of 
affection  ;  sen  re  of  a  character,  of  >hame  and  honour  ; 
and  the  highest  mental  enjoyments  and  sufferings, 
even  to  the  last  gasp  :  and  these  surely  prove  even 
greater  vigor  of  life  than  bodily  strength  does.  Now 
what  pretence  is  there  for  thinking,  that  a  progressive 
disease  when  arrived  to  such  a  degree,  I  mean  that  de- 
gree which  is  mortal,  will  destroy  those  powers  which 
were  not  impaired,  which  were  not  affected  by  it,  dur- 
ing its  whole  progress  quite  up  to  that  degree  ?  And 
if  death,  by  diseases  of  this  kind,  is  not  the  destruc- 
tion of  our  present  reflecting  powers,  it  will  scarce  be 
thought  that  death  by  any  other  means  is. 

It  is  obvious  that  thi*  general  observation  may  be 
■carried  on  further ;  and  there  appears  so  little  con- 
nexion between  our  bodily  powers  of  sensation,  and 
our  present  powers  of  reflection,  that  there  is  no  reason 
to  conclude,  that  death,  which  destroys  the  former, 
does  *o  much  as  suspend  the  exercise  of  the  latter,  or 


Chap.  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  9S 

interrupt  our  continuing  to  exist  in  the  like  state  of  re- 
flection which  we  do  now.  For  suspension  of  reason, 
memory,  and  the  affections  which  they  excite,  is  no 
part  of  the  idea  of  death,  nor  U  implied  in  our  notion 
of  it.  And  our  daily  experiencing  these  powers  to  be 
exercised,  without  any  assistance,  that  we  know  of, 
from  those  bodies,  which  will  be  dissolved  by  death  ; 
and  our  rinding  often  that  the  exercise  of  them  is  so 
lively  to  the  last ;  these  things  afford  a  sensible  appre- 
hension, that  death  may  not  perhaps  be  so  much  as  a 
discontinuance  of  the  exercise  of  these  powers,  nor  of 
the  enjoyments  and  sufferings  which  it  implies.*  So 
that  our  posthumous  life,  whatever  there  may  be  in  it 
additional  to  our  present,  yet  may  not  be  entirely  be- 
ginning anew,  but  going  on.  Death  may,  in  some 
sort,  and  in  some  respects,  answer  to  our  birth  ;  which 
is  not  a  suspension  of  the  faculties  which  we  had  be- 
fore it,  or  a  total  change  of  the  state  of  life  in  which 
we  existed  when  in  the  womb  ;  but  a  continuation  of 
both,  with  such  ar\d    uch  great  alterations. 

Nay,  for  what  we  know  of  ourselves,  of  our  present 
life  and  of  death,  death  may  immediately,  in  the  nat- 
ural course  of  things,  put  us  into  a  higher  and  more 
enlarged  state  of  life,  as  our  birth  does  ;f  a  state  in 

*  There  are  three  distinct  questions,  relating  to  a  future  life,  here  consid- 
ered :  whether  death  be  the  destruction  of  living  agents  ;  if  not,  whether 
it  be  the  destruction  of  their  present  powers  of  reflection,  as  it  certainly  is- 
the  destruction  of  their  present  powers  of  sensation;  and  if  not,  -u/hether  it 
be  the  suspension,  or  discontinuance  of  the  exercise,  of  these  present  reflect" 
ing  powers.  Now,  if  there  be  no  reason  to  believe  the  last,  there  will  be,  if 
that  were  possible,  less  for  the  next,  and  less  still  for  the  first. 

f  This,  according  to  Strabo,  was  the  opinion  of  the  Brackmans, 

VOf&ifyiv  piv  y<*£  tiq  tov  fu.lv  ivQetdl  fitov,  ug  xv  autQUp  K^otc'ivuv  uvxi'  tov  & 
Sxvxtov,  yivariv  tig  tov  ovToog  /3/W,  Koti  tov  iv^ot(uo»x  Toig  QiXoo-o$4ca.<rf 
Lib  XV.  p.  1039.  Ed.  Amst.  1707-  To  which  opinion  per- 
haps Antoninus  may    allude  in  these  words,  ug    vvv  ■zui^uivuc*  T«m 

ep&gvov  ik  tjjj  yugT^bg  rv\v  yvvcttKog  e-«  s^sA^"/?,  VTag  ix.$i%-aS jk*  tkv  upnv 
h  q   to  4,*/#*g'dV  *^  T*  ^A'JTgy  t*t»   sK7ri<ruTxt.      Lib.  IX.    C^.  3. 


96  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  f. 

which  our  capacities  and  sphere  of  perception  and 
of  action  may  be  much  greater  than  at  present.  For* 
as  our  relation  to  our  external  organs  of  sense  ren- 
ders us  capable  of  existing  in  our  present  state  of 
sensation,  so  it  may  be  the  only  natural  hindrance 
to  our  existing,  immediately  and  of  course,  in  a 
higher  state  of  reflection.  The  truth  is,  reason  does 
not  at  all  shew  us  in  what  state  death  naturally  leaves 
u>.  But  were  we  sure  that  it  would  suspend  all  our 
perceptive  and  active  powers,  yet  the  suspension  of 
a  power  and  the  destruction  of  it  are  effects  so  to- 
tally different  in  kind,  as  we  experience  from  sleep 
and  a  swoon,  that  we  cannot  in  any  wise  argue  from 
one  to  the  other,  or  conclude,  even  to  the  lowest 
degree  of  probability,  that  the  same  kind  of  force 
which  is  sufficient  to  suspend  our  faculties,  though 
it  be  increased  ever  so  much,  will  be  sufficient  to 
destroy  them. 

These  observations  together  may  be  sufficient  to 
shew,  how  little  presumption  there  is,  that  death  is 
the  destruction  of  human  creatures.  However,  there 
is  the  shadow  of  an  analogy  which  may  lead  us  to 
imagine  it  is  ;  the  supposed  likeness  which  is  obst  rv- 
ed  between  the  decay  of  vegetables,  and  of  living 
creatures.  And  this  likeness  is  indeed  sufficient  to 
afford  the  poets  very  apt  allusions  to  the  flowers  of 
the  field,  in  their  pictures  of  the  frailty  of  our  present 
life.  But  in  reason,  the  analogy  is  so  far  from  hold- 
ing, that  there  appears  no  ground  even  for  the  com- 
parison, as  to  the  present  question  ;  because  one  of  the 
two  subjects  compared  is  wholly  void  of  that,  which  is 
the  principal  and  chief  thing  in  the  other,  the  power 
of  perception  and  of  action,  and  which  is  the  only 
thing  we  are  inquiring  about  the  continuance  of  ;  so 
that  the  destruction  of  a  vegetable   is  an  event  not 


Chap.  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  9? 

similar  or  analogous  to  the  destruction  of  a  living 
agent* 

But  if,  as  was  above  intimated,  leaving  off  the  de- 
lusive custom  of  substituting  imagination  in  the  room 
of  experience,  we  would  confine  ourselves  to  what  we 
do  know  and  understand,  if  we  would  argue  only  from 
that^  and  from  that  form  our  expectations,  it  w  ould 
appear  at  first  sight,  that  as  no  probability  of  living 
beings  ever  ceasing  to  be  so,  can  be  concluded  from 
the  reason  of  the  thing,  so  none  can  be  collected  from 
the  analogy  of  nature,  because  we  cannot  trace  any 
living  beings  beyond  death.  But  as  we  are  conscious 
that  we  are  endued  with  capacities  of  perception  and 
of  action,  and  are  living  persons,  what  we  are  to  go 
upon  is,  that  we  shall  continue  so,  until  we  foresee 
some  accident  or  event  which  will  endanger  those  ca- 
pacities, or  be  likely  to  destroy  us  ;  which  death  does 
in  no  wise  appear  to  be. 

And  thus,  when  we  go  out  of  this  world,  we  may 
pass  into  new  scenes,  and  a  new  state  of  life  and  ac- 
tion, just  as  naturally  as  we  came  into  the  present* 
And  this  new  state  may  naturally  be  a  social  one. 
And  the  advantages  of  it,  advantages  of  every  kind* 
may  naturally  be  bestowed,  according  to  some  fixed 
general  laws  of  wisdom,  upon  every  one  in  proportion 
to  the  degrees  of  his  virtue.  And  though  the  ad- 
vantages of  that  future  natural  state,  should  not  be 
bestowed,  as  these  of  the  present  in  some  measure  are, 
by  the  will  of  the  society,  but  entirely  by  his  more 
immediate  action,  upon  whom  the  whole  frame  of  na- 
ture depends  ;  yet  this  distribution  may  be  just  as 
natural  as  there  being  distributed  here  by  the  instru- 
mentality of  men.  And  indeed,  though  one  were  to 
allow  any  confused  undetermined  sense,  which  people 
please  to  put  upon  the  word   natural^  it  would  be  a 

N 


93  Of  a  Future  Life.  Part  L 

shortness  of  thought  scarce  credible,  to  imagine  that 
no  system  or  course  of  things  can  be  so,  but  only  what 
we  see  at  present  ;  especially  whilst  the  probability  of 
a  future  life,  or  the  natural  immortality  of  the  soul,  is 
admitted  upon  the  evidence  of  reason  ;  because  this  is 
really  both  admitting  and  denying  at  once,  a  state  of 
being  different  from  the  present  to  be  natural.  But 
the  only  distinct  meaning  of  that  word  is  stated^  fixed, 
or  settled ;  since  what  is  natural,  as  much  requires  and 
presupposes  an  intelligent  agent  to  render  it  so,  i.  e.  to 
effect  it  continually  or  at  stated  times,  as  what  is  su- 
pernatural or  miraculous  does  to  effect  it  for  once. 
And  from  hence  it  must  follow,  that  persons'  notion  of 
what  is  natural,  will  be  enlarged  in  proportion  to  their 
greater  knowledge  of  the  works  of  God,  and  the  dis- 
pensations of  his  providence.  Nor  is  there  any  ab- 
surdity in  supposing,  that  there  may  be  beings  in  the 
universe,  whose  capacities,  and  knowledge,  and  views, 
may  be  so  extensive,  as  that  the  whole  christian  dis- 
pensation may  to  them  appear  natural,  i.  e.  analogous 
or  conformable  to  God's  dealings  with  other  parts  of 
his  creation ;  as  natural  as  the  visible  known  course 
of  things  appears  to  us.  For  there  seems  scarce  any 
other  possible  sense  to  be  put  upon  the  word,  but  that 
only  in  which  it  is  here  used  j  similar,  stated,  or 
uniform. 

This  credibility  of  a  future  life,  which  has  been 
here  insisted  upon,  how  little  soever  it  may  satisfy  our 
curiosity,  seems  to  answer  all  the  purposes  of  religion, 
in  like  manner  as  a  demonstrative  proof  would.  In- 
deed a  proof,  even  a  demonstrative  one,  of  a  future 
life,  would  not  be  a  proof  of  religion.  For  that  we 
are  to  live  hereafter,  is  just  as  reconcilcable  with  the 
scheme  of  atheism,  and  as  well  to  be  accounted  for  by 
it,  as  that  we  are  now  alive,  is  ;  and  therefore  nothing 


Chap.  I.  Of  a  Future  Life.  99 

can  be  more  absurd  than  to  argue  from  that  scheme, 
that  there  can  be  no  future  state.  But  as  religion  im- 
plies a  future  state,  any  presumption  against  such  a 
state  is  a  presumption  against  religion.  And  the  fore- 
going observations  remove  all  presumptions  of  that 
sort,  and  prove,  to  a  very  considerable  degree  of  prob- 
ability, one  fundamental  doctrine  of  religion  ;  which, 
if  believed,  would  greatly  open  and  dispose  the  mind 
seriously  to  attend  to  the  general  evidence  of  the 
whole. 


100  Of  the  Government  of  God  Part  I. 


CHAP.  II. 


Of  the   Government  ef  God  by  Rewards  and  Punish- 
ments  ;  and  particularly  of  the  latter. 

That  which  makes  the  question  concerning  a 
future  life  to  be  of  so  great  importance  to  us,  is 
our  capacity  of  happiness  and  misery.  And  that 
which  makes  the  consideration  of  it  to  be  of  so  great 
importance  to  us,  is  the  supposition  of  our  happiness 
and  misery  hereafter  depending  upon  our  actions  here. 
Without  this,  indeed,  curiosity  could  not  but  some- 
times bring  a  subject,  in  which  we  may  be  so  highly 
in-erested,  to  our  thoughts  ;  especially  upon  the  mor- 
tality of  others,  or  the  near  prospect  of  our  own.  But 
reasonable  men  would  not  take  any  farther  thought 
about  hereafter,  than  what  should  happen  thus  occa- 
sionally to  rise  in  their  minds,  if  it  were  certain  that  our 
future  interest  no  way  depended  upon  our  present  be- 
haviour ;  whereas,  on  the  contrary,  if  there  be  ground, 
either  from  analogy  or  any  thing  else,  to  think  it  does, 
then  there  is  reason  also  for  the  most  active  thought 
and  solicitude  to  secure  that  interest,  to  behave  so  as 
that  we  may  escape  that  misery  and  obtain  that  hap- 
piness in  another  life,  which  we  not  only  suppose  our- 
selves capable  of,  but  which  we  apprehend  also  is  put 
in  our  own  power.  And  whether  there  be  ground  for 
this  last  apprehension,  certainly  would  deserve  to  be 
most  seriously  considered,  were  there  no  other  proof 
of  a  future  life  and  interest  than  that  presumptive  one 
which  the  foregoing  observations  amount  to. 


Chap.  II.     by  Rewards  and  Punishments.  101 

Now  in  the  present  state,  all  which  we  enjoy,  and  a 
g**eat  part  of  what  we  suffer,  is  put  in  our  own  power. 
For  pleasure  and  pain  are  the  consequence*  of  our  ac- 
tions ;  and  we  are  endued  by   the  author  of  our  na- 
ture with  capacities  of  foreseeing  these  consequences. 
We  find  by  experience  he  does  not  so  much  as  pre- 
serve our  lives,  exclusively  of  our  own  care  and  ?tten- 
tion  to  provide  ourselves   with,  and  to  make  use  of, 
that  sustenance,  by  which  he  has  appointed  our  lives 
shall  be  preserved,  and  without  which,  he  has  appoint- 
ed they  shall  not  be  preserved  at  all.     And  in  general 
we  foresee  that  the  external  things,  which  are  the  ob- 
jects of  our  various  passions,  can  neither  be  obtained 
nor  enjoyed  without  exerting  ourselves  in   such  and 
such  manners  ;  but  by  thus  exerting  ourselves,    we 
obtain  and  enjoy    these  objects  in  which  our  natural 
good   consists  ;  or,  by  this    means  G^d  gives   us  the 
posses  ion  and  enjoyment  of  them.     I  know  not  that 
we  have  any  one  kind  or  degree  of  enjoyment,  but  by 
the  means  of  our  own  actions.     And  by  prudence  and 
care  we  may,  for  the  most  part,  pass  our  days  in  tol- 
erable ease  and  quiet ;  or,  on  the  contrary,  we  may  by 
rashness,  ungoverned  passion,  wilfulness,  or  even  by 
negligence,   make  ourselves  as  miserable  as  ever  we 
please.     And  many  do  please  to  make  themselves  ex- 
tremely miserable,  i.  e.  to  do  what  they  know  before- 
hand will  render  them  so.     They  follow  those  ways, 
the  fruit  of  which  they  know  by  instruction,  example,  • 
experience,  will  be  disgrace,  and  poverty,  and  sickness, 
and  untimely  death.     This  every  one  observes  to  be 
the  general  course  of  things  ;  though  it  is  to  be  al- 
lowed, we  cannot  find  by  experience,  that  ail  our  suf- 
ferings are  owing  to  our  own  follies. 

Why  the  author  of  nature  does   not  give  his  crea- 
tures promiscuously  such  and  such  perceptions,  with- 


102  Of  the  Government  of  God        Part  I. 

out  regard  to  their  behaviour  ;  why  he  does  not  make 
them  happy  without  the  instrumentality  of  their  own 
actions,  and  prevent  their  bringing  any  sufferings  up- 
on themselves,  is  another  matter.  Perhaps  there  may 
be  some  impossibilities  in  the  nature  of  things,  which 
we  are  unacquainted  with.  Or  less  happiness,  it  may 
be,  would  upon  the  whole  be  produced  by  such  a 
method  of  conduct,  than  is  by  the  present.  Or  per- 
haps divine  goodness,  with  which,  if  I  mistake  not, 
we  make  very  free  in  our  speculations,  may  not  be  a 
bare  single  disposition  to  produce  happiness,  but  a  dis- 
position to  make  the  good,  the  faithful,  the  honest 
man  happy.  Perhaps  an  infinitely  perfect  mind  may 
be  pleased  with  seeing  his  creatures  behave  suitably 
to  the  nature  which  he  has  given  them,  to  the  rela- 
tions which  he  has  placed  them  in  to  each  other,  and 
to  that  which  they  stand  into  himself  ;  that  relation 
to  himself,  which,  during  their  existence,  is  even 
necessary,  and  which  is  the  most  important  one  of  all. 
Perhaps,  I  say,  an  infinitely  perfect  mind  may  be 
pleased  with  this  moral  piety  of  moral  agents,  in  and 
for  itself;  as  well  as  upon  account  of  its  being  essen- 
tially conducive  to  the  happiness  of  his  creation.  Or 
the  whole  end,  for  which  God  made,  and  thus  governs 
the  world,  may  be  utterly  beyond  the  reach  of  our 
faculties ;  there  may  be  somewhat  in  it  as  impossible 
for  us  to  have  any  conception  of,  as  for  a  blind  man 
t<  >  have  a  conception  of  colours.  But  however  this  be, 
it  is  certain  matter  of  universal  experience,  that  the 
general  method  of  divine  administration  is  forewarn- 
ing us,  or  giving  us  capacities  to  foresee,  with  more  or 
less  clearness,  that  if  we  act  so  and  so,  we  shall  have 
such  enjoyments,  if  so  and  so,  such  sufferings  ;  and 
giving  us  those  enjoyments,  and  making  us  feel  those 
sufferings,  in  consequence  of  our  actions. 


Chap.  II.     by  Rewards  and  Punis /merits.  103 

"  But  ail  this  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  general  course 
of  nature."  True.  This  is  the  very  thing  which  I 
am  observing.  It  is  to  be  ascribed  to  the  general  course 
of  nature  ;  i.  e.  not  surely  to  the  words  or  ideas,  course 
ef  nature,  but  to  him  who  appointed  it,  and  put 
things  into  it  y  or  to  a  course  of  operation,  from  its 
uniformity  or  constancy,  called  natural  ;#  and  which 
necessarily  implies  an  operating  agent.  For  when 
men  iind  themselves  necessitated  to  confess  an  Author 
of  nature,  or  that  God  is  the  natural  Governor  of  the 
world,  they  must  not  deny  this  again,  because  his 
government  is  uniform  ;  they  must  not  deny  that  he 
does  things  at  all,  because  he  does  them  constantly  ; 
because  the  effects  of  his  acting  are  permanent,  wheth- 
er his  acting  r?e  so  or  not,  though  there  is  no  reason  to 
think  it  is  not.  In  short,  every  man,  in  every  thing 
he  does,  naturally  acts  upon  the  forethought  and  ap- 
prehension of  avoiding  evil  or  obtaining  good  \  and  if 
the  natural  course  of  things  be  the  appointment  of 
God,  and  our  natural  faculties  of  knowledge  and  ex- 
perience are  given  us  by  him,  then  the  good  and  bad 
consequences  which  follow  our  actions  are  his  appoint- 
ment, and  our  foresight  of  those  consequences  is  a 
warning  given  us  by  him,  how  we  are  to  act. 

"  Is  the  pleasure  then  naturally  accompanying  every 
particular  gratification  of  passion  intended  to  put  us 
upon  gratifying  ourselves  in  every  such  particular  in- 
stance, and  as  a  reward  to  us  for  so  doing  ?"  No  cer- 
tainly. Nor  is  it  to  be  said,  that  our  eyes  were  natu- 
rally intended  to  give  us  the  sight  of  each  particular 
object,  to  which  they  do  or  can  extend  ;  objects  which 
are  destructive  of  them,  or  which,  for  any  other  rea- 
son, it  may  become  us  to  turn  our  eyes  from.  Yet 
there  is  no  doubt  but  that  our  eyes  were  intended  for 

*  P.  97,  98. 


104  Of  the  Government  of  God         Part  I. 

us  to  see  with.  So  neither  is  there  any  doubt  but 
that  the  fore  een  plea  ures  and  pains  belonging  to  the 
passions  were  intended,  in  general,  to  induce  mankind 
to  act  in  such  and  such  manners. 

Now  from  this  general  observation,  obvious  to  eve- 
ry one,  that  God  ha^  given  us  to  understand  he  has  ap* 
pointed  satisfaction  and  delight  to  be  the  consequence 
of  our  acting  in  one  manner,  and  pain  and  uneasiness 
of  our  acting  in  another,  and  of  our  not  acting  at-  all ; 
and  that  we  find  the  consequences  which  we  were  be- 
forehand informed  of  uniformly  to  follow — we  may 
learn,  that  we  are  at  present  actually  under  his  govern- 
ment in  the  strictest  and  most  proper  sense  ;  in  such  a 
sense,  as  that  he  rewards  and  punishes  y*s  for  our  ac- 
tions. An  Author  of  nature  being  supposed,  it  is  not 
so  much  a  deduction  of  reason  as  a  matter  of  expe- 
rience, that  we  are  thus  under  his  government ;  under 
his  government,  in  the  same  sense  as  we  are  under  the 
government  of  civil  magistrates.  Because  the  annex- 
ing pleasure  to  some  actions  and  pain  to  others,  in  our 
power  to  do  or  forbear,  and  giving  notice  of  this  ap- 
pointment beforehand  to  those  whom  it  concerns,  is 
the  proper  formal  notion  of  government.  Whether 
the  pleasure  or  pain  which  thus  follows  upon  our  be- 
haviour be  owing  to  the  Author  of  nature's  acting  up- 
on us  every  moment  which  we  feel  it,  or  to  his  having 
at  once  contrived  and  executed  his  own  part  in  the 
plan  of  the  world,  makes  no  alteration  a>  to  the  mat- 
ter before  us.  For  if  civil  magistrates  could  make 
the  sanctions  of  their  laws  take  place,  without  inter- 
posing at  all  after  they  had  passed  them,  without  a  tri- 
al and  the  formalities  of  an  execution  ;  if  they  were 
able  to  make  their  laws  execute  themselves,  or  evjry 
offender  to  execute  them  upon  himself;  we  should  be 
just  in  the  same  sense  under  their  government  then,  as 


Chap.  IL        by  Rewards  and  Punishments*         105 

we  are  now,  but  in  a  much  higher  degree,  and  more 
perfect  manner.  Vain  is  the  ridicule,  with  which  one 
foresees  some  persons  will  divert  themselves,  upon 
finding  lesser  pains  considered  as  instances  of  divine 
punishment.  There  is  no  possibility  of  answering  or 
evading  the  general  thing  here  intended,  without  de- 
nying all  final  causes.  For  final  causes  being  admit- 
ted, the  pleasures  and  pains  now  mentioned  must  be 
admitted  too  as  instances  of  them.  And  if  they  are, 
if  God  annexes  delight  to  some  actions  and  uneasiness 
to  others,  with  an  apparent  design  to  induce  us  to  act 
so  and  so,  then  he  not  only  dispenses  happiness  and 
misery,  but  also  rewards  and  punishes  actions.  I£> 
for  example,  the  pain  which  we  feel,  upon  doing  what 
tends  to  the  destruction  of  our  bodies,  suppose  upon 
too  near  approaches  to  fire,  or  upon  wounding  our- 
selves, be  appointed  by  the  Author  of  nature  to  pre- 
vent our  doing  what  thus  tends  to  our  destruction,  this 
is  altogether  as  much  an  instance  of  his  punishing 
our  actions,  and  consequently  of  our  being  under 
his  government,  as  declaring  by  a  voice  from  heaven 
that  if  we  acted  so,  he  would  inflict  such  pain  up- 
on us,  and  inflicting  it,  whether  it  be  greater  or 
less. 

Thus  we  find,  that  the  true  notion  or  conception  of 
the  Author  of  nature  is  that  of  a  master  or  governor, 
prior  to  the  consideration  of  his  moral  attributes.  The 
fact  of  our  case,  which  we  find  by  experience,  is,  that 
he  actually  exercises  dominion  or  government  over  us 
at  present,  by  rewarding  and  punishing  us  for  our  ac- 
tions, in  as  strict  and  proper  a  sense  of  these  words, 
and  even  in  the  same  sense,  as  children,  servants,  sub- 
jects, are  rewarded  and  punished  by  those  who  govern 
them. 


106  Of  the  Government  of  God         Part  L 

And  thus  the  whole  analogy  of  nature,  the  whole 
present  course  of  things,  most  fully  shows,  that  there 
is  nothing  incredible  in  the  general  doctrine  of  religion, 
that  God  will  reward  and  punish  men  for  their  actions 
hereafter  ;  nothing  incredible,  I  mean,  arising  out  of 
the  notion  of  rewarding  and  punishing.  For  the  whole 
course  of  nature  is  a  present  instance  of  his  exercising 
that  government  over  us,  which  implies  in  it  rewarding 
and  punishing. 


But  as  divine  punishment  is  what  men  chiefly 
object  against,  and  are  most  unwilling  to  allow,  it  may 
be  proper  to  mention  some  circumstances  in  the  nat- 
ural course  of  punishments  at  present,  which  are  an- 
alogous to  what  rtligion  teaches  us  concerning  a  fu- 
ture state  of  punishments  ;  indeed  so  analogous,  that 
as  they  add  a  farther  credibility  to  it,  so  they  cannot 
but  raise  a  most  serious  apprehension  of  it  in  those 
who  will  attend  to  them. 

It  has  been  now  observed,  that  such  and  such  mis- 
eries naturally  follow  such  and  such  actions  of  impru- 
dence and  wilfulness,  as  well  as  actions  more  commonly 
and  more  distinctly  considered  as  vicious;  and  that 
these  consequences,  when  they  may  be  foreseen,  are 
properly  natural  punishments  annexed  to  such  actions. 
For  the  general  thing  here  insisted  upon  is,  not  that  we 
see  a  great  deal  of  misery  in  the  world,  but  a  great 
deal  which  men  bring  upon  themselves  by  their  own 
behaviour,  which  they  might  have  foreseen  and  avoided. 
Now  the  circumstances  of  these  natural  punishments 
particularly  deserving  our  attention,  are  such  as  these  : 
that  oftentimes  they  follow  or  are  inflicted  in  conse- 
quence of  actions,  which    procure   many  present  ad- 


Chap.  II,  by  Punishments.  107 

vantages,  and  are  accompanied  with  much  present 
pleasure;  for  instance,  sickness  and  untimely  death  is 
the  consequence  of  intemperance,  though  accompa- 
nied with  the  highest  mirth  and  jollity  :  that  these  \ 
punishments  are  often  much  greater  than  the  advan-  ) 
tages  or  pleasures  obtained  by  the  actions  of  which  they 
are  the  punishments  or  consequences :  *mat  though 
we  may  imagine  a  constitution  of  nature,  in  which 
these  natural  punishments  which  are  in  fact  to  follow 
would  follow,  immediately  upon  such  actions  being 
done,  or  very  soon  after  ;  we  find  on  the  contrary  in 
our  world,  that  they  are  often  delayed  a  great  while, 
sometimes  even  until  long  after  the  actions  occasioning 
them  are  forgot  ;  so  that  the  constitution  of  nature  is 
such,  that  delay  of  punishment  is  no  sort  nor  degree 
of  presumption  of  final  impunity  :  that  after  such 
deUy,  these  natural  punishments  or  miseries  often 
come,  not  by  degrees,  but  suddenly,  with  violence, 
and  at  once  ;  however,  the  chief  misery  often  does  : 
that  as  certainty  of  such  distant  misery  following  such 
actions  is  never  afforded  persons,  so  perhaps  during 
the  actions  they  have  seldom  a  distinct  full  expecta- 
tion of  its  following  ;*  and  many  times  the  case  is 
only  thus,  that  they  see  in  general,  or  may  see,  the 
credibility  that  intemperance,  suppose,  will  bring  after 
it  di  ease-,  civil  crimes  civil  punishments,  when  yet 
the  real  probability  often  is  that  they  shall  escape  ; 
but  things  notwithstanding  take  their  destined  course, 
and  the  misery  inevitably  follows  at  its  appointed 
time,  in  very  many  of  these  cases.  Thus  also,  though 
youth  may  be  alleged  a>  an  excuse  for  rashness  and 
folly,  as  being  naturally  thoughtless,  and  not  clearly 
foreseeing  all  the  consequences  of  being  untractable 

*  See  Part  II.  Chap.  vi. 


108  Of  the  Government  of  God        Part  I. 

and  profligate,  this  does  not  hinder,  but  that  these 
consequences  follow,  and  are  grievously  felt  throughout 
the  whole  course  of  mature  life.  Habits  contracted 
even  in  that  age  are  often  utter  ruin  ;  and  men's  uc- 
cess  in  the  world,  not  only  in  the  common  jense  of 
worldly  success,  but  their  real  happiness  and  misery 
depends,  in  a  great  degree,  and  in  various  ways,  upon 
the  manner  in  which  they  pass  their  youth  ;  which 
consequences  they  for  the  most  part  neglect  to  con. 
sider,  and  perhaps  seldom  can  properly  be  said  to  be- 
lieve, beforehand.  It  requires  also  to  be  mentioned, 
that  in  numberless  cases  the  natural  course  of  things 
affords  us  opportunities  for  procuring  advantages  to 
ourselves  at  certain  times,  which  we  cannot  procure 
when  we  will,  nor  ever  recal  the  opportunities,  if  we 
have  neglected  them.  Indeed  the  general  course  of 
nature  is  an  example  of  this.  If,  during  the  oppor- 
tunity of  youth,  persons  are  indocile  and  self  willed, 
they  inevitably  suffer  in  their  future  life  for  want  of 
those  acquirements  which  they  neglected  the  natural 
season  of  attaining.  If  the  husbandman  lets  his  seed 
time  pass  without  sowing,  the  whole  year  is  lo^t  to  him 
beyond  recovery.  In  like  manner,  though  after  men 
have  been  guilty  of  folly  and  extravagance  up  to  a  cer- 
tain degree ',  it  is  often  in  their  power,  for  instance,  to 
retrieve  their  affairs,  to  recover  their  health  and  char- 
acter, at  least  in  good  measure  ;  yet  real  reformation 
is,  in  many  cases,  of  no  avail  at  all  towards  preventing 
the  miseries,  poverty,  sickness,  infamy,  naturally  an- 
nexed to  folly  and  extravagance  exceeding  that  degree. 
There  is  a  certain  bound  to  imprudence  and  misbe- 
haviour, which  being  transgressed,  there  remains  no 
place  for  repentance  in  the  natural  course  of  things. 
It  is  further  very  much  to  be  remarked,  that  neglects 


Chap.  II.  by  Punishments.  109 

from  inconsiderateness,  want  of  attention,*  not  look- 
ing about  us  to  see  what  we  have  to  do,  are  often  at- 
tended with  consequences  altogether  as  dreadful  as 
any  active  misbehaviour,  from  the  most  extravagant 
passion.  And  lastly,  civil  government  being  natural, 
the  punishments  of  it  are  so  too  ;  and  some  of  these 
punishments  are  capital,  as  the  effects  of  a  dissolute 
course  of  pleasure  are  often  mortal.  So  that  many 
natural  punishments  are  finalf  to  him  who  incurs 
them,  if  considered  only  in  his  temporal  capacity  ;  and 
seem  inflicted  by  natural  appointment,  either  to  re- 
move the  offender  out  of  the  way  of  being  further  mis- 
chievous ;  or  as  an  example,  though  frequently  a  dis- 
regarded one,  to  those  who  are  left  behind. 

These  things  are  not  what  we  call  accidental,  or  to 
be  met  with  only  now  and  then  ;  but  they  are  things 
of  every  day's  experience  :  they  proceed  from  gene- 
ral laws,  very  general  ones,  by  which  God  governs  the 
world,  in  the  natural  course  of  his  providence.     And 

*  Part  II    Chap.  vi. 

f  Thegeneral  consideration  of  a  future  state  of  punishment,  most  evident- 
ly belongs  to  the  subject  of  natural  religion.  But  if  any  of  these  reflections 
should  be  thought  to  relate  more  particularly  to  this  doctrine,  as  taugh:  in 
scripture,  the  reader  is  desired  to  observe  that  gentile  writers,  both  moralists 
and  poets,  speak  of  the  future  punishment  of  the  wicked,  both  as  to  the  du- 
ration and  degree  of  it,  in  a  like  manner  of  expression  and  of  description  as 
the  scripture  does  So  that  all  which  can  positively  be  asserted  to  be  matter 
of  mere  revelation,  with  regard  to  this  doctrine,  seems  to  be,  that  the  great 
distinction  between  the  righteous  and  the  wicked  shall  be  made  at  the  end 
of  this  world;  that  each  shall  then  receive  according  to  his  deserts.  Reason 
did,  as  it  well  might,  conclude  that  it  should,  finally  and  upon  the  whole,  be 
well  with  the  righteous  and  ill  with  the  wicked  ;  but  it  could  not  be  deter- 
mined  upon  any  principles  of  reason,  Arhether  human  creatures  might  not 
have  been  appointed  to  pass  through  other  states  of  life  and  being,  before 
that  distributive  justice  should  finally  and  effectually  take  place.  Revelation 
teaches  us,  that  the  next  state  of  things  after  the  present  is  appointed  for  the 
execution  of  this  justice,  that  it  shall  be  no  longer  delayed  ;  but  the  mystery  of 
God,  the  great  mystery  of  his  suffering  vice  and  confusion  to  prevail,  shall  then 
be  finished  ;  and  he  will  take  to  him  his  great  poivcr  and -Kill  reign,  by  rendering 
to  every  one  according  to  his  works. 


110  Of  the  Government  of  God        Part  L 

they  are  so  analogous  to  what  religion  teaches  us  con- 
cerning the  future  punishment  of  the  wicked,    o  much 
of  a  piece  with  it,  that  both  would  naturally  be  ex- 
pressed in  the  very  same  words  and  manner  of  descrip- 
tion.    In    the  book   of   Proverbs  *  for   instance,  wis- 
dom is   introduced  as    frequenting   the   mot    public 
places  of  resort,  anda>  rejected  when  she  offers  herself 
a    the  natural  appointed  guide  of  human   life.     How 
long,  speaking  to  those   who  are  passing  through    it, 
how  long,  ye  simple  ones,  will  ye  love  folly,  and  the  s corn- 
ers delight  in  their  scorning,  and  fools  hate  kn  wledge  f 
Turn  ye  at  my  reproof     Behold,  I  will  pour  out  my  Spirit 
upon  you,  I  will  make    known  my  words  unto  you.     But 
upon  being  neglected,  Bicause   I  have  called,    and  ye 
refused,  I  have  stretched  out  my  hand,  and  no  man  re- 
garded ;  but  ye  have  set  at  nought  all  my  counsel,  and 
would  none  of  my  reproof:  I  alfo  will  laugh  at  your  ca- 
lamity, I  will  mock    when  your  fear  cometh  ;  when  your 
fear  cometh  as  desolation,  and  your  destruction  cometh  as  a 
whirlwind  ;  when  distress  and  anguish  cometh  upon  you. 
Then  shall  they  call  upon  me,  but  I  will  not  answer ;  they 
shall  seek  me  early,  but  they  shall  not  find  me.     This  pas- 
sage every  one  sees  is  poetical,  and  some  parts  of  it  are 
highly  figurative  ;  but  their  meaning  is  obvious.     And 
the  thing  intended  is  expressed  more  literally  in  the 
following   words :  For  that  they  hated  knowledge,  and 
did  not  choose  the  fear  of  the  Lord — therefore  shall  they 
eat  of  the  fruit   of  their  own  way,  and  be  filled  with 
their  own    devices.     For   the  security  of  the  simple  shall 
slay  them,  and  the  prosperity  of  fools  shall  destroy  them. 
And  the  whole  passage  is  so   equally   applicable  to 
what  we  experience  in   the  present  world  concerning 
the  consequences  of  men's  actions,  ami  to  what    re- 

*  Chap.  I. 


Chap.  II.  by  Punishments.  Ill 

ligion  teaches  us  is  to  be  expected  in  another,  that  it 
may  be  questioned  which  of  the  two  was  principally 
intended. 

Indeed  when  one  has  been  recollecting  the  proper 
proofs  of  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments, 
nothing  methinks  can  give  one  so  sensible  an  appre- 
hension of  the  latter,  or  representation  of  it  to  the 
mind,  a»  observing,  that  after  the  many  disregarded 
checks,  admonitions  and  warnings,  which  people  meet 
with  in  the  ways  of  vice  and  folly  and  extravagance  ; 
warnings  from  their  very  nature  ;  from  the  examples 
of  others  ;  from  the  lesser  inconveniences  which  they 
bring  upon  themselves ;  from  the  instructions  of  wise 
and  virtuous  men — after  these  have  been  long  despi- 
sed, scorned,  ridiculed  ;  after  the  chief  bad  conse- 
quences, temporal  consequences,  of  their  follies  have 
been  delayed  for  a  great  while  ;  at  length  they  break 
in  irresistibly,  like  an  armed  force ;  repentance  is  too 
late  to  relieve,  and  can  >erve  only  to  aggravate  their 
distress ;  the  case  is  become  desperate,  and  poverty  and 
sickness,  remorse  and  anguish,  infamy  and  death,  the 
effects  of  their  own  doings,  overwhelm  them,  beyond 
possibility  of  remedy  or  escape.  This  is  an  account  of 
what  is  in  fact  the  general  constitution  of  nature. 

It  is  not  in  any  :  ort  meant,  that  according  to  what 
appears  at  present  of  the  natural  course  of  things,  men 
are  always  uniformly  punished  in  proportion  to  their 
misbehaviour  ;  but  that  there  are  very  many  instances 
of  misbehaviour  punished  in  the  several  ways  now 
mentioned,  and  very  dreadful  instances  too  ;  sufficient 
to  show  what  the  laws  of  the  universe  may  admit,  and, 
if  thoroughly  considered,  sufficient  fully  to  answer  all 
objections  against  the  credibility  of  a  future  state  of 
punishments,  from  any  imaginations  that  the  frailty 
of  our  nature  and  external  temptations  almost  annihi- 


112  Of  the  Government  of  God.  Part  1. 

late  the  guilt  of  human  vices,  as  well  as  objections  of 
another  sort,  from  necessity,  from  suppositions  that 
the  will  of  an  infinite  being  cannot  be  contradict- 
ed, or  that  he  must  be  incapable  of  offence  and 
provocation.* 

Reflections  of  this  kind  are  not  without  their  ter- 
rors to  serious  persons,  the  most  free  from  enthusiasm, 
and  of  the  greatest  strength  of  mind  ;  but  it  is  fit 
things  be  stated  and  considered  as  they  really  are. 
And  there  is,  in  the  present  age,  a  certain  fearlessness, 
with  regard  to  what  may  be  hereafter  under  the  gov- 
ernment of  God,  which  nothing  but  an  universally 
acknowledged  demonstration  on  the  side  of  atheism 
can  justify  ;  and  which  makes  it  quite  necessary,  that 
men  be  reminded,  and  if  possible  made  to  feel,  that 
there  is  no  sort  of  ground  for  being  thu*  presumptu- 
ous, even  upon  the  most  sceptical  principles.  For, 
may  it  not  be  said  of  any  person  upon  his  being  born 
into  the  world,  he  may  behave  so  as  to  be  of  no  service 
to  it,  but  by  being  made  an  example  of  the  woful  ef- 
fects of  vice  and  folly  ?  That  he  may,  as  any  one  may, 
if  he  will,  incur  an  infamous  execution  from  the  hands 
of  civil  justice;  or  in  some  other  course  of  extrava- 
gance shorten  his  days  ;  or  bring  upon  himself  infamy 
and  diseases  worse  than  death  ?  So  that  it  had  been 
better  for  him,  even  with  regard  to  the  present  world, 
that  he  had  never  been  born.  And  is  there  any  pre- 
tence of  reason,  for  people  to  think  themselves  secure, 
and  talk  as  if  they  had  certain  proof,  that  let  them  act 
as  licentiously  as  they  will,  there  can  be  nothing  anal- 
ogous to  this,  with  regard  to  a  future  and  more  gene- 
ral interest,  under  the  providence  and  government  of 
the  same  God  ? 

*  See  Chap.  iv.  and  vi. 


Chap.  III.  Of  Moral  Government.  lia 


CHAP.  III. 


Of  the  Moral  Government  of  God. 

J\s  the  manifold  appearances  of  design  and  of  final 
causes,  in  the  constitution  of  the  world,  prove  it 
to  be  the  work  of  an  intelligent  mind,  so  the  par- 
ticular final  cau  e.s  of  plea  ure  and  pain  distributed 
amongst  his  creatures,  prove  that  they  are  under  his 
government  ;  what  may  be  called  his  natural  govern- 
ment of  creatures  endued  with  sense  and  reason.  This, 
however,  implies  somewhat  more  than  seems  usually 
attended  to,  when  we  >peak  of  God's  natural  govern- 
ment of  the  world.  It  implies  government  of  the 
very  same  kind  with  that,  which  a  master  exercises 
over  his  servants,  or  a  civil  magistrate  over  his  sub- 
jects. These  larter  instances  of  final  causes  as  really 
prove  an  intelligent  Governor  of  the  world,  in  the  sense 
now  mentioned,  and  before*  distinctly  treated  of,  as 
any  other  instances  of  final  causes  prove  an  intelligent 
Maker  of  it. 

But  this  alone  does  not  appear  at  first  sight  to  de- 
termine any  thing  certainly,  concerning  the  moral 
character  of  the  author  of  nature,  considered  in  this 
relation  of  governor  ;  does  not  ascertain  his  govern- 
ment to  be  moral,  or  prove  that  he  is  the  righteous 
Judge  of  the  world.  Moral  government  consists,  not 
barely  in  rewarding  and  punishing  men  for  their  ac- 
tions, which  the  most  tyrannical  person  may  do  ;  but 
in  rewarding  the  righteous  and  punishing  the  wicked, 

*  Ch.ii. 


114  Of  the  Moral  Part  I. 

in  rendering  to  men  according  to  their  actions  con- 
sidered as  good  or  evil.  And  the  perfection  of  moral 
government  consists  in  doing  this,  with  regard  to  all 
intelligent  creatures,  in  an  exact  proportion  to  their 
personal  merits  or  dements. 

Some  men  seem  to  think  the  only  character  of  the 
author  of  nature  to  be  that  of  simple  absolute  benev- 
olence.    This,  considered  as  a  principle  of  action  and 
infinite  in  degree,  is  a  disposition  to  produce  the  great- 
est possible  happiness,  without  regard  to  persons'  be- 
haviour, otherwise  than  as  such  regard  would  produce 
higher  degrees  of  it.     And  supposing  this  to  be  the 
only  character  of  God,  veracity  and  justice  in  him 
would  be  nothing  but  benevolence  conducted  by  wis- 
dom. Now  surely  this  ought  not  to  be  asserted,  unless 
it  can  be  proved  ;  for  we  should  speak  with  cautious 
reverence  upon  such  a  subject.     And  whether  it  can 
be  proved  or  not,  is  not  the  thing  here  to  be  inquired 
into  ;  but  whether  in  the  constitution  and  conduct  of 
the  world  a  righteous  government  be  not  discernibly 
planned  out ;  which  necessarily  implies  a  righteous 
Governor.     There  may  possibly  be  in  the  creation  be- 
ings, to  whom  the  author  of  nature  manifests  himself 
under  this  most  amiable  of  all  characters,  this  of  infi- 
nite absolute  benevolence  ;  for  it  is  the  most  amiable, 
supposing    it  not,  as  perhaps  it  is  not,  incompatible 
with  justice ;  but    he  manifests   himself  to   us  under 
the  character  of  a  righteous  Governor.     He  may,  con- 
sistently with    this,   be  simply  and  absolutely  benevo- 
lent, in  the  sense  now  explained  ;  but  he  is,  for  he  has 
given  us  a  proof  in  the  constitution  and  conduct  of 
the  world  that  he  is,  a  governor  over  servants,  as  he 
rewards  and  punishes  us  for  our  actions.     And  in  the 
constitution  and  conduct  of  it,  he  may  also  have  giv- 
en, besides  the  reason  of  the  thing,  and  the  natural 


Chap.  III.  Government  of  God*  115 

presages  of  conscience,  clear  and  distinct  intimations 
that  his  government  is  righteous  or  moral  ;  clear  to 
such  as  think  the  nature  of  it  deserving  their  atten- 
tion;  and  yet  not  to  every  careless  person,  who  casts 
a  transient  reflection  upon  the  subject.* 

But  it  is  particularly  to  be  observed,  that  the  divine 
government,  which  we  experience  ourselves  under  in 
the  pre  ent  state,  taken  alone,  is  allowed  not  to  be  the 
perfection  of  moral  government.  And  yet  this  by  no 
means  hinders  biJt  that  there  may  be  somewhat,  be  it 
more  or  less,  truly  moral  in  it.  A  righteous  govern- 
ment may  plainly  appear  to  be  carried  on  to  some  de- 
gree ;  enough'  to  give  us  the  apprehension  that  it  shall 
be  completed,  or  carried  on  to  that  degree  of  perfec- 
tion which  religion  teaches  us  it  shall  ;  but  which  can- 
not appear,  till  much  more  of  the  divine  administra- 
tion be  seen,  than  can  in  the  present  life.  And  the 
design  of  this  chapter  is  to  inquire,  how  far  this  is  the 
case  ;  how  far,  over  and  above  the  moral  naturef 
which  God  has  given  us,  and  our  natural  notion-  of 
him  as  righteous  Governor  of  those  his  creatures,  to 
whom  he  has  given  this  nature  ;  I  say  how  far  besides 
this,  the  principles  and  beginnings  of  a  moral  govern- 
ment over  the  world  may  be  discerned,  notwithstand- 
ing and  amidst  all  the  confusion  and  disorder  of  it. 

Now  one  might  mention  here,  what  has  been  often 
urged  with  great  force,  that  in  general  less  uneasiness 

*  The  objections  against  religion,  from  the  evidence  of  it  not  being  uni- 
versal, nor  so  strong  as  might  possibly  have  been,  may  be  urged  against 
natural  religion,  as  well  as  against  revealed  ;  and  therefore  the  considera- 
tion of  them  belongs  to  the  first  part  of  this  treatise,  as  well  as  the  second. 
But  as  these  objections  are  chiefly  urged  against  revealed  religion,  I  chose  to 
consider  them  in  the  second  part.  And  the  answer  to  them  there,  Ch.  vi.  as 
urged  against  Christianity,  being  almost  equally  «pplicable  to  them  as  urged 
against  the  religion  of  nature  ;  jo  avoid  repetition,  the  reader  is  referred  to 
that  chapter. 

|  Dissertation  II. 


116  Of  the  Moral  Part  I. 

and  more  satisfacti6n  are  the  natural  consequences*  of 
a  virtuous  than  of  a  vicious  course  of  life,  in  the  pres- 
e:  t  state,  as  an  instance  of  a  moral  government  estab- 
lished in  nature  ;  an  instance  of  it,  collected  from  ex- 
perience and  present  matter  of  fact.  But  it  must  be 
owned  a  thing  of  difficulty  to  weigh  and  balance  pleas- 
ures and  uneasinesses,  each  amongst  themselves,  and 
also  against  each  other,  so  as  to  make  an  estimate,  with 
any  exactness,  of  the  overplus  of  happiness  on  the  side 
of  virtue.  And  it  is  not  impossible,  that,  amidst  the 
infinite  disorders  of  the  world,  there  may  be  excep- 
tions to  the  happiness  of  virtue,  even  with  regard  to 
those  persons  whose  course  of  life,  from  their  youth  up, 
has  been  blameless  ;  and  more  with  regard  to  those 
who  have  gone  on  for  some  time  in  the  ways  of  vice, 
and  have  afterwards  reformed.  For  suppose  an  in- 
stance of  the  latter  case  ;  a  person  with  his  passions  in- 
flamed, his  natural  faculty  of  self-government  impair- 
ed by  habits  of  indulgence,  and  with  all  his  vices  about 
him,  like  so  many  harpies,  craving  for  their  accustomed 
gratifications,  who  can  say  how  long  it  might  be,  be- 
fore such  a  person  would  find  more  satisfaction  in  the 
reasonableness  and  present  good  consequences  of  vir- 
tue, than  difficulties  and  self  denial  in  the  restraints  of 
it  ?  Experience  also  shows,  that  men  can,  to  a  great 
degree,  get  over  their  sense  of  shame,  so  as  that  by 
professing  themselves  to  be  without  principle,  and 
avowing  even  direct  villany,  they  can  support  them- 
selves against  the  infamy  of  it.  But  as  the  ill  actions 
of  any  one  will  probably  be  more  talked  of,  and  oftener 
thrown  in  his  way,  upon  his  reformation,  so  the  infamy 
of  them  will  be  much  more  felt,  after  the  natural  sense 
of  virtue  and  honour  is  recovered.     Uneasinesses  of 

*  See  Lord  Sbafuburys  Inquiry  concerning  Virtue,  Part  II. 


Chap.  III.  Government  of  God.  117 

this  kind  ought,  indeed,  to  be  put  to  the  account  of 
former  vices  -,  yet  it  will  be  said,  they  are  in  part  the 
consequences  of  reformation.  Still  1  am  far  from  al- 
lowing it  doubtful,  whether  virtue,  upon  the  whole,  be 
happier  than  vice  in  the  prebent  world.  But  if  it  were, 
yet  the  beginnings  ot  a  righteous  administration  may, 
beyond  all  question,  be  found  in  nature,  if  we  will  at- 
tentively inquire  after  them.     And, 

I.  In  whatever  manner  the  notion  of  God's  rrfbral 
government  over  the  world  might  be  treated,  if  it  did 
not  appear  whether  he  were  in  a  proper  sense  our  gov- 
ernor at  all,  yet  when  it  is  certain  matter  of  experience, 
that  he  does  manifest  himself  to  us  under  the  charac- 
ter of  a  governor,  in  the  sense  explained,*  it  must  de- 
serve to  be  considered,  whether  there  be  not  reason  to 
apprehend,  that  he  may  be  a  righteous  or  moral  Gov- 
ernor. Since  it  appears  to  be  fact,  that  God  does  gov- 
ern mankind  by  the  method  of  rewards  and  punish- 
ments, according  to  some  settled  rules  of  distribution, 
it  is  surely  a  questioa  to  be  asked,  what  presumption 
is  there  against  his  finally  rewarding  and  punishing 
them,  according  to  this  particular  rule,  namely,  as  they 
act  reasonably  or  unreasonably,  virtuously  or  vicious- 
ly ?  since  rendering  men  happy  or  miserable  by  this 
rule,  certainly  falls  in,  much  more  falls  in,  with  our 
natural  apprehensions  and  sense  of  things,  than  doing  so 
by  any  other  rule  whatever  ;  since  rewarding  and  pun- 
ishing actions  by  any  other  rule,  would  appear  much 
harder  to  be  accounted  for  by  minds  formed  as  he  has 
formed  ours,  Be  the  evidence  of  religion  then  more 
or  less  clear,  the  expectation  which  it  raises  in  us,  that 
the  righteous  shall,  upon  the  whole,  be  happy,  and  the 
wicked  miserable,  canjaot  however  possibly  be  consid- 
ered as  absurd   or  chimerical  ;  because  it  is  no   more 

*  Chap.  II. 


IIS  Of  the  Moral  Part  I. 

than  an  expectation,  that  a  method  of  government 
already  begun,  shall  be  carried  on,  the  method  of  re- 
warding and  punishing  actions  ;  and  shall  be  carried 
on  by  a  particular  rule,  which  unavoidably  appears  to 
us  at  first  sight  more  natural  than  any  other,  the  rule 
which  we  call  distributive  justice.     Nor, 

II.  Ought  it  to  be  entirely  passed  over,  that  tran- 
quillity, satisfaction,  and  external  advantages,  being 
the  Hatural  consequences  of  prudent  management  of 
ourselves,  and  our  affairs  ;  and  rashness,  profligate  neg- 
ligence, and  wilful  folly,  bringing  after  them  many  in- 
conveniences and  sufferings  ;  these  afford  instances  of 
a  right  constitution  of  nature  ;  as  the  correction  of 
children,  for  their  own  sakes,  and  by  way  of  example, 
when  they  run  into  danger  or  hurt  themselves,  is  a 
part  of  right  education.  And  thus,  that  God  governs 
the  world  by  general  fixed  laws,  that  he  has  endued 
us  with  capacities  of  reflecting  upon  this  constitution 
of  things,  and  foreseeing  the  good  and  bad  conse- 
quences of  our  behaviour,  planely  implies  some  sort  of 
moral  gevernment ;  since  from  such  a  constitution  of 
things  it  cannot  but.follow,  that  prudence  and  impru- 
dence, which  are  of  the  nature  of  virtue  and  vice,* 
must  be,  as  they  are,  respectively  rewarded  and  pun- 
ished. 

III.  From  the  natural  course  of  things,  vicious  ac- 
tions are,  to  a  great  degree,  actually  punished  as  mis- 
chievous to  society  ;  and  .besides  punishment  actually 
inflicted  upon  this  account,  there  is  also  the  fear  and 
apprehension  of  it  in  those  persons,  whose  crimes  have 
rendered  them  obnoxious  to  it,  in  case  of  a  discovery  ; 
this  state  of  fear  being  itself  often  a  very  considerable 
punishment.  The  natural  fcar^nd  apprehension  of  it 
rno,  which  restrains  from  such  crimes,  is  a  declaration 

See  Dissertation  II. 


Chap.  III.  Government  of  God.  119 

of  nature  against  them.  It  is  necessary  to  the  very 
being  of  society,  that  vices  destructive  of  it  should  be 
punished  as  being  so  ;  the  vices  of  falsehood,  injustice, 
cruelty ;  which  punishment  therefore  is  as  natural  as 
society,  and  so  is  an  instance  of  a  kind  of  moral  gov- 
ernment, naturally  established  and  actually  taking 
place.  And,  since  the  certain  natural  course  of  things 
is  the  conduct  of  Providence  or  the  government  of 
God,  though  carried  on  by  the  instrumentality  of 
men,  the  observation  here  made  amounts  to  this,  that 
mankind  find  themselves  placed  by  him  in  such  cir- 
cumstances, as  that  they  are  unavoidably  accountable 
for  their  behaviour,  and  are  often  punished,  and  some- 
times rewarded  unde^his  government,  in  the  view  of 
their  being  mischievous,  or  eminently  beneficial  to 
society.  I 

If  it  be  objected  that  good  actions,  and  such  as 
are  beneficial  to  society,  are  often  punished,  as  in  the 
case  of  persecution  and  in  other  cases,  and  that  ill  and 
mischievous  actions  are  often  rewarded,  it  may  be  an- 
swered distinctly,  first,  that  this  is  in  no  sort  necessary, 
and  consequently  not  natural,  in  the  sense  in  which  it 
is  necessary,  and  therefore  natural,  that  ill  or  mis- 
chievous actions  should  be  punched  ;  and  in  the  next 
place,  that  good  actions  are  never  punished,  consider- 
ed as  beneficial  to  society,  nor  ill  actions  rewarded,  un- 
der the  view  of  their -being  hurtful  to  it.  So  that  k 
stands  good,  without  any  thing  on  the  side  of  vice  to 
be  set  over  against  it,  that  the  Author  of  nature  has 
as  truly  directed,  that  vicious  actions,  considered  as 
mischievous  to  society,  should  be  punished,  and  put 
mankind  under  a  necessity  of  thus  punishing  them,  as 
he  has  directed  and  necessitated  us  to  preserve  our 
lives  by  food. 


120  Of  the  Moral  Part  I. 

IV.  In  the  natural  course  of  things,  virtue  as  such 
is  actually  rewarded,  and  vice  as  such  punished  ;  which 
seems  to  afford  an  instance  or  example,  not  only  of 
government,  but  of  moral  government,  begun  and 
established  ;  moral  in  the  strictest  sense,  though  not  in 
that  perfection  of  degree,  which  religion  teaches  us  to 
expect.  In  order  to  see  this  more  clearly,  we  must 
distinguish  between  actions  themselves,  and  that  qual- 
ity ascribed  to  them,  which  we  call  virtuous  or  vi- 
cious. The  gratification  itself  of  every  natural  passion, 
must  be  attended  with  delight  ;  and  acquisitions  of 
fortune,  however  made,  are  acquisitions  of  the  means 
or  materials  of  enjoyment.  An  action  then,  by 
which  any  natural  passion  is  gratified  or  fortune  ac- 
quired, procures  delight  or  advantage,  abstracted  from 
all  consideration  of  the  morality|of  such  action.  Con- 
sequently, the  pleasure  or  advantage  in  this  case  is 
gained  by  the  action  itself,  not  by  the  morality,  the 
virtuousness  or  viciousness  of  it ;  though  it  be,  per- 
haps, virtuous  or  vicious.  Thus  to  say  such  an  ac- 
tion or  course  of  behaviour  procured  such  pleasure  or 
advantage,  or  brought  on  such  inconvenience  and  pain, 
is  quite  a  different  thing  from  saying,  that  such  good  or 
bad  effect  was  owing  to  the  virtue  or  vice  of  <uch  ac- 
tion or  behaviour.  In  one  case,  an  action,  abstracted 
from  all  moral  consideration,  produced  its  effect ;  in 
the  other  case,  for  it  will  appear  that  there  are  such 
cases,  the  morality  of  the  action,  the  action  under  a 
moral  consideration,  i.  e.  the  virtuousness  or  vicious- 
ness of  it,  produced  the  effect.  Now  I  say,  virtue,  as 
such,  naturally  procures  considerable  advantages  to  the 
virtuous,  and  vice,  as  such, naturally  occasions  great  in- 
convenience and  even  misery  to  the  vicious,  in  very 
many  instances.  The  immediate  effects  of  virtue  and 
vice  upon  the  mind  and  temper  are  to  be    mentioned 


Chap.  III.  Government  of  God,  121 

as  instances  of  it.     Vice,  as  such,  is  naturally  attended 
with  some  sort  of  uneasiness,   and,  not  uncommonly^ 
with  great  disturbance  and  apprehension.     That    in- 
ward feeling,  which  respecting  lesser  matters,  and    in 
familiar  speech,  we  call  being  vexed  with  oneself,  and 
in  matters  of  importance  and  in  more  serious  language, 
remorse,  is  an  uneasiness  naturally  arising  from  an  ac- 
tion of  a  man's   own,    reflected    upon  by    himself  as 
wrong,  unreasonable,  faulty,  i.  e.  vicious  in  greater  or 
less  degrees  ;  and  this  manifestly  is  a  different  feeling 
from  that  uneasiness  which  arises  from  a  sense  of  mere 
loss  or  harm.     What  is  more  common,  than  to    hear 
a  man  lamenting  an  accident  or  ev  nt  and  adding,—-* 
but  however  he  has    the  satisfaction  that   he   cannot 
blame  himself  for  it  ;*or  on  the  contrary,  that  he  has 
the  uneasiness  of  being^ensible  it  was  his  own  doing  ? 
Thus  also  the  disturbance  and  fear,  which  often  follow 
upon  a  man's  having  done  an  injury,  arise  from  a  sense 
of  his  being  blameworthy  ;    otherwise  there  would,  in 
many  cases,  be  no  ground  of  disturbance,  nor  any  rea-> 
son  to  fear  resentment  or  shame.     On  the  other  hand, 
inward  security  and   peace,  and  a  mind   open  to    the 
several  gratifications  of  life,  are  the  natural  attendants 
of  innocence  and  virtue.     To  which  must  be  added 
the  complacency,  satisfaction,  and  even  joy    of  heart, 
which  accompany  the   exercise,  the   real  exercise,  of 
gratitude,  friendship,  benevolence. 

And  here,  I  think,  ought  to  be  mentioned,  the 
fears  of  future  punishment,  and  peaceful  hopes  of  a 
better  life,  in  those  who  fully  believe,  or  have  any  se- 
rious apprehension  of  religion,  because  these  hopes  and 
fears  are  present  uneasiness  and  satisfaction  to  the 
mind  ;  and  cannot  be  got  rid  of  by  great  part  of  the 
world,  even  by  men  who  have  thought  most  thor- 
oughly upon  the  subject  of  religion.     And  no  one  can 

Q 


122  Of  the  Moral  Part  i. 

say,  how  considerable  this  uneasiness   and  satisfaction 
may  be,  or  what  upon  the  whole  it  may  amount  to. 

In  the  next  ^place  comes  in  the  consideration,  that 
all  honest  and  good  men  are  disposed  to  befriend  hon- 
est good  men,  as  such,  and  to  discountenance  the  vi- 
cious, as  such,  and  do  so  in  some  degree,  indeed  in  a 
considerable  degree  ;  from  which  favour  and  discour- 
agement cannot  but  arise  considerable  advantage  and 
inconvenience.  And  though  the  generality  of  the 
world  have  little  regard  to  the  morality  of  their  own 
actions,  and  may  be  supposed  to  have  less  to  that  of 
others,  when  they  themselves  are  not  concerned,  yet 
let  any  one  be  known  to  be  a  man  of  virtue,  some 
how  or  other  he  will  be  favoured,  and  good  offices 
will  be  done  him,  from  regard  to  his  character  with- 
out remote  views,  occasionally^  and  in  some  low  de- 
gree,! think,  by  the  generality  of  the  world,  as  it  hap- 
pens to  come  in  their  way.  Public  honours  too  and 
advantages  are  the  natural  consequences,  are  some- 
times at  least  the  consequences  in  fact,  of  virtuous  ac- 
tions  ;  of  eminent  justice,  fidelity,  charity,  love  to  our 
country,  considered  in  the  view  of  being  virtuous. 
And  sometimes  even  death  itself,  often  infamy  and 
external  inconveniences,  are  the  public  consequences 
of  vice,  a  vice.  For  instance,  the  sense  which  man- 
kind have  of  tyranny,  injustice,  oppression,  additional 
to  the  mere  feeling  or  fear  of  misery,  has  doubtless 
been  instrumental  in  bringing  about  revolutions, 
which  make  a  figure  even  in  the  history  of  the  world. 
For  it  is  plain,  men  resent  injuries  as  implying  faulti- 
ness,  and  retaliate,  not  merely  under  the  notion  of 
having  received  harm,  but  of  having  received  wrong  ; 
and  they  have  this  resentment  in  behalf  of  others,  as 
well  as  of  themselves.  So  likewise  even  the  generality 
are,  in  some  degree,  grateful,  and  disposed  to  return 


Chap.  III.  Government  of  God.  123 

good  offices ,  not  merely  because  such  an  one  has  been 
the  occasion   of  good    to  them,  but  under  the  view, 
that  such    good    offices   implied    kind  attention  and 
good  desert  in  the  doer.     To  all  this    may  be    added 
two  or  three   particular  things,  which   many  persons 
will  think  frivolous  ;  but  to  me   nothing  appears  so, 
which  at  all  comes  in  ti wards    determining  a  question 
of  such  importance,  a*,  whether  there  be  or  be  not  a 
moral  institution  of  government,  in  the  strictest  sense 
moral,  visibly  established  and  begun  in  nature.     The 
particular  things  are  these  :  that  in   domestic  govern- 
ment, which  is   doubtless   natural,  children  and  others 
al'  o  are  very  generally  punished  for  falsehood  and  in- 
justice and  ill  behaviour,  as  such,  and  rewarded  for  the 
contrary  ;  which  are  instances  where  veracity  and  jus- 
tice, and  right   behaviour,  as  such,  are  naturally  en- 
forced by  rewards  and  punishments,  whether  more  or- 
less  considerable  m   degree  :  that,  though    civil  gov- 
ernment be  suppo.ed  to  take  cognizance  of  actions  in 
no  other  view  than  as  prejudicial  to  society,  without 
respect  to  the  immorality  of  them  ;  yet  as  such  actions 
are  immoral,  so  the  sense  which  men  have  of  the  im- 
morality of  them  very  greatly  contributes,  in  different 
ways,  to  bring  offenders  to  justice  ;  and,  that  entire  ab- 
sence of  all  crime  and  guilt  in  the  moral  sense,  when 
plainly  appearing,  will  almost  of  course  procure,  and 
circumstances  of  aggravated  guilt  prevent,  a  remission 
of  the  penalties  annexed  to  civil  crimes,  in  many  cases, 
though  by  no  means  in  all. 

Upon  the  whole  then,  besides  the  good  and  bad  ef- 
fects of  virtue  and  vice  upon  men's  own  minds,  the 
course  of  the  world  does,  in  some  measure,  turn  upon 
the  approbation  and  disapprobation  of  them,  as  such, 
in  others.  The  sense  of  well  and  ill  doing,  the  pre- 
sages of  conscience,  the  love  of  good  characters  and 


124  Of  the  Moral  Part  I, 

dislike  of  bad  ones,  honour,  shame,  resentment,  grati- 
tude ;  all  these,  considered  in  themselves,  and  in  their 
effects,  do  afford  manifest  real  instances  of  virtue,  as 
such,  naturally  favoured,  and  of  vice,  as  such,  discoun- 
tenanced, more  or  less,  in  the  daily  course  of  human 
life  ;  in  every  age,  in  every  relation,  in  every  general 
circumstance  of  it.  That  God  has  given  us  a  moral 
nature,*  may  most  justly  be  urged  as  a  proof  of  our 
being  under  his  moral  government ;  but  that  he  has 
placed  us  in  a  condition,  which  gives  this  nature,  as 
one  may  speak,  scope  to  operate,  and  in  which  it  does 
unavoidably  operate,  i.  e.  influence  mankind  to  act, 
so  as  thus  to  favour  and  reward  virtue,  and  discoun- 
tenance and  punish  vice — this  is  not  the  same,  but  a 
further  additional  proof  of  his  moral  government,  for 
it  is  an  instance  of  it.  The  first  is  a  proof  that  he 
will  finally  favour  and  support  virtue  effectually;  the 
second  is  an  example  of  his  favouring  and  supporting 
it  at  present,  in  some  degree. 

If  a  more  distinct  inquiry  be  made,  whence  it  arises 
that  virtue,  as  such,  is  often  rewarded,  and  vice,  as 
such,  is  punished,  and  this  rule  never  inverted — it 
will  be  found  to  proceed,  in  part,  immediately  from 
the  moral  nature  itself,  which  God  has  given  us  ;  and 
also,  in  part,  from  his  having  given  us,  together  with 
this  nature,  so  great  a  power  over  each  other's  happiness 
and  misery.  For  first,  it  is  certain  that  peace  and  de- 
light, in  some  degree  and  upon  some  occasions,  is  the 
necessary  and  present  effect  of  virtuous  practice  ;  an 
effect  arising  immediately  from  that  constitution  of 
our  nature.  We  are  so  made,  that  well  doing,  as 
such,  give*  us  satisfaction  at  lea.->t  in  some  instances  ; 
ill  doing,  as  such,  in  none.     And  secondly,  from  our 

*  Sec  Dissertation  II. 


Chap.  III.  Government  of  God.  \  25 

moral  nature,  joined  with  God's  having  put  our  hap- 
piness and  misery  in  many  respects  in  each  other's 
power,  it  cannot  but  be  that  vice,  as  such,  some 
kinds  and  instances  of.  it  at  least,  will  be  infamous, 
and  men  will  be  disposed  to  punish  it,  as  in  itself  de- 
testable ;  and  the  villain  will  by  no  means  be  able  al- 
ways to  avoid  feeling  that  infamy,  any  more  than  he 
will  be  able  to  escape  this  further  punishment,  which 
mankind  will  be  disposed  to  inflict  upon  him,  under 
the  notion  of  his  deserving  it.  But  there  can  be  noth- 
ing on  the  side  of  vice  to  answer  this,  because  there  is 
nothing  in  the  human  mind  contradictory,  as  the  lo- 
gicians speak,  to  virtue.  For  virtue  consists  in  a  re- 
gard to  what  is  right  and  reasonable,  as  being  so  ;  in 
a  regard  to  veracity,  justice,  charity,  in  themselves  ; 
and  there  is  surely  no  such  thing  as  a  like  natural  re- 
gard to  falsehood,  injustice,  cruelty.  If  it  be  thought 
that  there  are  instances  of  an  approbation  of  vice,  as 
such,  in  itself,  and  for  its  own  sake,  (though  it  does 
not  appear  to  me  that  there  is  any  such  thing  at  all ; 
but  supposing  there  be,)  it  is  evidently  monstrous  ;  as 
much  so  as  the  most  acknowledged  perversion  of  any 
passion  whatever.  Such  instances  of  perversion  then 
being  left  out,  as  merely  imaginary,  or,  however,  un- 
natural, it  must  follow  from  the  frame  of  our  nature, 
and  from  our  condition,  in  the  respects  now  described, 
that  vice  cannot  at  all  be,  and  virtue  connot  but  be 
favoured,  as  such,  by  others,  upon  some  occasions,  and 
happy  in  itself  in  some  degree.  For  what  is  here  in- 
sisted upon,  is  not  the  degree  in  which  virtue  and  vice 
are  thus  distinguished,  but  only  the  thing  itself,  that 
they  are  so  in  some  degree,  though  the  whole  good 
and  bad  effect  of  virtue  and  vice,  as  such,  is  not  in- 
considerable in  degree.  But  that  they  must  be  thus 
distinguished  in  some  degree,  is  in  a  manner  necessary  ; 


126  Of  the  Moral  Part  I. 

it  is  matter  of  fact  of  daily  experience,  even  in  the 
greatest  confusion  of  human  affairs. 

It  is  not  pretended  but  that  in  the  natural  course  of 
things,  happiness  and  misery  appear  to  be  distributed 
by  other  rules  than  only  the  personal  merit  and  de- 
merit of  characters.  They  may  sometimes  be  distri- 
buted by  way  of  mere  discipline.  There  may  be 
the  wisest  and  best  reasons,  why  the  world  should  be 
governed  by  general  laws,  from  whence  >uch  promis- 
cuous distribution  perhaps  must  follow,  and  also  why 
our  happiness  and  misery  should  be  put  in  each  other's 
power  in  the  degree  which  they  are.  And  these 
things,  as  in  general  they  contribute  to  the  rewarding 
virtue  and  punishing  vice,  as  such,  so  they  often  con- 
tribute also,  not  to  the  inversion  of  this,  w  hich  is  im- 
possible, but  to  the  rendering  persons  prosperous, 
though  wicked  ;  afflicted,  though  righteous  ;  and, 
which  is  worse,  to  the  rewarding  some  act 'ions ,  though 
vicious,  and  punishing  other  actions,  though  virtuous. 
But  all  this  cannot  drown  the  voice  of  nature  in  the 
conduct  of  Providence,  plainly  declaring  itself  for  vir- 
tue, by  way  of  distinction  from  vice,  and  preference  to 
it.  For,  our  being  so  constituted,  as  that  virtue  and 
vice  are  thus  naturally  favoured  and  discountenanced, 
rewarded  and  punished  respectively,  as  such,  is  an  in- 
tuitive proof  of  the  intent  of  nature  that  it  should  be 
so  ;  otherwise  the  constitution  of  our  mind,  from 
which  it  thus  immediately  and  directly  proceeds,  would 
be  absurd.  But  it  cannot  be  said,  because  virtuous 
actions  are  sometimes  punished,  and  vicious  actions 
rewarded,  that  nature  intended  it.  For,  though  this, 
great  disorder  is  brought  about,  as  all  actions  are 
done,  by  means  of  some  natural  passion,  yet  this  may 
be,  as  it  undoubtedly  is,  brought  about  by  the  perver- 
sion of  such  passion,  implanted  in   us  for  other   and 


Chap.  III.  Government  of  God.  127 

those  very  good  purposes.  And  indeed  these  other 
and  good  purposes,  even  of  every  passion,  may  be 
clearly  seen. 

We  have  then  a  declaration  in  some  degree  of  pres- 
ent effect,  from  him  who  is  supreme  in  nature,  which 
side  he  is  of,  or  what  part  he  takes  ;  a  declaration  for 
virtue,  and  against  vice.  So  far  therefore  as  a  man  is 
true  to  virtue,  to  veracity  and  justice,  to  equity  and 
charity,  and  the  right  of  the  case,  in  whatever  he  is 
concerned,  so  far  he  is  on  the  side  of  the  divine  ad- 
ministration, and  cooperates  with  it  ;  and  from  hence, 
to  such  a  man  arises  naturally  a  secret  satisfaction  and 
sense  of  security,  and  implicit  hope  of  somewhat  fur- 
ther.    And, 

V.  This  hope  is  confirmed  by  the  necessary  tenden- 
cies of  virtue,  which,  though  not  of  present  effect,  yet 
are  at  present  discernible  in  nature,  and  so  afford  an 
instance  of  somewhat  moral  in  the  essential  constitu- 
tion of  it.  There  is,  in  the  nature  of  things,  a  ten- 
dency in  virtue  and  vice  to  produce  the  good  and  bad 
effects  now  mentioned  in  a  greater  degree  than  they  do 
in  fact  produce  them.  For  instance  ;  good  and  bad 
men  would  be  much  more  rewarded  and  punished,  as 
such,  were  it  not  that  justice  is  often  artifically  eluded, 
that  characters  are  not  known,  and  many,  who  would 
thus  favour  virtue  and  discourage  vice,  are  hindered 
from  doing  so  by  accidental  causes.  These  tendencies 
of  virtue  and  vice  are  obvious  with  regard  to  individ- 
uals. But  it  may  require  more  particularly  to  be 
considered,  that  power  is  a  society,  by  being  under  the 
direction  of  virtue,  naturally  increases,  and  has  a  nec- 
essary tendency  to  prevail  over  opposite  power,  not  un- 
der the  direction  of  it ;  in  like  manner  as  power*  by 
being  under  the  direction  of  reason,  increases,  and  hzR 
a  tendency  to  prevail  over  brute  force.     There  are 


128  Of  the  Moral  Part  I, 

several  brute  creatures  of  equal,  and  several  of  superior 
strength,  to  that  of  men,  and  possibly  the  sum  of  the 
whole  strength  of  brutes  may  be  greater  than  that  of 
mankind  ;  but  rer.son  gives  us  the  advantage  and  su- 
periority over  them,  and  thus  man  is  the  acknowledg- 
ed governing  animal  upon  the  earth.  Nor  is  this  su- 
periority considered  by  any  as  accidental,  but  as  what 
reason  has  a  tendency,  in  the  nature  of  the  thing,  to 
obtain.  And  yet  perhaps  difficulties  may  be  raised 
about  the  meaning  as  well  as  the  truth  of  the  assertion, 
that  virtue  has  the  like  tendency. 

To  obviate  these  difficulties,  let  us  see  more  distinct- 
ly how  the  case  stands  with  regard  to    reason,  which 
is  so  readily  acknowledged  to  have  this  advantageous 
tendency.     Suppose  then  two  or  three  men,  of  the 
best  and  most  improved  understanding,  in  a  desolate 
open  plain,  attacked  by  ten  times  the  number  of  beasts 
of  prey — would  their  reason  secure  them  the  victory 
in  this  unequal  combat  ?  Power  then,  though  joined 
with  reason,  and  under  its   direction,  cannot  be  ex- 
pected to  prevail  over  opposite  power,  though  merely 
brutal,  unless  the  one  bears  some  proportion  to  the 
other.     Again — put  the  imaginary  case,  that  rational 
and  irrational  creatures  were  of  like  external  shape  and 
manner  ;  it  is  certain,  before  there  were  opportunities 
for  the  first  to  distinguish  each  other,  to  separate  from 
their  adversaries,  and  to  form  an  union  among  them- 
selves, they  might  be  upon  a  level,  or  in  several  re- 
spects upon  great  disadvantage,  though    united    they 
might  be  vastly  superior  ;  since  union  is  of  such  effi- 
cacy, that  ten  men,  united,  might  be  able  to  accom- 
plish what  ten  thousand  of  the  same  natural  strength 
and  understanding,  wholly  ununited,  could  net.     In 
this  case  then,  brute  force  might  more  than  maintain 
its  ground  against  reason,  for  want  of  union  among 


Chat.  III.  Government  of  God.  129 

the  rational  creatures.  Or  suppose  a  number  of  men 
to  land  upon  an  island  inhabited  only  by  wild  beasts, 
a  number  of  men,  who,  by  the  regulations  of  civil 
government,  the  inventions  of  art,  and  the  experience 
of  some  years,  could  they  be  preserved  so  long,  would 
be  really  sufficient  to  subdue  the  wild  beasts,  and  to 
preserve  themselves  in  security  from  them  ;  yet  a  con- 
juncture of  accidents  might  give  such  advantage  to 
the  irrational  animals,  as  that  they  might  at  once 
overpower,  and  even  extirpate*  the  vvhole  species  of 
rational  ones.  Length  of  time  then,  proper  scope  and 
opportunities  for  reason  to  exert  itself,  may  be  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  its  prevailing  over  brute  force. 
Further  still— there  are  many  instances  of  brutes  sue* 
ceeding  in  attempts  which  they  could  not  have  un- 
dertaken had  not  their  irrational  nature  rendered  them 
incapable  of  foreseeing  the  danger  of  such  attempts^ 
or  the  fury  of  passion  hindered  their  attending  to  it  ; 
arid  there  are  instances  of  reason  and  real  prudence 
preventing  men's  undertaking  what,  it  hath  appeared 
afterwards,  they  might  have  succeeded  in  by  a  lucky 
rashness.  And  in  certain  conjunctures,  ignorance 
and  folly,  weakness  and  discord,  may  have  their  ad* 
vantages.  So  that  rational  animals  have  not  neces- 
sarily the  superiority  over  irrational  ones ;  but,  how 
improbable  soever  it  may  be,  it  is  evidently  possible, 
that,  in  some  globes,  the  latter  may  be  superior* 
And  were  the  former  wholly  at  variance  and  disunit- 
ed, by  false  self  interest  and  envy,  by  treachery  and  in- 
justice, and  consequent  rage  and  malice  against  each 
other,  whilst  the  latter  were  firmly  united  among 
themselves  by  instinct,  this  might  greatly  contribute 
to  the  introducing  such  an  inverted  order  of  things. 
For  every  one  would  consider  it  as  inverted,  since  rea- 
son has,  in  the  nature  of  it,  a  tendency  to  prevail  over 

R 


130  Of  the  Moral  Part  L 

brute  force  ;  notwithstanding  the  possibility  it  may 
not  prevail,  and  the  necessity  which  there  is  of  many 
concurring  circumstances  to  render  it  prevalent. 

Now  I  say,  virtue  in  a  society  has  a  like  tendency 
to  procure  superiority  and  additional  power,  whether 
this  power  be  considered  as  the  means  of  security  front 
opposite  power,  or  of  obtaining  other  advantages. 
And  it  has  this  tendency,  by  rendering  public  good 
an  object  and  end  to  every  member  of  the  society  ; 
by  putting  every  one  upon  consideration  and  diligence, 
recollection  and  self  government,  both  in  order  to  see 
what  is  the  most  effectual  method,  and  also  in  order 
to  perform  their  proper  part  for  obtaining  and  pre- 
serving it  ;  by  uniting  a  society  within  itself,  and  so 
increasing  its  strength  ;  and,  which  is  particularly  to 
be  mentioned,  uniting  it  by  means  of  veracity  and  jus- 
tice. For  as  these  last  are  principal  bonds  of  union, 
so  benevolence  or  public  spirit,  undirected,  unrestrain- 
ed by  them,  is,  nobody  knows  what. 

And  suppose    the  invisible  world,  and  the  invisible 
dispensations  of  Providence,  to  be  in  any  sort  analo- 
gous to  what  appears,  or  that  both  together  make  up 
one  uniform  scheme,  the  two  parts  of  which,  the  part 
which  we  see,  and  that  which  is  beyond  our  observa- 
tion, are  analogous  to  each  other,  then  there  must  be 
a  like  natural  tendency  in  the  derived  power,  through- 
out the  universe,  under  the  direction  of  virtue,  to  pre- 
vail in  general  over  that  which  is  not  under  its  protec- 
tion, as  there  is  in  reason,  derived  reason  in  the  uni- 
verse, to  prevail  over  brute  force.     But  then,  in  order 
to  the  prevalence  of  virtue,  or  that  it  may  actually  pro- 
duce what  it  has  a  tendency  to  produce,  the  like  con- 
currences are  necessary  as  are  to  the  prevalence  of  rea- 
son.   There  must  be  some  proportion  between  the  nat- 
ural power  or  force  which  is,  and  that  which  is  not,  un- 


Chap.  III.  Government  of  God.  131 

der  the  direction  of  virtue  ;  there  must  be  sufficient 
length  of  time  ;  for  the  complete  success  of  virtue,  as  of 
reason,  cannot,  from  the  nature  of  the  thing,  be  other- 
wise than  gradual ;    there  must  be,  as  one  may  speak, 
a  fair  field  of  trial,  a  stage  large  and  extensive  enough, 
proper  occasions  and  opportunities,  for  the  virtuous  to 
join  together  to  exert  themselves  against  lawless  force, 
and  to  reap    the  fruit  of  their  united  labours.     Now 
indeed  it  is  to  be  hoped,  that   the  disproportion   be- 
tween the  good  and  bad,  even  here  on  earth,  is  not  so 
great  but  that  the  former  have  natural  power  sufficient 
to  their  prevailing  to  a  considerable  degree,  if  circum- 
stances would  permit  this  power  to  be  united.     For 
much  less,  very  much  less  power  under  the  direction  of 
virtue,  would  prevail  over  much  greater  not  under  the 
direction  of  it.     However,  good  men  over  the  face  of 
the  earth  cannot  -unite,  as  for  other  reasons,  so  because 
they  cannot  be  sufficiently  ascertained  of  each  other's 
characters.     And  the  known  course  of  human  things,  I 
the  scene  we  are  now  passing  through,  particularly  the 
shortness  of  life,  denies  to  virtue  ils  full  scope  in  seve- 
ral other  respects.     The  natural  tendency,  which  we 
have  been  considering,  though  real,  is  hindered  from 
being  carried  into  effect  in  the  present  state  ;  but  these 
hindrances  may  be  removed  in  a  future  one.     Virtue, 
to  borrow  the  Christian  allusion,  is  militant  here,  and 
various  untoward  accidents  contribute  to  its  being  oft- 
en overborne  ;  but   it  may  combat   with  greater   ad- 
vantage hereafter,  and  prevail  completely,  and   enjoy 
its  consequent  rewards  in  some  future  states.     Neg- 
lected as  it  is,  perhaps  unknown,  perhaps  despised  and 
oppressed  here,  there  may  be  scenes  in  eternity  lasting 
enough,  and  in  every  other  way  adapted,  to  afford  it  a 
sufficient  sphere  of  action,  and  a  sufficient   sphere  for 
the  natural  consequences  of  it  to  follow  in  fact.     If  the 


133  Of  the  Moral  Part  I. 

soul  be  naturally  immortal,  and  this  state  be  a  progress 
towards  a  future  one,  as  ciiildnood  is   towards  mature 
age,  good  men  may  naturally  unite,  not  only  amongst 
themselves,  but  aio  with  other  orders  or  virtuous  crea- 
tures, in  that  future  state.     For  virtue,  from  the  very 
nature  of  it,  is  a  principle  and  bond  of  union,  in  some 
degree,  amongst    all  who   are   endued  with   it,  and 
known  to  each  other ;  so  as  that  by  it  a  good  man 
cannot  but  recommend  frimself  to  the  favour  and  pro- 
tection of  all  virtuous  beings,  throughout   the  whole 
poiverse,   who  can  be  acquainted  with  his  character, 
and  can  any  way  interpose  in  his  behalf  in  any  part  of 
his  duration.     And  one    might  add,  that  suppose  all 
this  advantageous  tendency  of  virtue  to  become  effect, 
amongst  one  or  more  orders  of  creatures,  in  any  dis- 
tant scenes  and  periods,  and  to  be  seen  by  any  orders 
of  vicious  creatures  throughout  the  universal  kingdom 
of  God,  this  happy  effect  of  virtue  would  have  a  ten- 
dency, by  way  of  example,  and  possibly  in  other  ways, 
to  amend  those  of  them  who  are  capable  of  amend- 
ment, and  being  recovered  to  a  just  sense   of  virtue. 
Jf  our  notions  of  the  plan  of  Providence  were  enlarged, 
in  any  sort  proportionably  to  what  late  discoveries  have 
enlarged  our  views  with  respect  to  the  material  world, 
representations  of  this  kind  would  not  appear  absurd  or 
extravagant.     However,  they    are  not  to  be  taken  as 
intended  for  a  literal  delineation  of  what  is  in  fact  the 
particular  scheme  of  the  universe,  which  cannot  be 
known  without  revelation  ;  for  suppositions  are  not  to 
be  looked  on  as  true,  because  not  incredible,  but  they 
are   mentioned  to  shew,  that  our  finding  virtue  to  be 
hindered  from  procuring  to  itself  such  superiority  and 
advantages  is  no  objection  against  its  having,  in  the 
essential  nature  of  the  thing,  a  tendency  to  procure 
them.     And  the  suppositions  now  mentioned  do  plain- 


Chap.  III.  Government  of  God,  133 

ly  shew  this  ;  for  they  shew  that  these  hindrances  are 
so  far  from  being  necessary,  that  we  ourselves  can  easi- 
ly conceive  how  they  may  De  removed  in  future  states, 
and  full  scope  be  granted  to  virtue.  And  all  these  ad- 
vantageous tendencies  of  it  are  to  be  considered  as  dec- 
larations of  God  in  its  favour.  This,  however,  is  tak^ 
ing  a  pretty  large  compass  ;  though  it  is  certain  that, 
a.  the  material  world  appears  to  be,  in  a  manner, 
boundless  and  immense,  there  must  be  some  scheme  of 
Proviuence  vast  in  proportion  to  it. 

But  let  Ui  return  to  the  earth  our  habitation,  and 
we  shall  see  this  happy  tendency  of  virtue,  by  imagin- 
ing an  instance  pot  so  vast  andieinote  ;  by  ^uppo^ing 
a  kingdom  or  society  of  men  upon  it,  perfectly  virtu- 
ous, tor  a  succession  of  many  ages,  to  whieh,  if  you 
please,  may  be  given  a  situation  advantageous  for  uni- 
vt  al  monarchy.  In  such  a  btcte  there  would  be  no 
suet;  thing  as  faction  ;  but  men  of  the  greatest  capa- 
city would  of  course,  all  along,  have  the  chief  direction 
of  affairs  willingly  yielded  to  them  ;  and  they  would 
share  it  among  themselves  without  envy.  Each  of 
these  would  have  the  part  assigned  him  to  which  his 
genius  was  peculiarly  adapted  ;  and  others,  who  had 
not  any  distinguished  genius,  would  be  safe,  and  think 
themselves  very  happy,  by  being  under  the  protection 
and  guidance  of  tho>e  who  had.  Public  determina- 
tions would  really  be  the  result  of  the  united  wisdom 
of  the  community  j  and  they  would  faithfully  \>e  exe- 
cuted, by  the  united  strength  of  it.  Some  would  in 
a  higher  way  contribute,  but  all  would  in  some  way 
contribute,  to  the  public  prosperity ;  and  in  it,  each 
would  enjoy  the  fruits  of  his  own  virtue.  And  as  ia 
justice,  whether  by  fraud  or  force,  would  be  unknown 
among  themselves,  so  they  would  be  sufficiently  se- 
cured from  it  in  their   neighbours  j  for  cunning  ?jid 


134  Of  the  Moral  Part  L 

false  self  interest,  confederacies  in  injustice,  ever  slight, 
and  accompained  with  faction  and  intestine  treachery  ; 
these  on  one  hand  would  be  found  mere  childish  folly 
and  weakness,  when  set  in  opposition  against  wisdom, 
public  spirit,  union  inviolable,  and  fidelity  on  the 
other  ;  allowing  both  a  sufficient  length  of  years  to 
try  their  force.  Add  the  general  influence  which  such 
a  kingdom  would  have  over  the  face  of  the  earth,  by 
way  of  example  particularly,  and  the  reverence  which 
would  be  paid  it.  It  would  planely  be  superior  to  all 
others,  and  the  world  must  gradually  come  under  its 
jempire  ;  not  by  means  of  lawless  violence,  but  partly 
by  what  must  be  allowed  to  be  just  conquest,  and  part- 
ly by  other  kingdoms  submitting  themselves  volun- 
tarily to  it,  throughout  a  course  of  ages,  and  claiming 
its  protection,  one  after  another,  in  successive  exi- 
gencies. The  head  of  it  would  be  an  universal  mon- 
arch, in  another  sense  than  any  mortal  has  yet  been  ; 
and  the  eastern  style  would  be  literally  applicable  to 
him,  that  all people^  nations  and  languages  should  serve 
him.  And  though  indeed  our  knowledge  of  human 
nature,  and  the  whole  history  of  mankind,  shew  the 
impossibility,  without  some  miraculous  interposition, 
that  a  number  of  men,  here  on  earth,  should  unite  in 
one  society  or  government,  in  the  fear  of  God  and  uni- 
versal practice  of  virtue  ;  and  that  such  a  government 
should  continue  so  united  for  a  succession  of  ages ;  yet 
admitting  or  supposing  this,  the  effect  would  be  as 
now  drawn  out.  And  thus,  for  instance,  the  wonder- 
ful power  and  prosperity  promised  to  the  Jewish  na* 
tion  in  the  scripture,  would  be,  in  a  great  measure,  the 
consequence  of  what  is  predicted  of  them, — that  the 
people  should  be  all  righteous  and  inherit  the  land  for 
ever*  were  we  to  understand  the  latter  phrase  of  a 

»  Isai.  U.21. 


Chap.  III.  Government  of  God.  135 

long  continuance  only,  sufficient  to  give  things  tim6 
to  work.  The  predictions  of  this  kind,  for  there  are 
many  of  them,  cannot  come  to  pass  in  the  present 
known  course  of  nature  ;  but  suppose  them  come  to 
pass,  and  then  the  dominion  and  preeminence  promis- 
ed must  naturally  follow,  to  a  very  considerable  degree. 

Consider  now  the  general  system  of  religion  ;  that 
the  government  of  the  world  is  uniform,  and  one,  and 
moral ;  that  virtue  and  right  shall  finally  have  the  ad- 
vantage and  prevail  over  fraud  and  lawless  force,  over 
the  deceits  as  well  as  the  violence  of  wickedness,  un- 
der the  conduct  of  one  supreme  Governor  ;  and  from 
the  observations  above  made,  it  will  appear,  that  God 
has,  by  our  reason,  given  us  to  see  a  peculiar  connex- 
ion in  the  several  parts  of  this  scheme,  and  a  tendency 
towards  the  completion  of  it,  arising  out  of  the  very 
nature  of  virtue ;  which  tendency  is  to  be  considered 
as  somewhat  moral  in  the  essential  constitution  of 
things.  If  any  one  should  think  all  this  to  be  of  lit- 
tle importance,  I  desire  him  to  consider  what  he  would 
think  if  vice  had,  essentially  and  in  its  nature,  these 
advantageous  tendencies  ;  or  if  virtue  had  essentially 
the  direct  contrary  ones. 

But  it  may  be  objected,  that,  notwithstanding  all 
these  natural  effects  and  these  natural  tendencies  of 
virtue,  yet  things  may  be  now  going  on  throughout 
the  universe,  and  may  go  on  hereafter,  in  the  same 
mixed  way  as  here  at  present  upon  earth  ;  virtue  some- 
times prosperous,  sometimes  depressed  ;  vice  some- 
times punished,  sometimes  successful.  The  answer  to 
which  is,  that  it  is  not  the  purpose  of  this  chapter,  nor 
of  this  treatise,  properly  to  prove  God's  perfect  moral 
government  over  the  world,  or  the  truth  of  religion, 
but  to  observe  what  there  is  in  the  constitution  and 
course  of  nature  to  confirm  the  proper  proof  of  it, 


136  Of  the  Moral  Part  1. 

supposed  to  be  known  ;  and  that  the  weight  of  the 
foregoing  observations  to  this  purpose  may  be  thus? 
distinctly  proved.  Pleasure  and  pain  are,  indeed,  to  a 
certain  degree,  say  to  a  very  high  degree,  distributed 
amongst  us  without  any  apparent  regard  to  the  merit 
or  demerit  of  characters.  And  were  there  nothing 
else,  concerning  this  matter,  discernible  in  the  con  ti- 
tution  and  course  of  nature,  there  would  be  no  ground 
from  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature,  to  hope  or 
to  fear  that  men  would  be  rewarded  or  punished  here- 
after according  to  their  deserts  ;  which,  however,  it  is 
to  be  remarked,  implies  that  even  then  there  would  be 
no  ground  from  appearances  to  think,  that  vice  upon 
the  whole  would  have  the  advantage,  rather  than  that 
virtue  would.  And  thus  the  proof  of  a  future  state  of 
retribution  would  rest  upon  the  usual  known  argu- 
ments for  it  ;  which  are,  I  think,  plainly  unanswera- 
ble, and  would  be  so,  though  there  were  no  additional 
confirmation  of  them  from  the  things  above  insisted! 
on  :  but  these  things  are  a  very  strong  confirmation 
of  them.     For, 

First,  they  shew  that  the  author  of  nature  is  not 
indifferent  to  virtue  and  vice.  They  amount  to  a 
declaration  from  him,  determinate  and  not  to  be  evad- 
ed, in  favour  of  one,  and  against  the  other ;  such  a 
declaration,  as  there  is  nothing  to  be  set  over  against 
or  answer,  on  the  part  of  vice*  So  that  were  a  man, 
laying  aside  the  proper  proof  of  religion,  to  determine 
from  the  course  of  nature  only,  v*  hether  it  were  most 
probable  that  the  righteous  or  the  wicked  would  have 
the  advantage  in  a  future  life,  there  can  b°  no  doubt 
but  that  he  would  determine  the  probability  to  b?, 
that  the  former  would.  The  course  of  nature  then, 
in  the  view  of  it  now  given,  furnishes  us  with  a  real 
practical  proof  of  the  obligations  of  religion. 


Chap.  III.  Government  of  God.  137 

Secondly,  when,  conformably  to  what  religion 
teaches  us,  God  shall  reward  and  punish  virtue  and 
vice,  as  such,  so  as  that  every  one  shall,  upon  the  whole, 
have  his  deserts,  this  distributive  justice  will  not  be  a 
thing  different  in  kind,  but  only  in  degree,  from  what 
we  experience  in  his  present  government.  It  will  be 
that  in  effect,  towards  which  we  now  see  a  tendency. 
It  will  be  no  more  than  the  completion  of  that  moral 
government,  the  principles  and  beginning  of  which  have 
been  shewn,  beyond  all  dispute,  discernible  in  the 
present  constitution  and  course  of  nature.  And  from 
hence  it  follows, 

Thirdly,  that  as  under  the  natural  government  of 
God,  our  experience  of  those  kinds  and  degrees  of 
happiness  and  misery  which  we  do  experience  at  pres- 
ent, gives  just  ground  to  hope  for  and  to  fear  higher 
degrees  and  other  kinds  of  both  in  a  future  state,  sup- 
posing  a  future  state  admitted,  so  under  his  moral 
government,  our  experience,  that  virtue  and  vice  are, 
in  the  manners  above  mentioned,  actually  rewarded 
and  punished  at  present,  in  a  certain  degree,  gives  just 
ground  to  hope  and  to  fear  that  they  may  be  rewarded 
and  punished  in  an  higher  degree  hereafter.  It  is  ac- 
knowledged indeed  that  this  alone  is  not  sufficient 
ground  to  think  that  they  actually  will  be  rewarded 
and  punished  in  a  higher  degree,  rather  than  in  a  low- 
er ;  but  then, 

Lastly,  there  is  sufficient  ground  to  think  so,  from 
the  good  and  bad  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice.  For 
these  tendencies  are  essential,  and  founded  in  the  na- 
ture of  things,  whereas  the  hindrances  to  their  becom- 
ing effect,  are,  in  numberless  cases,  not  necessary,  but 
artificial  only.  Now  it  may  be  much  more  strongly 
argued,  that  these  tendencies,  as  well  as  the  actual  re- 
wards and  punishments  of  virtue  and  vice,  which  arise 

s 


13&  Of  the  Moral  Part  L 

directly  out  of  the  nature  of  things,  will  remain  here- 
after, than  that  the  accidental  hindrances  of  them 
will.  And  if  these  hindrances  do  not  remain,  those 
rewards  an  punishments  cannot  but  be  carried  on 
much  further  towards  the  perfection  of  moral  govern- 
ment, i.  e.  the  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice  will  be- 
come effect  ;  but  when,  or  where,  or  in  what  particu- 
lar way,  cannot  be  known  at  all,  but  by  revelation. 

Upon  the  whole,   there  is  a  kind  of  moral  govern- 
ment implied  in  God's  natural  government  ;#  virtue 
and  vice  are  naturally  rewarded  and  punished  as  ben- 
eficial and  mischievous  to  society,!  and  rewarded  and 
punished  directly   as  virtue  and  vice,}     The  notion 
then  of  a  moral  scheme  of  government  is  not  fictitious 
but  natural,  for  it  is  suggested  to  our  thoughts  by  the 
constitution  and  course  of  nature  ;  and  the  execution 
of  this  scheme  is  actually  begun,  in  the  instances  here 
mentioned.     And  these  things  are  to  be  considered  as 
a  declaration  of  the  author  of  nature  for  virtue  and 
against  vice  ;  they  give  a  credibility  to  the  supposition 
of  their  being  rewarded  and  punished  hereafter,  and 
also  ground  to  hope  and  to  fear  that  they  may  be  re- 
warded and  punished  in  higher  degrees  than  they  are 
here.     And  as  all  this  is  confirmed,  so  the  argument 
for  religion  from  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature 
is  carried  on  farther,  by  observing,  that  there  are  nat- 
ural tendencies,  and,  in  innumerable  cases,  only  artifi- 
cial hindrances,  to  this  moral  scheme's  being  carried 
on  much  farther  towards  perfection  than  it  is  at  pres- 
ent. §     The  notion  then  of  a  moral  scheme  of  govern- 
ment much  more  perfect  than  what  is  seen,  is  not  a 
fictitious  but  a  natural  notion,  for  it  is  suggested  to 
our  thoughts  by  the  essential  tendencies  of  virtue  and 
vice.     And  these  tendencies  are  to  be  considered  as  in- 

*   P.  117.  f  P.   IIP.  \  P.  120,  &c.  §  P.  127,  &c. 


Chap.  III.  Government  of  God.  139 

timations,  as  implicit  promises  and  threatnings  from 
the  author  of  nature,  of  much  greater  rewards  and 
punishments  to  follow  virtue  and  vice  than  do  at  pres- 
ent. And  indeed,  every  natural  tendency  which  is  to 
continue,  but  which  is  hindered  from  becoming  effect 
by  only  accidental  causes,  affords  a  presumption  that 
such  tendency  will,  some  time  or  other,  become  effect ; 
a  presumption  in  degree  proportionable  to  the  length 
of  the  duration  through  which  such  tendency  will  con- 
tinue. And  from  these  things  together  arises  a  real 
presumption,  that  the  moral  scheme  of  government 
established  in  nature  shall  be  carried  on  much  farther 
towards  perfection  hereafter,  and,  I  think,  a  presump- 
tion that  it  will  be  absolutely  completed.  But  from 
these  things,  joined  with  the  moral  nature  which  God 
has  given  us,  considered  as  given  us  by  him,  arises  a 
practical  proof*  that  it  will  be  completed  ;  a  proof 
from  fact,  and  therefore  a  distinct  one  from  that  which 
is  deduced  from  the  eternal  and  unalterable  relations, 
the  fitness  and  unfitness  of  actions. 

*  See  this  proof  drawn  out  briefly,  Ch.  vi. 


140  Of  a  State  of  Trial.  Part  I. 


CHAP.  IV. 

Of  a  State  of  Probation,   as  implying  Trial,  Difficulties, 
and  Danger. 

I  he  general  doctrine  of  religion,  that  our  pres- 
ent life  is  a  state  of  probation  for  a  future  one,  com- 
prehends under  it  several  particular  things  distinct 
from  each  other.  But  the  first  and  most  common 
meaning  of  it  seems  to  be,  that  our  future  interest  is 
now  depending,  and  depending  upon  ourselves  ;  that 
we  have  scope  and  opportunities  here  for  that  good 
and  bad  behaviour,  which  God  will  reward  and  punish 
hereafter ;  together  with  temptations  to  one,  as  well 
as  inducements  of  reason  to  the  other.  And  this  is, 
in  great  measure,  the  same  with  saying,  that  we  are 
under  the  moral  government  of  God,  and  to  give  an 
account  of  our  actions  to  him.  For  the  notion  of  a 
future  account  and  general  righteous  judgment  im- 
plies some  sort  of  temptations  to  what  is  wrong,  oth- 
erwise there  would  be  no  moral  possibility  of  doing 
wrong,  nor  ground  for  judgment  or  discrimination. 
But  there  is  this  difference,  that  the  word  probation  is 
more  distinctly  and  particularly  expressive  of  allure- 
ments to  wrong,  or  difficulties  in  adhering  uniformly 
to  what  is  right,  and  of  the  danger  of  miscarrying  by 
6uch  temptations,  than  the  words  moral  government. 
A  state  of  probation  then,  as  thus  particularly  imply- 
ing in  it  trial,  difficulties  and  danger,  may  require  to 
be  considered  distinctly  by  itself. 

And  as  the  moral  government  of  God,  which  re- 
ligion teaches  us,  implies  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  tri- 
al with  regard  to  a  future  world,  so  also  his  natural 


Chap.  IV.  Of  a  State  of  Trial.  141 

government  over  us  implies  that  we  are  in  a  state  of 
trial  in  the  like  sense  with  regard  to  the  present  world. 
Natural  government  by  rewards  and  punishments  as 
much  implies  natural  trial  as  moral  government  does 
moral  trial.  The  natural  government  of  God  here 
meant,*  consists  in  his  annexing  pleasure  to  some  ac- 
tions and  pain  to  others,  which  are  in  our  power  to 
do  or  forbear,  and  in  giving  us  notice  of  such  appoint- 
ment beforehand.  This  necessarily  implies,  that  he 
has  made  our  happiness  and  misery,  or  our  interest,  to 
depend  in  part  upon  ourselves.  And  so  far  as  men 
have  temptations  to  any  course  of  action  which  will 
probably  occasion  them  greater  temporal  inconven- 
ience and  uneasiness  than  satisfaction,  so  far  their  tem- 
poral interest  is  in  danger  from  themselves,  or  they  are 
in  a  state  of  trial  with  respect  to  it.  Now  people 
often  blame  others,  and  even  themselves,  for  their 
misconduct  in  their  temporal  concerns.  And  we  find 
many  are  greatly  wanting  to  themselves,  and  miss  of 
that  natural  happiness  which  they  might  have  obtain- 
ed in  the  present  life  ;  perhaps  every  one  does  in  some 
degree.  But  many  run  themselves  into  great  incon- 
venience, and  into  extreme  distress  and  misery  ;  not 
through  incapacity  of  knowing  better,  and  doing  bet- 
ter for  themselves,  which  would  be  nothing  to  the 
present  purpose,  but  through  their  own  fault.  And 
these  things  necessarily  imply  temptation,  and  danger 
of  miscarrying,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  with  respect 
to  our  worldly  interest  or  happiness.  Every  one  too, 
without  having  religion  in  his  thoughts,  speaks  of  the 
hazards  which  young  people  run,  upon  their  setting 
out  in  the  world  ;  hazards  from  other  causes  than 
merely  their  ignorance  and  unavoidable  accidents. 
And  some  courses  of  vice,  at  least,  being  contrary  t© 

*  Ch.  it 


142  Of  a  State  of  Trial.  Part  I,    " 

men's  worldly  interest  or  good,  temptations  to  these 
must  at  the  same  time  be  temptations  to  forego  our 
present  and  our  future  interest.  Thus  in  our  natural 
or  temporal  capacity  we  are  in  a  state  of  trial,  i.  e.  of 
difficulty  and  danger  analogous  or  like  to  our  moral 
and  religious  trial. 

This  will  more  distinctly  appear  to  any  one  who 
thinks  it  worth  while  more  distinctly  to  consider 
what  it  is  which  constitutes  our  trial  in  both  capaci- 
ties, and  to  observe  how  mankind  behave  under  it. 

And  that  which  constitutes  this  our  trial,  in  both 
these  capacities,  must  be  somewhat  either  in  our  ex- 
ternal circumstances,  or  in  our  nature.     For,  on  the 
one  hand,  persons  may   be  betrayed  into  wrong  be- 
haviour upon  surprise,  or  overcome  upon  any  other 
very  singular  and  extraordinary  external  occasions, 
who  would  otherwise  have  preserved  their  character  of 
prudence  and  of  virtue  ;  in  which  cases,  every  one,  in 
speaking  of  the  wrong  behaviour  of  these  persons, 
would  impute  it  to   such  particular  external  circum- 
stances :  and  on  the  other  hand,  men  who  have  con- 
tracted habits  of  vice  and  folly  of  any  kind,  or  have 
some  particular  passions  in  excess,  will  seek  opportu- 
nities, and,  as  it  were,  go  out  of  their  way  to  gratify 
themselves  in  these  respects,  at  the  expence  of  their 
wisdom  and  their  virtue  ;  led  to  it,  as  every  one  would 
say,  not  by  external  temptations,  but  by  such  habits 
and  passions.     And  the  account  of  this  last  case  is, 
that  particular  passions  are  no  more  coincident  with 
prudence,  or  that  reasonable  self  love,  the  end  of  which 
is  our  worldly  interest,  than  they  are  with  the  princi- 
ple of  virtue  and   religion,  but  often  draw  contrary 
ways  to  one  as  well  as  to  the  other  ;  and  so  such  par- 
ticular passions  are  as  much  temptations  to  act  im- 
prudently with  regard  to  our  worldly  interest,  as  to  act 


Chap.  IV.  Of  a  'State  of  Trial.  143 

viciously.*  However,  as  when  we  say,  men  are  mis- 
led  by  external  circumstances  of  temptation,  it  cannot 
but  be  understood  that  there  is  somewhat  within 
themselves  to  render  those  circumstances  temptations 
or  to  render  them  susceptible  of  impressions  from 
them  ;  so  when  we  say,  they  are  misled  by  passions, 
it  is  always  supposed  that  there  are  occasions,  circum- 
stances and  objects,  exciting  these  passions,  and  afford- 
ing means  for  gratifying  them.  And  therefore, 
temptations  from  within  and  from  without  coincide 
and  mutually  imply  each  other.  Now  the  several 
external  objects  of  the  appetites,  passions  and  affec- 
tions being  present  to  the  senses,  or  offering  themselves 
to  the  mind,  and  so  exciting  emotions  suitable  to 
their  nature,  not  only  in  cases  where  they  can  be  grat- 
ified consistently  with  innocence  and  prudence,  but 
also  in  cases  where  they  cannot,  and  yet  can  be  grati- 
fied imprudently  and  viciously ;  this  as  really  puts 
them  in  danger  of  voluntarily  foregoing  their  present 
interest  or  good  as  their  future,  and  as  really  renders 
self  denial  as  necessary  to  secure  one  as  the  other ;  i.  e. 
we  are  in  a  like  state  of  trial  with  respect  to  both,  by 
the  very  same  passions,  excited  by  the  very  same 
means.  Thus  mankind  having  a  temporal  interest 
depending  upon  themselves,  and  a. prudent  course  of 
behaviour  being  necessary  to  secure  it,  passions  inor- 
dinately excited,  whether  by  means  of  example,  or  by 
any  other  external  circumstance,  towards  such  objects, 
at  such  times,  or  in  such  degrees,  as  that  they  cannot 
be  gratified  consistently  with  worldly  prudence,  are 
temptations,  dangerous  and  too  often  successful  temp- 
tations, to  forego  a  greater  temporal  good  for  a  less  ; 
i.  e.  to  forego  what  is,  upon  the  whole,  our  temporal 

*  See  Sermons  preached  at  the  Rolls,  1726,  2d  Ed.  p.  205,  life.    Pref.  p 
35,-t&     Serm.p.  21,  &V. 


144  Of  a  State  of  Trial.  Part  L 

interest,  for  the  sake  of  a  present  gratification.  This 
is  a  description  of  our  state  of  trial  in  our  temporal  ca- 
pacity. Substitute  now  the  word  future  for  temporal. 
and  virtue  for  prudence,  and  it  will  be  just  as  proper  a 
description  of  our  state  of  trial  in  our  religious  capa- 
city ;  so  analogous  are  they  to  each  other. 

If,  from  consideration  of  this  our  like  state  of  trial 
in  both  capacities,  we  go  on  to  observe  farther  how 
mankind  behave  under  it,  we  shall  find  there  are  some 
who  have  so  little  sense  of  it  that  they  scarce  look  be- 
yond the  passing  day  ;  they  are  so  taken  up  with  pres- 
ent gratifications  as  to  have,  in  a  manner,  no  feeling 
of  consequences,  no  regard  to  their  future  ease  or  for- 
tune in  this  life,  any  more  than  to  their  happiness  in 
another.  Some  appear  to  be  blinded  and  deceived  by 
inordinate  passion  in  their  worldly  concerns  as  much 
as  in  religion.  Others  are  not  deceived,  but  as  it  were 
forcibly  carried  away  by  the  like  passions,  against  their 
better  judgment  and  feeble  resolutions  too  of  acting 
better.  And  there  are  men,  and  truly  they  are  not  a 
few,  who  shamelessly  avow,  not  their  interest,  but  their 
mere  will  and  pleasure,  to  be  their  law  of  life,  and  who, 
in  open  defiance  of  every  thing  that  is  reasonable,  will 
go  on  in  a  course  of  vicious  extravagance,  foreseeing, 
with  no  remorse  and  little  fear,  that  it  will  be  their 
temporal  ruin,  and  some  of  them  under  the  apprehen- 
sion of  the  consequences  of  wickedness  in  another 
state.  And  to  speak  in  the  most  moderate  way,  hu- 
man creatures  are  not  only  continually  liable  to  go 
wrong  voluntarily,  but  we  see  likewise  that  they  often 
actually  do  so,  with  respect  to  their  temporal  interests 
as  well  as  with  respect  to  religion. 

Thus  our  difficulties  and  dangers,  or  ©ur  trials,  in 
©ur  temporal  and  our  religious  capacity,  as  they  pro- 
reed  from  the  same  causes,  and  have  the  same  effect 


Chap.  IV.  Of  a  State  of  Trial.  145 

upon  men's  behaviour,  are  evidently  analogous  and 
of  the  same  kind. 

It  may  be  added,  that  as  the  difficulties  and  dangers 
of  miscarrying  in  our  religious  state  of  trial  are  greatly 
increased,  and  one  is  ready  to  think  in  a  manner  wholly 
made,  by  the  ill  behaviour  of  others ;  by  a  wrong  edu- 
cation, wrong  in  a  moral  sense,   sometimes  positively 
vicious  5  by  general  bad  example  ;  by  the  dishonest 
artifices  which  are  got  into  business  of  all  kinds  ;  and* 
in  very  many  parts  of  the  world,  by  religion's  being 
corrupted  into  superstitions,  which  indulge   men  in 
their  vices ;  so  in  like  manner,  the  difficulties  of  con- 
ducting ourselves  prudently  in  respect  to  our  present 
interest,  and  our  danger  of  being  led  aside  from  pursu- 
ing it,  are  greatly  increased  by  a  foolish  education  ; 
and,  after  we  come  to  mature  age,  by  the  extravagance 
and  carelessness  of  others  whom  we  have  intercourse 
with,  and  by   mistaken  notions,  very  generally  preva- 
lent, and  taken  up  from  common  opinion,  concerning 
temporal  happiness,  and  wherein  it  consists     And  per- 
sons, by  their  own  negligence  and  folly  in  their  tem- 
poral affairs,  no  less  than  by  a  course  of  vice,  bring 
themselves  into  new  difficulties,   and,  by  habits  of  in- 
dulgence, become  less  qualified  to  go  through  them  ; 
and  one  irregularity  after  another  embarrasses  things 
to  such   a  degree,  that  they  know  not  whereabout 
they  are,  and  often  makes  the  path  of  conduct  so  in- 
tricate  and  perplexed,  that  it   is   difficult  to  trace  it 
out,  difficult  even  to  determine  what  is  the  prudent 
or  the  moral  part.     Thus,  for  instance,  wrong  behav- 
iour in  one  stage  of  life,  youth  ;  wrong,  I  mean,  con- 
sidering ourselves  only  in  our  temporal  capacity,  with- 
out taking  in  religion  ;  this,  in  several  ways,  increases 
the  difficulties  of  right  behaviour  in  mature  age  ;  i.  e* 

T 


146  Of  a  State  of  Trial.  Part  L 

puts  us  into  a  more  disadvantageous  state  of  trial  in  our 
temporal  capacity. 

We  are  an  inferior  part  of  the  creation  of  God. 
There  are  natural  appearances  of  our  being  in  a  state 
of  degradation.  x\nd  we  certainly  are  in  a  condition, 
which  docs  not  seem,  by  any  means,  the  most  advanta- 
geous we  could  imagine  or  desire,  either  in  our  natu- 
ral or  moral  capacity,  for  securing  either  our  present  or 
future  interest.  However,  this  condition,  low  and 
careful  and  uncertain  as  it  is,  does  not  afford  any  just 
ground  of  complaint*  For,  as  men  may  manage  their 
temporal  affairs  with  prudence,  and  so  pass  their  days 
here  on  earth  in  tolerable  ease  and  satisfaction,  by  a 
moderate  degree  of  care,  so  likewise  with  regard  to  re- 
ligi  m,  there  is  no  more  required  than  what  they  are 
well  able  to  do,  and  what  they  must  be  greatly  want- 
ing to  themselves  if  they  neglect.  And  for  persons 
to  have  that  put  upon  them  which  they  are  well  able 
to  go  through,  and  no  more,  we  naturally  consider  as 
;aitable  thing,  supposing  it  done  by  proper  au- 
thority. Nor  have  we  any  more  reason  to  complain 
of  it,  with  regard  to  the  Author  of  nature,  than  of 
his  not  having  given  us  other  advantages,  belonging  to 
other  orders  of  creatures. 

But  the  thing  here  insisted  upon  is,  that  the  state  of 
trial,  which  religion  teaches  us  we  are  in,  i>  rendered 
credible  by  its  being  throughout  uniform  and  of  a 
pi  with  the  general  conduct  of  Providence  towards 
us  m  all  other  respects  within  the  compass  of  our 
knowledge.  Indeed  if  mankind,  considered  in  their 
natural  capacity,  as  inhabitants  of  this  world  only, 
found  themselves,  from  their  birth  to  their  death,  in  a 
settled  state  of  security  and  happiness,  without  any  so- 
licitude or  thought  of  their  own  ;  or  if  they  were  in 
no  danger  of  being  brought  into  inconveniences  anrf 


Chap.  IV.  Of  a  State  of  Trial.  147 

distress,  by  carelessness,  or  the?folly  of  passion,  through 
bad  example,  the  treachery  of  others,  or  the  deceitful 
appearances  of  things  ;  were  this  cur  natural  condi- 
tion, then  it  might  seem  strange,  and  be  some  pre- 
sumption agdnst  the  truth  of  religion,  that  it  repre- 
sents our  future  and  more  general  interest,  as  not  se- 
cure of  course,  but  as  depending  upon  our  behaviour, 
and  requiring  recollection  and  self  government  to  ob- 
tain it.  For  it  might  be  alleged,  "  what  you  say  is 
our  condition  in  one  respect  is  not  in  any  wise  of  a  sort 
with  what  we  find,  by  experience,  our  condition  is  in 
another.  Our  whole  present  interest  is  secured  to  our 
hands,  without  any  solicitude  of  ours ;  and  why  should 
not  our  future  interest,  if  we  have  any  such,  be  so 
too  ?"  But  since,  on  the  contrary,  thought  and  con- 
sideration, the  voluntary  denying  ourselves  many 
things  which  we  desire,  and  a  course  of  behaviour  far 
from  being  always  agreeable  to  us,  are  absolutely  ne- 
cessary to  our  acting  even  a  common  decent  and  com- 
mon prudent  part,  so  as  to  pass  with  any  satisfaction 
through  the  present  world,  and  be  received  upon  any 
tolerable  good  terms  in  it  ;  since  this  is  the  case,  all 
presumption  against  self  denial  and  attention  being 
necessary  to  secure  our  higher  interest,  is  removed. 
Had  we  not  experience,  it  might,  perhaps  speciously, 
be  urged,  that  it  is  improbable  any  kind  of  hazard 
and  danger  should  be  put  upon  U*  by  an  infinite  Be- 
ing, when  every  thing  which  is  hazard  and  danger  in 
our  manner  of  conception,  and  will  end  in  error,  con- 
fusion and  misery,  is  now  already  certain  in  his  fore- 
knowledge. And  indeed,  why  any  thing  of  hazard 
and  danger  should  be  put  upon  such  frail  creatures  as 
we  are,  may  well  be  thought  a  difficulty  in  specula- 
tion, and  cannot  but  be  so  till  we  know  the  whole,  or, 
however,  much  more  of  the  case.     But  still  the  con- 


148  Of  a  State  of  Trial.  Part  I. 

stitution  of  nature  is  as  it  is,  Our  happiness  and  mis- 
ery are  trusted  to  our  conduct,  and  made  to  depend 
upon  it.  Somewhat,  and  in  many  circumstances  a 
great  deal  too,  is  put  upon  us,  either  to  do  or  to  suf- 
fer, as  we  choose.  And  all  the  various  miseries  of  life 
which  people  bring  upon  themselves  by  negligence 
and  folly,  and  might  have  avoided  by  proper  care,  are 
instance-  of  this  ;  which  miseries  are  beforehand  just 
as  conti  gent  and  undetermined  as  their  conduct,  and 
left  to  be  determined  by  it. 

These  observations  are  an  answer  to  the  objections 
against  the  credibility  of  a  state  of  trial,  as  implying 
temptation  >,  and  real  danger  of  miscarrying  with  re- 
gard to  our  general  interest,  under  the  moral  govern- 
ment of  God  ;  and  they  shew  that,  if  we  are  at  all  to 
be  considered  in  such  a  capacity,  and  as  having  such 
an  interest,  the  general  analogy  of  Providence  must 
lead  us  to  apprehend  ourselves  in  danger  of  miscarry- 
ing, in  different  degrees,  as  to  this  interest,  by  our 
neglecting  to  act  the  proper  part  belonging  to  us  in 
that  capacity.  For  we  have  a  present  interest,  under 
the  government  of  God  which  we  experience  here  upon 
earth.  And  this  interest,  as  it  is  not  forced  upon  us, 
so  neither  is  it  offered  to  our  acceptance,  but  to  our 
acquisition,  in  such  sort  as  that  we  are  in  danger  of 
missing  it,  by  means  of  temptations  to  neglect,  or 
act  contrary  to  it  ;  and  without  attention  and  self 
denial  mu^t  and  do  miss  of  it.  It  is  then  perfectly 
credible  that  this  may  be  our  case,  with  respect  to  that 
chief  and  final  gaod  which  religion  proposes  to  us. 


Chap.  V.  Of  Moral  Discipline.  149 


CHAP.  V. 

Of  a  State    of  Probation,  as  intended  for  Moral  Dis- 
cipline and  Improvement, 

£  rom  the  consideration  of  our  being  in  a  probation 
state,  of  so  much  difficulty  and  hazard,  naturally  arises 
the  question,  how  we  came  to  be  placed  in  it.  But 
such  a  general  inquiry  as  this  would  be  found  involved 
in  insuperable  difficulties.  For  though  iome  of  these 
difficulties  would  be  lessened,  by  observing  that  all 
wickedness  is  voluntary,  as  is  implied  in  its  very  notion, 
and  that  many  of  the  miseries  of  life  have  apparent 
good  effects,  yet  when  we  consider  other  circumstan- 
ces belonging  to  both,  and  what  must  be  the  conse- 
quence of  the  former  in  a  life  to  come,  it  cannot  but  be 
acknowledged  plain  folly  and  presumption  to  pretend 
to  give  an  account  of  the  whole  reasons  of  this  matter ; 
the  whole  reasons  of  our  being  allotted  a  condition,  out 
of  which  so  much  wickedness  and  misery,  so  circum- 
stanced, would  in  fact  arise.  Whether  it  be  not  be- 
yond our  faculties,  not  only  to  find  out,  but  even  to  un- 
derstand, the  whole  account  of  this  \  or,  though  we 
should  be  supposed  capable  of  understanding  ir,  yet, 
whetherit  would  be  of  service  or  prejudice  to  us  to  bein- 
formed  of  it,  is  impossible  to  say.  But  as  our  present 
condition  can  in  no  wise  be  shewn  inconsistent  with  the 
perfect  moral  government  of  God,  so  religion  teaches 
us  we  were  placed  in  it  that  we  might  qualify  ourselves, 
by  thepractice  of  virtue,  for  another  state  whichi-*  to  fol- 
low it.  And  this,  though  but  a  partial  answer,  a  very 
partial  one  indeed,  to  the  inquiry  now  mentioned,  yet- 


150  Of  a  State  of  Part  L 

is  a  more  satisfactory  answer  to  another,  which  is  of 
real,  and  of  the  utmost  importance  to  us  to  have  an- 
swered,— the  inquiry,  what  is  our  busii  ;ess  here  ?  The 
known  end,  then,  why  we  are  placed  in  a  state  of  so 
much  affliction,  hazard  and  difficulty,  is,  our  improve- 
ment  in  virtue  and  piety,  as  the  requisite  qualification 
for  a  future  state  of  security  and  happiness. 

Now  the  beginning  of  life,  considered  as  an  educa- 
tion for  mature  age  in  the  present  world,  appears  plain- 
ly,  at  first  sight,  analogous  to  this  our  trial  for  a  future 
one  ;  the  former  being  in  our  temporal  capacity,  what 
the  latter  is  in  our  religious  capacity.  But  some  ob- 
servations common  to  both  of  them,  and  a  more  dis- 
tinct consideration  of  each,  will  more  distinctly  shew 
the  extent  and  force  of  the  analogy  between  them,  and 
the  credibility  which  arises  from  hence,  as  well  as  from 
the  nature  of  the  thing,  that  the  present  life  was  in- 
tended to  be  a  state  of  discipline  for  a  future  one. 

I.  Every  species  of  creatures  is,  we  see,  designed  for 
a  particular  way  of  life  ;  to  which  the  nature,  the  ca- 
pacities, temper,  and  qualifications  of  each  species,  are 
as  necessary  as  their  external  circumstances.  Both 
come  into  the  notion  of  such  state,  or  particular  way 
of  life,  and  are  constituent  parts  of  it.  Change  a 
man's  capacities  or  character,  to  the  degree  in  which 
it  is  conceivable  they  may  be  changed,  and  he  would 
be  altogether  incapable  of  a  human  course  of  life,  and 
human  happiness  ;  as  incapable  as  if,  his  nature  con- 
tinuing unchanged,  he  were  placed  in  a  world  where 
he  had  no  sphere  of  action,  nor  any  objects  to  answer 
his  appetites,  passions,  and  affections  of  any  sort.  One 
thing  is  set  over  against  another,  as  an  ancient  writer 
expresses  it.  Our  nature  corresponds  to  our  external 
condition  :  without  this  correspondence,  there  would 
be  no  possibility  of  any  such  thing  as  human  life  and 


Gha*.  V.  Moral  Discipline.  151 

human  happiness ;  which  life  and  happiness  are,  there- 
fore, a  result  from  our  nature  and  condition  jointly  ; 
meaning  by  human  life,  not  living  in  the  literal  sense, 
but  the  whole  complex  notion  commonly  understood 
by  those  words.  So  that  without  determining  what 
will  be  the  employment  and  happiness,  the  particular 
life  of  good  men  hereafter,  there  must  be  some  deter- 
minate capacities,  some  necessary  character  and  qual- 
ifications, without  which  persons  cannot  but  be  utterly 
incapable  of  it ;  in  like  manner  as  there  must  be  some, 
without  which  men  would  be  incapable  of  their  pres- 
ent state  of  life.     Now, 

II.  The  constitution  of  human  creatures,  and  in- 
deed of  all  creatures  which  come  under  our  notice,  is 
isuch,  as  that  they  are  capable  of  naturally  becoming 
qualified  for  states  of  life,  for  which  they  were  once 
wholly  unqualified.  In  imagination  we  may  indeed 
conceive  of  creatures  as  incapable  of  having  any  of 
their  faculties  naturally  enlarged,  or  as  being  unable 
naturally  to  acquire  any  new  qualifications ;  but  the 
faculties  of  every  species  known  to  us  are  made  for 
enlargement,  for  acquirements  of  experience  and  hab- 
its. We  find  ourselves  in  particular  endued  with  ca- 
pacities, not  only  of  perceiving  ideas,  and  of  knowl- 
edge or  perceiving  truth,  but  also  of  storing  up  our 
ideas  and  knowledge  by  memory.  We  are  capable, 
not  only  of  acting,  and  of  having  different  momentary 
impressions  made  upon  us,  but  of  getting  a  new  fa- 
cility in  any  kind  of  action,  and  of  settled  alterations 
in  our  temper  or  character.  The  power  of  the  two 
last  is  the  power  of  habits  ;  but  neither  the  percep- 
tion of  ideas,  nor  knowledge  of  any  sort,  are  habits, 
though  absolutely  necessary  to  the  forming  of  them. 
However,  apprehension,  reason,  memory,  which  are 
the  capacities  of  acquiring  knowledge,  are  greatly  im- 


152  Of  a  Stale  of  Part  I. 

proved  by  exercise.  Whether  the  word  habit  is  ap- 
plicable to  all  these  improvements,  and  in  particular 
how  far  the  powers  of  memory  and  of  habits  may  be 
powers  of  the  same  nature,  I  shall  not  inquire.  But 
that  perceptions  come  into  our  minds  readily  and  of 
course,  by  means  of  their  having  been  there  before, 
seems  a  thing  of  the  same  sort  as  readiness  in  any  par- 
ticular kind  of  action,  proceeding  from  being  accus- 
tomed to  it.  And  aptness  to  recollect  practical  ob- 
servations of  service  in  our  conduct,  is  plainly  habit  in 
many  cases.  There  are  habits  of  perception,  and  hab- 
its of  action.  An  instance  of  the  former  is  our  con- 
stant and  even  involuntarily  readiness,  in  correcting 
the  impressions  of  our  sight  concerning  magnitudes 
and  di>tances,  so  as  to  substitute  judgment  in  the  room 
of  sensation  imperceptibly  to  ourselves.  And  it  seems 
as  if  all  other  associations  of  ideas  not  naturally  con- 
nected, might  be  called  passive  habits,  as  properly  as 
our  readiness  in  understanding  languages  upon  sight, 
or  hearing  of  words.  And  our  readiness  in  speaking 
and  writing  them  is  an  instance  of  the  latter,  of  active 
habits.  For  distinctness,  we  may  consider  habits  as 
belonging  to  the  body  or  the  mind  ;  and  the  latter 
will  be  explained  by  the  former.  Under  the  former 
are  comprehended  all  bodily  activities  or  motions, 
whether  graceful  or  unbecoming,  which  are  owing  to 
use;  under  the  latter,  general  habits  of  life  and  con- 
duct, such  as  those  of  obedience  and  submission  to  au- 
thority, or  to  any  particular  person  ;  those  of  veracity, 
justice  and  charity  ;  those  of  attention,  industry,  self 
government,  envy,  revenge.  And  habits  of  this  latter 
kind  seem  produced  by  repeated  acts,  as  well  as  the 
former.  And  in  like  manner  as  habits  belonging  to 
the  body  are  produced  by  external  acts,  so  habits  of 
the   mind  are  produced  by  the   exertion  of  inward 


CtfAP,  V.  Moral  Discipline.  138 

practical  principles,  i.  e.  by  carrying  them  into  act,  or 
acting  upon  them  ;  the  principles  of  obedience,  of  ve- 
racity, justice  and  charity.     Nor  can   those  habits  be 
formed  by  any   external  course   of  action,  otherwise 
than  as  it  proceeds  from  these  principles  ;  because  it  is 
only  these  inward  principles  exerted,  which  are  strictly 
act«?  of  obedience,  of  veracity,  of  justice,  and  of  charity. 
So  likewise  habits  of  attention,  industry,  self  govern- 
ment, are  in  the  same  manner  acquired  by  exercise  f 
and  habits  of  envy  and  revenge  by  indulgence,  whether 
in  outward  act,  or  in  thought  and  intention,  i.   e.  in-* 
ward  act  ;  for  such  intention  is  an  act.      Resolutions 
also  to  do  well,  are  properly  acts.     And  endeavouring 
to  enforce  upon  our  own  minds  a  practical   sense  of 
virtue,  or  to  beget  in  others  that  practical  sense  of  it 
which  a  man  really  has  himself,  is  a  virtuous  act.     All 
these,  therefore,  may  and  will   contribute    towards 
forming  good  habits.    But  going  over  the   theory  of 
virtue  in  one's  thoughts,  talking  well,  and  drawing  fine 
pictures  of  it, — this  is  so  far  from   necessarily  or  cer- 
tainly conducing  to  form  an  habit  of  it,  in   him  who 
thus  employs  himself,  that  it  may  harden  the  mind  in 
a  contrary  course,  and  render  it  gradually  more  insen- 
sible, i.  e.  form  an  habit  of  insensibility  to  all  moral 
considerations.     For,  from  our  very  faculty  of  habits, 
passive  impressions,  by  being  repeated,  grow   weaker. 
Thoughts,  by  often  passing  through  the  mind,  are  felt 
less  sensibly  ;  being  accustomed  to  danger  begets  in- 
trepidity, i.  e.  lessens  fear ;  to  distress,  lessens  the  pas- 
sion of  pity  ;  to  instances  of  others'  mortality,  lessens 
the  sensible  apprehension  of  our  own.      And   from 
these  two  observations  together, — that  practical  habits 
are  formed  and  strengthened  by  repeated  acts,  and  that 
passive  impressions  grow  weaker  by  being  repeated  up- 
en  us, — it  must  follow,  that  active  habits  may  be 

v 


1J4  Of  a  State  of  Part  L 

gradually  forming  and  strengthening,  by  a  course   of 
acting  upon  such  and  such  motives   and    excitements, 
whilst  these  motives  and  excitements  themselves   are, 
by  proportionable   degrees,  growing  less  sensible,  i.  e. 
are  continually  le*s  and  les3  sensibly  felt,   even  as  the 
active  habits  strengthen.     And    experience  confirms 
this ;  for  active  principles,  at  the  very  time    that  they 
are  less  lively  in  perception  than  they  were,  are  found 
to  be,  some  how,  wrought  more  thoroughly  into  the 
temper  and  character,  and  become  more   effectual  in 
influencing  our  practice.     The  three  things  just  men- 
tioned, may  afford  instances  of  it.     Perception  of  dan- 
ger is  a  natural  excitement  of  passive  fear,  and  active 
caution  ;  and  by  being  inured  to  danger,  habits  of  the 
latter  are  gradually  wrought,  at   the  same    time  that 
the  former  gradually  lessens.     Perception  of  distress  in 
others  is  a  natural  excitement,  pasriveiy  to    pity,    and 
actively   to  relieve  it ;  but  let  a  man  set   himself  to  at- 
tend to,  inquire  out,  and  relieve  distressed  persons,  and 
he  cannot  but  grow  less  and  less  sensibly  affected  with 
the  various  miseries  of  life  with  which  he  must  become 
acquainted,  when  yet  at  the  same    time    benevolence, 
considered  not  as  a  passion,  but  as  a  practical  principle 
of  action,  will  strengthen  ;  and  whilst  he  passively  com- 
passionates the  distressed  less  he  will  acquire  a  greater 
aptitude  actively  to  assist  and  befriend  them.     So  also 
at  the  same  time  that  the  daily  insta/ices  of  men's  dy- 
ing around  us  give  us  daily  a  less  sensible  passive  feel- 
ing or  apprehension  of  our  own  mortality,    such  in- 
stances greatly  contribute  to  the  strengthening  a  prac- 
tical regard  to  it  in  serious   men,  i.  e.  to   forming  an 
habit  of  acting  with  a  constant  view  to  it.     And    this 
seems  again  further  to  shew,  that  passive  impressions 
made  upon  our  minds  by  admonition,  experience,  ex- 
ample, though  they  may  have  a  remote  efficacy,   and 


Chap.  V.  Moral  Discipline.  155 

a  very  great  one,  towards  forming  active  habits,  yet 
can  have  this  efficacy  no  otherwise  than  by  inducing 
us  to  such  a  course  of  action  ;  and  that  it  is,  not  be- 
ing affected  so  and  so,  but  acting,  which  forms  those 
habits  ;  only  it  must  be  always  remembered,  that  real 
endeavours  to  enforce  good  impressions  upon  ourselves, 
are  a  species  of  virtuous  action.  Nor  do  we  know 
how  far  it  is  possible,  in  the  nature  of  things,  that  ef- 
fects should-  be  wrought  in  us  at  once,  equivalent  to 
habits,  i.  e.  what  is  wrought  by  use  and  exercise. 
However,  the  thing  insisted  upon  is,  not  what  may  be 
possible,  but  what  is  in  fact  the  appointment  of  nature; 
which  is,  that  active  habits  are  to  be  formed  by  exer- 
cise. Their  progress  may  be  so  gradual  as  to  be  im- 
perceptible in  its  steps  ;  it  may  be  hard  to  explain  the 
faculty  by  which  we  are  capable  of  habits  throughout 
its  several  parts,  and  to  trace  it  up  to  its  original,  so 
as  to  distinguish  it  from  all  others  in  our  mind  ;  and 
it  >eems  as  if  contrary  effects  were  to  be  ascribed  to  it. 
Bu^he^tlu^^hi  general,  that  our  nature  is  formed  to 
■■^ief«3itii^onl'e"sn5rtn^ner  as  this,  to  use  and  exercise, 
is  matter  of  certain  experience. 

Thus,  by  accustoming  ourselves  to  any  course  of 
action,  we  get  an  aptness  to  go  on,  a  facility,  readiness, 
and  often  pleasure  in  it.  The  inclinations  which  ren- 
dered us  averse  to  it  grow  weaker  ;  the  difficulties  in 
it,  not  only  the  imaginary  but  the  real  ones,  lessen  ; 
the  reasons  for  it  offer  themselves  of  course  to  our 
thoughts  upon  all  oecasioa%~  and  the  least  glimpse  of 
them  is  sufficient  to  make  us  go  on  in  a  course  of  ac- 
tion to  which  we  have  been  accustomed.  And  prac- 
tical principles  appear  to  grow  stronger  absolutely  in 
themselves  by  exersise,  as  well  as  relatively  with  re- 
gard to  contrary  principles,  which,  by  being  accus- 
tomed to  submit,  do  so  habitually  and  of  course.    And 


156  Of  a  State  of  Part  h 

thus  a  new  character  in  several  respects  may  be  form- 
ed, and  many  habitudes  of  life  not  given  by  nature, 
but  which  nature  directs  us  to  acquire. 

III.  Indeed  we  may  be  assured,  that  we  should 
never  have  had  these  capacities  of  improving  by  expe* 
rience,  acquired  knowledge  and  habits,  had  they  not; 
been  necessary,  and  intended  to  be  made  use  of.  And 
accordingly  we  find  them  so  necessary,  and  so  much 
intended,  that  without  them  we  should  be  utterly  in- 
capable of  that  which  was  the  end  for  which  we  were 
made,  considered  in  our  temporal  capacity  only,  the 
employments  and  satisfactions  of  our  mature  state  of 

life. 

Nature  does  in  no  wise  qualify  us  wholly,  much  less 
at  once,  for  this  mature  state  of  life.  Even  maturity 
of  understanding  and  bodily  strength  are  not  only  ar- 
rived to  gradually,  but  are  also  very  much  owing  to  the 
countinued  exercise  of  our  powers  of  body  and  mind, 
from  infancy.  But  if  we  suppose  a  person  brought  into 
the  world  with  both  these  in  maturity,  as  far  as  this  is 
conceivable,  he  would  plainly  at  first  be  as  unqualified 
for  the  human  life  of  mature  age  as  an  idiot.  He 
would  be  in  a  manner  distracted  with  astonishment, 
and  apprehension,  and  curiosity,  and  suspense  ;  nor  can 
one  guess  how  long  it  would  be  before  he  would  be 
familiarized  to  himself,  and  the  objects  about  him, 
enough  even  to  set  himself  to  any  thing.  It  may  be 
questioned  too,  whether  the  natural  information  of  his 
sight  and  hearing  would  be  of  any  manner  of  use  at  all 
to  him  in  acting,  before  experience.  And  it  seems, 
that  men  would  be  strangely  headstrong  and  self  will- 
ed, and  disposed  to  exert  themselves  with  an  impetuosi- 
ty which  would  render  society  insupportable,  and  the 
living  in  it  impracticable,  were  it  not  for  some  acquir- 
rd  moderation  and  self  government,  some   aptitude 


Chap.  V.  Moral  Discipline.  157 

and  readiness  in  restraining  themselves,  and  conceal- 
ing their  sense  of  things.  Want  of  every  thing  of 
this  kind  which  is  learnt,  would  render  a  man  as  un- 
capable  of  society  as  want  of  language  would,  or  as 
his  natural  ignorance  of  any  of  the  particular  employ- 
ments of  life  would  render  him  uncapable  of  provid- 
ing himself  with  the  common  conveniences,  or  sup- 
plying the  nece  sary  wants  of  it.  In  these  respects, 
and  probably  in  many  more,  of  which  we  have  no  par- 
ticular notion,  mankind  is  left  by  nature  an  unform- 
ed, unfinished  creature,  utterly  deficient  and  unquali- 
fied, before  the  acquirement  of  knowledge,  experience 
and  habits,  for  that  mature  state  of  life  which  was  the 
end  of  his  creation,  considering  him  as  related  only  to 
this  world. 

But  then,  as  nature  has  endued  us  with  a  power  of 
supplying  those  deficiencies  by  acquired  knowledge, 
experience  and  habits,  so  likewise  we  are  placed  in  a 
condition,  in  infancy,  childhood  and  youth,  fitted  for 
it  ;  fitted  for  our  acquiring  those  qualifications  of  all 
sorts,  which  we  stand  in  need  of  in  mature  age. 
Hence  children,  from  their  very  birth,  are  daily  grow- 
ing acquainted  with  the  objects  about  them,  with  the 
scene  in  which  they  are  placed  and  to  have  a  future 
part,  and  learning  somewhat  or  other  necessary  to  the 
performance  of  it.  The  subordinations  to  which  they 
are  accustomed  in  domestic  life,  teach  them  self  gov- 
ernment in  common  behaviour  abroad,  and  prepare 
them  for  subjection  and  obedience  to  civil  authority. 
What  passes  before  their  eyes,  and  daily  happens  to 
them,  gives  them  experience,  caution  against  treache- 
ry and  deceit,  together  with  numberless  little  rules  of 
action  and  conduct,  which  we  could  not  live  without, 
and  which  are  learnt  so  insensibly  and  so  perfectly  as  to 
be  mistaken  perhaps  for  instinct,  though  they  are  the 


158  Of  a  State  of  Part  I. 

effect  of  long  experience  and  exercise,  as  much  so  as 
language,  or  knowledge  in  particular  bu  iness,   or  the 
qualifications  and  behaviour  belonging  to  the  several 
ranks  and  professions.     Thus  the   beginning  of   our 
days  is  adapted  to  be,  and  is,  a   state  of  education   in 
the  theory  and  practice  of  mature  life.     We  are  much 
assisted  in  it  by  example,  instruction,  and  the  care    of 
others  ;  but  a  great  deal  is  left   to    ourselves    to   do. 
And  of  this,  as  part  is  done  easily  and  of  course,   so 
part  require^  diligence  and  care,  the  voluntary  forego- 
ing many  things  which  we  desire,  and  setting  ourselves 
to  what  we  should  have  no  inclination  ro,    but  for   the 
necessity  or  expedience  of  it.     For^  that  labour  and 
industry  which  the  station  of  so    m^ny  absolutely  re- 
quires, they  would  be  greatly  unqualified   for   in   ma- 
turity, as  those  in  other  stations  would  be  for  any  oth- 
er sorts  of  application,  if  both  were  not  accustomed  to 
them  in  their  youth.     And  according  as  persons   be- 
have themselves,  in  the   general  education   which  all 
go  through,  and  in  the  particular  ones  adapted  to  par- 
ticular employments,  their  character  is  formed   and 
made  appear  ;  they  recommend  themselves   more    or 
less,  and  are  capable  of  and  placed  in  different  stations 
in  the  society  of  mankind. 

The  for  mer  part  of  life  then  is  to  be  considered  as 
an  important  opportunity  which  nature  puts  into  our 
hands,  and  which,  when  lost,  is  not  to  be  recovered. 
And  our  being  placed  in  a  state  of  discipline  through- 
out this  lite  for  another  world,  is  a  providential  dispo- 
sition of  things,  exactly  of  the  same  kind  as  our  being 
placed  in  a  state  of  discipline  during  childhood,  for 
mature  age.  Our  condition  in  both  respects  is  uni- 
form and  of  a  piece,  and  comprehended  under  one  and 
the  same  general  law  of  nature. 


Chap.  V.  Moral  Discipline.  159 

And  if  we  were  not  able  at  all  to  discern  how  or  in 
what  way  the  present  life  could  be  our  preparation  for 
another,  this  would  be  no  objection  against  the  credi- 
bility of  its  being  so.  For  we  do  not  discern  how 
food  and  sleep  contribute  to  the  growth  of  the  body, 
nor  could  have  any  thought  that  they  would  before  we 
had  experience.  Nor  do  children  at  all  think,  on  the 
one  hand,  tl  at  the  sports  and  exercises  to  which  they 
.  are  so  much  addicted  contribute  to  their  health  and 
gr  >wth  ;  nor  on  the  other,  of  the  necessity  which  there 
is  for  their  being  restrained  in  them  ;  nor  are  they 
capable  of  understanding  the  use  of  many  parts  of  dis- 
cipline, which  nevertheless  they  must  be  made  to  go 
through,  in  order  to  qualify  them  for  the  business  of 
mature  age.  Were  we  not  able  then  to  discover,  in 
what  respects  the  present  life  could  form  us  for  a  fu- 
ture one,  yet  nothing  would  be  more  supposeable 
than  that  it  might,  in  some  respects  or  other,  from 
the  general  analogy  of  Providence.  And  this,  for 
ought  I  see,  might  reasonably  be  said,  even  though 
we  should  not  take  in  the  consideration  of  God's  mor- 
al government" over  the  world.     But, 

IV.  Take  in  this  consideration,  and  consequently 
that  the  character  of  virtue  and  piety  is  a  necessary 
qualification  for  the  future  state,  and  then  we  may 
distinctly  see  how,  and  in  what  respects,  the  present 
life  may  be  a  preparation  for  it  ;  since  we  want,  and 
are  capable  of,  improvement  in  that  character,  by  moral 
and  religious  habits,  and  the  present  life  is  jit  to  be  a  state 
of  discipline  for  such  improvement  ;  in  like  manner  as 
we  have  already  observed  how,  and  in  what  respects, 
infancy,  childhood  and  youth  are  a  necessary  prepara- 
tion, and  a  natural  state  of  discipline,  for  mature  age. 

Nothing  which  we  at  present  see  would  lead  us  to 
the  thought  of  a  solitary  unactive  state  hereafter  \  but, 


j  60  Of  a  State  of  Part  L 

if  we  judge  at  all  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  we  must 
.suppose,  according  to  the  Scripture  account  of  it,  that 
it  will  be  a  community.     And   there  is  no  shadow  of 
any  thing  unreasonable  in  conceiving,  though  there 
be  no  analogy  for  it,  that  this  community  will  be,  as 
the  Scripture  represents  it,  under  the  more  immediate, 
or,  if  such  an  expression  may  be  used,  the  more  sensi- 
ble government  of  God.     Nor  is  our  ignorance  what 
will  be  the  employments  of  this  happy  community,  nor 
our  consequent  ignorance  what  particular  scope  or  oc- 
casion there  will  be  for  the  exercise  of  veracity,  justice 
and  charity  amongst  the  members  of  it  with  regard  to 
each  other,  any  proof  that  there  will  be  no  sphere  of 
exercise  for  those  virtues  ;  much  less,  if  that  were  pos- 
sible, is  our  ignorance  any  proof,  that  there  will  be  no 
occasion  for  that  frame  of  mind,  or  character,  which  is 
formed  by  the  daily  practice  of  those  particular  virtues 
here,  and  which  is  a   result  from  it.     This  at  least 
must  be  owned  in   general,  that,  as  the  government 
established  in  the  universe  is  moral,  the  character  of 
virtue  and  piety  must,  in  some  way  or  other,  be  the 
condition  of  our  happiness,  or  the  qualification  for  it. 
Now  from  what  is  above  observed,  concerning  our 
natural  power  of  habits,  it   is  easy  to  see  that  we  are 
capable  of  moral   improvement  by  discipline.     And 
how  greatly  we  want  it,  need  not  be  proved  to  any  one 
who  is  acquainted  with  the  great  wickedness  of  man- 
kind, or  even  with  those  imperfections  which  the  best 
are  conscious  of.     But  it  is  not  perhaps  distinctly  at- 
tended to  by  every  one,  that  the  occasion  which  hu- 
man creatures  have  for  discipline,  to  improve  in  them 
this  character  of  virtue  and  piety,  is  to  be  traced  up 
higher  than  to  excess  in  the  passions,  by  indulgence 
and  habits  of  vice.     Mankind,   and  perhaps  all  finite 
creatures,  from  the  very  constitution  of  their  nature, 


Chap.  V.  Moral  Discipline.  l(jl 

before  habits  of  virtue,  are  deficient,  and  in  danger  of 
deviating  from  what  is  right  ;  and  therefore  stand  in 
need  of  virtuous  habits,  for  a  security  against  this  dan- 
ger. For,  together  with  the  general  principle  of  moral 
understanding,  we  have  in  our  inward  frame  various 
affections  towards  particular  external  objects.  These 
affections  are  naturally  and  of  right  subject  to  the 
government  of  the  moral  principle,  as  to  the  occasions 
upon  which  they  may  be  gratified,  as  to  the  times,  de- 
grees and  manner  in  which  the  objects  of  them  may  be 
pursued  ;  but  then  the  principle  of  virtue  can  neither 
excite  them,  nof  prevent  their  being  excited.  On 
the  contrary,  they  are  naturally  felt,  when  the  objects 
of  them  are  present  to  the  mind,  not  only  before  all 
consideration  whether  they  can  be  obtained  by  lawful 
means,  but  after  it  is  found  they  cannot.  For  the 
natural  objects  of  affection  continue  so  ;  the  necessa- 
ries, conveniences  and  pleasures  of  life  remain  naturally 
desirable,  though  they  cannot  be  obtained  innocently  ; 
nay,  though  they  cannot  possibly  be  obtained  at  all. 
And  when  the  objects  of  any  affection  whatever  can- 
not be  obtained  without  unlawful  means,  but  may  be 
obtained  by  them,  such  affection,  though  its  being  ex- 
cited, and  its  continuing  some  time  in  the  mind,  be  it 
as  innocent  as  it  is  natural  and  necessary,  yet  cannot 
but  be  conceived  to  have  a  tendency  to  incline  persons 
to  venture  upon  such  unlawful  means,  and  therefore 
must  be  conceived  as  putting  them  in  some  danger  of 
it.  Now  what  is  the  general  security  against  this  dan- 
ger, against  their  actually  deviating  from  right  ?  As 
the  danger  is,  so  also  must  the  security  be  from  with- 
in ;  from  the  practical  principle  of  virtue.*     And  the 

*  It  may  be  thought,  that  a  sense  of  interest  would  as  effectually  restraia 
creatures  from  doing  wrong.  But  if  by  a  sense  of  Interest  is  meant  a  specu- 
lative  conviction  or  belief,  that   puch   and  such  indulgence  would  occasion 

X 


162  Of  a  State  of  Part  I. 

strengthening  or  improving  this  principle,  considered 
as  practical,  or  as  a  principle  of  action,  will  le^en  the 
danger,  or  increase  the  security  against  it.  And  this 
moral  principle  is  capable  of  improvement  by  proper 
discipline  and  exercise,  by  recollecting  the  practical 
impressions  which  example  and  experience  have  made 
upon  us,  and,  instead  of  following  humour  and  mere 
inclination,  by  continually  attending  to  the  equity  and 
right  of  the  case  in  whatever  we  are  engaged,  be  it  in 
greater  or  less  matters,  and  accustoming  ourbelves  al- 
ways to  act  upon  it,  as  being  itself  the  just  and  natural 
motive  of  action  ;  and  as  this  moral  course  of  behav- 
iour must  necessarily,  under  divine  government,  be 
our  final  intere  t.  Thus  the  principle  rf  virtue,  im- 
proved into  an  habit,  of  which  improvement  we  are  thus 
capable,  will  plainly  be,  in  proportion  to  the  strength  of  it, 
a  security  gainst  the  danger  which  finite  creatures  are  in, 
from  the  very  nature  of  propension,  or  particular  affections. 
This  way  of  putting  the  matter  supposes  particular  af- 
fections to  remain  in  a  future  state,  which  it  is  scarce 
possible  to  avoid  supposing.  And  if  they  do,  we  clear- 
ly see  that  acquired  habits  of  virtue  and  self  govern- 
ment may  be  necessary  for  the  regulation  of  them. 
However,  though  we  were  not  distinctly  to  take  in 
this  supposition,  but  to  *>peak  only  in  general,  the 

them  greater  uneasiness,  upon  the  whole,  than  satisfaction,  it  is  contrary  to 
present  experience  to  say,  that  this  sense  of  interest  is  sufficient  to  restrain 
them  from  thus  indulging  themselves.  And  if  by  a  setue  of  interest  is  meant 
a  practical  regard  to  what  is,  upon  the  whole,  our  happiness,  this  is  not  only 
coincident  with  the  principle  of  virtue  or  moral  rectitude,  but  is  a  part  of 
the  idea  itself.  And  it  is  evident  this  reasonable  self  love  wants  to  be  im- 
proved, as  really  as  any  principle  in  our  nature.  For  we  daily  see  it  over- 
matched, not  only  by  the  more  boisterous  passions,  but  by  curiosity,  shame, 
love  of  imitation,  by  any  thing,  even  indolence;  especially  if  the  interest,  the 
temporal  interest,  suppose,  which  is  the  end  of  such  self  love,  be  at  a  dis- 
tance. So  greatly  are  profligate  men  mistaken,  when  they  affirm  they 
are  wholly  governed  by  interestedness  and  self  love.  And  so  little  cause  i 
there  for  moralists  to  disclaim  this  principle.     See  p.  Hi',  1  1\ 


Chap,  V.  Moral  Discipline.  163 

thing  really  comes  to  the  same.  For  habits  of  virtue, 
thu>  acquired  by  discipline,  are  improvement  in  vir- 
tu? ;  and  improvement  in  virtue  must  be  advance- 
ment in  happiness,  if  the  government  of  the  universe 
be  moral. 

From  these  things  we  may  observe,  and  it  will  far- 
ther shew  this  our  natural  and  original  need  of  being 
improved  by  discipline,  how  it  comes  to  pass,  that 
creatures  made  upright  fall  ;  and  that  those  who  pre- 
serve their  uprightness,  by  so  doing  raise  themselves  to 
a  more  secure  state  of  virtue.  To  say  that  the  former 
is  accounted  for  by  the  nature  of  liberty,  is  to  say  no 
more  than  that  an  event's  actually  happening  is  ac- 
counted for  by  a  mere  possibility  of  its  happening. 
But  it  seems  distinctly  conceivable  from  the  very  na- 
ture of  particular  affections  or  propensions.  For, 
suppose  creatures  intended  for  such  a  particular  state 
of  life  for  which  such  propensions  were  necessary ; 
suppose  them  endued  with  such  propensions,  together 
with  moral  understanding,  as  well  including  a  practi- 
cal sense  of  virtue  as  a  speculative  perception  of  it, 
and  that  all  these  several  principles,  both  natural  and 
moral,  forming  an  inward  constitution  of  min  ,  were 
in  the  most  exact  proportion  possible,  i;  e.  in  a  pro- 
portion the  most  exactly  adapted  to  their  intended 
state  of  life;  such  creatures  would  be  made  upright, 
or  finitely  perfect.  Now  particular  propensions,  from 
their  very  nature,  must  be  felt,  the  objects  of  them 
being  present,  though  they  cannot  be  gratified  at  all, 
or  not  with  the  allowance  of  the  moral  principle.  But 
if  they  can  be  gratified  without  its  allowance,  or  by 
contradicting  it,  then  they  must  be  conceived  to  have 
some  tendency,  in  how  low  a  degree  soever,  yet  some 
tendency,  to  induce  persons  to  such  forbidden  gratifi- 
cation.    This  tendency,  in  some  one  particular  pro- 


164  Of  a  State  of  Part  1. 

pension,  may  be  increased  by  the  greater  frequency  of 
occasions  naturally  exciting  it,  than  of  occasions  ex- 
citing others.  The  least  voluntary  indulgence  in  for- 
bidden circumstances,  though  but  in  thought,  will 
increase  this  wrong  tendency,  and  may  increase  it  fur- 
ther, until,  peculiar  conjunctures  perhaps  conspiring, 
it  becomes  effect ;  and  danger  of  deviating  from  right, 
ends  in  actual  deviation  from  it ;  a  danger  necessarily 
arising  from  the  very  nature  of  propension,  and  which 
therefore  could  not  have  been  prevented,  though  it 
might  have  been  escaped,  or  got  innocently  through. 
The  case  would  be  as  if  we  were  to  suppose  a  strait 
path  marked  out  for  a  person,  in  which  such  a  degree 
of  attention  would  keep  him  steady  ;  but  if  he  would 
not  attend  in  this  degree,  any  one  of  a  thousand  ob- 
jects catching  his  eye  might  lead  him  out  of  it.  Now 
it  is  impossible  to  say  how  much,  even  the  first  full 
overt  act  of  irregularity,  might  disorder  the  inward 
constitution,  unsettle  the  adjustments,  and  alter  the 
proportions  which  formed  it,  and  in  which  the  up- 
rightness of  its  make  consisted  ;  but  repetition  of  ir- 
regularities would  produce  habits :  and  thus  the  con- 
stitution would  be  spoiled,  and  creatures  made  upright 
become  corrupt  and  depraved  in  their  settled  char- 
acter, proportionably  to  their  repeated  irregularities  in 
occasional  acts.  But  on  the  contrary,  these  creatures 
might  have  improved,  and  raised  themselves  to  an 
higher  and  more  secure  state  of  virtue,  by  the  con- 
tra* y  behaviour  ;  by  steadily  following  the  moral  prin- 
ciple, supposed  to  be  one  part  of  their  nature,  and 
thus  withstanding  that  unavoidable  danger  of  defec- 
tion, which  necessarily  arose  from  propension,  the  other 
part  of  it.  For,  by  thus  preserving  their  integrity  for 
some  time,  their  danger  would  lessen,  since  propen- 
cions  by  being  inured  to  submit,  would  do  it  more  ea-, 


Chap.  V.  Moral  Discipline.  16£ 

sily  and  of  course  ;  and  their  security  against  this  les- 
seni  g  danger  would  increase,  since  the  moral  princi- 
ple would  gain  additional  strength  by  exercise  ;  both 
which  things  are  implied  in  the  notion  of  virtuous 
habits.  Thus  then,  vicious  indulgence  is  not  only 
criminal  in  itself,  but  also  depraves  the  inward  con  ti- 
tution  and  character.  And  virtuous  self  government 
is  not  only  right  in  itself,  but  also  improves  the  inward 
constitution  or  character  ;  and  may  improve  it  to  such 
a  degree,  that  though  we  should  suppose  it  impossible 
for  particular  affections  to  be  absolutely  coincident 
with  the  moral  principle,  and  consequently  should  al- 
low, that  such  creatures  as  have  been  above  supposed 
would  for  ever  remain  defectible,  yet  their  danger  of 
actually  deviating  from  right  may  be  almost  infinitely 
lessened,  and  they  fully  fortified  against  what  remains 
of  it,  if  that  may  be  called  danger  against  which  there 
is  an  adequate  effectual  security.  But  still  this  their 
higher  perfection  may  continue  to  consist  in  habits  of 
virtue,  formed  in  a  state  of  discipline,  and  this  their 
more  complete  security  remain  to  proceed  from  them. 
And  thus  it  is  plainly  conceivable,  that  creatures 
without  blemish,  as  they  came  out  of  the  hands  of  God, 
may  be  in  danger  of  going  wrong,  and  so  may  stand  in 
need  of  the  security  of  virtuous  habits,  additional  to 
the  moral  principle  wrought  into  their  natures  by  him. 
That  which  is  the  ground  of  their  danger,  or  their 
want  of  security,  may  be  considered  as  a  deficiency  in 
them,  to  which  virtuous  habits  are  the  natural  supply. 
And  as  they  are  naturally  capable  of  being  raised  and 
improved  by  discipline,  it  may  be  a  thing  fit  and 
requisite  that  they  should  be  placed  in  circumstances 
with  an  eye  to  it ;  in  circumstances  peculiarly  fitted 
to  be  to  them  a  state  of  discipline  for  their  improve- 
ment in  virtue. 


166  Of  a  State  of  Part  I. 

But  how  much  more  strongly  mu<t  this  hold  with 
respect  to  those  who  have  corrupted  their  natures,  are 
fallen  from  their  original  rectitude,  and  whose  passions 
are  become  excessive  by  repeated  violation i  of  their 
inward  con  titution  ?  Upright  creatures  may  want  to 
be  improved  ;  depraved  creatures  want  to  be  renew- 
ed. Education  and  discipline,  which  may  be  in  all 
degrees  and  sorts  of  gentleness  and  of  severity,  is  ex- 
pedient for  those,  but  mu  t  be  absolutely  necessary  for 
these.  For  the^e,  discipline  of  the  severer  sort  too, 
and  in  the  higher  aegrees  of  it,  must  be  necessary,  in 
order  to  wear  out  vicious  habits ;  to  recover  their 
primitive  strength  of  self  government,  which  indul- 
gence must  have  weakened  ;  to  repair,  as  well  as  raise 
into  an  habit,  the  moral  principle,  in  order  to  their 
arriving  at  a  secure  state  of  virtuou>  happiness. 

Now  whoever  will  consider  the  thing,  may  clearly 
see,  that  the  present  world  is  peculiarly  Jit  to  be  a  state 
of  discipline  for  this  purpose,  to  such  as  will  set  them- 
selves to  mend  and  improve.  For,  the  various  temp- 
tations with  which  we  are  urrounded  ;  our  experience 
of  the  deceits  of  wickedness  ;  having  been  in  many 
instance^  led  wrong  ourselves  ;  the  great  viciousness  of 
the  world  ;  the  infinite  disorders  consequent  upon  it  ; 
our  being  made  acquainted  with  pain  and  sorrow,  ei- 
ther from  our  own  feeling  of  it,  or  from  the  sight  of 
it  in  others  ;  these  thir.gs.  though  some  of  them  may 
indeed  produce  wrong  effects  upon  our  minds,  yet 
when  duly  reflected  upon,  have,  all  of  them,  a  direct 
tendency  to  bring  us  to  a  settled  moderation  and  rea- 
sonableness of  temp;  r,  the  contnry  both  to  thought- 
less levity,  and  also  to  that  unrestrained  self  will,  and 
violent  bent  to  follow  present  inclination,  which  may 
be  observed  in  undisciplined  minds.  Such  experience 
as  the  present  state  affords,  of  the  fraility  of  our  nature  j 


Chap.  V.  Moral  Discipline.  ]67 

of  the  boundless  extravagance  of  ungoverned  passion* 
of  the  power  which  an  infinite  Being  has  over  us,  by 
the  variou  capacities  of  misery  which  he  has  given  us  ; 
in  short,  that  kind  and  degree  of  experience  which  the 
present  state  affords  us,  that  the  constitution  of  nature 
is  ^uch  as  to  admit  the  possibility,  the  danger,  and  the 
actual  event  of  creatures  losing  their  innocence  and 
happiness,  and  becoming  vicious  and  wretched,  hath 
a  tendency  to  give  us  a  practical  sense  of  things  very 
different  from  a  mere  speculative  knowledge,  that  we 
are  liable  to  vice,  and  capable  of  misery.  And  who 
knows,  whether  the  security  of  creatures  in  the  high- 
est and  most  settled  state  of  perfection  may  not  in  part 
arise  from  their  having  had  such  a  sense  of  things  as 
this,  formed  and  habitually  fixed  within  them,  in  some 
state  of  probation.  And  passing  through  the  present 
world  with  that  moral  attention  which  is  necessary  to 
the  acting  a  right  part  in  it,  may  leave  everlasting  im- 
pressions of  this  sort  upon  our  minds.  But  to  be  a 
little  more  distinct — allurements  to  what  is  wrong  ; 
difficulties  in  the  discharge  of  our  duty  ;  our  not  be- 
ing able  to  act  an  uniform  right  part  without  some 
thought  and  care  ;  and  the  opportunities  which  we 
have,  or  imagine  we  have,  of  avoiding  what  we  dislike, 
or  obtaining  what  we  desire,  by  unlawful  means,  when 
we  either  cannot  do  it  at  all,  or  at  least  not  so  easily, 
by  lawful  ones  ;  these  things,  i.  e.  the  snares  and 
temptations  of  vice,  are  what  render  the  present  world 
peculiarly  fit  to  be  a  state  of  discipline  to  those  who 
will  preserve  their  integrity,  because  they  render  being 
upon  our  guard,  resolution,  and  the  denial  of  our 
passions  necessary  in  order  to  that  end.  And  the 
exercise  of  such  particular  recollection,  intention  of 
mind,  and  self  government  in  the  practice  of  virtue 
has,  from  the  make  of  our  nature,  a  peculiar  tendency 


j  68  Of  a  State  of  Part  1. 

to  form  habits  of  virtue,  as  implying  not  only  a  real 
but  also  a  more  continued  and  a  more  intense  exercise 
of  the  virtuous  principle,  or  a  more  constant  and  a 
stronger  effort  of  virtue  exerted  into  act.  Thus  sup- 
pose a  person  to  know  himself  to  be  in  particular  dan- 
ger  for  some  time  of  doing  any  thing  wrong,  which 
yet  he  fully  resolves  not  to  do  ;  continued  recollection, 
and  keeping  upon  his  guard,  in  order  to  mak?  good 
his  resolution,  is  a  continued  exerting  of  that  act  of  vir- 
tue in  a  high  degree,  which  need  have  been,  and  per- 
haps would  have  been,  only  instantaneous  and  weak, 
had  the  temptation  been  so.  It  is  indeed  ridiculous 
to  assert,  that  self  denial  is  essential  to  virtue  and  piety  ; 
but  it  would  have  been  nearer  the  truth,  though  not 
strictly  the  truth  itself,  to  have  said,  that  it  is  essential 
to  discipline  and  improvement.  For  though  actions 
materially  virtuous,  which  have  no  sort  of  difficulty, 
but  are  perfectly  agreeable  to  our  particular  inclina- 
tions, may  possibly  be  done  only  from  these  particu- 
lar inclinations,  and  so  may  not  be  any  exercise  of  the 
principle  of  virtue,  i.  e.  not  be  virtuous  actions  at  all  ; 
yet  on  the  contrary,  they  may  be  an  exercise  of  that 
principle  ;  and  when  they  are,  they  have  a  tendency 
to  form  and  fix  the  habit  of  virtue.  But  when  the 
exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle  is  more  continued, 
oftener  repeated,  and  more  intense,  as  it  must  be  in 
circumstances  of  danger,  temptation,  and  difficulty 
of  any  kind  and  in  any  degree,  this  tendency  is  in- 
creased proportionably,  and  a  more  confirmed  habit  is 
the  consequence. 

This  undoubtedly  holds  to  a  certain  length ;  but 
how  far  it  may  hold  I  know  not.  Neither  our  intel- 
lectual powers,  nor  our  bodily  strength,  can  be  impro- 
ved beyond  such  a  degree  ;  and  both  may  be  over- 
wrought.    Possibly  there  may  be  somewhat  analogous 


Chap.  V.  Moral  Discipline.  169 

to  this,  with  respect  to  the  moral  character,  which  is 
scarce  worth  considering.  And  I  mention  it  only,  lest 
it  should  come  into  some  persons'  thoughts,  not  as  an 
exception  to  the  foregoing  observations,  which  perhaps 
it  i  ,  but  as  a  confutation  of  them,  which  it  is  not. 
And  there  mav  be  several  other  exceptions.  Obser- 
vations of  this  kind  cannot  be  supposed  to  hold  minute- 
ly and  in  every  case.  It  is  enough  that  they  hold  in 
general.  And  these  plainly  hold  so  far,  as  that  from 
them  may  be  seen  distinctly,  which  is  all  that  is  intend- 
ed by  them,  that  the  present  world  is  peculiarly  Jit  to  be  a 
state  of  discipline,  for  our  improvement  in  virtue  and  piety, 
in  the  same  sense  as  some  sciences,  by  requiring  and 
engaging  the  attention,  not  to  be  sure  of  such  per- 
sons as  will  not,  but  of  such  as  will,  set  them- 
selves to  them,  are  fit  to  form  the  mind  to  habits  of 
attention. 

Indeed  the  present  state  is  so  far  from  proving,  in 
event,  a  discipline  of  virtue  to  the  generality  of  men, 
that,  on  the  contrary,  they  seem  to  make  it  a  disci- 
pline of  vice.  And  the  viciousness  of  the  world  is,  in 
different  ways,  the  great  temptation  which  renders  it 
a  state  of  virtuous  discipline,  in  the  degree  it  is,  to 
good  men.  The  whole  end  and  the  whole  occasion 
of  mankind's  being  placed  in  such  a  state  as  the  pres- 
ent, is  not  pretended  to  be  accounted  for.  That 
which  appears  amidst  the  general  corruption,  is,  that 
there  are  some  persons,  who,  having  within  them  the 
principle  of  amendment  and  recovery,  attend  to  and 
follow  the  notices  of  virtue  and  religion,  be  they  more 
clear  or  more  obscure,  which  are  afforded  them  ;  and 
that  the  present  world  is,  not  only  an  exercise  of  vir- 
tue in  these  persons,  but  an  exercise  of  it  in  ways  and 
degrees  peculiarly  apt  to  improve  it ;  apt  to  improve 
it,  in  some  respects,  even  beyond  what  would  be  by 


170  Of  a  Suite  of  Part  I. 

the  exercise  of  it  required  in  a  perfectly  virtuous  soci- 
ety, or  in  a  society  of  equally  imperfect  virtue  with 
themselves.  But  that  the  present  world  does  not  ac- 
tually become  a  state  of  moral  discipline  to  many, 
even  to  the  generality,  i.  e.  that  they  do  not  improve 
or  grow  better  in  it,  cannot  be  urged  as  a  proof  that 
it  was  not  intended  for  moral  discipline,  by  any  who 
at  all  observe  the  analogy  of  nature.  For,  of  the  nu- 
merous seeds  of  vegetables  and  bodies  of  animals, 
which  are  adapted  and  put  in  the  way  to  improve  to 
such  a  point  or  state  of  natural  maturity  and  perfec- 
tion, we  do  not  see  perhaps  that  one  in  a  million  ac- 
tually does.  Far  the  greatest  part  of  them  decay  be- 
fore they  are  improved  to  it,  and  appear  to  be  abso- 
lutely destroyed.  Yet  no  one,  who  does  not  deny  all 
final  causes,  will  deny  that  those  seeds  and  bodies 
which  do  attain  to  that  point  of  maturity  and  perfec- 
tion, answer  the  end  for  which  they  were  really  design- 
ed by  nature,  and  therefore  that  nature  designed  them 
for  such  perfection.  And  I  cannot  forbear  adding, 
though  it  is  not  to  the  present  purpose,  that  the  ap-> 
pcarance  of  such  an  amazing  waste  in  nature,  with  re- 
spect to  these  seeds  and  bodies,  by  foreign  causes,  is  to 
us  as  unaccountable,  as,  what  is  much  more  terrible, 
the  present  and  future  ruin  of  so  many  moral  agents 
by  themselves,  i.  e.  by  vice. 

Against  this  whole  notion  of  mora!  discipline  it  may 
be  objected  in  another  way,  that  so  far  as  a  course  ot 
b  ■haviour,  materially  virtuous,  proceeds  from  hope 
and  fear,  so  far  it  is  only  a  discipline  and  strengthen- 
ing of  self  love.  But  doing  what  God  commands, 
because  he  commands  it,  is  obedience,  though  it  pro- 
ceeds from  hope  or  fear.  And  a  course  of  such  obe- 
di  nco  will  form  habits  of  it.  And  a  constant  regard 
to  veracity,  justice  and  charity  may  form  distinct  hab- 


Chap.  V.  Moral  Discipline.  171 

its  of  these  particular  virtues,  and  will  certainly  form 
habits  of  self  government,  and  of  denying  our  inclina- 
tions, whenever  veracity,  ju  tice  or  charity  requires 
it.  Nor  is  there  any  foundation  for  this  great  nicety, 
with  which  some  affect  to  distinguish  in  this  case,  in 
order  to  depreciate  all  religion  proceeding  from  hope 
or  fear.  For,  veracity,  justice  and  charity,  regard  to 
God's  authority,  and  to  our  own  chief  interest,  are  not 
only  all  three  coincident,  but  each  of  them  is,  in  it- 
self, a  ju.t  and  natural  motive  or  principle  of  action. 
And  he  who  begins  a  good  life  from  any  one  of  them, 
and  perseveres  in  it,  as  he  is  already  in  some  degree, 
so  he  cannot  fail  of  becoming  more  and  more  of  that 
character,  which  is  correspondent  to  the  constitution 
of  nature  as  moral,  and  to  the  relation  which  God 
stands  in  to  us  as  moral  governor  of  it ;  nor  conse- 
quently can  he  fail  of  obtaining  that  happiness  which 
this  constitution  and  relation  necessarily  suppose  con- 
nected with  that  character. 

These  several  observations  concerning  the  active 
principle  of  virtue  and  obedience  to  God's  cojnmands 
are  applicable  to  passive  submission  or  resignation  to 
his  will,  which  is  another  essential  part  of  a  right  char- 
acter, connected  with  the  former,  and  very  much  in 
our  power  to  form  ourselves  to.  It  may  be  imagined, 
that  nothing  but  afflictions  can  give  occasion  for  or 
require  this  virtue  ;  that  it  can  have  no  respect  to,  nor 
be  any  way  necessary  to  qualify  for,  a  state  of  perfect 
happiness  ;  but  it  is  not  experience  which  can  make 
us  think  thus.  Prosperity  itself,  whilst  any  thing  sup- 
posed desirable  is  not  ours,  begets  extravagant  and  un- 
bounded thoughts.  Imagination  is  altogether  as 
much  a  source  of  discontent  as  any  thing  in  our  exter- 
nal condition.  It  is  indeed  true,  that  there  can  be  no 
scope  for  patience,  when  sorrow  shall  be  no  more;  but 
there  may  be  need  of  a  temper  of  mind    which  shal* 


172  Of  a  State  of  Part  I. 

have  been  formed  by  patience.     For  though  self  love, 
considered  merely  a>  an  active  principle  leading  us  to 
pursue  our  chief  interest,  cannot  but  be  Uniformly  co- 
incident with  the  principle  of  obedience    to   God's 
commands,  our  interest  being  rightly  understood  ;  be- 
cause this  obedience,  and  the  pursuit  of  our  own  chi  f 
interest,  must  be  in  every  ca  e  one  and  the  same  thing  ; 
yet  it  may  be  questioned,  whether  self  love,  considered 
merely  as  the  desire  of  our  own  interest  or  happiness, 
can,  from  its  nature,  be  thus  absolutely  and  uniformly 
coincident  with  the  will  of    God,  any  more  than  par. 
ticular  affections  cad  ;  coincident  in  such  sort,  as  not 
to  be  liable   to  be  excited  upon   occasions  and  in  de- 
grees, impossible  to  be  gratified   consistently  with  the 
constitution  of  things,    or  the  divine  appointments. 
So  that  habits  of  resignation  may,  upon  this  account, 
be  requisite  for  all  creature^  ;  habits,  I  say,  which    ig- 
nify  what  is  formed    by  use.     However,  in  general  it 
is  obvious,  that  both  self  love  and  particular  affections 
in  human  creatures,  considered  only  as  pas^ve  feelings, 
distort  and  rend  the  mind,  and  therefore  stand  in  need 
of  discipline.     Now   denial  of  those  particular  affec- 
tions, in  a  course  of  active  virtue  and  obedience   to 
God's   will,  has  a  tendency   to  moderate  them,   and 
seems  also  to  have  a  tendency   to  habituate  the   mind 
to  be  easy    and  satisfied  with  that  degree  of  happiness 
which  is  allotted  us,  i.  e.  to  moderate  self  love.     But 
the  proper  discipline  for  resignation  is  affliction.     For 
a  right   behaviour  under  that  tiial  ;  recollecting  our- 
selves so  as  to  consider  it  in  the  view  in  which  religion 
teaches  us  to  consider  it,  as   from  the  hand  of  God  ; 
receiving  it  as  what  he  appoints,  or  thinks  proper  to 
permit,  in  his  world  and  under  his  government  ;  this 
will  habituate  the  mind  to  a  dutiful  submission.     And 
such  submission,  together. with  the  active  principle  of 
obedience,   make  up  the   temper  and  character  in  us 


Chap.  V.  Moral  Discipline.  173 

which  answers  to  his  sovereignty,  and  which  absolute- 
ly belongs  to  the  condition  of  our  being,  as  depend- 
ent creatures.  Nor  can  it  be  said  that  this  is  only 
breaking  the  mind  to  a  submission  to  mere  power,  for 
mere  power  may  be  accidental,  and  precarious,  and 
u  urped  ;  but  it  is  forming  within  ourselves  the  tem- 
per of  resignation  to  his  rightful  authority,  who  is,  bv 
nature,  supreme  over  all. 

Upon  the  whole,  such  a  character,  and  such  qual- 
ifications, are  necessary  for  a  mature  state  of  life  in  the 
present  world,  as  nature  alone  does  in  no  wise  bestow, 
but  has  put  it  upon  us  in  great  part  to  acquire,  in  our 
progress  from  one  stage  of  life  to  another,  from  child- 
hood to  mature  age  ;  put  it  upon  us  to  acquire  them, 
by  giving  us  capacities  of  doing  it,  and  by  placing  us, 
in  the  beginning  of  life,  in  a  condition  fit  for  it.  And 
this  is  a  general  analogy  to  our  condition  in  the  pres- 
ent world,  as  in  a  state  of  moral  discipline  for  another. 
It  is  in  vain  then  to  object  against  the  cerdibility  of 
the  present  life's  being  intended  for  this  purpose,  that 
all  the  trouble  and  the  danger  unavoidably  accompa- 
nying such  discipline  might  have  been  saved  us,  by  our 
being  made  at  once  the  creatures  and  the  characters 
whkh  we  were  to  be.  For  we  experience,  that  what 
we  were  to  be  was  to  be  the  effect  of  what  we  would 
do  ;  and  that  the  general  conduct  of  nature  is,  net  to 
save  us  trouble  or  danger,  but  to  make  us  capable  of 
going  through  them,  and  to  put  it  upon  us  to  do  so. 
Acquirements  of  our  own,  experience  and  habits,  are 
the  natural  supply  to  our  deficiencies,  and  security 
against  our  dangers,  ince  it  is  as  plainly  natural  to  set 
ourselves  to  acquire  the  qualifications,  as  the  externa! 
things,  which  we  stand  in  need  of.  In  particular,  it 
is  as  plainly  a  general  law  of  nature  that  we  should, 
with  regard  to  our  temporal  interest,  form  and  culti- 
vate practical  principles  within  us,  by  attention,  u>e 


174  Of  Moral  Discipline.  Part  I. 

and  discipline,  as  any  thing  whatever  is  a  natural  law  ; 
chiefly  in  the  beginning  of  life,  but  also  throughout 
the  whole  course  of  it.  And  the  alternative  is  left  to 
our  choice,  either  to  improve  ourselves,  and  better 
our  condition,  or,  in  default  of  such  improvement,  to 
remain  deficient  and  wretched.  It  is  therefore  perfect- 
ly credible,  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  that  the  same 
may  be  our  case,  with  respect  to  the  happiness  of  a  fu- 
ture state,  and  the  qualifications  necessary  for  it. 

There  is  a  third  thing,  which  may  seem  implied  in 
the  present  world's  being  a  state  of  probation  ;  that  it 
is  a  theatre  of  action  for  the  manifestation  of  persons' 
character  ,  with  respect  to  a  future  one;  not  to  be 
sure  to  an  all  knowing  Being,  but  to  his  creation  or 
part  of  it.  This  may,  perhaps,  be  only  a  consequence 
of  our  being  in  a  state  of  probation  in  the  other  senses. 
However,  it  is  not  impossible  that  men's  shewing  and 
making  manifest  what  is  in  their  heart,  what  their  re- 
al character  is,  may  have  respect  to  a  future  life,  in 
ways  and  manners  which  we  are  not  acquainted  with  -7 
particularly  it  may  be  a  means,  for  the  Author  of  na- 
ture does  not  appear  to  do  any  thing  without  means, 
of  their  being  disposed  of  suitably  to  their  characters  ; 
and  of  its  being  known  to  the  creation,  by  way  of  ex- 
ample, that  they  are  thus  disposed  of.  But  not  to 
enter  upon  any  conjectural  account  of  this,  one  may 
just  mention,  that  the  manifestation  of  persons'  char- 
acters contributes  very  much,  in  various  ways,  to  the 
carrying  on  a  great  part  of  that  general  course  of  na- 
ture, respecting  mankind,  which  comes  under  our  ob- 
servation at  present.  I  shall  only  add,  that  probation, 
in  both  these  senses,  as  well  as  in  that  treated  of  in  the 
foregoing  chapter,  is  implied  in  moral  government, 
since  by  persons'  behaviour  under  it  their  characters 
cannot  but  be  manifested,  and,  if  they  behave  well, 
improved. 


Chap.  VI.         Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity. 


CHAP.  VI. 

Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity,  considered  as  influencing 
Practice, 

J  hroughout  the  foregoing  treatise  it  appears,, 
that  the  condition  of  mankind,  considered  as  in- 
habitants of  this  world  only,  and  under  the  govern- 
ment of  God  which  we  experience,  is  greatly  anal- 
ogous to  our  condition  as  designed  for  another 
world,  or  under  that  farther  government  which  reli- 
gion teaches  us.  If  therefore  any  assert,  as  a  fatalist 
must,  that  the  opinion  of  universal  necessity  is  recon- 
cileable  with  the  former,  there  immediately  arises  a 
question  in  the  way  of  analogy,  whether  he  must  not 
also  own  it  to  be  reconcileable  with  the  latter,  i.  e. 
with  the  system  of  religion  itself,  and  the  proof  of  it. 
The  reader  then  will  observe,  that  the  question  now 
before  us  is  not  absolute,  whether  the  opinion  of  fate 
be  reconcileable  with  religion  ;  but  hypothetical, 
whether,  upon  supposition  of  its  being  reconcileable 
with  the  constitution  of  nature,  it  be  not  reconcileable 
with  religion  slso ;  or,  what  pretence  a  fatalist,  not 
other  persons,  but  a  fatalist,  has  to  conclude  from  his 
opinion  that  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  religion. 
And  as  the  puzzle  and  obscurity  which  must  unavoid- 
ably arise  from  arguing  upon  so  absurd  a  supposition 
as  that  of  universal  necessity  will,  I  fear,  easily  be  seen, 
it  will,  I  hope,  as  easily  be  excused. 

But  since  it  has  been  all  along  taken  for  granted,  as 
a  thing  proved,  that  there  is  an  intelligent  author  of 
nature,  or  natural  governor  of  the  world  ;  and  since 


.176  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity,         Part  L 

an  objection  may  be  made  against  the  proof  of  this, 
from  the  opinion  of  universal  necessity,  as  it  may  be 
supposed  that  such  necessity  will  itself  account  for  the 
origin  and  preservation  of  all  things,  it  is  requisite  that 
this  objection  be  distinctly  answered,  or  that  it  be 
shewn  that  a  fatality,  supposed  consistent  with  what 
we  certainly  experience,  does  not  destroy  the  proof  of 
an  intelligent  author  and  governor  of  nature,  before 
we  proceed  to  consider  whether  it  destroys  the  proof 
of  a  moral  governor  of  it,  or  of  our  being  in  a  state  of 
religion. 

Now,  when  it  is  said  by  a  fatalist,  that  the  whole 
constitution  of  nature,  and  the  actions  of  men,  that 
every  thing,  and  every  mode  and  circumstance  of  ev- 
ery thing,  is  necessary,  and  could  not  possibly  have 
been  otherwise,  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  this  neces- 
sity does  not  exclude  deliberation,  choice,  preference, 
and  acting  from  certain  principles,  and  to  certain 
end<  ;  because  all  this  is  matter  of  undoubted  expe- 
rience, acknowledged  by  all,  and  what  every  man 
may,  every  moment,  be  conscious  of.  And  from 
hence  it  follows,  that  necessity,  alone  and  of  itself,  is 
in  no  sort  an  account  of  the  constitution  of  nature, 
and  how  things  came  to  be  and  to  continue  as  they  are  ; 
but  only  an  account  of  this  circumstance  relating  to 
their  origin  and  continuance,  that  they  could  not  have 
been  otherwise  than  they  are  and  have  been.  The 
assertion  that  every  thing  is  by  necessity  of  nature,  is 
not  an  answer  to  the  question,  whether  the  world 
came  into  being  as  it  is,  by  an  intelligent  agent  form- 
ing it  thus,  or  not ;  but  to  quite  another  question, 
whether  it  came  into  being  as  it  is,  in  that  way  and 
manner  which  we  call  necessarily,  or  in  that  way  and 
manner  which  we  call  freely.  For  suppose  farther, 
♦hat  one  who  was  a  fatalist,  and  one  who  kept  to  his 


Chap.  VT.  as  influencing  Practice.  177 

natural  sense  of  things,  and  believed  himself  a  free 
agent,  were  disputing  together,  and  vindicating  their 
respective  opinions,  and  they  should  happen  to  instance 
in  a  house, — they  would  agree  that  it  was  built  by  an, 
architect.  Their  difference  concerning  necessity  and 
freedom  would  occasion  no  difference  of  judgment 
concerning  this,  but  only  concerning  another  matter, 
whether  the  architect  built  it  necessarily  or  freely. 
Suppose  then  they  should  proceed  to  inquire  concern- 
ing the  constitution  of  nature ;  in  a  lax  way  of  speak- 
ing, one  of  them  might  say  it  was  by  necessity,  and 
the  other  by  freedom  ;  but  if  they  had  any  meaning 
to  their  words,  as  the  latter  must  mean  a  free  agent, 
so  the  former  must  at  length  be  reduced  to  mean  an 
agent,  whether  he  would  say  one  or  more,  acting  by 
necessity  ;  for  abstract  notions  can  do  nothing.  In- 
deed we  ascribe  to  God  a  necessary  existence,  uncaused 
by  any  agent.  For  we  find  within  ourselves  the  idea 
of  infinity,  i.  e.  immensity  and  eternity,  impossible, 
even  in  imagination,  to  be  removed  out  of  being. 
We  seem  to  discern  intuitively  that  there  must  and 
cannot  but  be  somewhat,  external  to  ourselves,  answer- 
ing this  idea,  or  the  archetype  of  it.  And  from 
hence  (for  this  abstract,  as  much  as  any  other,  implies 
a  concrete)  we  conclude  that  there  is,  and  cannot  but 
be,  an  infinite  and  immense  eternal  Being,  existing 
prior  to  all  design  contributing  to  his  existence  and 
exclusive  of  it.  And  from  the  scantiness  of  language, 
a  manner  of  speaking  has  been  introduced,  that  neces- 
sity is  the  foundation,  the  reason,  the  account  of  the 
existence  of  God.  But  it  is  not  alleged,  nor  can  it  be 
at  ail  intended,  that  every  thing  exists  as  it  does,  by 
this  kind  of  necessity,  a  necessity  antecedent  in  nature 
to  design  :  it  cannot,  I  say,  be  meant  that  every  thing 
exists  as  it  does,  by  this  kind  of  necessity,  upon  several 

z 


178  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity,         Part  I. 

accounts ;  and  particularly  becau-e  it  is  admitted, 
that  design,  in  the  actions  of  men,  contributes  to  ma- 
ny  alterations  in  nature.  For  if  any  deny  this,  I  shall 
not  pretend  to  reason  with  them. 

From  these  things  it  follows,  first,  that  when  a 
fatalist  asserts  that  every  thing  is  by  necessity,  he  must 
mean  by  an  agent  acting  necessarily ;  he  must,  1     ay, 
mean  thb,  for  1  am  very  sensible  he  would  not  choose 
to   mean    it:    and,   secondly,   that   the  riecessitj/  by 
which  such  an  agent  is  supposed  to  act  does  not  ex- 
clude intelligence  and  design.     So  that  *  ere  the  sys- , 
tern  of  fatality   admitted,  it  would  just  as  much  ac- 
count for  the  formation  of  the  world  as  for  the  struc- 
ture oi  an  house,  and  no  more.     Necessity  as  mu.h 
requires  and  supposes  a  necessary  agent,  as  freed'  m 
requires  and  supposes  a  free  agent,  to  be  the  former  of 
the  world.     And  the  appearances  of  design  and  of  final 
causes  in  the  constitution  of  nature  as  really  prove  this 
acting  agent  to  be  an  intelligent  designer,  or  to  act  From 
choice,   upon  the  scheme  of  necessity,  supposed  pos- 
sible, as  upon  that  of  freedom. 

It  appearing  thus,  that  the  notion  of  necessity  does 
not  destroy  the  proof  that  there  is  an  intelligent  au- 
thor of  nature  and  natural  governor  of  the  wurld,  the 
present  question,  which  the  analogy  before  mention- 
ed* suggests,  and  which,  I  think,  it  will  answer,  is 
this,— -whether  the  opinion  of  necessity,  supposed 
consistent  with  possibility,  with  the  constitution  of  the 
world,  and  the  natural  government  which  we  expe- 
rience exercised  over  it,  destroys  all  reasonable  ground 
of  belief  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  religion  ;  or  whether 
that  opinion  be  reconcileable  with  religion,  with  the 
system  and  the  proof  of  it. 

•  P.  175. 


Chap.  VI.  as  influencing  Practice*  179 

Suppose  then  a  fatalist  to  educate  any  one,  from  his 
youth  up,  in  his  own  principles  ;  that  the  child 
should  reason  upon  them,  and  conclude  that  since  he 
cannot  possibly  behave  otherwise  than  he  does,  he  is 
not  a  subject  of  blame  or  commendation,  nor  can  de- 
serve to  be  rewarded  or  punished :  imagine  him  to 
eradicate  the  very  perceptions  of  blame  and  commen- 
dation out  of  his  mind,  by  means  of  this  system  ;  to 
form  his  temper,  and  character,  and  behaviour  to  ir, 
and  from  it  to  judge  of  the  treatment  he  was  to  ex* 
pectj  say  from  reasonable  men,  upon  his  coming  abroad 
into  the  world  ;  as  the  fatalist  judges  from  this  system 
what  he  is  to  expect  from  the  author  of  nature  and 
with  regard  to  a  future  state.  I  cannot  forbear  stop- 
ping here  to  ask,  whether  any  one  of  common  sense 
would  think  fit  that  a  child  should  be  put  upon  these 
speculations,  and  be  left  to  apply  them  to  practice. 
And  a  man  has  little  pretence  to  reason,  who  is  not 
sensible  that  we  are  all  children  in  speculations  of  this 
kind.  However,  the  child  would  doubtless  be  highly 
delighted  to  find  himself  freed  from  the  restraints  of 
fear  and  shame,  with  which  his  playfellows  were  fet- 
tered and  embarrassed,  and  highly  conceited  in  his  su- 
perior knowledge  so  far  beyond  his  years.  But  con- 
ceit and  vanity  would  be  the  least  bad  part  of  the  in- 
fluence which  these  principles  must  have,  when  thus 
reasoned  and  acted  upon,  during  the  course  of  his  ed- 
ucation. He  must  either  be  allowed  to  go  on  and  be 
the  plague  of  all  about  him,  and  himself  too,  even  to 
his  own  destruction,  or  else  correction  must  be  con- 
tinually made  use  of,  to  supply  the  want  of  those  nat- 
ural perceptions  of  blame  and  commendation  which 
we  have  supposed  to  be  removed,  and  to  give  him  a 
practical  impression  of  what  he  had  reasoned  himself 
out  of  the  belief  of,  that  he  was  in  fact  an  accountable 


180  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity,  Part  I, 

child,  and  to  be  puni  heel  for  doing  what  he  was  for- 
bid. It  is  therefore  in  reality  impo  sible,  but  that  the 
correction  which  he  mu^t  meet  with,  in  the  course  of 
his  education,  must  convince  him  that  if  the  scheme 
he  was  instructed  in  were  not  false,  yet  that  he  reason- 
ed inconclusively  upon  it,  and  some  how  or  other  mis- 
applied it  to  practice  and  common  life  ;  as  what  the 
fatalist  experiences  of  the  conduct  of  Providence  at 
present,  ought  in  all  reason  to  convince  him  that  this 
scheme  is  misapplied  when  applied  to  the  subject  of 
religion.  But  supposing  the  child's  temper  could  re- 
main still  formed  to  the  system,  and  his  expectation 
of  the  treatment  he  was  to  have  in  the  world  be  regu- 
lated by  it,  so  as  to  expect  that  no  reasonable  man 
would  blame  or  punish  him  f  r  any  thing  which  he 
should  do,  because  he  could  not  help  doing  it — upon 
this  supposition  it  is  manifest  he  would,  upon  his  com- 
ing abroad  into  the  world,  be  insupportable  to  socie- 
ty, and  the  treatment  which  he  would  receive  from  it 
would  render  it  so  to  him,  and  he  could  not  fail  of  do- 
ing somewhat  very  soon  for  which  he  would  be  deliv- 
ered over  into  the  hand  of  civil  justice.  And  thus, 
in  the  end,  he  would  be  convinced  of  the  obligations 
he  was  under  to  his  wise  instructor.  Or  suppose  this 
scheme  of  fatality  in  any  other  way  applied  to  practice, 
such  practical  application  of  it  will  be  found  equally 
absurd,  equally  falacious  in  a  practical  sense.  For 
instance,  that  if  a  man  be  destined  to  live  such  a  time, 
he  shall  live  to  it,  though  he  take  no  care  of  hi.  own 
preservation  ;  or  if  he  be  destined  to  die  before  that 
time,  no  care  can  prevent  it ;  therefore  all  care  about 
preserving  one's  life  is  to  be  neglected,  which  is  the 
fallacy  instanced  in  by  the  ancients.  But  now  on  the 
contrary,  none  of  these  practical  absurdities  can  be 
drawn  from  reasoning  upon  the  supposition  that  we  are 


Chap.  VI.  as  influencing  Practice.  181 

free  ;  but  all  such  reasoning  with  regard  to  the  com- 
mon affairs   of  life  is  justified  by   experience.     And 
therefore,  though  it  were  admitted   that  this  opinion 
of  necessity  were  speculatively  true,  yet  with  regard  to 
practice  it  is  as  if  it  were  false,  so  far  as  our  experience 
reaches ;  that  is,   to  the  whole  of  our  present  life. 
For,    the  constitution  of  the  present   world,   and  the 
condition  in  which  we  are  actually  placed,  is  as  if  we 
were  free.     And  it  may  perhaps  ju  tly  be  concluded, 
t1       since  the  whole  proce  s  of  action,   through  every 
st  p  of  it,   suspense,  deliberation,  inclining  one  way, 
det  rmining,  and  at  last  doing  as  we   determine,   is  as 
if  we  were  free,  therefore  we  are  so      But  the  thing 
here    insi  ted   upon  is,  that  under  the  present  natural 
government  of  the  world,  we  find  we  are  treated  and 
dealt  with  as  if  we  were  free,  prior  to  all  consideration 
whether  we  are  or  not.     Were  thi>  opinion   therefore 
of  necessity  admitted  to  be  ever  so  true,  yet  such  is  in 
fact   our   condition  and  the   natural  course  of  things, 
that  whenever  we  apply  it  to  life  and  practice,  thi>  ap- 
plication of  it  always  misleads  u*,  and  cannot  but  mis- 
lead us,  in  a  most  dreadful  manner,  with  regard  to 
our  present    interest.     And   how  can    people  think 
themselves  so  very  secure  then,  that  the  same  applica- 
tion of  the  same  opinion  may  not  mislead  them  also, 
in  some  analogous  manner,  with   respect  to  a  future 
or   more  general  and  more  important  interest  ?  For, 
religion  being  a  practical  subject,  and  the  analogy  of 
nature  shewing  us  that  we  have  not  faculties  to  apply 
this  opinion,  were  it  a  true  one,  to  practical  subjects* 
whenever  we  do  apply  it  to  the  subject  of  religion,  and 
thence  conclude  that  we  are  free  from  its  obligations, 
it  is  plain  this  conclusion  cannot  be  depended   upon. 
There  will  still  remain  just  reason  to  think,  whatever 
appearances  are,  that  we  deceive  ourselves  ;  in  some- 


182  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity,         Part  L 

what  of  a  like  manner,  as  when  people  fancy  they  can 
draw  contradictory  conclusions  from  the  idea  of  infinity. 

From  these  things  together,  the  attentive  reader 
will  see  it  follow: ,  that  if  upon  supposition  of  freedom 
the  evidence  of  religion  be  conclusive,  it  remains  so 
upon  suppo>ition  of  necessity,  because  the  notion  of 
necessity  is  not  applicable  to  pracriol  subjects,  i.  e. 
with  respect  to  them,  is  as  if  it  were  not  true.  Nor 
does  this  contain  any  reflection  upon  reason,  but  only 
upon  what  is  unreasonable.  For  to  pretend  to  act 
upon  reason,  in  opposition  to  practical*  principles, 
which  the  author  of  our  nature  gave  u>  to  act  upon, 
and  to  pretend  to  apply  our  reason  to  -ubjtcts,  with 
regard  to  which  our  own  short  views,  and  even  our 
experience,  wili  shew  us  it  cannot  be  depended  upon, 
and  such  at  best  the  subject  of  necessity  must  be,  this 
is  vanity,  conceit  and  unreasonableness. 

But  this  is  not  all  ;  for  we  find  within  ourselves  a 
will,  and  are  conscious  of  a  character.  Now  if  this  in 
us  be  reconcileable  with  fate,  it  is  reconcileable  with  it 
in  the  author  of  nature.  And  besides,  natural  gov- 
ernment and  final  causes  imply  a  character  and  a  will 
in  the  governor  and  designer  j*  a  will  concerning  the 
creatures  whom  he  governs.  The  author  of  nature 
then  being  certainly  of  some  character  or  other,  not- 
withstanding necessity,  it  is  evident  this  necessity  is  as 
reconcileable  with  the  particular  character  of  benevo- 
lence, veracity  and  justice  in  him,  which  attributes  are 
the  foundation  of  religion,  as  with  any  other  charac- 
ter ;  since  we  find  this  necessity  no  more  hinders  men 
from  being  benevolent  than  cruel,  true  than  faithless, 


*  By  ivill  and  character  is  meant  that,  which,  in  speaking  of  men,  we 
•hould  express,  not  on'y  by  these  words,  but  also  by  the  words  temper,  taste, 
dispositions,  practical  principles  ;  that  txbole  frame  of  mind,  from  ivhcnct  ive  act  'it. 
an;  ma  nncr  rather'  than  another. 


Chap.  VI.  as  influencing  Practice.  183 

just  than  unjust,  or  if  the  fatalist  pleases,  what  we  call 
unjust.  !1<>r  it  is  said  indeed,  that  what,  upon  suppo- 
sition of  freedom,  would  be  just  punishment,  upon  sup- 
portion  of  necessity  becomes  manifestly  unjust,  because 
it  is  punishment  inflicted  for  doing  that  which  persons 
could  not  avoid  doing  ;  as  if  the  necessity  which  is 
supposed  to  destroy  the  injustice  of  murder,  for  in- 
stance, would  not  also  destroy  the  injustice  of  punish- 
ing it.  Hu  wever,  a  little  to  the  purpose  as  this  ob- 
jection is  in  itself,  it  is  very  much  to  the  purpose  to 
observe  from  it  how  the  notions  of  justice  and  injustice 
remain,  even  whilst  we  endeavour  to  suppose  them  re- 
moved ;  how  they  force  themselves  upon  the  mind, 
even  whilst  we  are  making  suppositions  destructive  of 
them  ;  for  there  is  not,  perhaps,  a  man  in  the  world, 
but  would  be  ready  to  make  this  objection  at  first 
thought. 

But  though  it  is  most  evident,  that  universal  neces- 
sity,  if  it  be  reconcileable  with  any  thing,  is  reconcile- 
able  with  that  character  in  the  Author  of  nature  which 
is  the  foundation  of  religion,  "  yet,  does  it  not  plain- 
ly destroy  the  proof  that  he  is  of  that  character,  and 
consequently  the  proof  of  religion  ?'"  By  no  means. 
For  we  find,  that  happiness  and  misery  are  not  our  fate, 
in  any  such  sense  as  not  to  be  the  consequences  of  our 
behaviour  ;  but  that  they  are  the  consequences  of  it.* 
We  find  God  exercises  the  same  kind  of  government 
over  us  with  that  which  a  farther  exercises  over  his 
children,  and  a  civil  magistrate  over  his  subjects. 
Now,  whatever  becomes  of  abstract  questions  con- 
cerning liberty  and  necessity,  it  evidently  appears  to 
us,  that  veracity  and  justice  must  be  the  natural  rule 
and  measure  of  exercising  this  authority  or  govern- 
ment, to  a  Being  who  can  have  no  competitions,  or 

*  Chap.  ii. 


184  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity,         Part  I. 

interfering  of  interests,  with  his  creatures  and  his 
subjects. 

But  as  the  doctrine  of  liberty,  though  we  experience 
its  truth,  may  be  perplexed  with  difficultie  which  run 
up  into  the  most  abstruse  of  all  speculations,  and  as 
the  opinion  of  necessity  seems  to  be  the  very  basis  up- 
on which  infidelity  grounds  itself,  it  maybe  of  some 
use  to  offer  a  more  particular  proof  of  the  obligations 
of  religion,  which  may  distinctly  be  shewn  not  to  be 
destroyed  by  this  opinion. 

The  proof  from  final  causes  of  an  intelligent  Author 
of  nature  is  not  affected  by  the  opinion  of  necessity, 
supposing  necessity  a  thing  possible  in  itself,  and  recon- 
cilable with  the  constitution  of  things.*  And  it  is  a 
matter  of  f  ct,  independent  on  this  or  any  other  spec- 
ulation, thar  he  governs  the  world  by  the  method  of 
reward^  and  punishments;!  and  also  that  he  hath 
given  us  a  moral  faculty*  by  which  we  distinguish  be- 
tween actions,  a;  :<i  approve  some  as  virtuou  and  of 
good  desert,  and  disapprove  others  as  vicious  and  of 
ill  desert. |  Now  rhis  moral  discernment  implies  in 
the  notion  of  it  a  rule  of  action,  and  a  rule  of  a  very 
peculiar  kind  ;  for  it  carries  in  it  authority  and  a  right 
of  direction  ;  authoritv  in  such  a  sense,  as  that  we  can- 
not depart  from  it  without  being  self  condemned. § 
And  that  the  dictates  of  this  moral  faculty,  which  are 
by  nature  a  rule  to  us,  are  moreover  the  laws  of  God, 
laws  in  a  sense  including  sanctions,  may  be  thus  proved. 
Consciousness  of  a  rule  or  guide  of  action,  in  creatures 
who  are  capable  of  considering  it  as  given  them  by 
their  Maker,  not  only  raises  immediately  a  sense  of 
duty,  but  also  a  sense  of  security  in  following  it,  and 
of  danger    in  deviating  from  it.     A  direction  of  the 

*  P.  176,  &c.  f  Ch.  ii.  |  Dissertation  U 

S  Sermon  2.  at  the  RoiU. 


Chap.  VI.  as  influencing  Practice.  185 

Author  of  nature,  given  to  creatures  capable  of  look- 
ing upon  it  ab  such,  is  plainly  a  command  from  him  ; 
and  a  command  from  him  necessarily  includes  in  it, 
at  least,  an  implicit  promise  in  case  of  obedience,  or 
threatening  in  case  of  disobedience.  But  then  the 
sense  or  perception  of  good  and  ill  desert,*  which  is 
contained  in  the  moral  discernment,  renders  the  sanc- 
tion explicit,  and  makes  it  appear,  as  one  may  say,  ex^ 
pressed.  For  since  his  method  of  government  is  to  re- 
ward and  punish  actions,  his  having  annexed  to  some 
actions  an  inseparable  sense  of  good  desert,  and  to 
others  of  ill,  this  surely  amounts  to  declaring  upon 
whom  his  punishments  shall  be  inflicted,  and  his  re- 
wards be  bestowed.  For  he  must  have  given  us  this 
discernment  and  sense  of  things,  as  a  presentiment  of 
what  is  to  be  hereafter  ;  that  is,  by  way  of  informa- 
tion beforehand  what  we  are  finally  to  expect  in  his 
world.  There  is  then  most  evident  ground  to  think, 
that  the  government  of  God,  upon  the  whole,  will  be 
found  to  correspond  to  the  nature  which  he  has  given 
us  ;  and  that  in  the  upshot  and  issue  of  things,  happi- 
ness and  misery  shall,  in  fact  and  event,  be  made  to 
follow  virtue  and  vice  respectively,  as  he  has  already, 
in  so  peculiar  a  manner,  associated  the  ideas  of  them 
in  our  minds.  And  from  hence  might  easily  be  de- 
duced the  obligations  of  religious  worship,  were  it  on- 
ly to  be  considered  as  a  means  of  preserving  upon  our 
minds  a  sense  of  this  moral  government  of  God,  and 
securing  our  obedience  to  it  ;  which  yet  is  an  ex- 
tremely imperfect  view  of  that  most  important  duty. 
Now  I  say,  no  objection  from  necessity  can  lie 
against  this  general  proof  of  religion.  None  against 
the  proposition  reasoned  upon,  that  we  have  such  a 

*  Dissertation  IT- 

A  A 


186  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity,  Part  I. 

moral  faculty  and  discernment,  because  this  is  a  mere 
matter  of  fact,  a  thing  of  experience,  that  human  kind 
is  thus  constituted  ;  none  against  the  conclusion,  be- 
cause it  is  immediate  and  wholly  from  this  fact.  For 
the  conclusion,  that  God  will  finally  reward  the  righ- 
teous and  punish  the  wicked,  is  not  here  drawn  from 
its  appearing  to  us  fit*  that  he  should,  but  from  its  ap- 
pearing that  he  has  told  us  he  iviil.  And  this  he  hath 
certainly  told  us,  in  the  promise  and  threatening  which 
it  hath  been  observed  the  notion  of  a  command  im- 
plies, and  the  sense  of  good  and  ill  desert  which  he  has 
criven  us,  more  distinctly  expresses.  And  this  reason- 
ing from  fact  is  confirmed,  and  in  some  degree  even 
verified,  by  other  facts  ;  by  the  natural  tendencies  of 
virtue  and  of  vice  ;t  and  by  this,  that  God,  in  the 
natural  course  of  his  providence,  punishes  vicious  ac- 
tions as  mischievous  to  society,  and  also  vicious  ac- 
tions, as  such  in  the  strictest  sense.}  So  that  the  gen- 
eral proof  of  religion  is  unanswerably  real,  even  upon 
the  wild  supposition  which  we  are   arguing  upon. 

It  must  likewise  be  observed  farther,  that  natural 
religion  hath,  besides  this,  an  external  evidence,  which 
the  doctrine  of  necessity,  if  it  could    be   true,  would 

*  However,  T  am  far  from  intending  to  deny  that  the  will  of  God  is  deter- 
mine!, bv  what  is  fit,  by  the  right  and  reason  of  the  case  ;  though  one  choose^ 
to  decline  matters  of  such  abstract  speculation,  and  to  speak  with  caution 
when  one  does  speak  of  them.  But  if  it  be  intelligible  to  say,  that  it  is  ft  and 
reasonable  for  every  one  to  consult  hit  oivn  happinss%  then  ft  ness  iff  action,  or  th'- 
,iyht  and  reason  of  the  ea>e,  is  an  intelligible  manner  of  speaking.  And  it  seems 
as  inconceivable  to  suppose  God  to  approve  one  course  of  action,  or  one  end, 
preferably  to  another,  which  yet  his  acting  at  all  from  design  implies  that  he 
dc-.e^,  without  supposing  somewhat  prior  in  that  end  to  be  the  ground  of  the 
preference,  a«  to  suppose  him  to  discern  an  abstract  proposition  to  be  true, 
without  supposing  somewhat  prior  in  it  to  be  the  ground  of  the  discernment. 
It  doth  not  therefore  appear,  that  moral  right  is  any  more  relative  to  per- 
ception than  abstract  truth  is  ;  or  that  it  is  any  more  improper  to  speak  of 
the  fitness  and  Tightness  of  actions  and  ends,  as  founded  in  the  nature  ot 
things,  than  to  speak  of  abstract  truth,  as  thus  founded, 
f  p.   127  J  P.  118,&c. 


Chap.  VI.  as  influenc'mg  Practice.  x  87 

not  affect.  For  suppose  a  person,  by  the  observations 
and  reasoning  above,  or  by  any  other,  convinced  of  the 
truth  of  religion  ;  that  there  is  a  God,  who  made  the 
world,  who  is  the  moral  Governor  and  Judge  of  man- 
kind, and  will  upon  the  whole  deal  with  every  one  ac- 
cording to  his  works  ;  I  say,  suppose  a  person  con- 
vinced of  this  by  reason,  but  to  know  nothing  at  all 
of  antiquity,  or  the  present  state  of  mankind  ;  it  would 
be  natural  for  bueh  an  one  to  be  inquisitive  what  was 
the  history  of  this  system  of  doctrine  ;  at  what  time, 
and  in  what  manner,  it  came  first  into  the  world,  and 
whether  it  were  believed  by  any  considerable  part  of  it. 
And  were  he  upon  inquiry  to  find,  that  a  particular 
person  in  a  late  age  first  of  all  proposed  it,  as  a  deduc- 
tion of  reason,  and  that  mankind  were  before  wholly 
ignorant  of  it  ;  then,  though  its  evidence  from  reason 
would  remain,  there  would  be  no  additional  proba- 
bility of  its  truth,  from  the  account  of  its  discovery. 
But  instead  of  this  being  the  fact  of  the  case,  on  the 
contrary  he  would  find,  what  could  not  but  afford 
him  a  very  strong  confirmation  of  its  truth,  first, 
that  somewhat  of  this  system,  with  more  or  fewer  ad- 
ditions and  alterations,  hath  been  professed  in  all  ages 
and  countries,  of  which  we  have  any  certain  informa- 
tion relating  to  this  matter.  Secondly,  that  it  is  cer- 
tain historical  fact,  so  far  as  we  can  trace  things  up, 
that  this  whole  system  of  belief,  that  there  is  one  God, 
the  Creator  and  moral  Governor  of  the  world,  and  that 
mankind  is  in  a  state  of  religion,  was  received  in  the 
first  ages.  And,  thirdly,  that  as  there  is  no  hint  or 
intimation  in  history,  that  this  system  was  fir>t  reason- 
ed out,  so  there  is  express  historical  or  traditional  evi- 
dence, as  ancient  as  history,  that  it  was  taught  first  by 
revelation.  Now  these  things  must  be  allowed  to  be 
of  great  weight.     The  first  of  them,  general  consent, 


188  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity,         Part  I. 

shews  this  system  to  be  conformable  to  the  common 
sense  of  mankind.  The  second,  namely,  that  religion 
was  believed  in  the  first  ages  of  the  world,  especially 
as  it  does  not  appear  that  there  were  then  a  ly  super- 
stitious or  false  additions  to  it,  cannot  but  be  a  farther 
confirmation  of  its  truth.  For  it  is  a  proof  of  this 
alternative,  either  that  it  came  into  the  world  by  reve- 
lation, or  that  it  is  natural,  obvious,  and  forces  itself 
upon  the  mind.  The  former  of  these  is  the  conclu- 
sion of  learned  men.  And  whoever  will  consider  how 
unapt  for  speculation  rude  and  uncultivated  minds 
are,  will,  perhaps  from  hence  alone,  be  strongly  in- 
clined to  believe  it  the  truth.  And  as  it  is  shewn  in 
the  second  part*  of  this  treatise,  that  there  is  noth- 
ing of  such  peculiar  presumption  against  a  revelation 
in  the  beginning  of  the  world,  as  there  is  supposed  to 
be  against  subsequent  ones,  a  sceptic  could  not,  I 
think,  give  any  account,  which  would  appear  more 
probable  even  to  himself,  of  the  early  pretences  to  rev- 
elation, than  by  supposing  some  real  original  one, 
from  whence  they  were  copied.  And  the  third  thing 
abovementioned,  that  there  is  express  historical  or 
traditional  evidence  as  ancient  as  history,  of  the  sys- 
tem of  religion  being  taught  mankind  by  revelation  ; 
this  must  be  admitted  as  some  degree  of  real  proof 
that  it  was  so  taught.  For  why  should  not  the  most 
ancient  tradition  be  admitted,  as  some  additional 
proof  of  a  fact,  against  which  there  is  no  presumption  ? 
And  this  proof  is  mentioned  here,  because  it  has  its 
weight  to  shew,  that  religion  came  into  the  world  by 
revelation,  prior  to  all  consideration  of  the  proper  au- 
thority of  any  book  supposed  to  contain  it,  and  even 
prior  to  all  consideration  whether  the  revelation  itself 
be  uncorruptly    handed  down   and  related,  or  mixed 

*  Chap,  ii 


Chap.  VI.         as  influencing  Practice.  189 

and  darkened  with  fables.  Thus  the  historical  ac- 
count which  we  have  of  the  origin  of  religion,  taking 
in  all  circumstances,  is  a  real  confirmation  of  its  truth 
no  way  affected  by  the  opinion  of  necessity.  And  the 
external  evidence,  even  of  natural  religion,  is  by  no 
mean    inconsiderable. 

But  it  is  carefully  to  be  observed,  and  ought  to  be 
recollected  after  all  proofs  of  virtue  and  religion,  which 
are  only  general,  that  as  speculative  reason  may  be 
.neglected.*  prejudiced  and  deceived, — so  also  may  our 
moral  understanding  be  impaired  and  perverted,  and 
the  dictates  of  it  not  impartially  attended  to.  This 
indeed  proves  nothing  against  the  reality  of  our  spec- 
ulative or  practical  faculties  of  perception  ;  against 
their  being  intended  by  nature  to  inform  us  in  the 
theory  of  things,  and  instruct  us  how  we  are  to  be- 
have, and  what  we  are  to  expect  in  consequence  of 
our  behaviour.  Yet  our  liableness,  in  the  degree  we 
are  liable,  to  prejudice  and  perversion,  is  a  most  serious 
admonition  to  us  to  be  upon  our  guard  with  respect 
to  what  is  of  such  consequence  as  our  determinations 
concerning  virtue  and  religion,  and  particularly  not  to 
take  custom,  and  fashion,  and  slight  notions  of  hon- 
our, or  imaginations  of  present  ease,  use  and  conve- 
nience to  mankind,  for  the  only  moral  rule.* 

The  foregoing  observations,  drawn  from  the  nature 
of  the  thing,  and  the  history  of  religion,  amount, 
when  taken  together,  to  a  real  practical  proof  of  it, 
not  to  be  confuted  ;  such  a  proof  as,  considering  the 
infinite  importance  of  the  thing,  1  apprehend  would 
be  admitted  fully  sufficient,  in  reason,  to  influence  the 
actions  of  men  who  act  upon  thought  and  reflection, 
if  it  were  admitted  that  there  is  no  proof  of  the  con- 
trary.    But  it  may  be  said,  "  there  are  many    proba- 

*  Dissertation    II. 


190  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity ,  Part  I. 

bilities,  which  cannot  indeed  be  confuted,  i.  e.  shewn 
to  be  no  probabilities,  and  yet  may  be  overbalanced 
by  greater  probabilities  on  the  other  side  ;  much  more 
by  demonstration.  And  there  is  no  occasion  to  bject 
against  particular  arguments  alleged  for  an  opinion, 
when  the  opinion  itself  may  be  clearly  shewn  to  be 
false,  without  meddling  with  such  arguments  at  all, 
but  leaving  them  just  as  they  are.  Now  the  method 
of  government  by  rewards  and  punishments,  and  es- 
pecially rewarding  and  punishing  good  and  ill  desert, 
as  such,  respectively,  must  go  upon  supposition  that 
we  are  free,  and  not  necessary  agents.  And  it  is  in- 
credible that  the  Author  of  nature  should  govern  us 
upon  a  supposition  as  true,  which  he  knows  to  be  false  ; 
and  therefore  absurd  to  think  he  will  reward  or  punish 
us  for  our  actions  hereafter,  especially  that  he  will  do 
it  under  the  notion  that  they  are  of  good  or  ill  desert." 
Here  then  the  matter  is  brought  to  a  point.  And  the 
answer  to  ?11  this  is  full,  and  not  to  be  evadtd,  that 
the  whole  constitution  and  course  of  things,  the  whole 
analogy  of  Providence,  shews  beyond  possibility  of 
doubt,  that  the  conclusion  from  this  reasoning  is  false, 
wherever  the  fallacy  lies.  The  doctrine  of  freedom 
indeed  clearly  shows  where  ;  in  supposing  ourselves 
neressary,  when  in  truth  we  are  free  agents.  But  up- 
on the  supposition  of  necessity,  the  fallacy  lies  in  ta- 
king for  granted,  that  it  is  incredible  necessary  agents 
should  be  rewarded  and  punished.  But  that,  some 
how  or  other,  the  conclusion  now  mentioned  is  false, 
is  most  certain.  For  it  is  fact,  that  God  does  govern 
even  brute  creatures  by  the  method  of  rewards  and 
punishments,  in  the  natural  course  of  things.  And 
men  are  rewarded  and  punished  for  their  actions,  pun- 
ished for  actions  mischievous  to  society  as  being  so, 
punished  for  vicious  actions,  as   such,  by  the  natural 


Chap.  VI.  as  influencing  Practice.  191 

instrumentality  of  each  other,  under  the  present  con- 
duct of  Providence.  Nay  even  the  affection  of  grati- 
tude, and  the  passion  of  resentment,  and  the  rewards 
and  punishments  following  from  them,  which  in  gen- 
eral are  to  be  considered  as  natural,  i.  e.  from  the  Au- 
thor of  nature, — these  rewards  and  punishments,  be- 
ing naturally*  annexed  to  actions  considered  as  imply- 
ing good  intention  and  good  desert,  ill  intention  and 
ill  desert,  -these  natural  rewards  and  punishments,  I 
say,  are  as  much  a  contradiction  to  the  conclusion 
above,  and  shew  its  falsehood,  as  a  more  exact  and 
complete  rewarding  and  punishing  of  good  and  ill  de- 
sert, as  such.  So  that  if  it  be  incredible  that  necessary 
agents  should  be  thus  rewarded  and  punished,  then 
men  are  not  necessary,  but  free  ;  since  it  is  matter  of 
fact  that  they  are  thus  rewarded  and  punished.  But 
if,  on  the  contrary,  which  is  the  supposition  we  have 
been  arguing  upon,  it  be  insisted  that  men  are  neces- 
sary agents,  then  there  is  nothing  incredible  in  the  far- 
ther supposition  of  necessary  agents  being  thus  reward- 
ed and  punished,  since  we  ourselves  are  thus  dealt  with. 
From  the  whole,  therefore,  it  must  follow,  that  a 
necessity  supposed  possible,  and  reconcileable  with  the 
constitution  of  things,  does  in  no  sort  prove  that  the 
Author  of  nature  will  not,  nor  destroy  the  proof  that 
he  will,  finally  and  upon  the  whole,  in  his  eternal  gov- 
ernment, render  his  creatures  happy  or  miserable,  by 
some  means  or  other,  as  they  behave  well  or  ill.  Or, 
to  express  this  conclusion  in  words  conformable  to  the 
title  of  the  chapter,  the  analogy  of  nature  shews  us, 
that  the  opinion  of  necessity,  considered  as  practical, 
is  false.  And  if  necessity,  upon  the  supposition  above 
mentioned,  doth  not  destroy  the  proof  of  natural    re- 

*  Sermon  8th,  at  the  Roll?. 


192  Of  the  Opinion  of  Necessity.  Part  L 

ligion,  it  evidently  makes  no  alteration  in  the  proof  of 
revealed. 

From  these  things  likewise  we  may  learn,  in  what 
sense  to  understand  that  general  assertion,  that  the 
opinion  of  necessity  is  essentially  destructive  of  all  re- 
ligion. First  in  a  practical  sense  ;  that  by  this  notion, 
atheistical  men  pretend  to  satisfy  and  encourage  them- 
selves in  vice,  and  justify  to  others  their  disregard  to 
all  religion.  And  secondly,  in  the  strictest  sense,  that 
it  is  a  contradiction  to  the  whole  constitution  of  na- 
ture, and  to  what  we  may  every  moment  experience 
in  ourselves,  and  so  overturns  every  thing.  But  by 
no  means  is  this  assertion  to  be  understood,  as  if  ne- 
cessity, supposing  it  could  possibly  be  reconciled  with 
the  constitution  of  things  and  with  what  we  experience, 
were  not  also  reconcileable  with  religion  ;  for  upon 
this  supposition  it   demonstrably  is  so. 


X2hap.  VII.         Of  the  Government  of  God.  %m 


CHAP.  VII. 

^Of  the  Government  of  God,  considered  as  a  Scheme  cr 
Constitution,  imperfectly  comprehended, 

1  hough  it  be,   as  it  cannot  but  be,  acknowledg- 
ed, that  the  analogy  of  nature  gives  a  strong  credi- 
bility to  the  general  doctrine  of  religion,  and  to  the 
several  particular  things  contained  in  it,  considered  as 
so   many  matters  of  fact,  and  likewise  that  it  shews 
this   credibility  not  to  be  destroyed  by  any  notions 
of   necessity, — yet    still    objections   may    be   insisted 
Upon    against   the  wibdom,  equity  and  goodness  of 
the  divine   government  implied  in  the  notion  of  re- 
ligion, and    against  the  method  by  which  this  govern- 
ment is  conducted  5  to  which  objections  analogy  can 
be  no  direct  answer.     For  the  credibility  or  the  cer- 
tain truth  of  a  matter  of  fact   does   not  immediatelv 
prove  any  thing  concerning  the  wisdom  or  goodness 
of  it;  and  analogy  can  do  no  more,  imme  iately  or 
directly,  than  shew  such  and  such  things  to  be  true  or 
credible,  considered  only  as  matters  of  fact.     But  still, 
if,  upon  supposition  of  a  moral  constitution  of  nature 
and  a  moral  government  over  it,  analogy  suggests  and 
makes   it  credible  that   this  government  must  be  a 
scheme,  system,  or  constitution  of  government,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  a  number  of  single  unconnected  acts 
of  distributive  justice  and  goodness,  and  likewise  that 
it  must  be  a  scheme  so  imperfectly  comprehended,  and 
of  such  a  sort  in  other  respects,  as  to  afford  a  direct 
general  answer  to  all  objections  against  the  justice  and 
goodness  of  it,— -then  analogy  is,   remotely,  of  great 

B    B 


194  The  Government  of  God>  Part  I. 

service  in  answering  those  objections,  both  by  suggest* 
ing  the  answer,  and  shewing  it  to  be  a  credible  one. 

Now  this,  upon  inquiry,  will  be  found  to  be  the 
case.     For,   fir>t,  upon  .supposition  that   God  exer- 
cises a  moral  government  over  the  world,  the  analogy 
of  his  natural  government  suggests  and  makes  it  cred- 
ible that  his  moral  government  must  be  a  scheme  quite 
beyond  our  comprehension  ;  and  this  affords  a  general 
answer  to  all  objections  against  the  justice  and  good- 
ness of  it.     And,  secondly,  a  more  distinct  observation 
of  some  particular  things  contained  in  God's  scheme  ; 
of  natural  government,  the  like  things  being  supposed 
by  analogy  to  be  contained  in  his  moral  government, 
will  farther  shew  how  little  weight  is  to  be  laid  upon 
these  objections. 

I.  Upon    supposition  that    God  exercises  a  moral 
government  over  the  world,  the  analogy  of  his  natural 
government  suggests  and  makes  it  credible  that   his 
moral  government  must  be  a  scheme  quite  beyond  our 
comprehension  ;  and  this  affords  a  general  answer  to 
all  objections   against  the  justice  and  goodness  of  it. 
It  is  most  obvious,  analogy  renders  it  highly  credible, 
that  upon  supposition  of  a  moral  government,  it  must 
be  a  scheme  ;  for  the  world,  and  the  whole  natural 
government  of  it,  appears  to  be  so,  to  be  a  scheme,  sys- 
te  n,  or  constitution,  whose  parts  correspond  to  each 
other  and  to  a  whole,  as  really  as  any  work  of  art,  or 
as  any   particular  model    of  a  civil  constitution  and 
government.     In  this    great   scheme  of  the  natural 
world,  individuals  have    various  peculiar  relations  to 
(  Wet  individuals  of  their  own  species.     And  whole 
species  are,  we  find,  variously  related  to  other  species 
upon  this  earth.     Nor  do  we  know  how  much  farther 
thvj-e  kinds  of  relations  may  extend.     And,  as  there  is 
not  any  action  or  natural  event,  which  we  are  ac- 


Chap.  VII.         a  Scheme  incomprehenhble.  195 

quainted  with,  so  single  and  unconnected  as  not  to 
have  a  respect  to  some  other  actions  and  events, — so 
pos  ibly  each  of  them,  when  it  has  not  an  immediate, 
may  yet  have  a  remote  natural  relation  to  other  actions 
and  events,  much  beyond  the  compass  of  this  present 
world.  There  seems  indeed  nothing  from  whence  we 
can  so  much  as  make  a  conjecture,  whether  all  crea- 
tures, actions  and  events,  throughout  the  whole  of 
nature,  have  relations  to  each  other.  But,  as  it  is  ob- 
vious that  all  events  have  future  unknown  conse- 
quences, so  if  we  trace  any  as  far  as  we  can  go  into 
what  is  connected  with  it,  we  shall  find,  that  if  such 
event  were  not  connected  with  somewhat  farther  in  na- 
ture unknown  to  us,  somewhat  both  past  and  present, 
such  event  could  not  possibly  have  been  at  all.  Nor 
can  we  give  the  whole  account  of  any  one  thing  what- 
ever ;  of  all  its  causes,  ends  and  necessary  adjuncts  ; 
those  adjuncts,  I  mean,  without  which  it  could  not 
have  been.  By  this  most  astonishing  connexion, 
these  reciprocal  correspondencies  and  mutual  relations, 
every  thing  which  we  see  in  the  course  of  nature  is  ac- 
tually brought  about.  And  things  seemingly  the 
most  insignificant  imaginable,  are  perpetually  observ- 
ed to  be  necessary  conditions  to  other  things  of  the 
greatest  importance  ;  so  that  any  one  thing  whatever 
may,  for  ought  we  know  to  the  contrary,  be  a  necessa- 
ry condition  to  any  other.  The  natural  world  then, 
and  natural  government  of  it,  being  such  an  incom* 
prehensible  scheme,  so  incomprehensible  that  a  man 
must  really  in  the  literal  sense  know  nothing  at  all, 
who  is  not  sensible  of  his  ignorance  in  it,  this  imme- 
diately suggests,  and  strongly  shews  the  credibility,  that 
the  moral  world  and  government  of  it  may  be  so  too. 
Indeed  the  natural  and  moral  constitution  and  govern- 
ment  of  the  world  are  so  connected,  as  to  make  up  to- 


J  96  The  Government  of  God,  Part  Xt, 

gether  but  one  scheme  ;  and  it  is  highly  probable, 
that  the  first  is  formed  and  carried  on  merely  in  sub- 
serviency to  the  latter,  as  the  vegetable  world  is  for 
the  animal,  and  organized  bodies  for  minds.  But 
the  thing  intended  here  is,  without  inquiring  how  far 
the  administration  of  the  natural  world  is  subordinate 
to  that  of  the  moral,  only  to  observe  the  credibility 
that  one  should  be  analogous  or  similar  to  the  other  ; 
that  therefore  every  act  of  divine  justice  and  goodness 
may  be  supposed  to  look  much  beyond  itself,  and  its  im- 
mediate object ;  may  have  some  reference  to  other 
parts  of  God's  moral  administration,  and  to  a  general 
moral  plan  ;  and  that  every  circumstance  of  this  his 
moral  government  may  be  adjusted  beforehand  with  a 
view  to  the  whole  of  it.  Thus  for  example  ; — the  de- 
termined length  of  time,  and  the  degrees  and  way  in 
which  virtue  is  to  remain  in  a  state  of  warfare  and  dis- 
cipline, and  in  which  wickedness  is  permitted  to  have 
its  progress  ;  the  times  appointed  for  the  execution  of 
justice  ;  the  appointed  instruments  of  it ;  the  kinds  of 
rewards  and  punishments,  and  the  manners  of  their 
distribution  ;  all  particular  instances  of  divine  justice 
and  goodness,  and  every  circumstance  of  them,  may 
have  such  respects  to  each  other  as  to  make  up  all  to- 
gether a  whole,  connected  and  related  in  all  its  parts  ; 
a  scheme  or  sy>tem  which  is  as  properly  one  as  the 
natural  world  is,  and  of  the  like  kind.  And  suppos- 
ing this  to  be  the  case,  it  is  most  evident  that  we  are 
not  competent  judges  of  this  scheme,  from  the  small 
parts  of  it  which  come  within  our  view  in  the  present 
life  ;  and  therefore  no  objections  against  any  of  these 
parts  can  be  insisted  upon  by  reasonable  men. 

This  our  ignorance,  and  the  consequence  here 
drawn  from  it,  are  universally  acknowledged  upon 
pther  occasions  ;  and,   though  scarce  denied,  yet  are 


Chap.  VII.         a  Scheme  incomprehensible*  197 

universally  forgot,  when  persons  come  to  argue  against 
religion.  And  it  is  not  perhaps  easy,  even  for  the 
mo  t  reasonable  men,  always  to  bear  in  mind  the  de- 
gree or  our  ignorance,  and  make  due  allowances  for  it. 
Upon  these  accounts,  it  may  not  be  useless  to  go  on  a 
little  farther,  in  order  to  shew  more  distinctly  how  just 
an  answer  our  ignorance  is,  to  objections  against  the 
scheme  of  Providence.  Suppose  then  a  person  boldly 
to  assert  that  the  things  complained  of,  the  origin  and 
continuance  of  evil,  might  easily  have  been  prevent- 
ed by  repeated  interpositions  ;*  interpositions  so 
guarded  and  circumstanced,  as  would  preclude  all  mis- 
chief arising  from  them  ;  or,  if  this  were  impractica- 
ble, that  a  scheme  of  government  is  itself  an  imperfec- 
tion, since  more  gooa  might  have  been  produced  with- 
out any  scheme,  system,  or  constitution  at  all,  by  con- 
tinued single  unrelated  acts  of  distributive  justice  and 
goodness  \  because  these  would  have  occasioned  no  ir- 
regularities. And  farther  than  this,  it  is  presumed, 
the  objections  will  not  be  carried.  Yet  the  answer  is 
obvious,  that  were  these  assertions  true,  still  theob  er- 
vations  above,  concerning  our  ignorance  in  the  scheme 
of  divine  government,  and  the  consequence  drawn 
from  it,  would  hold  in  ^reat  measure,  enough  to  vin- 
dicate religion  against  all  objections  from  the  disorders 
of  the  present  state*  Were  these  assertions  true,  yet 
the  government  of  the  world  might  be  just  and  good 
notwithstanding  ;  for,  at  the  most,  they  would  infer 
nothing  more  than  that  it  might  have  been  better. 
But  indeed  they  are  mere  arbitrary  assertions,  no  man 
being  sufficiently  acquainted  with  the  possibilities  of 
things  to  bring  any  proof  of  them  to  the  lowest  de- 
gree of  probability.  For  however  possible  what  is  as- 
serted  may  seem,  yet  many  instances  may  be  alleged, 

•  P,  200.  201. 


198  The  Government  of  God9  Part  L 

in  things  much  less  out  of  our  reach,  of  suppositions 
absolutely  impossible,  and  reducible  to  the  most  pal- 
pable self  contradictions,  which  not  every  one  by  any 
means  would  perceive  to  be  such,  nor  perhaps  any  one 
at  first  sight  suspect.  From  these  things  it  is  easy  to 
see  distinctly  how  our  ignorance,  as  it  is  the  common, 
is  really  a  satisfactory  answer  to  ail  objections  against 
the  justice  and  goodness  of  Providence.  If  a  man, 
contemplating  any  one  providential  di  pensation,  which 
had  no  relation  to  any  others,  should  object,  that  he 
discerned  in  it  a  disregard  to  justice,  or  a  deficiency  of 
goodness,  nothing  would  be  less  an  answer  to  such  ob- 
jection than  our  ignorance  in  other  parts  of  Providence, 
or  in  the  possibilities  of  things  no  way  related  to  what 
he  was  contemplating.  But  when  we  know  not  but 
the  parts  objected  against  may  be  relative  to  other 
parts  unknown  to  us,  and  when  we  are  unacquainted 
with  what  is  in  the  nature  of  the  thing  practicable  in 
the  case  before  us,  then  our  ignorance  is  a  satisfac- 
tory answer ;  because,  some  unknown  relation,  or 
some  unknown  impossibility  may  render  what  is  ob- 
jected against  just  and  good  ;  nay,  good  in  the  highest 
practicable  degree. 

II.  And  how  little  weight  is  to  be  laid  upon  such 
objections  will  farther  appear,  by  a  more  distinct  ob- 
servation of  some  particular  things  contained  in  the 
natural  government  of  God,  the  like  to  which  may  be 
supposed,  from  analogy,  to  be  contained  in  his  moral 
government. 

First,  as  in  the  scheme  of  the  natural  world  no 
ends  appear  to  be  accomplished  without  means,  so  we 
find  that  means  very  undesirable  often  conduce  to 
bring  about  ends,  in  such  a  measure  desirable  as  great- 
ly to  overbalance  the  disagreeableness  of  the  means. 
And  in  cases  where  such  means  are  conducive  to  such 


Chap.  VII.         *  Scheme  incomprehensible.  199 

ends,  it  is  not  reason,  but  experience,  which  shews  us 
that  they  are  thus  conducive.  Experience  also  shews, 
many  means  to  be  conducive  and  necessary  to  accom- 
plish ends,  which  means,  before  experience,  we  should 
have  thought  would  have  had  even  a  contrary  tenden- 
cy. Now  from  these  observations  relating  to  the  nat- 
ural scheme  of  the  world,  the  moral  being  supposed 
analogous  to  it,  arises  a  great  credibility,  that  the  put- 
ting our  misery  in  each  other's  power  to  the  degree  it 
is,  and  making  men  liable  to  vice  to  the  degree  we 
are,— and  in  general,  that  those  things  which  are  ob- 
jected against  the  moral  scheme  of  Providence,  may 
be,  upon  the  whole,  friendly  and  assistant  to  virtue, 
and  productive  of  an  overbalance  of  happiness,  i.  e. 
the  things  objected  against  may  be  means,  by  which 
an  overbalance  of  good  will,  in  the  end,  be  found  pro- 
duced. And  from  the  same  observations,  it  appears 
to  be  no  presumption  against  this,  that  we  do  not, 
if  indeed  we  do  not,  see  those  means  to  have  any  such 
tendency,  or  that  they  seem  to  us  to  have  a  contrary 
one.  Thus  those  things  which  we  call  irregularities, 
may  not  be  so  at  all  ;  because  they  may  be  means  of 
accomplishing  wise  and  good  ends  more  considerable. 
And  it  may  be  added,  as  above,  that  they  may  also 
be  the  only  means  by  which  these  wise  and  good  ends 
are  capable  of  being  accomplished. 

After  these  observations  it  may  be  proper  to  add,  in 
order  to  obviate  an  absurd  and  wicked  conclusion  from 
any  of  them,  that  though  the  constitution  of  our  na- 
ture from  whence  we  are  capable  of  vice  and  misery, 
may,  as  it  undoubtedly  does,  contribute  to  the  per- 
fection and  happiness  of  the  world  :  and  though  the 
actual  permission  of  evil  may  be  beneficial  to  it,  (i.  e.  it 
would  have  been  more  mischievous,  not  that  a  wicked 
person  had  himself  abstained  from  his  own  wickedness 


200  The  Government  of  God,  Part  I.' 

but  that  any  one  had  forcibly  prevented  it,  than  that 
it  was  permitted)  yet  notwithstanding,  it  might  have 
been  much  better  for  the  world  if  this  very  evil  had 
never  been  done.  Nay,  it  is  most  clearly  conceivable, 
that  the  very  commission  of  wickedness  may  be  bene- 
ficial to  the  world,  and  yet  that  it  would  be  infinitely 
more  beneficial  for  men  to  refrain  from  it.  For  thus, 
in  the  wise  and  good  constitution  of  the  natural  world, 
there  are  disorders  which  bring  their  own  cures,  dis- 
eases which  are  themselves  remedies.  Many  a  man 
would  have  died,  had  it  not  been  for  the  gout  or  a 
fever  ;  yet  it  would  be  thought  madness  to  assert,  that 
sickness  is  a  better  or  more  perfect  state  than  health, 
though  the  like  with  regard  to  the  moral  world  has 
been  asserted.     But, 

Secondly,  the  natural  government  of  the  world  is 
carried  on  by  general  laws.  For  this  there  may  be 
wise  and  good  reasons  ;  the  wisest  and  best,  for  ought 
we  know  to  the  contrary.  And  that  there  are  such 
reasons,  is  suggested  to  our  thoughts  by  the  analogy  of 
nature  ;  by  our  being  made  to  experience  good  ends 
to  be  accomplished,  as  indeed  all  the  good  which  we 
enjoy  is  accomplished,  by  this  means,  that  the  laws  by 
which  the  world  is  governed  are  general.  For  we  have 
scarce  any  kind  of  enjoyments  but  what  we  are,  in 
some  way  or  other,  instrumental  in  procuring  our- 
selves, by  acting  in  a  manner  which  we  foresee  likely  to 
procure  them  ;  now  this  foresight  could  not  be  at  all, 
were  not  the  government  of  the  world  carried  on  by 
general  laws.  And  though,  for  ought  we  know  to  the 
contrary,  every  single  case  may  be  at  length  found  to 
have  been  provided  for  even  by  these,  yet  to  prevent 
all  irregularities,  or  remedy  them  as  they  arise,  by 
the  wisest  and  best  general  laws,  may  be  impossible  in 
the  nature  of  things,  as  we  see   it  is  absolutely  impossi- 


Chap.  VII.         a  Scheme  incomprehensible.  SOI 

ble  in  civil  government.     But  then  we  are  ready  to 
think,  that,  the  constitution  of  nature  remaining  as  it 
is,  anc^  the  course  of  things  being  permitted  to  go  on 
in  other  respect     as  it  does,    there  might  be  interpo- 
sitions to  prevent  irregularities,  though  they  could  not 
have  been  prevented  or  remedied  by  any  general  laws. 
And  there  would  indeed  be  reason  to  wish,  which,  by 
the  way,  is  very  different  from  a  right  to  claim,  that  all 
irregularities  were  prevented  or  remedied  by  present 
interpositions,  if  these  interpositions  would  have  no 
other  effect  than  this.     But  it  is  plain  they  would  have 
some  visible  and  immediate  bad  effects  ;  for  instance, 
they  would    encourage  idleness  and   negligence,  and 
they  would    render  doubtful  the  natural  rule  of  life, 
which  is  ascertained  by  this  very  thing,  that  the  course 
of  the  world  is  carried  on  by  general  laws.     And  far- 
ther, it  is  certain  they  would  have  distant  effects,  and 
very  great  ones  too,  by  means   of  the  wonderful  con- 
nexions before    mentioned.*     So  that  we  cannot  so 
much  as  guess  what  would  be  the  whole  result  of  the 
interpositions  desired.     It  may  be  said,  any  bad  result 
might  be  prevented  by  farther  interpositions,  whenever 
there  was  occasion  for  them  ;  but  this  again  is  talking 
quite  at  random,  and  in  the  dark.f     Upon  the  whole 
then,  we  see  wise  reasons,  why  the  course  of  the  world 
should  be  carried  on  by  general  laws,  and  good  ends 
accomplished  by  this  means  ;  and,  for  ought  we  know, 
there  may  be  the  wisest  reasons  for  it,  and  the  best  ends 
accomplished  by  it.     We  have  no  ground  to  believe, 
that  all  irregularities  could  be  remedied  as  they  arise,  or 
could  have  been  precluded,  by  general  laws.     We  find 
that   interpositions  would  produce  evil,  and  prevent 
good  ;  and,  for  ought  we  know,  they  would  produce 
greater  evil  than   they   would  prevent ;  and  prevent 

*  P.  194,  &c,  f   196,  197. 

c  c 


202  The  Government  of  God,  Part  !♦ 

greater  good  than  they  would  produce.  And  if  this 
be  the  case,  then  the  not  interposing  is  so  far  from  be- 
ing a  ground  of  complaint,  that  it  is  an  instance  of 
goodness.  This  is  intelligible  and  sufficient,  and  go- 
ing farther  seems  beyond  the  utmost  reach  of  our  fac- 
ulties. 

But  it  may  be  said,  that  "  after  all,  these  supposed 
impossibilities  and  relations  are  what  we  are  unac- 
quainted with,  and  we  must  judge  of  religion,  as  of 
other  things,  by  what  we  do  know,  and  look  upon 
the  re^t  as  nothing  ;  or  however,  that  the  answers  here 
given  to  what  is  objected  against  religion,  may  equally 
be  made  use  of  to  invalidate  the  proof  of  it,  since  their 
stress  lies  so  very  much  upon  our ignorance."     But, 

First,  though  total  ignorance  in  any  matter  does 
indeed  equally  destroy,  or  rather  preclude  all  proof 
concerning  it,  and  objections  against  it,  yet  partial  ig- 
norance does  not.  For  we  may  in  any  degree  be  con- 
vinced, that  a  person  is  of  such  a  character,  and  con- 
sequently will  pursue  such  ends,  though  we  are  greatly 
ignorant  what  is  the  proper  way  of  acting,  in  order  the 
most  effectually  to  obtain  those  ends  ;  and  in  this  case, 
objections  against  his  manner  of  acting,  as  seemingly 
not  conducive  to  obtain  them,  might  be  answered  by 
our  ignorance,  though  the  proof  that  such  ends  were 
intended  might  not  at  all  be  invalidated  by  it.  Thus 
the  proof  of  religion  is  a  proof  of  the  moral  character 
of  God,  and  consequently  that  his  government  is  mor- 
al and  that  every  one  upon  the  whole  shall  receive  ac- 
cording to  his  deserts  -,  a  proof  that  this  is  the  designed 
end  of  his  government.  But  we  are  not  competent 
judges  what  is  the  proper  way  of  acting,  in  order  the 
most  effectually  to  accomplish  this  end.*  Therefore 
our  ignorance  is  an  answer  to  objections  against  the 

*  P.  74,  75. 


Chap.  VII.         a  Scheme  incomprehensible,  203 

conduct  of  Providence  in  permitting  irregularities,  as 
seeming  contradictory  to  this  end.  Now,  since  it  is 
so  obvious  that  our  ignorance  may  be  a  .satisfactory 
answer  to  objections  against  a  thing,  and  yet  not  affect 
the  proof  of  it,  till  it  can  be  shewn,  it  is  frivolous  to 
assert  that  our  ignorance  invalidates  the  proof  of  reli- 
gion, as  it  does  the  objections  against  it. 

Secondly,  suppose  unknown  impossibilities  and  un- 
known relations  might  ju>tly  be  urged  to  invalidate 
tht-  proof  of  religion,  as  well  as  to  answer  objections 
against  it,  and  that  in  consequence  of  this  the  proof 
of  it  were  doubtful, — yet  still,  let  the  assertion  be  de- 
spised, or  let  it  be  ridiculed,  it  is  undeniably  true  that 
moral  obligations  would  remain  certain,  though  it 
were  not  certain  what  would,  upon  the  whole,  be  the 
consequences  of  observing  or  violating  them.  For, 
these  obligations  arise  immediately  and  necessarily  from 
the  judgment  of  our  ownmind,  unless  perverted,  which 
we  cannot  violate  without  being  self  condemned.  And 
they  would  be  certain  too,  from  considerations  of  in- 
terest. For  though  it  were  doubtful  what  will  be  the 
future  consequences  of  virtue  and  vice,  yet  it  is,  how- 
ever, credible,  that  they  may  have  those  consequences 
which  religion  teaches  us  they  will  ;  and  this  credibil- 
ity is  a  certain*  obligation  in  point  of  prudence,  to 
abstain  from  all  wickedness,  and  to  live  in  the  consci- 
entious practice  of  all  that  is  good.     But, 

Thirdly,  the  answers  above  given  to  the  objections 
against  religion,  cannot  equally  be  made  use  of  to  in- 
validate the  proof  of  it.  For,  upon  supposition  that 
God  exercises  a  moral  government  over  the  world, 
analogy  does  most  strongly  lead  us  to  conclude,  that 
this  moral  government  must  be  a  scheme  or  constitu- 
tion beyond  our  comprehension.     And  a  thousand 

*  Part.  II.  Ch.  vi. 


^04*  The  Government  of  God.  Part  I. 

particular  analogies  shew  us,  that  parts  of  such  a 
scheme,  from  their  relation  to  other  parts,  may  con- 
duce to  accomplish  ends,  which  we  should  have  thought 
they  had  no  tendency  at  all  to  accomplish  ;  nay  ends, 
which  before  experience  we  should  have  thought  such 
parts  were  contradictory  to,  and  had  a  tendency  to 
prevent.  And  therefore  all  these  analogies  shew,  that 
the  way  of  arguing  made  use  of  in  objecting  against 
religion,  is  delusive  ;  because  they  shew  it  is  not  at  all 
incredible,  that,  could  we  comprehend  the  whole,  we 
should  find  the  permission  of  the  disorders  objected 
against  to  be  consistent  with  justice  and  goodness,  and 
even  to  be  instances  of  them.  Now  this  is  not  appli- 
cable to  the  proof  of  religion,  as  it  is  to  the  objections 
against  it  ;*  and  therefore  cannot  invalidate  that  proof, 
as  it  does  these  objections. 

Lastly,  from  the  observation  now  made,  it  is  easy 
to  see,  that  the  answers  above  given  to  the  objections 
against  Providence,  though  in  a  general  way  of  speak- 
ing, they  may  be  said  to  be  taken  from  our  ignorance, 
yet  are  by  no  means  taken  merely  from  that,  but  from 
somewhat  which  analogy  shews  us  concerning  it.  v  For 
analogy  shews  us  positively,  that  our  ignorance  in  the 
possibilities  of  things,  and  the  various  relations  in  na- 
ture, renders  us  incompetent  judges,  and  leads  us  to 
false  conclusions,  in  cases  similar  to  this,  in  which  we 
pretend  to  judge  and  to  object.  So  that  the  things 
above  insisted  upon,  are  not  mere  suppositions  of  un- 
known impossibilities  and  relations,  but  they  are  sug- 
gested to  our  thoughts  and  even  forced  upon  the  ob- 
servation of  serious  men,  and  rendered  credible  too,  by 
the  analogy  of  nature.  And  therefore,  to  take  these 
things  into  the  account,  is  to  judge  by  experience  and 
what  we  do  know  ;  and  it  is  not  judging  so,  to  take 
no  notice  of  them. 

•  Sermon   at  the  Rolls,  p.  312.  2d  Ed. 


conclusion; 


The  observations  of  the  last  chapter  lead  us  to 
consider  this  little  scene  of  human  life,  in  which  we 
are  so  busily  engaged,  as  having  a  reference  of  some 
sort  or  other,  to  a  much  larger  plan  of  things. 
Whether  we  are  any  way  related  to  the  more  distant 
parts  of  the  boundless  universe,  into  which  we  are 
brought,  is  altogether  uncertain.  But  it  is  evident 
that  the  course  of  things  which  comes  within  our  view 
is  connected  with  somewhat  past,  present,  and  future, 
beyond  it.*  So  that  we  are  placed,  as  one  may  speak, 
in  the  middle  of  a  scheme,  not  as  a  fixed  but  a  pro- 
gressive one,  every  way  incomprehensible  ;  incompre- 
hensible in  a  manner  equally  with  respect  to  what  has 
been,  what  now  is,  and  what  shall  be  hereafter.  And 
this  scheme  cannot  but  contain  in  it  somewhat  as  won- 
derful and  as  much  beyond  our  thought  and  concep- 
tion! as  any  thing  in  that  of  religion,  For,  will  any 
man  in  his  senses  say,  that  it  is  less  difficult  to  conceive 
how  the  world  came  to  be  and  to  continue  as  it  is, 
without,  than  with,  an  intelligent  author  and  governor 
of  it  ?  or,  admitting  an  intelligent  governor  of  it* 
that  there  is  some  other  rule  of  government  more  nat- 
ural and  of  easier  conception  than  that  which  we  call 
moral  ?  Indeed,  without  an  intelligent  author  and 
governor  of  nature,  no  account  at  all  can  be  given 
how  this  universe,  or  the  part  of  it  particularly  in 

*  P.   194,  &c.  f  See  Part  II.  Ch.  ii. 


20(5  Conclusion.  Part  L 

which  we  are  concerned,  came  to  be,  and  the  course 
of  it  to  be  carried  on,  as  it  is ;  nor  any  of  its  general 
end  and  design,  without  a  moral  governor  of  it. 
That  there  is  an  intelligent  author  of  nature  and 
natural  governor  of  the  world,  is  a  principle  gone  up- 
on in  the  foregoing  treatise,  as  proved,  and  generally- 
known  and  confessed  to  be  proved.  And  the  very 
notion  of  an  intelligent  Author  of  nature,  proved  by 
particular  final  causes,  implies  a  will  and  a  character.* 
Now  as  our  whole  nature,  the  nature  which  he  has 
given  us,  leads  us  to  conclude  his  will  and  character  to 
be  moral,  just  and  good, — so  we  can  scarce  in  imagi- 
nation conceive  what  it  can  be  otherwise.  However,, 
in  consequence  of  this  his  will  and  character,  whatever 
it  be,  he  formed  the  universe  as  it  is,  and  carries  on 
the  course  of  it  as  he  does,  rather  than  in  any  other 
manner ;  and  has  assigned  to  us,  and  to  all  living 
creatures,  a  part  and  a  lot  in  it.  Irrational  creatures 
act  this  their  part,  and  enjoy  and  undergo  the  pleas- 
ures and  the  pains  allotted  them,  without  any  reflec- 
tion. But  one  would  think  it  impossible,  that  crea- 
tures endued  with  reason  could  avoid  reflecting  some- 
times upon  all  this  ;  reflecting,  if  not  from  whence  we 
came,  yet,  at  lea*t,  whither  we  are  going  ;  and  what 
the  mysterious  scheme,  in  the  minst  of  which  we  find 
ourselves,  will,  at  length,  come  but  and  produce;  a 
scheme  in  which  it  is  certain  we  are  highly  interested, 
and  in  which  we  may  be  interested  even  beyond  con- 
ception. For  many  things  prove  it  palpably  absurd  to 
conclude,  that  we  shall  cease  to  be  at  death.  Partic- 
ular analogies  do  most  sensibly  shew  us,  that  there  is 
nothing  to  be  thought  strange,  in  our  being  to  exist 
in  another  state  of  life.  And  that  we  are  not  living 
beings  affords  a  strong  probability  that  we  shall  eon* 

*   P.  182. 


Part  I.  Conclusion.  207 

tinue  so,  unless  there  be  some  positive  ground,  and 
there  is  none  from  reason  or  analogy,  to  think  death 
will  destroy  us.  Were  a  persuasion  of  this  kind  ever 
so  well  grounded,  there  would  surely  be  little  reason  to 
take  pleasure  in  it.  But  indeed  it  can  have  no  other 
ground,  than  some  such  imagination  as  that  of  our 
gross  bodies  being  ourselves  ;  which  is  contrary  to  ex- 
perience. Experience  too  most  clearly  shews  us  the 
folly  of  concluding,  from  the  body  and  the  living 
agent  affecting  each  other  mutually,  that  the  dissolu- 
tion of  the  former  is  the  destruction  of  the  latter* 
And  there  are  remarkable  instances  of  their  not  affect- 
ing each  other,  which  lead  us  to  a  contrary  conclusion. 
The  supposition  then,  t  which  in  all  reason  we  are  to 
go  upon,  is,  that  our  living  nature  will  continue  after 
death.  And  it  is  infinitely  unreasonable  to  form  an 
institution  of  life,  or  to  act,  upon  any  other  supposition. 
Now  all  expectation  of  immortality,  whether  more  01 
less  certain,  opens  an  unbounded  prospect  to  our  hopes 
and  our  fears  ;  since  we  see  the  constitution  of  nature 
is  such  as  to  admit  of  misery,  as  well  as  to  be  produc- 
tive of  happiness,  and  experience  ourselves  to  partake 
of  both  in  some  degree  ;  and  since  we  cannot  but  know 
what  higher  degrees  of  both  we  are  capable  of.  And 
there  is  no  presumption  against  believing  farther,  that 
out  future  interest  depends  upon  our  present  behav- 
iour ;  for  we  see  our  present  interest,  doth,  and  that 
the  happiness  and  misery  which  are  naturally  annexed 
to  our  actions,  very  frequently  do  not  follow  till  long 
after  the  actions  are  done  to  which  they  are  respective- 
ly annexed.  So  that  were  speculation  to  leave  us  un- 
certain whether  it  were  likely  that  the  author  of  na- 
ture, in  giving  happiness  and  misery  to  his  creatures, 
hath  regard  to  their  actions  or  not,  yet  since  we  find 
by  experience  that  he  hath  such  regard,  the  who!- 


208  Conclusion*  Part  L- 

sense  of  things  which  he  has  given  us  plainly  leads  us, 
at  once  and  without  any  elaborate  inquiries,  to  think 
that  it  may,  indeed  must,  be  to  good  actions  chiefly 
that  he  hath  annexed  happiness,  and  to  bad  actions 
misery  ;  or  that  he  will,  upon  the  whole,  reward  those 
who  do  well,  and  punish  those  who  do  evil.  To  con- 
firm this  from  the  constitution  of  the  world,  it  has 
been  observed,  that  some  sort  of  moral  government 
is  necessarily  implied  in  that  natural  government  of 
God,  which  we  experience  ourselves  under  ;  that  good 
and  bad  actions  at  present  are  naturally  rewarded  and 
punished,  not  only  as  beneficial  and  mischievous  to 
society,  but  also  as  virtuous  and  vicious  ;  and  that 
there  is,  in  the  very  nature  of  fche  thing,  a  tendency  to 
their  being  rewarded  and  punished  in  a  much  higher 
degree  than  they  are  at  present.  And  though  this 
higher  degree  of  distributive  justice,  which  nature  thus 
points  out  and  leads  towards,  is  prevented  for  a  time 
from  taking  place,  it  is  by  obstacles  which  the  state  of 
this  world  unhappily  throws  in  its  way,  and  which 
therefore  are  in  their  nature  temporary.  Now  as  these 
things,  in  the  natural  conduct  of  Providence,  are  ob- 
servable on  the  side  of  virtue,  so  there  is  nothing  to  be 
set  against  them  on  the  side  of  vice.  A  moral  scheme 
of  government  then  is  visibly  established,  and  in  some 
degree  carried  into  execution  ;  and  this,  together  with 
the  essential  tendencies  of  virtue  and  vice  duly  consid- 
ered, naturally  raise  in  us  an  apprehension,  that  it  will 
be  carried  on  farther  towards  perfection  in  a  future 
state,  and  that  every  one  shall  there  receive  according 
to  his  deserts.  And  if  this  be  so,  then  our  future  and 
general  interest,  under  the  moral  government  of  God, 
is  appointed  to  depend  upon  our  behaviour,  notwith- 
standing the  difficulty  which  this  may  occasion  of  se- 
curing it,  and  the  danger  of  losing  it,  just  in  the  same 


Part  I.  Conclusion.  209 

manner  as  our  temporal  interest*  under  his  natural  gov- 
ernment, is  appointed  to  depend  upon  our  behaviour, 
notwithstanding  the  like  difficulty  and  danger.  For, 
from  our  original  constitution,  and  that  of  the  world 
which  we  inhabit,  we  are  naturally  trusted  with  our- 
selves, with  our  own  conduct  and  our  own  interest. 
And  from  the  same  constitution  of  nature,  especially 
joined  with  that  course  of  things  which  is  owing  to 
men,  we  have  temptations  to  be  unfaithful  in  this 
trust,  to  forfeit  this  interest,  to  neglect  it,  and  run 
ourselves  into  misery  and  ruin.  From  these  tempta- 
tions arise  the  difficulties  of  behaving  so  as  to  secure 
our  temporal  interest,  and  the  hazard  of  behaving  so 
as  to  miscarry  in  it.  There  is  therefore  nothing  in- 
credible in  supposing,  there  may  be  the  like  difficulty 
and  hazard  with  regard  to  that  chief  and  final  good 
which  religion  lays  before  us.  Indeed  the  whole  ac- 
count, how  it  came  to  pass  that  we  were  placed  in 
such  a  condition  as  this,  must  be  beyond  our  compre- 
hension ;  but  it  is  in  part  accounted  for  by  what  re- 
ligion teaches  us,  that  the  character  of  virtue  and  piety 
must  be  a  necessary  qualification  for  a  future  state  of 
security  and  happiness  under  the  moral  government  of 
God*  in  like  manner  as  some  certain  qualifications  or 
other  are  necessary  for  every  particular  condition  of  life 
under  his  natural  government ;  and  that  the  present 
state  was  intended  to  be  a  school  of  discipline  for  im- 
proving in  ourselves  that  character.  Now  this  intention 
of  nature  is  rendered  highly  credible  by  observing,  that 
we  are  plainly  made  for  improvement  of  all  kinds  ; 
that  it  is  a  general  appointment  of  Providence  that  we 
cultivate  practical  principles,  and  form  within  ourselves 
habits  of  action,  in  order  to  become  fit  for  what  we 
were  wholly  unfit  for  before  ;  that  in  particular,  child* 
hood  and  youth  is  naturally  appointed  to  be  a  state  of 

D  D 


210  Conclusion.  Part  I. 

discipline  for  mature  age  ;  and  that  the  present  world 
is  peculiarly  fitted  for  a  state  of  moral  discipline.  And 
whereas  objections  are  urged  against  the  whole  notion 
of  moral  government  and  a  probation  state,  from  the 
opinion  of  necessity,  it  has  been  shewn,  that  God  has 
given  us  the  evidence,  as  it  were,  of  experience,  that 
all  objections  against  religion  on  this  head  are  vain  and 
delusive.  He  has  also,  in  hi-  natural  government,  sug- 
gested an  answer  to  all  our  short  sighted  objections 
against  the  equity  and  goodness,  of  his  moral  govern- 
ment ;  and  in  general  he  has  exemplified  to  us  the  lat- 
ter by  the  former. 

These  things,  which,  it  is  to  be  remembered,  are 
matters  of  fact,  ought,  in  all  common  sense,  to  awaken 
mankind  \  to  induce  them  to  consider  in  earnest  their 
condition,  and  what  they  have  to  do.  It  is  absurd, 
absurd  to  the  degree  of  being  ridiculous,  if  the  subject 
were  not  of  so  serious  a  kind,  for  men  to  think  them- 
selves secure  in  a  vicious  life,  or  even  in  that  immoral 
thoughtlessness  which  far  the  greatest  part  of  them  are 
fallen  into.  And  the  credibility  of  religion,  arising  from 
experience  and  facts  here  considered,  is  fully  sufficient, 
in  reason,  to  engage  them  to  live  m  the  general  prac- 
tice of  all  virtue  and  piety  ;  under  the  serious  appre- 
hension, though  it  should  be  mixed  with  some  doubt,* 
of  a  righteous  administration  established  in  nature, 
and  a  future  judgment  in  consequence  of  it ;  espe- 
cially when  we  consider  how  very  questionable  it  is, 
whether  any  thing  at  all  can  be  gained  by  vice  ;f  how 
unquestionably  little,  as  well  as  precarious,  the  pleas- 
ures and  profits  or  it  are  at  the  best  ;  and  how  soon 
they  must  be  parted  with  at  the  longest.  For,  in  the 
deliberations  of  reason,  concerning  what  we  are  to  pur» 
sue  and  what  to  avoid,  as  temptations  to  any    thing 

•  Part  II.  Ch.  vi.  f  P.  1 1 5,  I  If. 


Part  I.  Conclusion.  211  , 

from  mere  passion,  are  supposed  out  of  the  case,— so  in- 
ducements to  vice,  from  cool  expectations  of  pleasure 
and  interest  so  small  and  uncertain  and  short,  are  re- 
ally so  insignificant,  as,  in  the  view  of  reason,  to  be  al- 
most nothing  in  themselves  ;  and  in  comparison  with 
the  importance  of  religion,  they  quite  disappear  and 
are  lost.  Mere  passion  indeed  may  be  alleged,  though 
not  as  a  reason,  yet  as  an  excuse,  for  a  vicious  course  of 
life.  And  how  sorry  an  excuse  it  is  will  be  manifest 
by  observing,  that  we  are  placed  in  a  condition,  in 
which  we  are  unavoidably  inured  to  govern  our  pas- 
sions, by  being  necessitated  to  govern  them  ;  and  to 
lay  ourselves  under  the  same  kind  of  restraints,  and  as 
great  ones  too,  from  temporal  regards,  as  virtue  and 
piety  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things  require.  The 
plea  of  ungovernable  passion  then,  on  the  side  of  vice, 
is  the  poorest  of  all  things ;  for  it  is  no  reason,  and 
but  a  poor  excuse.  But  the  proper  motives  to  relig- 
ion are  the  proper  proofs  of  it,  from  our  moral  nature, 
from  the  presages  of  conscience,  and  our  natural  ap- 
prehension of  God  under  the  character  of  a  righteous 
governor  and  judge  ;  a  nature  and  conscience  and  ap- 
prehension given  us  by  him  ;  and  from  the  confirma- 
tion of  the  dictates  of  reason,  by  life  and  immortality 
brought  to  light  by  the  Gospel ;  and  the  wrath  of  God  re- 
sealed  from  heaven^  against  all  ungodliness,  and  unrigh- 
teousness of  men. 


ANALOGY 

OF 

RELIGION 

TO    THE 

CONSTITUTION  AND  COURSE  OF  NATURE. 


PART   II. 

OF  REVEALED  RELIGION. 


CHAP.    I. 

Of  the  Importance  of  Christianity. 

Some  persons,  upon  pretence  of  the  sufficiency 
of  the  light  of  nature,  avowedly  reject  all  revelation, 
as  in  its  very  notion  incredible,  and  what  must  be 
fictitious.  And  indeed  it  is  certain  no  revelation 
would  have  been  given,  had  the  light  of  nature  been 
sufficient  in  such  a  sense  as  to  render  one  not  wanting 
and  useless.  But  no  man,  in  seriousness  and  simplicity 
of  mind,  can  possibly  think  it  so,  who  considers  the 
state  of  religion  in  the  heathen  world,  before  revela- 
tion, and  its  present  state  in  those  places  which  have 
borrowed  no  light  from  it  ;  particularly  the  doubt- 
fulness of  some  of  the  greatest  men  concerning  things 
of  the  utmost  importance,  as  well  as  the  natural  inat- 


214  Of  the  Importance  Part  II. 

tention  and  ignorance  of  mankind  in  general.  It  is 
impossible  to  say  who  would  have  been  able  to  have 
reasoned  out  that  whole  system,  which  we  call  natural 
religion,  in  its  genuine  simplicity,  clear  of  superstition  ; 
but  there  is  certainly  no  ground  to  affirm  that  the 
generality  could.  If  they  could,  there  is  no  sort  of 
probability  that  they  would.  Admitting  there  were, 
they  would  highly  want  a  standing  admonition,  to  re- 
mind them  of  it,  and  inculcate  it  upon  them.  And 
farther  still,  were  they  as  much  disposed  to  attend  to 
religion  as  the  better  sort  of  men  are,  yet  even  upon 
this  supposition  there  would  be  various  occasions  for 
supernatural  instruction  and  assistance,  and  the  greatest 
advantages  might  be  afforded  by  them.  So  that  to 
say,  revelation  is  a  thing  superfluous,  what  there  was 
no  need  of,  and  what  can  be  of  no  service,  is,  I  think, 
to  talk  quite  wildly  and  at  random.  Nor  would  it 
be  more  extravagant  to  affirm,  that  mankind  is  so  en- 
tirely at  ease  in  the  present  state,  and  life  so  complete- 
ly happy,  that  it  is  a  contradiction  to  suppose  our  con- 
dition capable  of  being  in  any  respect  better. 

There  are  other  person -,  not  to  be  ranked  with 
these,  who  seem  to  be  getting  into  a  way  of  neglect- 
ing, and,  as  it  were,  overlooking  revelation  as  of  small 
importance,  provided  natural  religion  be  kept  to. 
With  little  regard  either  to  the  evidence  of  the  former, 
or  to  the  objections  against  it,  and  even  upon  suppo- 
sition of  its  truth,  "  the  only  design  of  it,"  say  they, 
"  must  be  to  establish  a  belief  of  the  moral  system  of 
nature,  and  to  enforce  the  practice  of  natural  piety 
and  virtue.  The  belief  and  practice  of  these  things 
were,  perhaps,  much  promoted  by  the  first  publication 
of  Christianity  ;  but  whether  they  are  believed  and 
practised,  upon  the  evidence  and  motives  of  nature  or 


Chap.  I.  of  Christianity.  21S 

of  revelation,  is  no  great  matter."*  This  way  of  con- 
sidering revelation,  though  it  is  not  the  same  with  the 
former,  yet  borders  nearly  upon  it,  and  very  much,  at 
length,  runs  up  into  it,  and  requires  to  be  particularly 
considered,  with  regard  to  the  persons  who  seem  to  be 
getting  into  this  way.  The  consideration  of  it  will 
likewise  farther  shew  the  extravagance  of  the  former 
opinion,  and  the  truth  of  the  observations  in  answer  to 
it,  just  mentioned.  And  an  inquiry  into  the  import- 
ance of  Christianity,  cannot  be  an  improper  introduc- 
tion to  a  treatise  concerning  the  credibility  of  it. 

Now  if  God  has  given  a  revelation  to  mankind,  and 
commanded  those  things  which  are  commanded  in 
Christianity,  it  is  evident,  at  first  sight,  that  it  cannot 
in  any  wise  be  an  indifferent  matter,  whether  we  obey 
or  disobey  those  commands,  unless  we  are  certainly  as- 
sured that  we  know  all  the  reasons  for  them,  and  that 
all  those  reasons  are  now  ceased,  with  regard  to  man- 
kind in  general,  or  to  ourselves  in  particular.  And  it 
is  absolutely  impossible  we  can  be  assured  of  this.  For 
our  ignorance  of  these  reasons  proves  nothing  in  the 
case,  since  the  whole  analogy  of  nature  shews,  what  is 
indeed  in  itself  evident,  that  there  may  be  infinite  rea- 
sons for  things,  with  which  we  are  not  acquainted. 

But  the  importance  of  Christianity  will  more  dis- 
tinctly appear,  by  considering  it  more  distinctly. — 
First,  as  a  republication  and  external  institution  of  nat- 
ural or  essential  religion,  adapted  to  the  present  cir- 
cumstances of  mankind,  and  intended  to  promote  nat- 

*  Invenis  multos propterea  nolle  fieri  Christianos,  quia  quasi  suffid- 

unt  sibi  debona  vita  sua.  Bene  vivere  opus  est,  ait.  Quid  mini  prxceptu- 
rus  est  Christus  ?  Ut  bene  vivam  ?  Jam  bene  vivo.  Quid  mini  necessarius 
est  Christus  ?  Nullum  homicidium,  nullum  furtum,  nullam  rapinam  facio, 
res  alienas  non  concupisco,  nullo  aduiterio  contaminor.  Nam  inveniatur 
in  vita  mea  aliquid  quod  reprehendatwr,  et  qui  reprehenderit  faciat  Christi- 
*»***»•  Atg,  in  Psal  xrri. 


216  Of  the  Importance  Part  If. 

ural  piety  and  virtue  :  and,  secondly,  as  containing  an 
account  of  a  dispensation  of  things,  not  discoverable 
by  reason,  in  consequence  of  which  several  distinct  pre- 
cepts are  enjoined  us.  For  though  natural  religion  is 
the  foundation  and  principal  part  of  Christianity,  it  is 
not  in  any  sense  the  whole  of  it. 

I.  Christianity  is  a  republication  of  natural  religion. 
It  instructs  mankind  in  the  moral  system  of  the  world  ; 
that  it  is  the  work  of  an  infinitely  perfect  Being,  and 
under  his  government ;  that  virtue  is  his  law  ;  and 
that  he  will  finally  judge  mankind  in  righteousness, 
and  render  to  all  according  to  their  works,  in  a  future 
state.  And,  which  is  very  material,  it  teaches  natural 
religion  in  its  genuine  simplicity,  free  from  those  super- 
stitions with  which  it  was  totally  corrupted,  and  un- 
der which  it  was  in  a  manner  lost. 

Revelation  is  farther  an  authoritative  publication 
of  natural  religion,  and  so  affords  the  evidence  of  testi- 
mony for  the  trurh  of  it.  Indeed  the  miracles  and 
prophecies  recorded  in  Scripture  were  intended  to 
prove  a  particular  dispensation  of  Providence,  the  re- 
demption of  the  world  by  the  Messiah  ;  but  this  does 
not  hinder  but  that  they  may  also  prove  God's  general 
providence  over  the  world,  as  our  moral  governor  and 
judge.  And  they  evidently  do  prove  it,  because  this 
character  of  the  author  of  nature  is  necessarily  con- 
nected with  and  implied  in  that  particular  revealed 
dispensation  of  things  ;  it  is  likewise  continually  taught 
expressly,  and  insisted  upon,  by  those  persons  who 
wrought  the  miracles  and  delivered  the  prophecies. 
So  that  indeed  natural  religion  seems  as  much  proved 
by  the  Scripture  revelation,  as  it  would  have  been  had 
the  design  of  revelation  been  nothing  else  than  to 
prove  it. 

But  it  may  possibly  be  disputed,  how  far  miracles 


Chap.  I.  of  Christianity.  217 

can  prove  natural  religion,  and  notable  Objections  may 
be  urged  against  this  proof  of  it,  considered  as  a  mat- 
ter  of  speculation  ;  but  considered  as  a  practical  thing, 
there  can  be  none.  For  suppose  a  person  to  teach 
natural  religion  to  a  nation,  who  had  lived  in  total  ig- 
norance or  forgetfulness  of  it,  and  to  declare  he  was 
commissioned  by  God  so  to  do, — -suppose  him,  in  proof 
of  his  commission,  to  foretel  things  future  which  no 
human  foresight  could  have  guessed  at,  to  divide  the 
sea  with  a  word,  feed  great  multitudes  with  bread  from 
heaven,  cure  all  manner  of  diseases,  and  raise  the  dead, 
even  himself,  to  life,— -would  not  this  give  additional 
credibility  to  his  teaching,  a  credibility  beyond  what 
that  of  a  common  man  would  have,  and  be  an  authori- 
tative publication  of  the  law  of  nature,  i.  e.  a  new  proof 
of  it  ?  It  would  be  a  practical  one,  of  the  strongest 
kind,  perhaps,  which  human  creatures  are  capable  of 
having  given  them.  The  Law  of  Moses  then,  and  the 
Gospel  of  Christ,  are  authoritative  publications  of  the 
religion  of  nature  ;  they  afford  a  proof  of  God's  gen- 
eral providence,  as  moral  governor  of  the  world,  as 
well  as  of  his  particular  dispensations  of  providence  to- 
wards sinful  creatures,  revealed  in  the  Law  and  the 
Gospel.  As  they  are  the  only  evidence  of  the  latter, 
so  they  are  an  additional  evidence  of  the  former. 

To  shew  this  further,  let  us  suppose  a  man  of  the 
greatest  and  most  improved  capacity,  who  had  never 
heard  of  revelation*  convinced  upon  the  whole,  not- 
withstanding the  disorders  of  the  world,  that  it  was  un- 
der the  direction  and  moral  government  of  an  infinitely 
perfect  Being,  but  ready  to  question  whether  he  were 
not  got  beyond  the  reach  of  his  faculties, — suppose 
him  brought,  by  this  suspicion,  into  great  danger  of 
being  carried  away  by  the  universal  bad  example  of  al- 
most every  one  around  him,  who  appeared  to  have  no 

K   R 


218  The  Importance  Fart  II. 

sense,  no  practical  sense  at  least,  of  these  things,-^-and 
this,  perhaps,  would  be  as  advantageous  a  situation 
with  regard  to  religion,  as  nature  alone  ever  placed 
any  man  in.  What  a  confirmation  now  must  it  be  to 
such  a  person,  all  at  once  to  find  that  this  moral  sys^ 
tern  of  things  was  revealed  to  mankind,  in  the  name 
of  that  infinite  Being,  whom  he  had  from  principles  of 
reason  believed  in  ;  and  that  the  publishers  of  the  rev- 
elation proved  their  commission  from  him,  by  making 
it  appear,  that  he  had  entrusted  them  with  a  power  of 
suspending  and  changing  the  general  laws  of  nature. 

Nor  must  it  by  any  means  be  omitted,  for  it  is  a 
thing  of  the  utmost  importance,  that  life  and  immor- 
tality are  eminently  brought  to  light  by  the  Gospel. 
The  great  doctrines  of  a  future  state,  the  danger  of  a 
course  of  wickedness,  and  the  efficacy  of  repentance, 
are  not  only  confirmed  in  the  Gospel,  but  are  taught, 
especially  the  last  is,  with  a  degree  of  light  to  which 
that  of  nature  is  but  darkness. 

Farther  :  as  Christianity  served  these  ends  and  pur- 
poses when  it  was  first  published,  by  the  miraculous 
publication  itself,  so  it  was  intended  to  serve  the  same 
purposes  in  future  ages,  by  means  of  the  settlement  of 
a  visible  church;  of  a  society  distinguished  from  com- 
mon ones,  and  from  the  rest  of  the  world,  by  peculiar 
religious  institutions,  by  an  instituted  method  of  in- 
struction, and  an  instituted  form  of  external  religion. 
Miraculous  powers  were  given  to  the  first  preachers  of 
Christianity,  in  order  to  their  introducing  it  into  the 
world  ;  a  visible  church  was  established  in  order  to 
continue  it,  and  carry  it  on  successively  throughout  all 
ages.  Had  Moses  and  the  prophets,  Christ  and  his 
apostles,  only  taught,  and  by  miracles  proved,  religion 
to  their  cotemporaries,  the  benefits  of  their  instructions 
would  have  reached  but  to  a  small  part  of  mankind, 


Chap.  I.  of  Christianity.  219 

Christianity  must  have  been,  in  a  great  degree,  sunk 
and  forgot  in  a  very  few  ages.  To  prevent  this,  ap- 
pears to  have  been  one  reason  why  a  visible  church  was 
instituted;  to  be  like  a  city  upon  a  hill,  a  standing 
memorial  to  the  world  of  the  duty  which  we  owe  our 
Maker;  to  call  men  continually,  both  by  example  and 
instruction,  to  attend  to  it,  and  by  the  form  of  religion 
ever  before  tjieir  eyes,  remind  them  of  the  reality;  to 
be  the  repository  of  the  oracles  of  God;  to  hold  up 
the  light  of  revelation  in  aid  to  that  of  nature,  and 
propagate  it  throughout  all  generations  to  the  end  of 
the  worlds— the  light  of  revelation  considered  here  in 
no  other  view  than  as  designed  to  enforce  natural  re- 
ligion. And  in  proportion  as  Christianity  is  professed 
and  taught  in  the  world,  religion,  natural  or  essential 
religion,  is  thus  distinctly  and  advantageously  laid  be- 
fore mankind,  and  brought  again  and  again  to  their 
thoughts,  as  a  matter  of  infinite  importance.  A  visible 
church  has  also  a  farther  tendency  to  promote  natural 
religion,  as  being  an  instituted  methodof  education,  ori- 
ginally intended  to  be  of  more  peculiar  advantage  to 
those  who  would  conform  to  it.  For  one  end  of  the  insti- 
tution was,  that  by  admonition  and  reproof,  as  well  as 
instruction,  by  a  general  regular  discipline,  and  public 
exercises  of  religion,  the  body  of  Christ,  as  the  Scripture 
speaks,  should  be  edified,  i.  e.  trained  up  in  piety  and 
virtue,  for  a  higher  and  better  state.  This  settlement 
then  appearing  thus  beneficial,  tending  in  the  nature  of 
the  thing  to  answer,  and  in  some  degree  actually  an- 
swering, those  ends,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the 
very  notion  of  it  implies  positive  institutions  ;  for  the 
visibility  of  the  church  consists  in  them.  Take  away 
every  thing  of  this  kind,  and  you  lose  the  very  no- 
tion itself.  So  that  if  the  things  now  mentioned  arc- 
advantages,  the  reason  and  importance  of  positive  in- 


220  The  Importance  Part  II, 

stitutions  in  general  is  most  obvious,  since  without  them 
these  advantages  could  not  be  secured  to  the  world. 
And  it  is  mere  idle  wantonness,  to  insist  upon  knowing 
the  reasons  why  such  particular  ones  were  fixed  upon, 
rather  than  others. 

The  benefit  arising  from  this  supernatural  assistance 
which  Christianity  affords  to  natural  religion,  is  what 
some  persons  are  very  slow  in  apprehending.    And  yet 
it  is  a  thing  distinct  in  itself,  and  a  very  plain  obvious 
one.     For  will  any  in  good  earnest  really  say,  that  the 
bulk  of  mankind  in  the  heathen  world  were  in  as  ad- 
vantageous a  situation  with  regard  to  natural  religion 
as  they  are  now   amongst  us  ;  that  it  was  laid  before 
them,  and  enforced  upon  them,  in  a  manner   as   dis- 
tinct, and  as  much  tending  to  influence  their  practice  ? 
The  objections  against  all  this,  from  the  perversion 
of  Christianity,  and  from  the  supposition  of  its  having 
had  but  little  good  influence,  however  innocently  they 
may  be  proposed,  yet  cannot  be  insisted  upon  as  con- 
clusive upon  any  principles  but  such  as  lead  to  down- 
right atheism  ;  because  the  manifestation  of  the  law 
of  nature  by  reason,  which  upon  all  principles  of  theism 
must  have  been  from  God,  has  been  perverted  and  renr 
dered  ineffectual  in  the  same  manner.     It  may  indeed, 
I  think,  truly  be  said,  that  the  good  effects  of  Christi- 
anity have  not  been  small  ;  nor  its  supposed  ill  effects 
any  effects  at  all  of  improperly  speaking.     Perhaps  too 
the  things  themselves  done  have  been  aggravated  ;  and 
if  not,  Christianity  hath  been  often  only  a  pretence  ; 
and  the  same  evils  in  the  main  would  have  been  done 
upon   some   other  pretence.      However,  great    and 
shocking   as  the  corruptions  and  abuses  of  it  have  re- 
ally been,  they  cannot  be  insisted  upon  as  arguments 
against  it  upon  principles  of  theism.     For  one  cannot 
proceed  one  step  in  reasoning  upon   natural  religion, 


Chap.  I.  of  Christianity,  221 

any  more  than  upon  Christianity,  without  laying  it 
down  as  a  first  principle,  that  the  dispensations  of  Prov- 
idence are  not  to  be  judged  of  by  their  perversions,  but 
by  their  genuine  tendencies  ;  not  by  what  fhey  do  ac- 
tually seem  to  effect,  but  by  what  they  would  effect  if 
mankind  did  their  part,  that  part  which  is  justly  put 
and  left  upon  them.  It  is  altogether  as  much  the 
language  of  one  as  of  the  other,  he  that  is  unjust  let 
him  be  unjust  still ;  and  he  that  is  holy  let  him  be  holy  still.* 
The  light  of  reason  does  not,  any  more  than  that  of 
revelation,  force  men  to  submit  to  its  authority  ;  both 
admonish  them  of  what  they  ought  to  do  and  avoid, 
together  with  the  consequences  of  each,  and  after  this 
leave  them  at  full  liberty  to  act  just  as  they  please,  till 
the  appointed  time  of  judgment*  Every  moment's 
experience  shews,  that  this  is  God's  general  rule  of 
government. 

To  return  then  :  Christianity  being  a  promulgation 
of  the  law  of  nature,  being  moreover  an  authoritative 
promulgation  of  it,  with  new  light,  and  other  circum- 
stances of  peculiar  advantage  adapted  to  the  wants  of 
mankind, — these  things  fully  shew  its  importance. 
And  it  is  to  be  observed  farther,  that  as  the  nature  of 
the  case  requires,  so  all  Christians  are  commanded  to 
contribute,  by  their  profession  of  Christianity,  to  pre- 
serve it  in  the  world,  and  render  it  such  a  promulga- 
tion and  enforcement  of  religion.  For  it  is  the  very 
scheme  of  the  gospel  that  each  Christian  should,  in 
his  degree,  contribute  towards  continuing  and  carry- 
ing it  on  ;  all  by  uniting  in  the  public  profession  and 
external  practice  of  Christianity  ;  some  by  instructing, 
by  having  the  oversight,  and  taking  care  of  this  reli- 
gious community,  the  church  of  God.  Now  this  far- 
ther shews  the  importance  of  Christianity,  and,  which 

*  Rev.  xxii.  11. 


-222  The  Importance  Part  II, 

is  what  I  chiefly  intend,  its  importance  in  a  practical 
sense  \  or  the  high  obligations  we  are  under  to  take  it 
into  our  most  serious  consideration,  and  the  danger 
there  must  necessarily  be,  not  only  in  treating  it  de- 
spitefully,  which  I  am  not  now  speaking  of,  but  in 
disregarding  and  neglecting  it.  For  this  is  neglecting 
to  do  what  is  expressly  enjoined  us,  for  continuing 
those  benefits  to  the  world,  and  transmitting  them 
down  to  future  times  ;  and  all  this  holds,  even  though 
the  only  thing  to  be  considered  in  Christianity  were 
its  subserviency  to  natural  religion.     But, 

II.  Christianity  is  to  be  considered  in  a  further  view, 
as  containing  an  account  of  a  dispensation  of  things 
not  at  all  discoverable  by  reason,  in  consequence  of 
which  several  distinct  precepts  are  enjoined  us.  Chrisr 
tianity  is  not  only  an  external  institution  of  natural 
religion,  and  a  new  promulgation  of  God's  general 
providence,  as  righteous  governor  and  judge  of  the 
world,  but  it  contains  also  a  revelation  of  a  particular 
dispensation  of  providence,  carrying  on  by  his  Son 
and  Spirit,  for  the  recovery  and  salvation  of  mankind, 
who  are  represented  in  Scripture  to  be  in  a  state  of  ruinc 
And  in  consequence  of  this  revelation  being  made,  we 
are  commanded  to  be  baptized,  not  only  in  the  name  of 
the  Father,  but  also  of  the  Son,  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost  ; 
and  other  obligations  of  duty,  unknown  before,  to 
the  Son  and  the  Holy  Ghost,  are  revealed.  Now  the 
importance  of  these  duties  may  be  judged  of,  by  ob- 
serving that  they  arise,  not  from  positive  command 
merely,  but  also  from  the  offices  which  appear  from 
Scripture,  to  belong  to  those  divine  persons  in  the 
Gospel  dispensation  ;  or  from  the  relations  which  we 
are  there  informed  they  stand  in  to  us.  By  reason  is 
revealed  the  relation  which  God  the  Father  stands  in 
to  us.     Hence  arises  the  obligation  of  duty  which  we 


Chap.  I.  of  Christianity.  223 

are  under  to  him.  In  Scripture  are  revealed  the  rela- 
tions which  the  Son  and  Holy  Spirit  stand  in  to  us. 
Hence  arise  the  obligations  of  duty  which  we  are  un- 
der to  them.  The  truth  of  the  case,  as  one  may  speak, 
in  each  of  these  three  respects  being  admitted  ;  that 
God  is  the  governor  of  the  world;  upon  the  evidence 
of  reason — that  Christ  is  the  mediator  between  God 
and  man,  and  the  Holy  Ghost  our  guide  and  sanctifier, 
upon  the  evidence  of  revelation  ;  the  truth  of  the  case, 
I  say,  in  each  of  these  respects  being  admitted,  it  is  no 
more  a  question,  why  it  should  be  commanded  that 
we  be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Son  and  of  the  Holy 
Ghost,  than  that  we  be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the 
father.  This  matter  seems  to  require  to  be  more 
fully  stated.* 

Let  it  be  remembered  then  that  religion  comes  un- 
der the  twofold  consideration  of  internal  and  external  ; 
for  the  latter  is  as  real  a  part  of  religion,  of  true  reli- 
gion, as  the  former.  Now  when  religion  is  considered 
under  the  first  notion,  as  an  inward  principle,  to  be 
exerted  in  such  and  such  inward  acts  of  the  mind  and 
heart,  the  essence  of  natural  religion  may  be  said  to 
consist  in  religious  regards  to  God  the  Father  Almighty  ;' 
and  the  essence  of  revealed  religion,  as  distinguished 
from  natural,  to  consist  in  religious  regards  to  the  So?: 
and  to  the  Holy  Ghost.  And  the  obligation  we  are 
under,  of  paying  these  religious  regards  to  each  of 
these  divine  persons  respectively,  arises  from  the  respec- 
tive relations  which  they  each  stand  in  to  us.  How 
these  relations  are  made  known,  whether  by  reason  or 
revelation,  makes  no  alteration  in  the  case  ;  because 
the  duties  arise  out  of  the  relations  themselves,  not 
out  of  the  manner  in  which  we  are  informed  of  them. 

*  See,  The  Nature,  Obligation,  and  Efficacy,  of  the  Christian  Sacrament:. 
&c.  and  Colliber  of  revealed  Religion,  as  there  quoted. 


224  The  Importance  Part  II, 

The  Son  and  Spirit  have  each  his  proper  office,  in  that 
great  dispensation  of  Providence,  the  redemption  of 
the  world  ;  the  one  our  mediator,  the  other  our  sanc- 
tifier.  Does  not  then  the  duty  of  religious  regards 
to  both  these  divine  persons  as  immediately  arise,  to 
the  view  of  reason,  out  of  the  very  nature  of  these  of- 
fices and  relations,  as  the  inward  good  will  and  kind 
intention,  which  we  owe  to  our  fellow  creatures,  arises 
out  of  the  common  relations  between  us  and  them  ? 
But  it  will  be  asked,  "  what  are  the  inward  religious 
regards,  appearing  thus  obviously  due  to  the  Son  and 
Holy  Spirit,  as  arising,  not  merely  from  eommand  in 
Scripture,  but  from  the  very  nature  of  the  revealed 
relations  which  they  stand  in  to  us  ?"  I  answer — the 
religious  regards  of  reverence,  honour,  love,  trust,  grat- 
itude, fear,  hope.  In  what  external  manner  this  in- 
ward worship  is  to  be  expressed,  is  a  matter  of  pure 
revealed  command,  as  perhaps  the  external  manner  iit 
which  God  the  Father  is  to  be  worshipped  may  be 
more  -so  than  we  are  ready  to  think  ;  but  the  wor- 
ship, the  internal  worship  itself,  to  the  Son  and  Holy 
Ghost,  is  no  farther  matter  of  pure  revealed  command, 
than  as  the  relations  they  stand  in  to  us  are  matter  of 
pure  revelation ;  for  the  relations  being  known,  the 
obligations  to  such  internal  worship  are  obligations  of 
reason,  arising  out  of  those  relations  themselves.  In 
^hort,  the  history  of  the  Gospel  as  immediately  shews 
us  the  reason  of  these  obligations,  as  it  shews  us  the 
meaning  of  the  words,  Son  and  Holy  Ghost. 

If  this  account  of  the  Christian  religion  be  just, 
those  persons  who  can  speak  lightly  of  it,  as  of  little 
consequence,  provided  natural  religion  be  kept  to, 
plainly  forget  that  Christianity,  even  what  is  peculiarly 
^o  called,  as  distinguished  from  natural  religion,  has 
yet  somewhat  very  important,  even  of  a  moral  nature* 


Chap.  I,  ef  Christianity  g25 

For  the  office  of  our  Lord  being  made  known  *  and  the 
relation  he  stands  in  to  us,  the  obligation  of  religious 
regards  to  him,  is  plainly  moral,  as  much  as  charity  to 
mankind  is  5  since  this  obligation  arises^  before  ex- 
ternal command,  immediately  out  of  that  his  office 
and  relation  itself.  Those  persons  appear  to  forget, 
that  revelation  is  to  be  considered  as  informing  us  of 
somewhat  new  in  the  state  of  mankind,  and  in  the 
government  of  the  world  ;  as  acquainting  us  with 
some  relations  we  stand  in,  which  could  not  otherwise 
have  been  known.  And  these  relations  being  real, 
(though  before  revelation  we  could  be  under  no  obli- 
gations from  them,  yet  upon  their  being  revealed) 
there  is  no  reason  to  think,  but  that  neglect  of  behav- 
ing suitably  to  them  will  be  attended  with  the  same 
kind  of  consequences  under  God's  government,  as 
neglecting  to  behave  suitably  to  any  other  relations 
made  known  to  us  by  reason.  And  ignorance,  wheth- 
er unavoidable  or  voluntary,  so  far  as  we  can  possibly 
see*  will,  just  as  much,  and  just  as  little,  excuse  in  one 
case  as  in  the  other ;  the  ignorance  being  supposed 
equally  unavoidable,  or  equally  voluntary,  in  both 
cases. 

If  therefore  Christ  be  indeed  the  mediator  between 
God  and  man,  i.  e.  if  Christianity  be  true,  if  he  be  in- 
deed our  Lord,  our  Saviour,  and  our  God,— no  one 
can  say  what  may  follow,  not  only  the  obstinate  but 
the  careless  disregard  to  him  in  those  high  relations. 
Nay,  no  one  can  say  what  may  follow  such  disregard, 
even  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence.  For,  as 
the  natural  consequences  of  vice  in  this  life  are  doubt- 
less to  be  considered  as  judicial  punishments  inflicted 
by  God,  so  likewise,  for  ought  we  know,  the  judicial 
punishments  of  the  future  life  may  be,  in  a  like  way  or 

F     F 


226  The  Importance  Part  II. 

a  like  sense,  the  natural  consequenceof  vice  j*  of  men's 
violating  or  disregarding  the  relations,  which  God 
has  placed  them  in  here,  and  made  known  to  them. 

Again  :  if  mankind  *ire  corrupted  and  depraved  in 
their  moral  character,  and  so  are  unfit  for  that  state 
which  Christ  is  gone  to  prepare  for  his  disciples ;  and 
if  the  assistance  of  God's  Spirit  be  necessary  to  renew 
their  nature,  in  the  degree  requisite  to  their  being 
qualiiied  for  that  state ;  all  which  is  implied  in  the 
express  though  figurative  declaration,  Except  a  man 
be  born  of  the  Spirit,  he  cannot  enter  into  the  kingdo7ii  of 
God  ;t  supposing  this,  is  it  possible  any  serious  person 
can  think  it  a  slight  matter,  whether  or  no  he  makes 
use  of  the  means  expressly  commanded  by  God  for 
obtaining  this  divine  assistance  ?  Especially  since  the 
whole  analogy  of  nature  shews,  that  we  are  not  to 
expect  any  benefits  without  making  use  of  the  appoint- 
ed means  for  obtaining  or  enjoying  them.  Now  rea- 
son shews  us  nothing  of  the  particular  immediate 
means  of  obtaining  either  temporal  or  spiritual  bene- 
fits. This  therefore  we  must  learn,  either  from  expe- 
rience or  revelation.  And  experience  the  present  case 
does  not  admit  of. 

The  conclusion  from  all  this  evidently  is,  that  Chris- 
tianity being  supposed  either  true  or  credible,  it  is  un- 
speakable irreverence,  and  really  the  most  presump- 
tuous rashness,  to  treat  it  as  a  light  matter.  It  can 
never  justly  be  esteemed  of  little  consequence,  till  it 
be  positively  supposed  false.  Nor  do  I  know  a  higher 
and  more  important  obligation  which  we  are  under, 
Than  that  of  examining  most  seriously  into  the  evi- 
dence of  it,  supposing  its  credibility,  and  of  embracing 
it,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth. 

*  Q\.  x.  t  Jo!m  "i*  5' 


Chap.  I.  of  Christianity.  227 

The  two  following  deductions  may  be  proper  to  be 
added,  in  order  to  illustrate  the  foregoing  observations, 
and  to  prevent  their  being  mistaken. 

First,  hence  we  may  clearly  see,  where  lies  the  dis- 
tinction between  what  is  positive  and  what  is  moral  in 
religion.  Moral  -precepts  are  precepts  the  reason  of 
which  we  see ;  positive  precepts  are  precepts  the  rea- 
sons of  which  we  do  not  see.*  Moral  duties  arise  out 
of  the  nature  of  the  case  itself,  prior  to  external  com- 
mand. Positive  duties  do  not  arise  out  of  the  nature 
of  the  case,  but  from  external  command  ;  nor  would 
they  be  duties  at  all,  were  it  not  for  such  command, 
received  from  him  whose  creatures  and  subjects  we 
are.  But  the  manner  in  which  the  nature  of  the  case 
or  the  fact  of  the  relation  is  made  known,  this  doth 
not  denominate  any  duty  either  positive  or  moral. 
That  we  be  baptized  in  the  name  of  the  Father,  is  as 
much  a  positive  duty,  as  that  we  be  baptized  in  the 
name  of  the  Son,  because  both  arise  equally  from  re- 
vealed command ;  though  the  relation  which  we 
stand  in  to  God  the  Father  is  made  known  to  us  by 
reason,  the  relation  we  stand  in  to  Christ  by  revelation 
only.  On  the  other  hand,  the  dispensation  of  the 
Gospel  admitted,  gratitude  as  immediately  becomes 
due  to  Christ,  from  his  being  the  voluntary  minister 
of  this  dispensation,  as  it  is  due  to  God  the  Father, 
from  his  being  the  fountain  of  ail  good  ;  though  the 
first  is  made  known  to. us  by  revelation  only,  the  sec* 
ond  by  reason.  Hence  also  we  may  see,  and,  for  dis- 
tinctness sake,  it  may  be  worth  mentioning,  thatposi- 

*  This  is  the  distinction  between  moral  and  positive  precepts,  considered 
.respectively  as  such.  But  yet,  since  the  latter  have  somewhat  of  a  moral  na- 
ture, we  may  see  the  reason  of  them,  considered  in  tin's  view.  Moral  and 
positive  precepts  are  in  some  respects  alike,  in  other  respects  different.  So 
far  as  they  are  alike,  we  discern  the  reasons  of  both ;  so  tar  as  they  are  dif- 
ferent, we  discern  the  reasons  of  the  former,  but  not  of  the  latter. 


228  The  Importance  Part  II, 

tive  institutions  come  under  a  twofold  consideration. 
They  are  either  institutions  founded  on  natural  relig- 
ion, as  baptism  in  the  name  of  the  Father,  though  this 
has  also  a  particular  reference  to  the  Gospel  dispensa- 
tion, for  it  is  in  the  name  of  God,  as  the  Father  of 
our  Lord  Jesus  Christ  ;  or  they  are  external  institu- 
tions founded  on  revealed  religion,  as  baptism  in  the 
name  of  the  Son  and  of  the  Holy  Ghost. 

Secondly,  from  the  distinction  between  what  is 
moral  and  what  is  positive  in  religion,  appears  the 
ground  of  that  peculiar  preference  which  the  Scripture 
teaches  us  to  be  due  to  the  former. 

The  reason  of  positive  institutions  in  general  is   very 
obvious,  though  we  should  not  see  the  reason  why  such 
particular  ones  are  pitched   upon  rather  than  others. 
Whoever  therefore,  instead  of  cavilling  at  words,  will 
attend  to  the  thing  itself,  may  clearly  see  that   positive 
institutions  in   general,  as  distinguished  from  this  or 
that  particular  one,  have  the  nature  of  riioral    com- 
mands, since  the  reasons  of  them  appear.     Thus,  for 
instance,  the  external  worship  of  God  is  a  moral  duty, 
though  no  particular  mode  of  it  be  so.     Care  then  is 
to  be  taken,  when  a  comparison  is  made  between  posi- 
tive and  moral  duties,  that  they  be  compared  no  far- 
ther than  as  they  are  different ;  no  farther  than  as  the 
former  are  positive,  or  arise  out  of  mere  external  com- 
mand,  the  reasons  of  which  we   are  not   acquainted 
with  ;  and  as  the  latter  are  moral,  or  arise  out  of  the 
apparent   reason  of  the  case,    without   such  external 
command.     Unless  this  caution  be  observed,  we  shall 
run  into  endless  confusion,. 

Now,  this  being  premised,  suppose  two  standing 
precepts  enjoined  by  the  same  authority  ;  that,  in  cer- 
tain conjunctures,  it  is  impossible  to  obey  both  ;  that 
the  former  is  moral,  i.  e.  a  precept  of  which  we  see 


Chap,  ft  of  Christianity.  229 

the  reasons,  and  that  they  hold  in  the  particular  case 
before  us  ;  but  that  the  latter  is  positive,  i.  e.  a  pre- 
cept of  which  we  do  not  see  the  reasons  ; — it  is  indis- 
putable that  our  obligations  are  to  obey  the  former  ; 
because  there  is  an  apparent  reason  for  this  preference, 
and  none  against  it.  Farther,  positive  institutions,  I 
suppose  all  those  which  Christianity  enjoins,  are  means 
to  a  moral  end  ;  and  the  end  must  be  acknowledged 
more  excellent  than  the  means.  Nor  is  observance  of 
these  institutions  any  religious  obedience  at  all,  or  of 
any  value,  otherwise  than  as  it  proceeds  from  a  nioral 
principle.  This  seems  to  be  the  strict  logical  way  of 
stating  and  determining  this  matter  ;  but  will,  per- 
haps, be  found  less  applicable  to  practice  than  may  be 
thought  at  first  sight. 

And  therefore,  in  a  more  practical  though  more  lax 
way  of  consideration,  and  taking  the  words,  moral  law 
and  positive  institutions,  in  the  popular  sense, — I  add, 
that  the  whole  moral  law  is  as  much  matter  of  reveal- 
ed command,  as  positive  institutions  are  ;  for  the 
Scripture  enjoins  every  moral  virtue.  In  this  repect 
then  they  are  both  upon  a  level.  But  the  moral  law 
is,  moreover,  written  upon  our  hearts — interwoven  in- 
to our  very  nature.  And  this  is  a  plain  intimation  of 
the  Author  of  it,  which  is  to  be  preferred,  when  they 
interfere. 

But  there  is  not  altogether  so  much  necessity  for  the 
determination  of  this  question  as  some  persons  seem  to 
think.  Nor  are  we  left  to  reason  alone  to  determine 
it.  For,  first,  though  mankind  have,  in  all  ages, 
been  greatly  prone  to  place  their  religion  in  peculiar 
positive  rites,  by  way  of  equivalent  for  obedience  to 
moral  precepts, — yet,  without  making  any  compari- 
son at  all  between  them,  and  consequently  without  de- 
termining which  is  to  have  the  preference,  the  nature 


'230  Of  the  Importance  Part  II. 

of  the  thing  abundantly  shews  all  notions  of  that  kind 
to  be  utterly  subversive  of  true  religion  ;  as  they  are, 
moreover,  contrary  to  the  whole  general  tenor  of  Scrip- 
ture, and  likewise  to  the  most  express  particular  decla- 
rations of  it,  that  nothing  can  render  us  accepted  of 
God  without  moral  virtue.  Secondly,  upon  the  oc- 
casion of  mentioning  together  positive  and  moral  du- 
ties, the  Scripture  always  puts  the  stress  of  religion 
upon  the  latter,  and  never  upon  the  former ;  which, 
though  no  sort  of  allowance  to  neglect  the  former, 
when  they  do  not  interfere  with  the  latter,  yet  is  a 
plain  intimation  that  when  they  do,  the  latter  are  to 
be  preferred.  And  farther,  as  mankind  are  for  pla- 
cing the  stress  of  their  religion  any  where  rather  than 
upon  virtue — lest  both  the  reason  of  the  thing,  and 
the  general  spirit  of  Christianity,  appearing  in  the  inti- 
mation now  mentioned,  should  be  ineffectual  against 
this  prevalent  folly, — our  Lord  himself,  from  whose 
command  alone  the  obligation  of  positive  institutions 
arises,  has  taken  occasion  to  make  the  comparison  be- 
tween them  and  mor?.l  precepts,  when  the  Pharisees 
censured  him,  for  eating  with  publicans  and  sinners  ; 
and  also  when  they  censured  his  disciples  for  plucking 
the  ears  of  corn  on  the  Sabbath  day.  Upon  this  com- 
parison, he  has  determined  expressly,  and  in  form, 
which  shall  have  the  preference  when  they  interfere. 
And  by  delivering  his  authoritative  determination  in 
a  proverbial  manner  of  expression,  he  has  made  it  gen- 
eral :  I  will  have  mercy ,  and  not  sacrifice*  The  pro- 
priety of  the  word  proverbial  is  not  the  thing  insisted 
upon,  though  I  think  the  manner  of  speaking  is  to  be 
called  so.  But  that  the  manner  of  speaking  very  re- 
markably renders  the  determination  general,  is  surely 
indisputable.     For,  had  it,  in  the  latter  case,  been  said 

v  Matth.  ix.  13,  and  xii.  7. 


Chap.  t.  of  Christianity.  231 

only,  that  God  preferred  mercy  to  the  rigid  observance 
of  the  Sabbath, — even  then,  by  parity  of  reason,  most 
justly  might  we  have  argued,  that  he  preferred  mercy 
likewise  to  the  observance  of  other  ritual  institutions, 
and  in  general,  moral  duties  to  positive  ones.  And 
thus  the  determination  would  have  been  general, 
though  its  being  so  were  inferred  and  not  expressed. 
But  as  the  passage  really  stands  in  the  Gospel,  it  is 
much  stronger.  For  the  sense,  and  the  very  literal 
words  of  our  Lord's  answer,  are  as  applicable  to  any 
other  instance  of  a  comparison,  between  positive  and 
moral  duties,  as  to  this  upon  which  they  were  spoken. 

And  if,  in  case  of  competition,  mercy  is  to  be  pre- 
ferred to  positive  institutions,  it  will  scarce  be  thought 
that  justice  is  to  give  place  to  them.  It  is  remarkable 
too,  that,  as  the  words  are  a  quotation  from  the  Ok! 
Testament,  they  are  introduced,  on  both  the  foremen- 
tioned  occasions,  with  a  declaration  that  the  Pharisees 
did  not  understand  the  meaning  of  them.  This,  I 
say,  is  very  remarkable.  For,  since  it  is  scarce  possi- 
ble for  the  most  ignorant  person  not  to  understand  the 
literal  sense  of  the  passage  in  the  prophet,*  and  since 
understanding  the  literal  sense  would  not  have  pre 
vented  their  condemning  the  guiltless^  it  can  hardly  be 
doubted  that  the  thing  which  our  Lord  really  intend- 
ed in  that  declaration  was,  that  the  Pharisees  had  not 
learnt  from  it,  as  they  might,  wherein  the  general  spiri? 
of  religion  consists ;  that  it  consists  in  moral  piety  and 
virtue,  as  distinguished  from  forms  and  ritual  observ- 
ances. However,  it  is  certain  we  may  learn  this  from 
his  divine  application  of  the  passage  in  the  Gospel. 

But,  as  it  is  one  of  the  peculiar  weaknesses  of  human 
nature,  when,  upon  a  comparison  of  two  things,  one  is 

*  Hm,  vi.  f  Ser  Matth.   xfr.  7. 


232  Of  the  Importance  of  Christianity.     Part  IL 

found  to  be  of  greater  importance  than  the  other,  to 
consider  this  other  as  of  scarce  any  importance  at  all,— 
it  is  highly  necessary  that  we  remind  ourselves  how 
great  presumption  it  is,  to  make  light  of  any  institu- 
tions of  divine  appointment  ;  that  our  obligations  to 
obey  all  God's  commands  whatever  are  absolute  and 
indispensable  ;  and  that  commands  merely  positive, 
admitted  to  be  from  him,  lay  us  under  a  moral  obli- 
gation to  obey  them --an  obligation  moral  in  the 
strictest  and  most  proper  sense* 

To  these  things  I  cannot  forbear  adding,  that  the 
account  now  given  of  Christianity  most  strongly  shews 
and  enforces  upon  us  the  obligation  of  searching  the 
Scriptures,  in  order  to  see  what  the  scheme  of  revela- 
tion really  is,  instead  of  determining  beforehand  from 
reason  what  the  scheme  of  it  must  be.*  Indeed  if  in 
revelation  there  be  found  any  passages,  the  seeming 
meaning  of  which  is  contrary  to  natural  religion,  we 
may  most  certainly  conclude  such  seeming  meaning 
not  to  be  the  real  one.  But  it  is  not  any  degree  of  a 
presumption  against  an  interpretation  of  Scripture,  that 
such  interpretation  contains  a  doctrine  which  the  light 
of  nature  cannot  discover,!  or  a  precept  which  the  law 
of  nature  does  not  oblige  to. 

*  See  Ch.  iii.  t  P.  233,  234. 


Chap.  II.     Of  the  supposed  Presumption,  &c.        233 


CHAR  II. 

Of  the  supposed  Presumption  aga'mst  a  Revelation,  con- 
sidered as  Miraculous, 

Having  shewn  the  importance  of  the  Christian  reve- 
lation, and  the  obligations  which  we  are  under  seri- 
ously to  attend  to  it,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth,  or 
its  credibility, — the  next  thing  in  order  is,  to  consider 
the  supposed  presumptions  against  revelation  in  gene- 
ral, which  shall  be  the  subject  of  this  chapter ;  and 
the  objections  against  the  Christian  in  particular,  which 
shall  be  the  subject  of  some  following  ones.*  For  it 
seems  the  most  natural  method  to  remove  the  preju- 
dices against  Christianity,  before  we  proceed  to  the 
consideration  of  the  positive  evidence  for  it,  and  the 
objections  against  that  evidence.! 

It  is,  I  think,  commonly  supposed,  that  there  is  some 
peculiar  presumption,  from  the  analogy  of  nature, 
against  the  Christian  scheme  of  things,  at  least  against 
miracles  ;  so  as  that  stronger  evidence  is  necessary  to 
prove  the  truth  and  reality  of  them  than  would  be  suf- 
ficient to  convince  us  of  other  events,  or  matters  of 
fact.  Indeed  the  consideration  of  this  supposed  pre- 
sumption  cannot  but  be  thought  very  insignificant,  by 
many  persons  ;  yet,  as  it  belongs  to  the  subject  of  this 
treatise,  so  it  may  tend  to  open  the  mind,  and  remove 
some  prejudices,  however  needless  the  consideration  of 
it  be  upon  its  own  account. 

I.  I  find  no  appearance  of  a  presumption,  from  the 
analogy  of  nature,  against  the  general  scheme  of  Chris* 

*  Ch.  iii.  iv.  v.   vi.  \  Ch.  vii. 

G  G 


234  Of  the  supposed  Presumption        Part  II. 

t'anity,  that  God  created  and  invisibly  governs  the 
world  by  Jesus  Christ,  and  by  him  also  will  hereafter 
judge  it  in  righteousness,  i.  e.  render  to  every  one  ac- 
cording to  his  works  ;  and  that  good  men  are  under 
the  secret  influence  of  his  Spirit.  Whether  these 
things  are  or  are  not  to  be  called  miraculous,  is  per- 
haps only  a  question  about  words,  or  however,  is  of 
no  moment  in  the  case.  If  the  analogy  of  nature  raises 
any  presumption  against  this  general  scheme  of  Chris- 
tianity, it  must  be  either  because  it  is  not  discoverable 
by  reason  or  experience,  or  else  because  it  is  unlike  that 
course  of  nature  which  is.  But  analogy  raises  no  pre- 
sumption against  the  truth  of  this  scheme,  upon  either 
of  these  accounts. 

First,  there  is  no  presumption,  from  analogy,  against 
the  truth  of  it  upon  account  of  its  not  being  discover- 
able by  reason  or  experience.  For  suppose  one  who 
never  heard  of  revelation,  of  the  most  improved  un- 
derstanding, and  acquainted  with  our  whole  system  of 
natural  philosophy  and  natural  religion, — such  an  one 
could  not  but  be  sensible  that  it  was  but  a  very  small 
part  of  the  natural  and  moral  system  of  the  universe, 
which  he  was  acquainted  with.  He  could  not  but  be 
sensible  that  there  must  be  innumerable  things,  in  the 
dispensations  of  Providence  past,  in  the  invisible  gov- 
ernment over  the  world  at  present  carrying  on,  and  in 
what  is  to  come,  of  which  he  was  wholly  ignorant,* 
and  which  could  not  be  discovered  without  revelation. 
Whether  the  scheme  of  nature  be,  in  the  strictest  sense, 
infinite  or  not,  it  is  evidently  vast,  even  beyond  all  pos- 
sible imagination  ;  and  doubtless  that  part  of  it  which 
is  opened  to  our  view  is  but  as  a  point,  in  comparison 
of  the  whole  plan  of  Providence,  reaching  throughout 
eternity  past  and  future  ;  in  comparison  of  what  is  even 

P.    194,   195. 


Chap.  II.  against  Miracles.  235 

now  going  on  in  the  remote  parts  of  the  boundless  uni- 
verse ;  nay,  in  comparison  ot  the  whole  scheme  of  this 
world.     And  therefore,  that  things  lie  beyond  the  nat- 
ural reach  of  our  faculties,  is  no  sort  of  presumption 
against  the  truth  and  reality  of  them  ;  because  it   is 
certain  there  are  innumerable  things,  in  the  constitu- 
tion and  government  of  the  universe,  which   are  thus 
beyond  the  natural  reach  of  our  faculties.     Secondly, 
analogy  raises   no   presumption    against  any    of  the 
things  contained  in  this  general  doctrine  of  Scripture 
now  mentioned,  upon  account  of  their  being  unlike 
the  known  course  of  nature.     For  there  is  no  pre- 
sumption at  all  from  analogy,  that  the  whole  course  of 
things,  or  divine  government,  naturally   unknown  to 
us,  and  every  thing   in  it,  is  like  to  any  thing  in  that 
which  is  known,  and  therefore  no  peculiar  presump- 
tion against  any  thing  in  the  former,  upon  account  of 
its  being  unlike  to  any  thing  in  the  latter.     And  in 
the  constitution  and  natural  government  of  the  world, 
as  well  as  in  the  moral  government  of  it,  we  see  things 
in  a  great  degree  unlike   one  another,  and  thereJ  ore 
ought  not  to  wonder  at  such  unlikeness  between  things 
visible  and  invisible.     However,  the  scheme  of  Chris- 
tianity is  by  no  means  entirely  unlike  the  scheme  of  na- 
ture, as  will  appear  in  the  following  part  of  this  treatise. 
The  notion  of  a  miracle,  considered  as  a  proof  of  a 
divine  mission,  has  been  stated  with  great  exactness  by 
divines,  and  is,  I  think,    sufficiently    understood  by 
every  one.     There  are  also  invisible  miracles,  the  in- 
carnation of  Christ,  for  instance,  which  being  secret 
cannot  be  alleged  as  a  proof  of  such  a  mission,  but  re- 
quire   themselves  to  be  proved  by   visible  miracles. 
Revelation  itself  too  is  miraculous,  and   miracles  are 
the  proof  of  it  ;  and  the  supposed  presumption  against 
these,  shall  presently  be  considered.     All  which  I  hate 


230  Of  the  supposed  Presumption         Part  II. 

been  observing  here  is,  that,  whether  we  choose  to  call 
every  thing  in  the  dispensations  of  Providence,  not 
discoverable  without  revelation,  nor  like  the  known 
course  of  things,  miraculous,  and  whether  the  general 
Christian  dispensation  now  mentioned,  is  to  be  called 
so  or  not,  the  foregoing  observations  seem  certainly  to 
shew,  that  there  is  no  presumption  against  it,  from 
the  analogy  of  nature. 

II.  There  is  no  presumption  from  analogy  against 
some  operations,  which  we  should  now  call  miracu- 
lous, particularly  none  against  a  revelation  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  world  ;  nothing  of  such  presumption 
against  it,  as  is  supposed  to  be  implied  or  expressed  in 
the  word  miraculous.  For  a  miracle,  in  its  very  no- 
tion, is  relative  to  a  course  of  nature,  and  implies 
somewhat  different  from  it,  considered  as  being  so. 
Now,  either  there  was  no  course  of  nature  at  the  time 
which  we  are  speaking  of,  or  if  there  were,  we  are  not 
acquainted  what  the  course  of  nature  is,  upon  the 
first  peopling  of  worlds.  And  therefore  the  question, 
whether  mankind  had  a  revelation  made  to  them  at 
that  time,  is  to  be  considered,  not  as  a  question  con- 
cerning a  miracle,  but  as  a  common  question  of  fact. 
And  we  have  the  like  reason,  be  it  more  or  less,  to 
admit  the  report  of  tradition  concerning  this  question, 
and  concerning  common  matters  of  fact  of  the  same 
antiquity  ;  for  instance,  what  part  of  the  earth  was 
first  peopled. 

Or  thus :  when  mankind  was  first  placed  in  this 
state,  there  was  a  power  exerted  totally  different  from 
the  present  course  of  nature.  Now,  whether  this  pow- 
er, thus  wholly  different  from  the  present  course  of  na- 
ture, for  we  cannot  properly  apply  to  it  the  word  mU 
racuious, — whether  this  power  stopped  immediately 
after  it  had  made   man,  or  went  on,  and  exerted  itself 


Chap.  II.  against  Miracles,  237 

farther  in  giving  him  a  revelation,  is  a  question  of  the 
same  kind,  as  whether  an  ordinary  power  exerted  it- 
self in  such  a  particular  degree  and  manner  or  not. 

Or  suppose  the  power  exerted  in  the  formation  of 
the  world  be  considered  as  miraculous,  or  rather  be 
called  by  that  name,  the  case  will  not  be  different  ; 
since  it  must  be  acknowledged,  that  such  a  power  was 
exerted.  For  supposing  it  acknowledged,  that  our 
Saviour  spent  some  years  in  a  course  of  working  mira- 
cles, there  is  no  more  presumption,  worth  mentioning, 
against  his  having  exerted  this  miraculous  power  in  a 
certain  degree  greater %  than  in  a  certain  degree  less  ; 
in  one  or  two  more  instances,  than  in  one  or  two  few- 
er ;  in  this,  than  in  another  manner. 

It  is  evident  then,  that  there  can  be  no  peculiar 
presumption,  from  the  analogy  of  nature,  against  sup- 
posing a  revelation  when  man  was  first  placed  upon 
the  earth. 

Add,  that  there  does  not  appear  the  least  intima- 
tion in  history  or  tradition,  that  religion  was  first  rea- 
soned out ;  but  the  whole  of  history  and  tradition 
makes  for  the  other  side,  that  it  came  into  the  world 
by  revelation.  Indeed  the  state  of  religion  in  the  first 
ages,  of  which  we  have  any  account,  seems  to  suppose 
and  imply  that  this  was  the  original  of  it  amongst 
mankind.  And  these  reflections  together,  without 
taking  in  the  peculiar  authority  of  Scripture,  amount 
to  real  and  a  very  material  degree  of  evidence,  that 
there  was  a  revelation  at  the  beginning  of  the  world. 
Now  this,  as  it  is  a  confirmation  of  natural  religion, 
and  therefore  mentioned  in  the  former  part  of  this 
treatise,*  so  likewise  it  has  a  tendency  to  remove  any 
prejudices  against  a  subsequent  revelation. 

*   P.  1ST,    &r. 


2l>8  Of  the  supposed  Presumption        Part  II. 

III.  But  still  it  may  be  objected,  that  there  is  some 
peculiar  presumption,  from  analogy,  against  miracles, 
particularly  against  revelation,  after  the  settlement  and 
during  the  continuance  of  a  course  of  nature. 

Now  with  regard  to  this  supposed  presumption  it  is 
to  be  observed  in  general,  that  before  we  can  have 
ground  for  raising  what  can,  with  any  propriety,  be 
called  an  argument  from  analogy,  for  or  against  revela- 
tion, considered  as  somewhat  miraculous,  we  must  be 
acquainted  with  a  similar  or  parallel  case.  But  the 
history  of  some  other  world,  seemingly  in  like  cir- 
cumstances with  our  own,  is  no  more  than  a  parallel 
case,  and  therefore  nothing  short  of  this  can  be  so.  Yet, 
could  we  come  at  a  presumptive  proof  for  or  against  a 
revelation,  from  being  informed  whether  such  world 
had  one  or  not,  such  a  proof,  being  drawn  from  one 
single  instance  only,  must  be  infinitely  precarious. 
More  particularly  :  first  of  all,  there  is  a  very  strong 
presumption  against  common  speculative  truths,  and 
against  the  most  ordinary  facts,  before  the  proof  of 
them,  which  yet  is  overcome  by  almost  any  proof. 
There  is  a  presumption  of  millions  to  one  against  the 
story  of  Casar,  or  of  any  other  man.  For  suppose  a 
number  of  common  facts  so  and  so  circumstanced,  of 
which  one  had  no  kind  of  proof,  should  happen  to 
come  into  one's  thoughts,  every  one  would,  without 
any  possible  doubt,  conclude  them  to  be  false  ;  and 
the  like  may  be  said  of  a  single  common  fact.  And 
from  hence  it  appears,  that  the  question  of  importance 
as  to  the  matter  before  us,  is,  concerning  the  degree  of 
the  peculiar  presumption  supposed  against  miracles ; 
not  whether  there  be  any  peculiar  presumption  at  all 
against  them.  For,  if  there  be  the  presumption  of 
millions  to  one  against  the  most  common  facts,  what 
can  a  small  pres  umption  additional  to  this  amount  to, 


Chap.  II.  against  Miracles.  239 

though  it  be  peculiar  ?  It  cannot  be  estimated,  and  is  as 
nothing.  The  only  material  question  is,  whether  there 
be  any  such  presumption  against  miracles,  as  to  render 
them  n\any  sort  incredible.  Secondly,  if  we  leave  out 
the  consideration  of  religion,  we  are  in  such  total  dark- 
ness upon  what  causes,  occasions,  reasons,  or  circum- 
stances, the  present  course  of  nature  depends,  that  there 
does  not  appear  any  improbability  for  or  against  suppos- 
ing, that  five  or  six  thousand  years  may  have  given 
scope  for  causes,  occasions,  reasons,  or  circumstances, 
from  whence  miraculous  interpositions  may  have  arisen. 
And  from  this,  joined  with  the  foregoing  observation, 
it  will  follow,  that  there  must  be  a  presumption  be- 
yond all  comparison  greater,  against  the  particular 
common  facts  just  now  instanced  in,  than  against  mir- 
acles in  general,  before  any  evidence  of  either.  But,, 
thirdly,  take  in  the  consideration  of  religion,  or  the 
moral  system  of  the  world,  and  then  we  see  distinct 
particular  reasons  for  miracles — to  afford  mankind  in- 
struction additional  to  that  of  nature,  and  to  attest 
the  truth  of  it.  And  this  gives  a  real  credibility  to 
the  supposition,  that  it  might  be  part  of  the  original 
plan  of  things,  that  there  should  be  miraculous  inter- 
positions. Then,  lastly,  miracles  must  not  be  com- 
pared to  common  natural  events,  or  to  events  which, 
though  uncommon,  are  similar  to  what  we  daily  expe- 
rience ;  but  to  the  extraordinary  phenomena  of  na- 
ture. And  then  the  comparison  will  be  between  the 
presumption  against  miracles,  and  the  presumption 
against  such  uncommon  appearances,  suppose,  as  com- 
ets, and  against  their  being  any  such  powers  in  nature 
as  magnetism  and  electricity,  so  contrary  to  the  prop- 
erties of  other  bodies  not  endued  with  these  power?. 
And  before  any  one  can  determine  whether  there  be 
any  peculiar  presumption  against  miracle?,  more  than 


240         Of  the  supposed  Presumption,  &c.     Part  II. 

against  other  extraordinary  things,  he  must  consider 
what,  upon  first  hearing,  would  be  the  presumption 
against  the  last  mentioned  appearances  and  powers,  to 
a  person  acquainted  only  with  the  daily,  monthly,  and 
annual  course  of  nature  respecting  this  earth,  and  with 
those  common  powers  of  matter  which  we  every  day 
see. 

Upon  all  this  I  conclude,  that  there  certainly  is  no 
such  presumption  against  miracles  as  to  render  them  in 
any  wise  incredible  ;  that  on  the  contrary,  our  being 
able  to  discern  reasons  for  them  gives  a  positive  credi- 
bility to  the  history  of  them,  in  cases  where  those  rea- 
sons hold  ;  and  that  it  is  by  no  means  certain,  that 
there  is  any  particular  presumption  at  all,  from  analo- 
gy, even  in  the  lowest  degree,  against  miracles,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  other  extraordinary  phenomena — 
though  it  is  not  worth  while  to  perplex  the  reader 
with  inquiries  into  the  abstract  nature  of  evidence,  in 
order  to  determine  a  question,  which  without  such  in- 
quiries  we  see*  is  of  no  importance. 

*  P.  £39. 


Chap.  III.     The  Credibility  of  Revelation,  tsfc.      2*1 


CHA£.  III. 

Of  our  Incapacity  of  judging  what  were  to  be  expected  in 
a  Revelation  ;  and  the  Credibility,  from  Analogy,  that 
it  mint  contain  Things  appearing  liable  to  Object  ionic 

J3esides  the  objections  against  the  evidence  for 
Christianity,  many  are  alleged  against  the  scheme 
of  it,  against  the  whole  manner  in  which  it  is  put 
and  left  with  the  world,  as  well  as  against  several  par- 
ticular relations  in  Scripture  ;  objections  drawn  from 
the  deficiencies  of  revelation ;  from  things  in  it 
appearing  to  men  foolishness  ;*  from  its  containing 
matters  of  offence,  which  have  led,  and  it  must  have 
been  foreseen  would  lead,  into  strange  enthusiasm  and 
superstition,  and  be  made  to  serve  the  purposes  of  ty- 
ranny and  wickedness  ;  from  its  not  being  universal  y 
and,  which  is  a  thing  of  the  same  kind,  from  its  evi- 
dence not  being  so  convincing  and  satisfactory  as  it 
might  have  been  ;  for  this  last  is  sometimes  turned 
into  a  positive  argument  against  its  truth. f  It  would 
be  tedious,  indeed  impossible,  to  enumerate  the  several 
particulars  comprehended  urfder  the  objections  here 
referred  to  ;  they  being  so  various,  according  to  the 
different  fancies  of  men.  There  are  persons  who  think 
it  a  strong  objection  against  the  authority  of  Scripture, 
that  it  is  not  composed  by  rules  of  art,  agreed  upon 
by  criticks,  for  polite  and  correct  writings.  And  the 
scorn  is  inexpressible,  with  which  some  of  the  prophet- 
ic parts  of  Scripture  are  treated  ;  partly    through  the 

*  l  COr.i.  28.  f  S.eeCh.ti. 

H  H 


242  The  Credibility  of  Revelation       Part  IL 

rashness  of  interpreters,  but  very  much  also  on  account 
of  the  hieroglyphical  and  figurative  language  in  which 
they  are  left  us.  Some  of  the  principal  things  of  this 
sort  shall  be  particularly  considered  in  the  following 
chapters.  But  my  design  at  present  is  to  observe  in 
general,  with  respect  to  this  whole  way  of  arguing, 
that,  upon  supposition  of  a  revelation,  it  is  highly  cred- 
ible beforehand,  we  should  be  incompetent  judges  of 
it,  to  a  great  degree  ;  and  that  it  would  contain  ma- 
ny things  appearing  to  us  liable  to  great  objections, 
in  case  we  judge  of  it  otherwise  than  by  the  analogy 
of  nature.  And  therefore  though  objections  against 
the  evidence  of  Christianity  are  most  seriously  to  be 
considered,  yet  objections  against  Christianity  itself  are, 
in  a  great  measure,  frivolous  ;  almost  all  objections 
against  it,  excepting  those  which  are  alleged  against 
the  particular  proofs  of  its  coming  from  God.  I  ex- 
press myself  with  caution,  lest  I  should  be  mistaken  to 
vilify  reason,  which  is  indeed  the  only  faculty  we  have 
wherewith  to  judge  concerning  any  thing,  even  reve- 
lation itself ;  or  be  misunderstood  to  assert,  that  a  sup- 
posed revelation  cannot  be  proved  false  from  internal 
characters.  For,  it  may  contain  clear  immoralities  or 
contradictions,  and  either  of  these  would  prove  it  false. 
Nor  will  I  take  upon  me  to  affirm,  that  nothing  else 
can  possibly  render  any  supposed  revelation  incredible. 
Yet  still  the  observation  above  is,  I  think,  true  beyond 
doubt,  that  objections  against  Christianity,  as  distin- 
guished from  objections  against  its  evidence,  are  friv- 
olous. To  make  out  this,  is  the  general  design  of  the 
present  chapter.  And  with  regard  to  the  whole  of 
it,  I  cannot  but  particularly  wish  that  the  proofs 
might  be  attended  to,  rather  than  the  assertions  cavil- 
led at,  upon  account  of  any  unacceptable  consequen- 
ces, whether  real  or  supposed,  which  may  be  drawn 


Chap.  III.  liable  to  Objections.  243 

from  them.  For,  after  all,  that  which  is  true  must 
be  admitted,  though  it  should  shew  us  the  shortness 
of  our  faculties,  and  that  we  are  in  no  wise  judges  of 
many  things,  of  which  we  are  apt  to  think  ourselves 
very  competent  ones.  Nor  will  this  be  any  objection 
with  reasonable  men,  at  least  upon  second  thought  it 
will  not  be  any  objection  with  such,  against  the  just- 
ness of  the  following  observations. 

As  God  governs  the  world,  and  instructs  his  crea- 
tures, according  to  certain  laws  or  rules,  in  the  known 
course  of  nature,  known  by  reason  together  with  ex- 
perience,— so  the  Scripture  informs  us  of  a  scheme  of 
divine  Providence  additional  to  this.  It  relates,  that 
God  has,  by  revelation,  instructed  men  in  things  con- 
cerning his  government  which  they  could  not  oth- 
erwise have  known,  and  reminded  them  of  things 
which  they  might  otherwise  know,  and  attested  the 
truth  of  the  whole  by  miracles.  Now  if  the  natural 
and  the  revealed  dispensation  of  things  are  both  from 
God,  if  they  coincide  with  each  other,  and  together 
make  up  one  scheme  of  Providence, — our  being  in- 
competent judges  of  one,  must  render  it  credible  that 
we  may  be  incompetent  judges  also  of  the  other. 
Since,  upon  experience,  the  acknowledged  constitution 
and  course  of  nature  is  found  to  be  greatly  different 
from  what,  before  experience,  would  have  been  ex- 
pected, and  such  as  men  fancy  there  lie  great  objections 
against, — this  renders  it  beforehand  highly  credible, 
that  they  may  find  the  revealed  dispensation  likewise, 
if  they  judge  of  it  as  they  do  of  the  constitution  of  na- 
ture, very  different  from  expectations  formed  before- 
hand, and  liable,  in  appearance,  to  great  objections  ; 
objections  against  the  scheme  itself,  and  against  the  de- 
grees and  manners  of  the  miraculous  interpositions  by 
which  it  was  attested  and  carried  on.     Thus,  suppose 


£44  The  Credibility  of  Revelation       Part  II. 

a  prince  to  govern  his  dominions  in  the  wisest  manner 
possible,  by  common  known  laws,  and  that  upon  some 
exigencies  he  should  suspend  these  laws,  and  govern, 
in  several  instance  ,  in  a  different  manner ;  if  one  of 
his  subjects  were  not  a  competent  judge  beforehand, 
by  what  common  rules  the  government  should  or 
would  be  carried  on,  it  could  not  be  expected  that 
the  same  person  would  be  a  competent  judge,  in  what 
exigencies,  or  in  what  manner,  or  to  what  degree,  those 
laws  commonly  observed  would  be  suspended  or  devi- 
ated from.  If  he  were  not  a  judge  of  the  wisdom  of 
the  ordinary  administration,  there  is  no  reason  to  think 
he  would  be  a  judge  of  the  wisdom  of  the  extraordina- 
nary.  If  he  thought  he  had  objections  against  the 
former,  doubtless  it  is  highly  supposable  he  might 
think  also  that  he  had  objections  against  the  latter. 

And  thus  as  we  fall  into  infinite  follies  and  mistakes, 
whenever  we  pretend,  otherwise  than  from  experience 
and  analogy,  to  judge  of  the  constitution  and  course 
of  nature, — it  u  evidently  supposable  beforehand  that 
we  should  fall  into  as  great  in  pretending  to  judge,  in 
the  like  manner,  concerning  revelation.  Nor  is  there 
any  more  ground  to  expect  that  this  latter  should  ap- 
pear to  us  clear  of  objections,  than  that  the  former 
should. 

These  observations,  relating  to  the  whole  of  Chris- 
tianity, are  applicable  to  inspiration  in  particular.  As 
we  are  in  no  sort  judges  beforehand,  by  what  laws  or 
rules,  in  what  degree,  or  by  what  means,  it  were  to 
have  been  expected,  that  God  would  naturally  instruct 
uS?— -so  upon  supposition  of  his  affording  us  light  and 
instruction  by  revelation,  additional  to  what  he  has  af- 
forded us  by  reason  and  experience,  we  are  in  no  sort 
judges  by  what  methods,  and  in  what  proportion,  it 
were  to  be  expected  that  this  supernatural  light  and 


Chap.  III.  liable  to  Objections.  245 

instruction  would  be  afforded  us.  We  know  not  be- 
forehand,  what  degree  or  kind  of  natural  information 
it  were  to  be  expected  God  would  afford  men,  each  by 
his  own  reason  and  experience  ;  nor  how  far  he  would 
enable  and  effectually  dispose  them  to  communicate 
it,  whatever  it  should  be,  to  each  other  ;  nor  whether 
the  evidence  of  it  would  be  certain,  highly  probable, 
or  doubtful ;  nor  whether  it  would  be  given  with  equal 
clearness  and  conviction  to  all.  Nor  could  we  guess, 
upon  any  good  ground  I  mean,  whether  natural  knowl- 
edge, or  even  the  faculty  itself  by  which  we  are  capa- 
ble of  attaining  it,  reason,  would  be  given  us  at  once, 
or  gradually.  In  like  manner  we  are  wholly  ignorant, 
what  degree  of  new  knowledge  it  were  to  be  expected 
God  would  give  mankind  by  revelation,  upon  suppo- 
sition of  his  affording  one ;  or  how  far,  or  in  what  way, 
he  would  interpose  miraculously  to  qualify  them,  to 
whom  he  should  originally  make  the  revelation,  for 
communicating  the  knowledge  given  by  it,  and  to  se- 
cure their  doing  it  to  the  age  in  which  they  should 
live,  and  to  secure  its  being  transmitted  to  posterity. 
We  are  equally  ignorant  whether  the  evidence  of  it 
would  be  certain,  or  highly  probable,  or  doubtful  ;•* 
or  whether  all  who  should  have  any  degree  of  instruc- 
tion from  it,  and  any  degree  of  evidence  of  its  truth, 
would  have  the  same  ;  or  whether  the  scheme  would 
be  revealed  at  once,  or  unfolded  gradually.  Nay,  we 
are  not  in  any  sort  able  to  judge,  whether  it  were  to 
have  been  expected  that  the  revelation  should  have 
been  committed  to  writing,  or  left  to  be  handed  down, 
and  consequently  corrupted  by  verbal  tradition,  and  at 
length  sunk  under  it,  if  mankind  so  pleased,  and  dur- 
ing such  time  as  they  are  permitted,  in  the  degree  they 
evidently  are,  to  act  as  they  will. 

*  See  Ch.  vi. 


24*6  The  Credibility  of  Revelation      Part  II. 

But  it  may  be  said,  "  that  a  revelation  in  some  of 
the  above  mentioned  circumstances,  one,  for  instance, 
which  was  not  committed  to  writing,  and  thus  secured 
against  danger  of  corruption,  would  not  have  answered 
its  purpose."  I  ask,  what  purpose  ?  It  would  not  have 
answered  all  the  purposes  which  it  has  now  answered, 
and  in  the  same  degree  ;  but  it  would  have  answered 
others,  or  the  same  in  different  degrees.  And  which 
of  these  were  the  purposes  of  God,  and  best  fell  in  with 
his  general  government,  we  could  not  at  all  have  de- 
termined beforehand. 

Now  since  it  has  been  shewn,  that  we  have  no  prin- 
ciples of  reason,  upon  which  to  judge  beforehand  how 
it  were  to  be  expected  revelation  should  have  been  left, 
or  what  was  most  suitable  to  the  divine  plan  of  gov- 
eminent  in  any  of  the  forementioned  respects, — k 
must  be  quite  frivolous  to  object  afterwards  as  to  any 
of  them,  against  its  being  left  in  one  way  rather  than 
another  ;  for  this  would  be  to  object  against  things, 
upon  account  of  their  being  different  from  expecta- 
tions, which  have  been  shewn  to  be  without  reason. 
And  thus  we  see  that  the  only  question  concerning  the 
truth  of  Christianity  is,  whether  it  be  a  real  revelation  ; 
not  whether  it  be  attended  with  every  circumstance 
which  we  should  have  looked  for — and  concerning  the 
authority  of  Scripture,  whether  it  be  what  it  claims  to 
be  ;  not  whether  it  be  a  book  of  such  sort,  and  so  pro- 
mulged,  as  weak  men  are  apt  to  fancy  a  book  con- 
taining a  divine  revelation  should.  And  therefore  nei- 
ther obscurity,  nor  seeming  inaccuracy  of  style,  nor 
various  readings,  nor  early  disputes  about  the  authors 
of  particular  parts,  nor  any  other  things  of  the  like 
kind,  though  they  had  been  much  more  considerable 
in  degree  than  they  are,  could  overthrow  the  authority 
of  the  Scripture  ;  unless  the  prophets,  apostles,  or  our 


Chap.  III.  liable  to  Objections.  247 

Lord,  had  promised  that  the  book  containing  the  di- 
vine revelation  should  be  secure  from  those  things. 
Nor  indeed  can  any  objections  overthrow  such  a  kind 
©f  revelation  as  the  Christian  claims  to  be,  since  there 
are  no  objections  against  the  morality  of  it,*  but  such 
as  can  shew  that  there  is  no  proof  of  miracles  wrought 
originally  in  attestation  of  it,  no  appearance  of  any 
thing  miraculous  in  its  obtaining  in  the  world,  nor  any 
ef  prophecy,  that  is,  of  events  foretold  which  hu- 
man sagacity  could  not  foresee.  If  it  can  be  shewn, 
that  the  proof  alleged  for  all  these  is  absolutely  none 
at  all,  then  is  revelation  overturned.  But  were  it  al- 
lowed that  the  proof  of  any  one  or  all  of  them  is  lower 
than  is  allowed,  yet,  whilst  any  proof  of  them  remains, 
revelation  will  stand  upon  much  the  same  foot  it  does 
at  present,  as  to  all  the  purposes  of  life  and  practice, 
and  ought  to  have  the  like  influence  upon  our  behav- 
iour. 

From  the  foregoing  observations  too  it  will  follow, 
and  those  who  will  thoroughly  examine  into  revelation 
will  find  it  worth  remarking,  that  there  are  several 
ways  of  arguing,  which,  though  just  with  regard  to 
other  writings,  are  not  applicable  to  Scripture  ;  at  least 
Hot  to  the  prophetic  parts  of  it.  We  cannot  argue, 
for  instance,  that  this  cannot  be  the  sense  or  intent  of 
such  a  passage  of  Scripture,  for  if  it  had  it  would  have 
been  expressed  more  plainly,  or  have  been  represented 
under  a  more  apt  figure  or  hieroglyphick  ;  yet  we  may 
justly  argue  thus  with  respect  to  common  books*  And 
the  reason  of  this  difference  is  very  evident,  that  in 
Scripture  we  are  not  competent  judges,  as  we  are  in- 
common  books,  how  plainly  it  were  to  have  been  ex- 
pected, what  is  the  true  sense  should  have  been  ex- 
pressed, or  under  how  apt    an  image  figured.     The 

'    P     25* 


248  The  Credibility  of  Revelation       Part  II. 

only  question  is,  what  appearance  there  is  that  this  is 
the  sense,  and  scarce  at  all  how  much  more  determi- 
nately  or  accurately  it  might  have  been  expressed  of 
figured. 

"  But  is  it  not  selfevident,  that  internal  improba- 
bilities of  all  kinds  weaken  external  probable  proof  V* 
Doubtless.  But  to  what  practical  purpose  can  thi>  be 
alleged  here,  when  it  has  been  proved  before,*  that 
real  internal  improbabilities,  which  rise  even  to  moral 
certainty,  are  overcome  by  the  most  ordinary  testimo- 
ny, and  when  it  now  has  been  made  appear,  that  we 
scarce  know  what  are  improbabilities  as  to  the  matter 
we  are  here  considering — as  it  will  farther  appear  from 
what  follows. 

For  though  from  the  observations  above  made,  it  is 
manifest  that  we  are  not  in  any  sort  competent  judges 
what  supernatural  instruction  were  to  have  been  expect- 
ed, and  though  it  is  selfevident  that  the  objections  of  an 
incompetent  judgment  must  be  frivolous, — yet  it  may 
be  proper  to  go  one  step  farther,  and  observe,  that  if 
men  will  be  regardless  of  these  things,  and  pretend  to 
judge  of  the  Scripture  by  preconceived  expectations, 
the  analogy  of  nature  shews  beforehand,  not  only  that 
it  is  highly  credible  they  may,  but  also  probable  that 
they  will,  imagine  they  have  strong  objections  against 
it,  however  really  unexceptionable  ;  for  so,  prior  to  ex- 
perience, they  would  think  they  had,  against  the  cir- 
cumstances and  degrees,  and  the  whole  manner  of  that 
instruction  which  is  afforded  by  the  ordinary  course  of 
nature.  Were  the  instruction  which  God  affords  to 
brute  creatures  by  instincts  and  mere  propensions,  and 
to  mankind  by  these  together  with  reason,  matter  of 
probable   proof,   and  not  of  certain  observation, — & 

*   P.    2M. 


Chap.  Ill,  liable  to  Objections.  .249 

would  be  rejected  as  incredible  in  many  instances  of  it, 
only  upon  account  of  the  means  by  which  thi^  instruc- 
tion is  given,  the  seeming  disproportions,  the  limita- 
tions, necessary  conditions  and  circumstances  of  it. 
For  in  tance — would  it  not  have  been  thought  highly 
improbable,  that  men  should  have  been  so  much  more 
capable  of  discovering,  even  to  certainty,  the  general 
laws  of  matter,  and  the  magnitudes,  paths  and  revo- 
lutions of  the  heavenly  bodies,  than  the  occasions  and 
cures  of  distempers,  and  many  other  things  in  which 
human  life  seems  so  much  more  nearly  concerned  than 
in  astronomy  ?  How  capricious  and  irregular  a  way 
of  information,  would  it  be  said,  is  that  of  invention, 
by  means  of  which  nature  instructs  us  in  matters  of 
science,  and  in  many  things  upon  which  the  affairs  of 
the  world  greatly  depend  ;  that  a  man  should  by  this 
faculty  be  made  acquainted  with  a  thing  in  an  instant, 
when  perhaps  he  is  thinking  of  somewhat  else  which  he 
has  in  vain  been  searching  after,  it  may  be,  for  years* 
So  likewise  the  imperfections  attending  the  only  meth- 
od by  which  nature  enables  and  directs  us  to  communi- 
cate our  thoughts  to  each  other,  are  innumerable.  Lan- 
guage is  in  its  very  nature  inadequate,  ambiguous,  lia- 
ble to  infinite  abuse  even  from  negligence,  and  so  liable 
to  it  from  design,  that  every  man  can  deceive  and  betray 
by  it.  And  to  mention  but  one  instance  more,  that 
brutes  without  reason  should  act,  in  many  respects, 
with  a  sagacity  and  foresight  vastly  greater  than  what 
men  have  in  those  respects,  would  be  thought  impos- 
sible ;  yet  it  is  certain  they  do  act  with  such  superior 
foresight — whether  it  be  their  own  indeed  is  another 
question.  From  these  things  it  is  highly  credible  be- 
forehand, that  upon  supposition  God  should  afford  men 
some  additional  instruction  by  revelation,  it  would  be 
with  circumstances,  in  manners,  degrees  and  respects* 

i  i 


250  The  Credibility  of  Revelation       Part  II. 

which  we  should  be  apt  to  fancy  we  had  great  objec- 
tions against  the  credibility  of.  Nor  are  the  objections 
against  the  Scripture,  nor  against  Christianity  in  gene- 
ral, at  all  more  or  greater  than  the  analogy  of  nature 
would  beforehand — not  perhaps  give  ground  to  ex- 
pect, for  this  analogy  may  not  be  sufficient  in  some  case 
to  ground  an  expectation  upon,  but  no  more  nor 
greater  than  analogy  would  shew  it,  beforehand,  to  be 
supposable  and  credible  that  there  might  seem  to  lie 
against  revelation. 

By  applying  these  general  observations  to  a  particu- 
lar objection,  it  will  be  more  distinctly  seen  how  they 
are  applicable  to  others  of  the  like  kind,  and  indeed 
to  almost  all  objections  against  Christianity,  as  distin- 
guished from  objections  against  its  evidence.  It  ap- 
pears from  Scripture,  that  as  it  was  not  unusual  in  the 
apostolick  age  for  persons,  upon  their  conversion  to 
-Christianity,  to  be  endued  with  miraculous  gifts,  so 
some  of  those  persons  exercised  these  gifts  in  a  strange- 
ly irregular  and  disorderly  manner  ;  and  this  is  made 
an  objection  against  their  being  really  miraculous. 
Now  the  foregoing  observations  quite  remove  this  ob- 
jection, how  considerable  soever  it  may  appear  at  first 
sight.  For  consider  a  person  endued  with  any  of 
these  gifts,  for  instance,  that  of  tongues,  it  is  to  be  sup- 
posed that  he  had  the  same  power  over  this  miracu- 
lous gift,  as  he  would  have  had  over  it  had  it  been 
the  effect  of  habit,  of  study  and  use,  as  it  ordinarily  is, 
or  the  same  power  over  it  as  he  had  over  any  other 
natural  endowment.  Consequently  he  would  use  it 
in  the  same  manner  he  did  any  other,  either  regularly 
an  1  upon  proper  occasions  only,  or  irregularly  and  up- 
on improper  ones,  according  to  his  sense  of  decency,; 
and  his  character  of  prudence.  Where  then  is  the 
objection  ?  Why,  if  this  miraculous  power  was  indeed 


Chap.  III.  liable  to  Objections.  251 

given  to  the  world  to  propagate  Christianity  and  attest 
the  truth  of  it,  we  might,  it  seems,  have  expected 
that  other  sort  of  persons  should  have  been  chosen  to 
be  invested  with  it ;  or  that  these  should,  at  the  same 
time,  have  been  endued  with  prudence  ;  or  that  they 
should  have  been  continually  restrained  and  directed 
in  the  exercise  of  it ;  i.  e.  that  God  .should  have  mi- 
raculously interposed,  if  at  all,  in  a  different  manner  or 
higher  degree.  But  from  the  observations  made 
above,  it  is  undeniably  evident  that  we  are  not  judges 
in  what  degrees  and  manners  it  were  to  have  been  ex- 
pected he  should  miraculously  interpose,  upon  suppo- 
sition of  his  doing  it  in  some  degree  and  manner. 
Nor,  in  the  natural  course  of  Providence,  are  superior 
gifts  of  memory,  eloquence,  knowledge,  and  other  tal- 
ents of  great  influence,  conferred  only  on  person  of 
prudence  and  decency,  or  such  as  are  disposed  to  make 
the  properest  use  of  them.  Nor  is  the  instruction  and 
admonition  naturally  afforded  u>  for  the  conduct  of 
life,  particularly  in  our  education,  commonly  given  in 
a  manner  the  most  suited  to  recommend  it,  but  often 
with  circumstances  apt  to  prejudice  us  against  such 
instruction. 

One  might  go  on  to  add,  that  there  is  a  great  re- 
semblance between  the  light  of  nature  and  of  revela- 
tion in  several  other  respects.  Practical  Christianity, 
or  that  faith  and  behaviour  which  renders  a  man  a 
Christian,  is  a  plain  and  obvious  thing,  like  the  com- 
mon rules  of  conduct  with  respect  to  our  ordinary 
temporal  affairs.  The  more  distinct  and  particular 
knowledge  of  those  things,  the  study  of  which  the 
Apostle  calls  going  on  unto  perfection,*  and  of  the  pro- 
phetick  parts  of  revelation,  like  many  parts  of  natural 
and    even  civil   knowledge,  may   require  very  exact 

•  Heb.  vi.  1. 


252  The  Credibility  of  Revelation       Part  II. 

thought,  and  careful  consideration.  The  hindrances 
too,  of  natural  and  of  supernatural  light  and  know- 
ledge, have  been  of  the  same  kind.  And  as,  it  is  own- 
ed, the  whole  scheme  of  Scripture  is  not  yet  under- 
stood, so,  if  it  ever  comes  to  be  understood,  before  the 
restitution  of  all  things,*  and  without  miraculous  inter- 
positions, it  must  be  in  the  same  way  as  natural  know- 
ledge is  come  at,  by  the  continuance  and  progress  of 
learning  and  of  liberty,  and  by  particular  persons  attend- 
ing to,  comparing  and  pursuing  intimations  scattered 
up  and  down  it,  which  are  overlooked  and  disregarded 
by  the  generality  of  the  world.  For  this  is  the  way  in 
which  all  improvements  are  made,  by  thoughtful  men's 
tracing  on  obscure  hints,  as  it  were,  dropped  us  by 
nature  accidentally,  or  which  seem  to  come  into  our 
minds  by  chance.  Nor  is  it  at  all  incredible,  that  a 
book  which  has  been  so  long  in  the  possession  of  man- 
kind should  contain  many  truths  as  yet  undiscovered. 
For,  all  the  same  phenomena  and  the  same  faculties 
of  investigation,  from  which  such  great  discoveries  in 
natural  knowledge  have  been  made  in  the  present  and 
last  age,  were  equally  in  the  possession  of  mankind  sev- 
eral thousand  years  before.  And  possibly  it  might  be 
intended,  that  events,  as  they  come  to  pass,  should  open 
and  ascertain  the  meaning  of  several  parts  of  Scripture. 
It  may  be  objected,  that  this  analogy  fails  in  a  mate- 
rial respect  ;  for  that  natural  knowledge  is  of  little  or 
no  consequence.  But  1  have  been  speaking  of  the  gen- 
eral instruction  which  nature  does  or  does  not  afford  us. 
And  besides,  some  parts  of  natural  knowledge,  in  the 
more  common  restrained  sense  of  the  words,  are  of  the 
greatest  consequence  to  the  ease  and  convenience  of 
life*  But  suppose  the  analogy  did,  as  it  does  not,  fail 
in  this   respect,  yet  it  might  be  abundantly   supplied 

*  Acts  iii.  21. 


Chap.  III.  liable  to  Objections.  253 

from  the  whole  constitution  and  course  of  nature, 
which  shews  that  God  does  not  dispense  his  gifts  ac^ 
cording  to  our  notions  of  the  advantage  and  conse- 
qu  nee  they  would  be  of  to  us.  And  thLs  in  general, 
with  his  method  of  dispensing  knowledge  in  particu- 
lar, would  together  make  out  an  analogy  full  to  the 
point  before  us. 

But  it  may  be  objected  still  farther  and  more  gen- 
erally, "  The  Scripture  represents  the  world  as  in  a 
state  of  ruin,  and  Christianity  as  an  expedient  to  re- 
cover it,  to  help  m  these  respects  where  nature  fails  ; 
in  particular,  to  supply  the  deficiencies  of  natural  hghu 
Is  it  credible  then,  that  so  many  ages  should  have 
been  let  pa^s,  before  a  matter  of  such  a  sort,  of  so  great 
and  so  general  importance,  was  made  known  to  man- 
kind ;  and  then  that  it  .should  be  made  known  to  so 
small  a  part  of  them  ?  Is  it  conceivable,  that  this  sup- 
ply should  be  so  very  deficient,  should  have  the  like 
ob  curity  and  doubtfulness,  be  liable  to  the  like  per* 
versions,  in  short,  lie  open  to  all  the  like  objections, 
as  the  light  of  nature  itself  ?"*  Without  determine 
ing  how  far  this  in  fact  is  so,  I  answer, — it  is  by  no 
means  incredible  that  it  might  be  so,  if  the  light  of  na- 
ture and  of  revelation  be  from  the  same  hand.  Men 
are  naturally  liable  to  diseases,  for  which  God,  in  his 
good  providence,  has  provided  natural  remedies.! 
But  remedies  existing  in  nature  have  been  unknown 
to  mankind  for  many  ages,  are  known  but  to  few  now, 
probably  many  valuable  ones  are  not  known  yet. 
Great  has  been  and  is  the  obscurity  and  difficulty  in 
the  nature  and  application  of  them.  Circumstances 
seem  often  to  make  them  very  improper,  where  they 
are  absolutely  necessary.  It  is  after  long  labour  and 
study,  and  many  unsuccessful  endeavours,  that  they  are 

*  Ch.vi.  f  See  Ch.  v. 


254  The  Credibility  of  Revelation        Part  II. 

brought  to  be  as  useful  as  they  are  ;  after  high  con- 
tempt and  absolute  rejection  of  the  most  useful  we 
have  ;  and  after  disputes  and  doubts  which  have  seem- 
ed to  be  endless.  The  best  remedies  too,  when  un- 
skilfully,  much  more  if  dishonestly  applied,  may  pro- 
duce new  diseases ;  and  with  the  rightest  application, 
the  success  of  them  is  often  doubtful.  In  many  ca&es 
they  are  not  at  all  effectual ;  where  they  are,  it  is  oft- 
en very  slowly  ;  and  the  application  of  them,  and  the 
necessary  regimen  accompanying  it,  is,  not  uncom- 
monly, so  disagreeable,  that  some  will  not  submit  to 
them,  and  satisfy  themselves  with  the  excuse,  that  if 
they  would,  it  is  not  certain  whether  it  would  be  suc- 
cessful. And  many  persons  who  labour  under  diseases 
for  which  there  are  known  natural  remedies,  are  not 
so  happy  as  to  be  always,  if  ever,  in  the  way  of  them. 
In  a  word,  the  remedies  which  nature  has  provided  for 
diseases  are  neither  certain,  perfect,  nor  universal. 
And  indeed  the  same  principles  of  arguing  which 
would  lead  us  to  conclude  that  they  must  be  so,  would 
lead  us  likewise  to  conclude  that  there  could  be  no 
occasion  for  them,  i.  e.  that  there  could  be  no  diseases 
at  all.  And  therefore,  our  experience  that  there  are 
diseases,  shews  that  it  is  credible  beforehand,  upon 
supposition  nature  has  provided  remedies  for  them, 
that  these  remedies  may  be,  as  by  experience  we  find 
they  are,  not  certain,  nor  perfect,  nor  universal ;  be- 
cause it  shews,  that  the  principles  upon  which  we 
should  expect  the  contrary  are  fallacious. 

And  now,  what  is  the  just  consequence  from  all 
these  things  ?  Not  that  reason  is  no  judge  of  what  is 
offered  to  us  as  being  of  divine  revelation.  For  this 
would  be  to  infer  that  we  are  unable  to  judge  of  any 
thing,  because  we  are  unable  to  judge  of  all  things. 
Reason  can  and  it  ought  to  judge,  not  only  of  the 


Chap.  III.  liable  to  Objections.  255 

meaning,  but  also  of  the  morality  and  the  evidence 
of  revelation.  First,  it  is  the  province  of  reason  to 
judge  of  the  morality  of  the  Scripture;  i.  e.  not 
whether  it  contains  things  different  from  what  we 
should  have  expected  from  a  wise,  just,  and  good  Be- 
ing, for  objections  from  hence  have  been  now  obvia- 
ted ;  but  whether  it  contains  things  plainly  contradic- 
tory  to  wisdom,  justice  or  goodness  ;  to  what  the  light 
of  nature  teaches  us  of  God.  And  I  know  nothing  or 
this  sort  objected  against  Scripture,  excepting  such  ob- 
jections as  are  formed  upon  suppositions,  which  would 
equally  conclude  that  the  constitution  of  nature  is  con- 
tradictory to  wisdom,  justice,  or  goodness,  which  most 
certainly  it  is  not.  Indeed  there  are  some  particular 
precepts  in  Scripture,  given  to  particular  persons,  re- 
quiring actions  which  would  be  immoral  and  vicious 
were  it  not  for  such  precepts.  But  it  is  easy  to  see 
that  all  these  are  of  such  a  kind,  as  that  the  precept 
changes  the  whole  nature  of  the  case  and  of  the  ac- 
tion, and  both  constitutes  and  shews  that  not  to  be 
unjust  or  immoral,  which,  prior  to  the  precept,  must 
have  appeared  and  really  have  been  so ;  which  may 
well  be,  since  none  of  these  precepts  are  contrary  to 
immutable  morality.  If  it  were  commanded  to  culti- 
vate the  principles,  and  act  from  the  spirit  of  treach- 
ery, ingratitude,  cruelty,  the  command  would  not  al- 
ter the  nature  of  the  case  or  of  the  action  in  any  of 
these  instances.  But  it  is  quite  otherwise  in  precepts, 
which  require  only  the  doing  an  external  action;  for 
instance,  taking  away  the  property  or  life  of  any.  Fcr 
men  have  no  right  to  either  life  or  property,  but  what 
arises  solely  from  the  grant  of  God  ;  when  this  grant 
is  revoked,  they  cease  to  have  any  right  at  all  in  ei- 
ther ;  and  when  this  revocation  is  made  known,  a§ 
surely  it  is  possible  it  may  be,  it  must  cease  to  be  un- 


256  The  Credibility  of  Revelation      Part  IL 

just  to  deprive  them  of  either.  And  though  a  course 
of  external  acts,  which  without  command  would  be 
immoral,  must  make  an  immoral  habit,  yet  a  few  de- 
tached commands  have  no  such  natural  tendency.  I 
thought  proper  to  say  thus  much  of  the  few  Scripture 
precepts,  which  require,  not  vicious  actions,  but  ac- 
tions which  would  have  been  vicious  had  it  not  been 
for  such  precepts  ;  because  they  are  sometimes  weakly 
urged  as  immoral,  and  great  weight  is  laid  upon  ob- 
jections drawn  from  them.  But  to  me  there  seems  no 
difficulty  at  all  in  these  precepts,  but  what  arises  from 
their  being  offences,  i.  e.  from  their  being  liable  to 
be  perverted,  as  indeed  they  are,  by  wicked  designing 
men,  to  serve  the  most  horrid  purposes  ;  and,  perhaps, 
to  mislead  the  weak  and  enthusiastick.  And  objec- 
tions from  this  head  are  not  objections  against  revela- 
tion, but  against  the  whole  notion  of  religion  as  atrial, 
and  against  the  general  constitution  of  nature.  Second- 
ly, reason  is  able  to  judge,  and  must,  of  the  evidence 
of  revelation,  and  of  the  objections  urged  against  that 
evidence  ;  which  shall  be  the  subject  of  a  following 
chapter.* 

But  the  consequence  of  the  foregoing  observation  is, 
that  the  question  upon  which  the  truth  of  Christiani- 
ty depends  is  scarce  at  all  what  objections  there  are 
against  its  scheme,  since  there  are  none  against  the 
morality  of  it  ;  but  what  objections  there  are  against  its 
■\ndcncc,  or  what  proof  there  remains  of  it,  after  due  aU 
lowanccs  made  for  the  objections  against  that  proof ;  be- 
cau.se  it  has  been  shewn,  that  the  objections  against 
Christianity,  as  distinguished  from  objections  against  its 
evidence*  are  frivolous.  For  surely  very  little  weight, 
if  any  at  all,  is  to  be  laid  upon  a  way  of  arguing  and 
objecting,  which,  when  applied  to  the  general  consti- 

"  Ch.  vii. 


Chap.  IIL  liable  to  Objections.  257- 

tution  of  nature,  experience  shews  not  to  be  conclu- 
sive ;  and  such,  I  think,  is  the  whole  way  of  objecting 
treated  of  throughout  this  chapter.  It  is  resolvable 
into  principles,  and  goes  upon  suppositions  which 
mislead  us  to  think  that  the  Author  of  nature  would 
not  act  as  we  experience  he  does,  or  would  act,  in  such 
and  such  cases,  as  we  experience  he  does  not,  in  like 
cases.  But  the  unreasonableness  of  this  way  of  ob- 
jecting will  appear  yet  more  evidently  from  hence, 
that  the  chief  things  thus  objected  against  are  justifi- 
ed, as  shall  be  farther  shown,*  by  distinct,  particular 
and  full  analogies,  in  the  constitution  and  course  of 
nature. 

But  it  is  to  be  remembered,  that,  as  frivolous  as 
objections  of  the  foregoing  sort  against  revelation  are, 
yet,  when  a  supposed  revelation  is  more  consistent  with 
itself,  and  has  a  more  general  and  uniform  tendency 
to  promote  virtue,  than,  all  circumstances  considered, 
could  have  been  expected  from  enthusiasm  and  polit- 
ical views, — this  is  a  presumptive  proof  of  its  not  pro- 
ceeding from  them,  and  so  of  its  truth  ;  because  we 
are  competent  judges  what  might  have  been  expected 
from  enthusiasm  and  political  views. 

*  Ch.  W.  latter  ptrt.    And  v.  vi. 


&    JC 


258  Christianity  a  Scheme,  Part  II. 


CHAP.  IV. 

Of  Christianity,  considered  as  a  Scheme  or  Constitution^ 
imperfectly  comprehended* 

It  hath  been  now  shewn*  that  the  analogy  of 
nature  renders  it  highly  credible  beforehand,  that 
supposing  a  revelation  to  be  made,  it  must  contain 
many  things  very  different  from  what  we  should 
have  expected,  and  such  as  appear  open  to  great  ob- 
jections, and  that  this  observation,  in  good  measure, 
takes  off  the  force  of  those  objections,  or  rather  pre- 
cludes them.  But  it  may  be  alleged,  that  this  is  a 
very  partial  answer  to  such  objections,  or  a  very  un- 
satisfactory way  of  obviating  them,  because  it  doth 
not  shew  at  all  that  the  things  objected  against  can  be 
wise,  just  and  good,  much  less  that  it  is  credible  they 
are  so.  It  will  therefore  be  proper  to  shew  this  dis- 
tinctly, by  applying  to  these  objections  against  the 
wisdom,  justice  and  goodness  of  Christianity,  the  an- 
swer abovef  given  to  the  like  objections  against  the 
constitution  of  nature,  before  we  consider  the  particu- 
lar analogies  in  the  latter  to  the  particular  things  ob- 
jected against  in  the  former.  Now  that  which  affords 
a  sufficient  answer  to  objections  against  the  wisdom, 
justice  and  goodness  of  the  constitution  of  nature,  is 
its  being  a  constitution,  a  system  or  scheme  imperfect- 
ly comprehended  ;  a  scheme  in  which  means  are 
made  use  of  to  accomplish  ends,  and  which  is  carried 
on  by  general  laws.  For  from  these  things  it  has  been 
proved,  not  only  to  be  possible,  but  also  to  be  credi- 

•   In  the  foregoing  chapter. 

f  Part  I.  Ch.  vii.  to  which  this  all  along  refers. 


Chap.  IV.         imperfectly  comprehended.  259 

ble,  that  those  things  which  are  objected  against  may 
be  consistent  with  wisdom,  justice  and  goodness,  nay 
may  be  instances  of  them  ;  and  even  that  the  consti- 
tution and  government  of  nature  may  be  perfect  in 
the  highest  possible  degree.  If  Christianity  then  be  a 
scheme,  and  of  the  like  kind,  it  is  evident  the  like  ob- 
jections against  it  must  admit  of  the  like  answer. 
And, 

I.  Christianity  is  a  scheme,  quite  beyond  our  com- 
prehension. The  moral  government  of  God  is  exer- 
cised, by  gradually  conducting  things  so  in  the  course 
of  his  providence,  that  every  one,  at  length  and  upon  the 
whole,  shall  receive  according  to  his  deserts  ;  and  nei- 
ther fraud  nor  violence,  but  truth  and  right,  shall  finally 
prevail.  Christianity  is  a  particular  scheme  under  this 
general  plan  of  Providence,  and  a  part  of  it,  conducive 
to  its  completion,  with  regard  to  mankind  ;  consist- 
ing itself  also  of  various  parts,  and  a  mysterious  econ- 
omy, which  has  been  carrying  on  from  the  time  the 
world  came  into  its  present  wretched  state,  and  is  still 
carrying  on  for  its  recovery,  by  a  divine  person,  the 
Messiah,  who  is  to  gather  together  in  one,  the  children 
of  God  that  are  scattered  abroad*  and  establish  an  ever- 
lasting kingdom,  wherein  dwelleth  righteousness.^  And 
in  order  to  it,  after  various  manifestations  of  things, 
relating  to  this  great  and  general  scheme  of  Providence, 
through  a  succession  of  many  ages  :  (For  the  Spirit  of 
Christ  which  was  in  the  prophets,  testified  beforehand  his 
sufferings,  and  the  glory  that  should  follow ;  unto  whom  it 
was  revealed,  that  not  unto  themselves,  but  unto  us  they 
did  minister  the  things  which  are  now  reported  unto  us  by 
them  that  have  preached  the  Gospel ;  which  things  the  an- 
gels  desire  to  look  into\) — after  various   dispensations^ 

*  Joh.  xi.  52.  f  2  Pet.  iii.  13. 

t   1  Pet.  i.  12,  12. 


260  Christianity  a  Scheme,  Part  II. 

looking  forward  and  preparatory  to  this  final  salvation, 
in  the  fullness  of  time,  when  infinite  wisdom  thought  fit, 
He,  being  in  the  form  of  God, — made  himself  of  no  repu- 
tation, and  took  upon  him  the  form  of  a  servant,  and  was 
made  in  the  likeness  of  men  ;  and  being  found  in  fashion  as 
a  man,  he  hwnbled  himself,  and  became  obedient  to  death, 
even  the  death  of  the  cross ;  wherefore  God  also  hath  high* 
ly  exalted  him,  and  given  him  a  name  which  is  above  every 
name  ;  that  at  the  name  of  Jesus  every  knee  should  bow,  of 
ih'mgs  in  heaven,  and  things  in  the  earth,  and  things  un- 
der the  earth  ;  and  that  every  tongue  should  confess,  that 
Jesus  Christ  is    Lord,  to  the  glory  of  God  the  Father.* 
Parts  likewise  of  this  economy,  are  the  miraculous  mis- 
sion of  the  Holy  Ghost,  and  his  ordinary  assistance  giv- 
en to  good  men ;  the  invisible  government  which  Christ 
at  present  exercises  over  his  church ;  that  which  he  him- 
self refers  to  in  these  words,  %In  my  father's  house  are 
many  mansions — I  go  to  prepare  a  place  for  you  ;  and  his 
future  return  to  judge  the  world  in  righteousness,  and 
completely  reestablish  the  kingdom  of  God.     For  the 
Father  judgeth  no  man  ;  but  hath  committed  all  judgment 
unto  the  Son,  that  all  men  should  honour  the  Son,  even  as 
they  honour  the  Fat her. \     All  power  is  given  unto  him  in 
heaven  and  in  earth.  %     And  he  must  reign  till  he  hath  put 
all  enemies  under  his  feet*     Then  comet h  the  end,  when  he 
shall  have  delivered  up  the  kingdom  to  God,  even  the  Fa- 
ther ;  when  he  shall  have  put  down  all  rule,  and  all  au- 
thority and  power.     And  when  all  things  shall  be  subdued 
unto  him,  then  shall  the  Son  also  himself  be  subject  unto  him 
that  put  all  things  under  him,  that  God  may  be  all  in  all.\ 
Now  little,  surely,  need  be  said  to  shew  that  this  system 
or  scheme  of  things  is  but  imperfectly  comprehended 
by  us.     The  Scripture    expre^ly  asserts  it   to  be  so. 

•  Phil.  ii.  |  Joli.    xiv.  2.  \   Joh.  v.  88,  %T- 

§  Matth.  xxvili.   18.  ||    ]    Cor.  xv. 


Chap.  IV.         imperfectly  comprehended.  261 

And  indeed  one  cannot  read  a  passage  relating  t(Hbis 
great  mystery  of  Godliness?  but  what  immediately  runs 
up  into  something  which  shews  us  our  ignorance  in  it  • 
as  every  thing  in  nature  shews  us  our  ignorance  in 
the  constitution  of  nature.  And  whoever  will  seri- 
ously consider  that  part  of  the  Christian  scheme  which 
is  revealed  in  Scripture,  will  find  so  much  more  unre- 
vealed,  as  will  convince  him,  that,  to  all  the  purposes  of 
judging  and  objecting,  we  know  as  little  of  it  as  of  the 
constitution  of  nature.  Our  ignorance,  therefore,  is 
as  much  an  answer  to  our  objections  against  the  per- 
fection of  one  as  against  the  perfection  of  the  other*  f 

II.  It  is  obvious  too,  that  in  the  Christian  dispen- 
sation, as  much  as  in  the  natural  scheme  of  things 
means  are  made  use  of  to  accomplish  ends.  And  the 
observation  of  this  furnishes  us  with  the  same  answer 
to  objections  against  the  perfection  of  Christianity,  as 
to  objections  of  the  like  kind  against  the  constitution 
of  nature.  It  shews  the  credibility,  that  the  things 
objected  against,  how  foolish\  soever  they  appear  to 
men,  may  be  the  very  best  means  of  accomplishing 
the  very  best  ends  ;  and  their  appearing  foolishness  is  no 
presumption  against  this,  in  a  scheme  so  greatly  beyond 
our  comprehension  § 

III.  The  credibility  that  the  Christian  dispensation 
may  have  been,  all  along,  carried  on  by  general  laws,|J 
no  less  than  the  course  of  nature,  may  require  to  be 
more  distinctly  made  out.  Consider  then  upon  what 
ground  it  is  we  say,  that  the  whole  common  course  of 
nature  is  carried  on  according  to  general  foreordained 
laws.     We  know  indeed  several  of  the  general  laws  of 

^matter,  and  a  great  part  of  the  natural  behaviour   of 
living  agents  is  reducible  to  general   laws.     But  we 

*  1  Tim.  iii.  16.  f.  P.  194,  &c.  J  1  Cor.  i. 

§  P.  19§>  19?:  J]    P.  200,  201. 


262  Christianity  a  Scheme,  Part   II. 

kngjJf  ina  manner  nothing  by  what  laws,  storms  and 
tempests,  earthquakes,  famine,  pestilence,  become  the 
instruments  of  destruction  to  mankind.  And  the 
laws  by  which  persons  born  into  the  world  at  ;  uch  a 
time  and  place  are  of  such  capacities,  geniuses,  Km. 
pers  ;  the  laws  by  which  thoughts  come  into  our 
mind  in  a  multitude  of  cases,  and  by  which  innume- 
rable things  happen,  of  the  greatest  influence  upon  the 
affairs  and  state  of  the  world  ;  these  laws  are  so  wholly 
unknown  to  us,  that  we  call  the  events  which  come  to 
pass  by  them  accidental,  though  all  reasonable  men 
know  certainly  that  there  cannot,  in  reality,  be  any 
such  thing  as  chance,  and  conclude  that  the  things 
which  have  this  appearance  are  the  result  of  general 
laws,  and  may  be  reduced  into  them.  It  is  then  but 
an  exceeding  little  way,  and  in  but  a  very  few  respects, 
that  we  can  trace  up  the  natural  course  of  things  be- 
fore us  to  general  laws.  And  it  is  only  from  analogy 
that  we  conclude  the  whole  of  it  to  be  capable  of  be- 
ing reduced  into  them — only  from  our  seeing  that 
part  is  so.  It  is  from  our  finding  that  the  course  of 
nature,  in  some  respects  and  so  far,  goes  on  by  general 
laws,  that  we  conclude  this  of  the  rest.  And  if  that 
be  a  just  ground  for  such  a  conclusion,  it  is  a  just 
ground  also,  if  not  to  conclude,  yet  to  apprehend,  to 
render  it  supposable  and  credible,  which  is  sufficient 
for  answering  objections,  that  God's  miraculous  inter- 
portions  may  have  been,  all  along  in  like  manner,  by 
general  laws  of  wisdom.  Thus,  that  miraculous  pow- 
ers should  be  exerted  at  such  times,  upon  such  occa- 
sions, in  such  degrees  and  manners,  and  with  regard  to 
such  persons,  rather  than  others — that  the  affairs  of 
the  world,  being  permitted  to  go  on  in  their  natural 
course  so  far,  should,  just  at  such  a  point,  have  a  new 
direction   given  them  by  miraculous  interpositions — 


Chap.  IV.        imperfectly  comprehended.  263 

that  these  interpositions  should  be  exactly  in  such  de- 
grees and  respects  only, — all  this  may  have  been  by 
general  laws.  These  laws  are  unknown  indeed  to  us, 
but  no  more  unknown  than  the  laws  from  whence  it 
is,  that  some  die  as  soon  as  they  are  born,  and  others 
live  to  extreme  old  age— that  one  man  is  so  superior 
to  another  in  understanding — with  innumerable  more 
things,  which,  as  was  before  observed,  we  cannot  re- 
duce to  any  laws  or  rules  at  all,  though  k  is  taken  for 
granted  they  are  as  much  reducible  to  general  ones  as 
gravitation.  Now,  if  the  revealed  dispensations  of 
providence,  and  miraculous  interpositions,  be  by  gen- 
eral laws,  as  well  as  God's  ordinary  government  in  the 
course  of  nature,  made  known  by  reason  and  expe- 
rience,—*-there  is  no  more  reason  to  expect  that  every 
exigence,  as  it  arises,  should  be  provided  for  by  these 
general  laws  or  miraculous  interpositions,  than  that 
every  exigence  in  nature  should  by  the  general  laws  of 
nature ;  yet  there  might  be  wise  and  good  reasons  that 
miraculous  interpositions  should  be  by  general  laws, 
and  that  these  laws  should  not  be  broken  in  upon,  or 
deviated  from,  by  other  miracles. 

Upon  the  whole  then,  the  appearance  of  deficiencies 
and  irregularities  in  nature  is  owing  to  its  being  a 
scheme  but  in  part  made  known,  and  of  such  a  cer- 
tain particular  kind  in  other  respects.  Now  we  see  no 
more  reason  why  the  frame  and  course  of  nature  should 
be  such  a  scheme,  than  why  Christianity  should.  And 
that  the  former  is  such  a  scheme,  renders  it  credible 
that  the  latter,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth,  may  be 
so  too.  And  as  it  is  manifest  that  Christianity  is  a 
scheme  revealed  but  in  part,  and  a  scheme  in  which 
means  are  made  use  of  to  accomplish  ends,  like  to 
that  of  nature, — so  the  credibility  that  it  may  have 
been  all  along  carried  on  by  general  laws,  no  less  than 


2£4  Christianity  a  Scheme ',  Part  H. 

the  course  of  nature,  has  been  distinctly  proved.  And 
from  all  this  it  is  beforehand  credible  that  there  might, 
I  think  probable  that  there  would,  be  the  like  appear- 
ance of  deficiencies  and  irregularities  in  Christianity  as 
in  nature  ;  i.  e.  that  Christianity  would  be  liable  to 
the  like  objections  as  the  frame  of  nature.  And  these 
objections  are  answered  by  these  observations  concern- 
ing Christianity,  as  the  like  objections  against  the 
frame  of  nature  are  answered  by  the  like  observations 
concerning  the  frame  of  nature. 


The  objections  against  Christianity,  considered  as 
a  matter  of  fact,*  having  in  general  been  obviated  in 
the  preceding  chapter,  and  the  same,  considered  as 
made  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  it,  having 
been  obviated  in  this,  the  next  thing,  according  to  the 
method  proposed,  is  to  shew  that  the  principal  objec- 
tions, in  particular,  against  Christianity  may  be  an- 
swered by  particular  and  full  analogies  in  nature. 
And  as  one  of  them  is  made  against  the  whole  scheme 
of  it  together,  as  just  now  described,  I  choose  to  con- 
sider it  here,  rather  than  in  a  distinct  chapter  by  itself. 
The  thing  objected  against  this  scheme  of  the  Gospel 
is,  "  that  it  seems  to  suppose  God  was  reduced  to  the 
necessity  of  a  long  series  of  intricate  means,  in  order  to 
accomplish  his  ends,  the  recovery  and  salvation  of  the 
world  ;  in  like  sort  as  men,  for  want  of  understanding 
or  power,  not  being  able  to  come  at  their  ends  direct- 
ly, are  forced  to  go  roundabout  ways,  and  make  use 
of  many  perplexed  contrivances  to  arrive  at  them." 
Now  every  thing  which  we  see  shews  the  folly  of  this, 

*  P.  19:5. 


Chap.  IV.         Imperfectly  comprehended,  263 

considered  as  an  objection  against  the  truth  of  Chris- 
tianity.    For,  according  to  our  manner  of  conception, 
God  makes  use  of  variety  of  means,  what  we  often 
think  tedious  ones,  in  the  natural  course  of  providence, 
for  the  accompli  hment  of  all  his  ends.     Indeed  it  is 
certain  there  is  somewhat  in  this  matter  quite   beyond 
our  comprehension  ;  but  the  mystery  is  as  great  in  na- 
ture as  in  Christianity.     We  know  what  we  ourselves 
aim  at,  as  final  ends,  and  what  courses  we  take,  mere- 
ly as  mean>  conducing  to  those  ends.     But  we  are 
greatly  ignorant  how  far  things  are  considered  by  the 
Author  of  nature,   under  the  single  notion  of  means 
and  ends  ;  so  as  that  it  may  be  said,  this  is  merely  an 
end,   and    that  merely    means,  in    his  regard.     And 
whether  there  be  not  some   peculiar  absurdity  in  our 
very  manner  of  conception,   concerning  this  matter, 
somewhat  contradictory  arising  from  our  extremely 
imperfect  views  of  things,  it    is  impossible  to  say. 
However,   thus  much  is  manifest,  that  the  whole  nat- 
ural world  and  government  of  it  is  a  scheme  or  sys- 
tem ;  not  a  fixed,  but  a  progressive  one  ;  a  scheme, 
in  which  the  operation  of  various  means  takes  up  a 
great  length  of  time,  before  the  ends  they  tend  to  can 
be  attained.     The  change  of  seasons,  the  ripening  of 
the  fruits  of  the  earth,  the  very  history  of  a  flower,  is 
an  instance  of  this,  and  so  is  human  life.     Thus  vege- 
table bodies,    and  those  of  animals,  though  possibly 
formed  at  once,  yet  grow  up  by  degrees  to  a  mature 
state.     And  thus  rational  agents,  who   animate  these 
latter  bodies,  are  naturally   directed  to  form  each  his 
own  manners  and  character,  by  the  gradual  gaining  of 
knowledge  and   experience,  and  by   a  long  course  of 
action.     Our  existence  is  not  only  successive,    as  it 
must  be  of  necessity,  but  one  state  of  our  life  and  be- 
ing is  appointed  by  God  to  be  a  preparation  for  an- 


266  Christianity  *  Scheme,  6fr.         Part  II. 

other,  and  that  to  be  the  means  of  attaining  to  anoth- 
er succeeding  one ;  infancy  to  childhood,  childhood 
to  youth,  youth  to  mature  age.  Men  are  impatient, 
and  for  precipitating  things  ;  but  the  Author  of  na- 
ture appears  de liberate  throughout  his  operations,  ac- 
complishing his  natural  ends  by  slow  .successive  steps. 
And  there  is  a  plan  of  things  beforehand  laid  out, 
which,  from  the  nature  of  it,  requires  various  systems 
of  means,  as  well  as  length  of  time,  in  order  to  the 
carrying  on  its  several  parts  into  execution.  Thus,  in 
the  daily  course  of  natural  providence,  God  operates 
in  the  very  same  manner  as  in  the  dispensation  of 
Christianity,  making  one  thing  subservient  to  another, 
this  to  somewhat  farther,  and  so  on,  through  a  pro- 
gressive series  of  means,  which  extend,  both  backward 
and  forward,  beyond  our  utmost  view.  Of  this  man- 
ner of  operation,  every  thing  we  see  in  the  course  of 
nature  is  as  much  an  instance,  as  any  part  of  the 
Christian  dispensation. 


0hap.  V.      Appointment  of  a  Mediator,  &V.        267 


CHAP.  V. 

Of  the  particular  System  of  Christianity  ;  the  Appoint- 
ment of  a  Mediator,  and  the  Redemption  of  the  World 
by  him. 

1  here  is  not,  I  think,  any  thing  relating  to 
Christianity  which  has  been  more  objected  against 
than  the  mediation  of  Christ,  in  some  or  other  of  its 
parts.  Yet,  upon  thorough  consideration,  there 
seems  nothing  less  justly  liable  to  it.     For, 

I.  The  whole  analogy  of  nature  removes  all  ima- 
gined presumption  against  the  general  notion  of  a  Me- 
diator between  God  and  man.*  For  we  find  all  living 
creatures  are  brought  into  the  world,  and  their  life  in 
infancy  is  preserved,  by  the  instrumentality  of  others  j 
and  every  satisfaction  of  it,  some  way  or  other,  is  be- 
stowed by  the  like  means.  So  that  the  visible  govern- 
ment which  God  exercises  over  the  world  is  by  the  in- 
strumentality and  mediation  of  others..  And  how  far 
his  invisible  government  be  or  be  not  so,  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  determine  at  all  by  reason.  And  the  supposition 
that  part  of  it  is  so,  appears,  to  say  the  least,  altogeth- 
er as  credible  as  the  contrary.  There  is  then  no  sort 
of  objection,  from  the  light  of  nature,  against  the  gen- 
eral notion  of  a  mediator  between  God  and  man,  con- 
sidered as  a  doctrine  of  Christianity,  or  as  an  appoint- 
ment in  this  dispensation  ;  since  we  find  by  experience 
that  God  does  appoint  mediators  to  be  the  instru- 
ments of  good  and  evil  to  us,  the  instruments  of  his 

*  1  Tim.  ii.  5. 


268  The  Appointment  of  Part  II. 

justice  and  his  mercy.  And  the  objection  here  re- 
ferred to  is  urged,  not  against  mediation  in  that  high, 
eminent  and  peculiar  sense  in  which  Christ  is  our  me- 
diator, but  absolutely  against  the  whole  notion  itself 
of  a  mediator  at  all. 

II.  As  we  must  suppose  that  the  world  i-  under  the 
proper  moral  government  of  God,  or  in  a  state  of  re- 
ligion, before  we  can  enter  into  consideration    of  the 
revealed  doctrine  concerning  the  redemption  of  it  by 
Christ,  so  that  supposition  is  here  to  be  distinctly  tak- 
en notice  of.      Now  the  divine    moral  government 
which  religion  teaches  us,  implies  that  the  consequence 
of  vice  shall  be  misery,    in  some  future  state,   by    the 
righteous  judgment  of  God.     That   such  consequent 
punishment    shall  take  eifect  by  his  appointment,  is 
necessarily  implied.     But,  as  it  is  not  in  any  sort  to  be 
supposed,  that  we  are  made  acquainted  with  all  the 
ends  or  reasons  for  which  it  is  fit  future  punishments 
should  be  inflicted,  or  why  God    has  appointed  such 
and  such  consequent  misery  should  follow  vice,  and  as 
we  are  altogether  in  the  dark  how  or  in  what  manner 
it  should  follow,  by  what  immediate  occasions,  or  by 
the  instrumentality  of  what  means,  there  is  no  absurd- 
ity in  supposing  it  may  follow   in  a  way  analogous  to 
that,  in  which  many  miseries  follow  such  and  such 
courses  of  action  at  present;  poverty,  sickness,  infamy, 
untimely  death  by    diseases,  death  from  the  hands  of 
civil  justice.     There  is  no  absurdity  in  supposing  fu- 
ture punishment  may   follow  wickedness  of  course,  as 
we  speak,  or  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence  from 
God's  original  constitution  of  the  world,  from  the  na- 
ture he  has  given  us,  and  from  the  condition  in  which 
he  places  us ;  or  in  a  like  manner,  as  a  person  rashly  tri- 
fling upon    a  precipice,    in  the  way  of  natural  conse- 
quence, falls  down  j  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence, 


Chap.  V.      a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.  269 

breaks  his  limbs,  suppose  ;  in  the  way  of  natural  con- 
sequence of  this,  without  help,  perishes, 

Some  good  men  may  perhaps  be  offended,  with 
hearing  it  spoken  of  as  a  supposable  thing,  that  the 
future  punishments  of  wickedness  may  be  in  the  way 
of  natural  consequence  ;  as  if  this  were  taking  the  ex- 
ecution of  justice  out  of  the  hands  of  God,  and  giv- 
ing it  to  nature.  But  they  should  remember,  that 
when  things  come  to  pass  according  to  the  course  of 
nature,  this  does  not  hinder  them  from  being  his  do- 
ing, who  is  the  God  of  nature  ;  and  that  the  Scrip- 
ture ascribes  tho.se  punishments  to  divine  justice  which 
are  known  to  be  natural  and  which  must  be  called  so, 
when  distinguished  from  such  as  are  miraculous.  But 
after  all,  this  supposition,  or  rather  this  way  of  speak- 
ing, is  here  made  use  of  only  by  way  of  illustration  of 
the  subject  before  us.  For  since  it  must  be  admitted, 
that  the  future  punishment  of  wickedness  is  not  a  mat- 
ter of  arbitrary  appointment,  but  of  reason,  equity 
and  justice,  it  comes,  for  aught  I  see,  to  the  same  thing, 
whether  it  is  supposed  to  be  inflicted  in  a  way  analo- 
gous to  that  in  which  the  temporal  punishments  of 
vice  and  folly  are  inflicted,  or  in  any  other  way.  And 
though  there  were  a  difference,  it  is  allowable,  in  the 
present  case,  to  make  this  supposition,  plainly  not  an 
incredible  one,  that  future  punishment  may  follow 
wickedness  in  the  way  of  natural  consequence,  or  ac- 
cording to  some  general  laws  of  government  already 
established  in  the  universe. 

nl.  Upon  this  supposition,  or  even  without  it,  we 
may  observe  somewhat  much  to  the  present  purpose 
in  the  constitution  of  nature  or  appointments  of  Prov- 
idence ;  the  provision  which  is  made  that  all  the  bad 
natural  consequences  of  men's  actions  should  not  al- 
ways actually  follow  ;  or  that  such  bad  consequences 


270  The  Appointment  of  Part  IL 

as,  according  to  the  settled  course  of  things,  would  in- 
evitably have  followed  if  not  prevented,  should  in 
certain  degrees  be  prevented.  We  are  apt  presump- 
tuously to  imagine,  that  the  world  might  have  been  so 
constituted,  as  that  there  would  not  have  been  any  such 
thing  as  misery  or  evil.  On  the  contrary  we  find  the 
Author  of  nature  permits  it ;  but  then  he  has  provid- 
ed reliefs,  and,  in  many  cases,  perfect  remedies  for  it, 
after  some  pains  and  difficulties  ;  reliefs  and  remedies 
even  for  that  evil,  which  is  the  fruit  of  our  own  mis- 
conduct ;  and  which,  in  the  course  of  nature,  would 
have  continued  and  ended  in  our  destruction,  but  for 
such  remedies.  And  this  is  an  instance  both  of  sever- 
ity and  indulgence,  in  the  constitution  of  nature. 
Thus  all  the  bad  consequences  now  mentioned,  of  a 
man's  trifling  upon  a  precipice,  might  be  prevented. 
And  though  all  were  not,  yet  some  of  them  might,  by 
proper  interposition,  if  not  rejected  ;  by  another's 
coming  to  the  rash  man's  relief,  with  his  own  laying 
hold  on  that  relief,  in  such  sort  as  the  case  required. 
Persons  may  do  a  great  deal  themselves  towards  pre- 
venting the  bad  consequences  of  their  follies ;  and 
more  may  be  done  by  themselves,  together  with  the 
assistance  of  others  their  fellow  creatures  ;  which  as- 
sistance nature  requires  and  prompts  us  to.  This  is 
the  general  constitution  of  the  world.  Now  suppose 
k  had  been  so  constituted,  that  after  such  actions  were 
done  as  were  foreseen  naturally  to  draw  after  them 
misery  to  the  doer,  it  should  have  been  no  more  in 
human  power  to  have  prevented  that  naturally  conse- 
quent misery,  in  any  instance,  than  it  is  in  all, — no 
one  can  say  whether  such  a  more  severe  constitution 
of  things  might  not  yet  have  been  really  good.  But 
that,  on  the  contrary,  provision  is  made  by  nature,  that 
we  may  and  do  to  so  great  degree  prevent  the  bad 


Chap.  V.        a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.  271 

natural  effects  of  our  follies, — this  may  be  called 
mercy  or  compassion  in  the  original  constitution  of  the 
world;  compassion  as  distinguished  from  goodness  in 
general.  And,  the  whole  known  constitution  and 
course  of  things  affording  us  instances  of  such  com- 
passion, it  would  be  according  to  the  analogy  of  na- 
ture to  hope,  that,  however  ruinous  the  natural  con- 
sequences of  vice  might  be,  from  the  general  laws  of 
God's  government  over  the  universe, — yet  provision 
might  be  made,  possibly  might  have  been  originally 
made,  for  preventing  those  ruinous  consequences  from 
inevitably  following  ;  at  least  from  following  univer- 
sally, and  in  all  cases. 

Many,  I  am  sensible,  will  wonder  at  finding  thi3 
made  a  question,  or  spoken  of  as  in  any  degree  doubt- 
ful. The  generality  of  mankind  are  so  far  from  hav- 
ing that  awful  sense  of  things,  which  the  present  state 
of  vice  and  misery  and  darkness  seems  to  make  but 
reasonable,  that  they  have  scarce  any  apprehension  or 
thought  at  all  about  this  matter  any  way  ;  and  some 
serious  persons  may  have  spoken  unadvisedly  concern- 
ing it.  But  let  us  observe  what  wTe  experience  to  be, 
and  what  from  the  very  constitution  of  nature  cannot 
but  be,  the  consequences  of  irregular  and  disorderly 
behaviour ;  even  of  such  rashness,  wilfulness,  neglects, 
as  we  scarce  call  vicious.  Now  it  is  natural  to  appre- 
hend, that  the  bad  consequences  of  irregularity  will  be 
greater  in  proportion  as  the  irregularity  is  so.  And 
there  is  no  comparison  between  these  irregularities,  and 
the  greater  instances  of  vice,  or  a  dissolute  profligate 
disregard  to  all  religion,  if  there  be  any  thing  at  all  in 
religion.  For  consider  what  it  is  for  creatures,  moral 
agents, presumptuously  to  introduce  that  confusion  and 
misery  into  the  kingdom  of  God,  which  mankind  have 
in  fact  introduced — to  blaspheme  the  sovereign  Lord 


272  The  Appoint rrunt  of  Part  II. 

of  all — to  contemn  his  authority — to  be  injurious  to 
the  degree  they  are,  to  their  fellow  creatures,  the  crea- 
tures of  God.  Add  that  the  effects  of  vice  in  the 
present  world  are  often  extreme  misery,  irretrievable 
ruin,  and  even  death  ;  and  upon  putting  all  this  to- 
gether iu  will  appear,  that  as  no  one  can  say  in  what 
degree  fatal  the  unprevented  consequences  of  vice  may 
be,  according  to  the  general  rule  of  divine  govern- 
ment, so  it  is  by  no  means  intuitively  certain  how  far 
these  consequences  could  possibly,  in  the  nature  of  the 
thing,  be  prevented,  consistently  with  the  eternal  rule 
of  right,  or  with  what  is  in  fact  the  moral  constitution 
of  nature.  However,  there  would  be  large  ground  to 
hope  that  the  universal  government  was  not  so  severely 
strict  but  that  there  was  room  for  pardon,  or  for  hav- 
ing those  penal  consequences  prevented.     Yet, 

IV.  There  seems  no  probability  that  any  thing  we 
could  do  would  alone  and  of  itself  prevent  them  ;  pre- 
vent their  following  or  being  inflicted.  But  one  would 
think,  at  least,  it  were  impossible  that  the  contrary 
should  be  thought  certain.  For  we  are  not  acquaint- 
ed with  the  whole  of  the  case.  We  are  not  informed 
of  all  the  reasons  which  render  it  fit  that  future  pun- 
ishments should  be  inflicted,  and  therefore  cannot 
know  whether  any  thing  we  could  do  would  make 
such  an  alteration  as  to  render  it  fit  that  they  should 
be  remitted.  We  do  not  know  what  the  whole  nat- 
ural or  appointed  consequences  of  vice  are,  nor  in  what 
way  they  would  follow,  if  not  prevented;  and  there- 
fore can  in  no  sort  say,  whether  we  could  do  anything 
which  would  be  sufficient  to  prevent  them.  Our  ig- 
norance being  thus  manifest,  let  us  recollect  the  analo- 
gy of  nature  or  Providence.  For,  though  this  may  be 
but  a  slight  ground  to  raise  a  positive  opinion  upon  in 
this  matter,  yet  it  is  sufficient  to  answer  a  mere  arbi- 


Chap.  V.        a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.  273 

trary  assertion,  without  any  kind  of  evidence,  urge'd  by 
way  of  objection  against  a  doctrine,  the  proof  of  which 
is  not  reason  but  revelation.  Consider  then — people 
ruin  their  fortunes  by  extravagance  ;  they  bring  dis- 
eases upon  themselves  by  excess  ;  they  incur  the  pen- 
alties of  civil  laws,  and  surely  civil  government  is  nat- 
ural ;  will  sorrow  for  these  follies  past,  and  behaving 
well  for  the  future,  alone  and  of  itself  prevent  the  nat- 
ural consequences  of  them  ?  On  the  contrary,  men's 
natural  abilities  of  helping  themselves  are  often  im- 
paired .;  or  if  not,  yet  they  are  forced  to  be  beholden 
to  the  assistance  of  others,  upon  several  accounts  and 
in  different  ways  ;  assistance  which  they  would  have 
had  no  occasion  for  had  it  not  been  for  their  miscon- 
duct, but  which,  in  the  disadvantageous  condition 
they  have  reduced  themselves  to,  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  their  recovery,  and  retrieving  their  affairs. 
Now  since  this  is  our  case,  considering  ourselves  mere- 
ly as  inhabitants  of  this  world,  and  as  having  a  tem* 
poral  interest  here,  under  the  natural  government  of 
God,  which  however  has  a  great  deal  moral  in  it,— 
why  is  it  not  supposable  that  this  may  be  our  case  also 
in  our  more  important  capacity,  as  under  his  perfect' 
moral  government,  and  having  a  more  general  and  fu- 
ture interest  depending  ?  If  we  have  misbehaved  in 
this  higher  capacity,  and  rendered  ourselves  obnoxious 
to  the  future  punishment  which  God  has  annexed  to 
vice,  it  is  plainly  credible,  that  behaving  well  for  the 
time  to  come,  may  be — not  useless,  God  forbid- 
but  wholly  insufficient,  alone  and  of  itself,  to  prevent 
that  punishment,  or  to  put  us  in  the  condition  which 
we  should  have  been  in  had  we  preserved  our  inno- 
cence. 

And  though  we  ought  to  reason  with  all  reverence, 
whenever  we  reason  concerning  the  divine  conduct,  yet 

M    M 


274  The  Appointment  of  Part  II. 

it  may  be  added,  that  it  is  clearly  contrary  to  all  our 
notions  of  government,  as  well  as  to  what  is  in  fact  the 
general  constitution  of  nature,  to  suppose  that  doing 
well  for  the  future  should,  in  all  cases,  prevent  all  the 
judicial  bad  consequences  of  having  done  evil,  or   all 
the   punishment  annexed  to  disobedience.     And  we 
have  manifestly  nothing  from  whence  to  determine,  in 
what  degree  and  in  what  cases  reformation  would  pre- 
vent this  punishment^  even  supposing  that  it  would  in 
some.     And  though  the  efficacy  of  repentance  itself 
alone,  to  prevent  what  mankind  had  rendered  them- 
selves obnoxious  to,  and  recover  what  they  had  for- 
feited, is  now  insisted  upon  in  opposition  to  Christian- 
ity,— yet,  by    the  general  prevalence  of  propitiatory 
sacrifices  over  the  heathen  world,  this  notion  of  re- 
pentance alone  being  sufficient  to  expiate  guilt,  ap- 
pears to  be  contrary  to  the  general  sense  of  mankind. 
Upon  the  whole  then,  had   the  laws,  the  general 
laws  of  God's  government  been  permitted  to  operate, 
without  any  interposition  in  our  behalf,  the  future 
punishment,  for  aught  we  know  to  the   contrary,  or 
have  any  reason  to  think,  must  inevitably  have  follow- 
ed, notwithstanding  any  thing  we  could  have  done  to 
prevent  it.     Now, 

V.  In  this  darkness,  or  this  light  of  nature,  call  it 
which  you  please,  revelation  comes  in — confirms  every 
doubting  fear,  which  could  enter  into  the  heart  of 
man,  concerning  the  future  unprevented  consequence 
of  wickedness — supposes  the  world  to  be  in  a  state  of 
ruin — (a  supposition  which  seems  the  very  ground  of 
the  Christian  dispensation,  and  which,  if  not  proveable 
by  reason,  yet  it  is  in  no  wise  contrary  to  it)  teaches 
us  too,  that  the  rules  of  divine  government  are  such  as 
not  to  admit  of  pardon  immediately  and  directly  upon 
repentance,  or  by  the  sole  efficacy  of  it ;  but  then 


Chap.  V.         a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.  275' 

teaches  at  the  same  time  what  nature  might  justly  have 
hoped,  that  the  moral  government  of  the  universe  was 
not  so  rigid,  but  that  there  was  room  for  an  interpo- 
sition to  avert  the  fatal  consequences  of  vice,  which 
therefore  by  this  means  does  admit  of  pardon.  Rev- 
elation teaches  us,  that  the  unknown  law<  of  God's 
more  general  government,  no  less  than  the  particular 
laws  by  which  we  experience  he  governs  us  at  present, 
are  compassionate,*  as  well  as  good  in  the  more  Gene- 
ral notion  of  goodness  ;  and  that  he  hath  mercifully 
provided  that  there  should  be  an  interposition  to  pre- 
vent the  destruction  of  human  kind,  whatever  that 
destruction  unprevented  would  have  been.  God  so 
loved  the  world,  that  he  gave  his  only  begotten  Son,  that 
whosoever  believeth,  not  to  be  sure  in  a  speculative, 
but  in  a  practical  sense,  that  whosoever  believeth  in  him 
should  not  perish  ;f  gave  his  Son  in  the  same  way  of 
goodness  to  the  world  as  he  affords  particular  persons 
the  friendly  assistance  of  their  fellow  creatures,  when 
without  it  their  temporal  ruin  would  be  the  certain 
consequence  of  their  follies ;  in  the  same  way  of  good- 
ness, I  say,  though  in  a  transcendent  and  infinitely 
higher  degree.  And  the  Son  of  God  loved  us  and  gave 
himself  for  us,  with  a  love  which  he  himself  compares 
to  that  of  human  friendship,  though  in  this  case  all 
comparisons  must  fall  infinitely  short  of  the  thing  in- 
tended to  be  illustrated  by  them.  He  interposed  in 
such  a  manner,  as  was  necessary  and  effectual  to  pre- 
vent that  execution  of  justice  upon  sinners,  which 
God  had  appointed  should  otherwise  have  been  exe- 
cuted upon  them  ;  or  in  such  a  manner  as  to  pre- 
vent that  punishment  from  actually  following,  which, 
according  to  the  general  laws  of  divine  government, 

*  P.  269,  &c.  f  Joh.  iii.  16/ 


276  The  Appointment  of  Part  II, 

must  have  followed  the  sins  of  the  world,  had  it  not 
been  for  such  interposition.* 

If  any  thing  here  said  should  appear,  upon  first 
thought,  inconsistent  with  divine  goodness,  a  second, 
I  am  persuaded,  will  entirely  remove  that  appearance. 
For  were  we  to  suppose  the  constitution  of  things  to 
be  such  as  that  the  whole  creation  must  have  perished, 
had  it  not  been  for  somewhat,  which  God  had  ap- 
pointed should  be,  in  order  to  prevent  that  ruin, — ■ 
even  this  supposition  would  not  be  inconsistent  in  any 
degree  with  the  most  absolutely  perfect  goodness.  But 
still  it  may  be  thought,  that  this  whole  manner  of 
treating  the  subject  before  us  supposes  mankind  to  be 
naturally  in  a  very  strange  state.  And  truly  so  it  does. 
But  it  is  not  Christianity  which  has  put  us  into  this 
state.  Whoever  will  consider  the  manifold  miseries, 
and  the  extreme  wickedness  of  the  world,  that  the  best 
have  great  wrongnesses  within  themselves,  which  they 
complain  of  and  endeavour  to  amend,  but  that  the 
generality  grow  more  profligate  and  corrupt  with  age  ; 
that  heathen  moralists  thought  the  present  state  to  be 

*  It  cannot,  I  suppose,  be  imagined,  even  by  the  most  cursory  reader, 
that  it  is  in  any  sort  affirmed  or  implied  in  any  tiling  said  in  this  chapter, 
that  none  can  have  the  benefit  of  the  general  Redemption  but  such  as  have 
the  advantage  of  being  made  acquainted  with  it  in  the  present  life.  But  it 
maybe  needful  to  mention,  that  several  questions  which  have  been  brought 
into  the  subject  before  us,  and  determined,  are  not  in  the  least  entered  into 
here  ;  questions  which  have  been,  I  fear,  rashly  determined,  and  perhaps 
frith  equal  rashness  contrary  ways.  For  instance,  whether  God  could  have 
saved  the  world  by  other  means  than  the  deitth  of  Christ,  consistently  with 
(he  general  laws  of  his  government.  And  had  not  Chrir.t  come  into  the 
world,  what  would  have  been  the  future  condition  of  the  better  sort  of  men, 
those  just  persons  over  the  face  of  the  earth,  for  whom  Manasset  in  his  pray- 
er asserts,  repentance  was  nor  appointed.  The  meaning  of  the  first  of  these 
questions  is  greatly  ambiguous;  and  neither  of  them  can  properly  be  answer- 
ed, without  going  upon  that  infinitely  absurd  supposition,  that  we  know  the 
whole  of  the  case.  And  perhaps  the  very  inquiry,  what  would  have  followed 
,f  God  bad  not  d.nr  as  h*  far,  may  have  in  it  some  very  great  impropriety,  and 
ought  not  to  be  carried  on  any  farther  than  is  necessary  to  hejp  our  partial 
and  inadequate  conceptions  of  ihu 


Chap.  V.         a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.  Tl*l 

a  state  of  punishment ;  and  what  might  be  added,  that 
the  earth  our  habitation  has  the  appearances  of  being 
a  ruin  ; — whoever,  T  say,  will  consider  all  these,  and 
some  other  obvious  things,  will  think  he  has  little  rea- 
son to  object  against  the  scripture  account,  that  man- 
kind is  in  a  state  of  degradation ;  against  this  being  the 
fact,  how  difficult  soever  he  may  think  it  to  account 
for,  or  even  to  form  a  distinct  conception  of  the  occa- 
sions-and  circumstances  of  it.  But  that  the  crime  of 
our  first  parents  was  the  occasion  of  our  being  placed 
in  a  more  disadvantageous  condition,  is  a  thing 
throughout  and  particularly  analogous  to  what  we  see 
in  the  daily  course  of  natural  providence  ;  as  the  re- 
covery of  the  world  by  the  interposition  of  Christ  has 
been  shewn  to  be  so  in  general. 

VI.  The  particular  manner  in  which  Christ  inter- 
posed in  the  redemption  of  the  world,  or  his  office  as 
mediator ',  in  the  largest  sense,  between  God  and  man,  is 
thus  represented  to  us  in  the  Scripture.  He  is  the 
light  of  the  world  ;*  the  revealer  of  the  will  of  God  in 
the  most  eminent  sense.  He  is  a  propitiatory  sacri- 
fice ;t  The  Lamb  of  God  ;\  and,  as  he  voluntarily  of- 
fered himself  up,  he  is  stiled  our  high  priest.  §  And, 
which  seems  of  peculiar  weight,  he  is  described  be- 
forehand in  the  Old  Testament,  under  the  same  char- 
acters of  a  priest,  and  an  expiatory  victim.  ||  And 
whereas  it  is  objected,  that  all  this  is  merely  by  way  of 
allusion  to  the  sacrifices  of  the  Mosaick  law,  the  apos- 
tle on  the  contrary  affirms,  that  the  law  was  a  shad- 
ow of  good  things  to  come,  and  not  the  very  image  of  the 
things  ;**  and  that  the  priests  that  offer  gifts  according  to 

*  Joh.  i.  and  viii.  12.  f  Rom.  iii.  25,  and  v.  11.     1  Cor.  v.  7.     Eph. 

v.  2.     1  Joh.  ii.  2.     Matth.  xxvi.  28.  \  Joh.  i.  29,  36,  and  through- 

out the  book  of  Revelation.  §  Throughout  the  Epistle  to  the  He- 

brews. H  Isai.  liii.     Dan.  ix.  24.     Ps,  ex.  4.  **  Heb.  x.  1. 


278  The  Appointment  of  Part  II. 

the  law — serve  unto  the  example  and  shadow  of  heaven- 
ly things ,  as  Moses  was  admonished  of  God  when  he  was 
about  to  make  the  tabernacle.  For  see,  saith  he,  that  tbou 
make  all  things  according  to  the  pattern  shewed  to  thee  in 
the  mount  ;*  i.  e.  the  Leviticai  priesthood  was  a  shad- 
ow of  the  priesthood  of  Christ,  in  like  manner  as  the 
tabernacle  made  by  Moses,  was  according  to  that  shew- 
ed him  in  the  mount.  The  priesthood  of  Christ,  and 
the  tabernacle  in  the  mount,  were  the  originals ;  of 
the  former  of  which  the  Leviticai  priesthood  was  a 
type,  and  of  the  latter  the  tabernacle  made  by  Moses 
was  a  copy.  The  doctrine  of  this  epistle  then  plainly 
is,  that  the  legal  sacrifices  were  allusions  to  the  great 
and  final  atonement,  to  be  made  by  the  blood  of 
Christ ;  and  not  that  this  was  an  allusion  to  those. 
Nor  can  any  thing  be  more  express  or  determinate, 
than  the  following  passage.  //  is  not  possible  that  the 
blood  of  bulls  and  of  goats  should  take  away  sin.  Where- 
fore  when  he  comet h  into  the  world,  he  saith,  sacrifice  and 
offering,  i.  e.  of  bulls  and  of  goats,  thou  wouldest  not,  but 
a  body  hast  thou  prepared  me — Lo  I  come  to  do  thy  will 
0  God — By  which  will  we  are  sanctified,  through  the 
offering  of  the  body  of  Jesus  Christ  once  for  alL\  And  to 
add  one  passage  more  of  the  like  kind — Christ  was  once 
offered  to  bear  the  sins  of  many,  and  unto  them  that  look 
for  him  shall  he  appear  the  second  time,  without  sin,  i.  e. 
without  bearing  sin  as  he  did  at  his  first  coming,  by 
being  an  offering  for  it,  without  having  our  iniquities 
again  laid  upon  him,  without  being  any  more  a  sin  of- 
fering ; — unto  them  that  look  for  him  shall  he  appear  the 
second  time,  without  sin,  unto  salvation.\  Nor  do  the 
inspired  writers  at  all  confine  themselves  to  this  man- 
ner of  speaking  concerning  the  satisfaction  of  Christ, 
but  declare  an  efficacy  in  what  he  did  and  suffered  for 

*  Heb   viiL  4,  5.         f  Heb.  x.    4,  5,  7,  9,   10.      J  Heb.  ix    28. 


Chap.  V.        a  Mediate  and  Redeemer.  27# 

us,  additional  to  and  beyond  mere  instruction,  exam- 
ple and  government,  in  great  variety  of  expression  ; 
That  Jesus  should  die  for  that  nation  the  Jews  ;  and  not 
for  that  nation  only,  but  that  also,  plainly  by  the  efficacy 
of  his  death,  he  should  gather  together  in  one,  the  children 
of  God  that  were  scattered  abroad  ;*  that  he  suffered  for 
sins,  the  just  for  the  unjust  ;f  that  he  gave  his  life,  himself, 
a  ransom  ;\  that  we  are  bought,  bought  with  a  -price  ;§ 
that  he  redeemed  us  with  his  blood  ;  redeemed  us  from  the 
curse  of  the  law,  being  made  a  curse  for  us  ;||  that  he  is 
our   advocate,    intercessor  and  propitiation  ;**  that  he 
was  made  perfect,  or  consummate,  through  sufferings  ; 
and  being  thus  made  perfect,  he  became  the  author  of  sal- 
vat  ion  ;ft  that  God  was  in  Christ  reconciling  the  world 
to  himself  by  the  death  of  his  son,  by  the  cross,  not  imputing 
their  trespasses  unto  them  ;\\   and  lastly,  that  through 
derth  he  destroyed  him  that  had  the  power  of  death. %% 
Christ  then  having  thus  humbled  himself  ,  and  become  obe» 
dient  to  death,  even  the  death  of  the  cross,  God  also  hath 
highly  exalted  him,  and  given  him  a  name  which  is  above 
every  name  ;  hath  given  all  things  into  his  hands  ;  hath 
committed  all  judgment  unto  him  ;  that  all  men  should  hon- 
our the  Son  even  as  they  honour  the  Father, \\\\    For,  wor- 
thy is  the  lamb  that  was  slain,  to  receive  power,  and  rich* 
es,  and  wisdom,  and  strength,  and  honour,  and  glory,  and 
blessing.     And  every  creature  which  is  in  heaven,  and  on 
the  earth,  heard  I,  saying,  Blessing,  and  honour,  and  glo- 
ry, and  power,  be  unto  him  that  sitteth  upon  the  throne, 
and  unto  the  Lamb  for  ever  and eve tM 

*  Joh.  xi.  51,  52.  f  1  Pet.  iii.   18.  \  Matth.  xx.  28.     Mark  x, 

45.     1  Tim.  ii.  6.  §  2  Pet.  ii.  1.     Rev.  xiv.  4.     1  Cor.  vi.  20. 

|f  1  Pet.  i.  19.  Rev.v.  9.  Gal.  iii.  13.  *  **  Heb.  vii.  25.  1  Joh.  ii, 
1,  2.  ff  Heb.  ii.  10,  and  v.  9.  #  2  Cor.  v.  19.  Rom.  v.  10.  Eph. 
n.  16.  §§  Heb.  5.  1 4,     See  also  a  remarkable  passage  in  the  Book  of 

Job,  xxxiii.  24,  flg  Phil.  ii.  §,  9.     Joh,  iij.  85,  and  v.  25*  £§, 

j  Rev.  v.  12,  m: 


2S0  The  Appointment  of  Part  II. 

These  passages  of  Scripture  seem  to  comprehend 
and  express  the  chief  parts  of  Christ's  office,  as  media- 
tor between  God  and  man,  so  far,  I  mean,  as  the  na- 
ture of  this  his  office  is  revealed  ;  and  it  is  usually 
treated  of  by  divines  under  three  heads. 

First,  he  was,  by  way  of  eminence,  the  prophet  ; 
that  prophet  that  should  come  into  the  world*  to  declare 
the  divine  will.  He  published  anew  the  law  of  nature 
which  men  had  corrupted,  and  the  very  knowledge  of 
which,  to  some  degree,  was  lost  among  them.  He 
taught  mankind,  taught  us  authoritatively,  to  live  so- 
berly, righteously  and  godly  in  this  present  world,  in  ex- 
pectation of  the  future  judgment  of  God.  He  con- 
firmed the  truth  of  this  moral  system  of  nature,  and 
gave  us  additional  evidence  of  it,  the  evidence  of  tes- 
timony.! He  distinctly  revealed  the  manner  in  which 
God  would  be  worshipped,  the  efficacy  of  repentance, 
and  the  rewards  and  punishments  of  a  future  life. 
Thus  he  was  a  prophet  in  a  sense  in  which  no  other 
ever  was.  To  which  is  to  be  added,  that  he  set  us  a 
perfect  example,  that  we  should  follow  his  steps. 

Secondly,  he  has  a  kingdom,  which  is  not  of  this  world. 
He  founded  a  church,  to  be  to  mankind  a  standing 
memorial  of  religion,  and  invitation  to  it,  which  he 
promised  to  be  with  always  even  to  the  end.  He  ex- 
ercises an  invisible  government  over  it  himself,  and  by 
his  Spirit  ;  over  that  part  of  it  which  is  militant  here 
on  earth,  a  government  of  discipline,/^  the  perfecting 
of  the  saints,  for  the  edifying  his  body,  till  we  all  come, 
in  the  unity  of  the  faith,  and  of  the  knowledge  of  the  Son 
of  God,  unto  a  perfect  man,  unto  the  measure  of  the  stature 
jf  the  fulness  of  Chrht.\  Of  this  church,  all  persons 
scattered  over  the  world,  who  live  in  obedience  to  his 
laws,  are  members.     For  these  he  is  gone  to  prepare  a 

-   Joh.   v\   14.  f   P.  L'lC,  &c.  \  £ph.  iv.  12,   IS. 


Chap.  V.      a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.  281 

place,  and  will  come  again  to  receive  them  unto  himself  \ 
that  where  he  h  there  they  may  be  also — and  reign  with 
him  for  ever  and  ever  ;*  and  likewise  to  take  vengeance 
on  them  that  know  not  God,  and  obey  not  his  Gospel ,f 

Against  these  parts  of  Christ's  office,  I  find  no  ob- 
jections but  what  are  fully  obviated  in  the  beginning 
of  this  chapter. 

Lastly,  Christ  offered  himself  a  propitiatory  sacrifice, 
and  made  atonement  for  the  sins  of  the  world  ;  which 
is  mentioned  last  in  regard  to  what  is  objected  against 
it.  Sacrifices  of  expiation  were  commanded  the  Jews, 
and  obtained  amongst  most  other  nations  from  tradi- 
tion, whose  original  probably  was  revelation.  And 
they  were  continually  repeated,  both  occasionally,  and 
at  the  returns  of  stated  times,  and  made  up  great  part 
of  the  external  religion  of  mankind.  But  now  once  in 
the  end  of  the  world  Christ  appeared  to  put  away  sin  by 
the  sacrifice  of  himself  \  And  this  sacrifice  was,  in  the 
highest  degree  and  with  the  most  extensive  influence* 
of  that  efficacy  for  obtaining  pardon  of  sin,  which  the 
heathens  may  be  supposed  to  have  thought  their  sac- 
rifices to  have  been,  and  which  the  Jewish  sacrifices 
really  were  in  some  degree,  and  with  regard  to  some 
persons. 

How  and  in  what  particular  way  it  had  this  efficacy, 
there  are  not  wanting  persons  who  have  endeavoured 
to  explain  ;  but  I  do  not  find  that  the  Scripture  has 
explained  it.  We  seem  to  be  very  much  in  the  dark 
concerning  the  manner  in  which  the  ancients  under- 
stood atonement  to  be  made,  i.  e.  pardon  to  be  ob- 
tained by  sacrifices.  And  if  the  Scripture  has,  as 
surely  it  has,  left  this  matter  of  the  satisfaction  of 
Christ  mysterious,  left  somewhat  in  it  unrevealed,  all 

*  Joh.  xiv.  2,  3.     Rev.  mil .  21.  and  xi.  15. 

f  2  Thess.  i.  8.  f  Heb.  ir.  26. 

N    N 


282  The  Appointment  of  Part  II. 

conjectures  about  it  must  be,  if  not  evidently  absurd, 
yet  at  least  uncertain.  Nor  has  any  one  reason  to 
complain  for  want  of  farther  information,  unless  he 
can  shew  his  claim  to  it. 

Some  having  endeavoured  to  explain  the  efficacy  of 
what  Christ  has  done  and  suffered  for  us,  beyond  what 
the  Scripture  has  authorized,  others,  probably  because 
they  could  not  explain  it,  have  been  for  taking  it  away, 
and  confining  his  office  as  redeemer  of  the  world  to  his 
instruction,  example  and  government  of  the  church. 
Whereas  the  doctrine  of  the  gospel  appears  to  be,  not 
only  that  he  taught  the  efficacy  of  repentance,  but 
rendered  it  of  the  efficacy  which  it  is  by  what  he  did 
and  suffered  for  us  ;  that  he  obtained  for  us  the  ben- 
efit of  having  our  repentance  accepted  unto  eternal 
life  ;  not  only  that  he  revealed  to  sinners  that  they 
were  in  a  capacity  of  salvation,  and  how  they  might 
obtain  it,  but  moreover  that  he  put  them  into  this 
capacity  of  salvation  by  what  he  did  and  suffered  for 
them  ;  put  us  into  a  capacity  of  escaping  future  pun- 
ishment, and  obtaining  future  happiness.  And  it  is 
our  wisdom  thankfully  to  accept  the  benefit,  by  per- 
forming  the  conditions  upon  which  it  is  offered  on  our 
part,  without  disputing  how  it  was  procured  on  his, 
For, 

VII.  Since  we  neither  know  by  what  means  punish- 
ment in  a  future  state  would  have  followed  wickedness 
in  this  ;  nor  in  what  manner  it  would  have  been  in- 
flicted had  it  not  been  prevented  ;  nor  all  the  reasons 
why  its  infliction  would  have  been  needful  ;  nor  the 
particular  nature  of  that  state  of  happiness  which 
Christ  is  gone  to  prepare  for  his  disciples  ;  and  since 
we  are  ignorant  how  far  any  thing  which  we  could  do 
would,  alone  and  of  itself,  have  been  effectual  to  pre- 
vent that  punishment  to  which  we  were  obnoxious, 


Chap.  V.        a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.  283 

and  recover  that  happiness  which  we  had  forfeited, — 
it  is  most  evident  we  are  not  judges  antecedently  to 
revelation,  whether  a  mediator  was  or  was  not  neces- 
sary to  obtain  those  ends,  to  prevent  that  future  pun- 
ishment, and  bring  mankind  to  the  final  happiness  of 
their  nature.  And  for  the  very  same  reasons,  upon 
supposition  of  the  necessity  of  a  mediator,  we  are  no 
more  judges  antecedently  to  revelation,  of  the  whole 
nature  of  his  office,  or  the  several  parts  of  which  it  con- 
sists, of  what  was  fit  and  requisite  to  be  assigned  him, 
in  order  to  accomplish  the  ends  of  divine  Providence 
in  the  appointment.  And  from  hence  it  follows,  that 
to  object  against  the  expediency  or  usefulness  of  par- 
ticular things,  revealed  to  have  been  done  or  suffered 
by  him,  because  we  do  not  see  how  they  were  condu- 
cive to  those  ends,  is  highly  absurd.  Yet  nothing  is 
more  common  to  be  met  with  than  this  absurdity. 
But  if  it  be  acknowledged  beforehand  that  we  are  not 
judges  in  the  case,  it  is  evident  that  no  objection  can, 
with  any  shadow  of  reason,  be  urged  against  any  par- 
ticular part  of  Christ's  mediatorial  office  revealed  in 
Scripture,  till  it  can  be  shewn  positively  not  to  be  re- 
quisite or  conducive  to  the  ends  proposed  to  be  accom- 
plished, or  that  it  is  in  itself  unreasonable. 

And  there  is  one  objection  made  against  the  satis- 
faction of  Christ,  which  looks  to  be  of  this  positive 
kind,  that  the  doctrine  of  his  being  appointed  to  suf- 
fer for  the  sins  of  the  world,  represents  God  as  being 
indifferent  whether  he  punished  the  innocent  or  the 
guilty.  Now  from  the  foregoing  observations  we  may 
see  the  extreme  slightness  of  all  such  objections  ;  and 
(though  it  is  most  certain  all  who  make  them  do  not 
see  the  consequence)  that  they  conclude  altogether  as 
much  against  God's  whole  original  constitution  of  na- 
ture, and  the  whole  dailv  course  of  divine  Providence 


284  The  Appointment  of  Part  II. 

in  the  government  of  the  world,  i.  e.  against  the  whole 
scheme  of  theism,  and  the  whole  notion  of  religion,  as 
against  Christianity.  For  the  world  is  a  constitution 
or  system,  whose  parts  have  a  mutual  reference  to  each 
other  ;  and  there  is  a  scheme  of  things  gradually  car- 
rying on,  called  the  course  of  nature,  to  the  carrying 
on  of  which  God  has  appointed  us,  in  various  ways, 
to  contribute.  And  when,  in  the  daily  course  of  nat- 
ural providence,  it  is  appointed  that  innocent  people 
should  suffer  for  the  faults  of  the  guilty,  this  is  liable 
to  the  very  same  objection  as  the  instance  we  are  now 
considering.  The  infinitely  greater  importance  of  that 
appointment  of  Christianity  which  is  objected  against, 
does  not  hinder  but  it  may  be,  as  it  plainly  is,  an  ap- 
pointment of  the  very  same  kind  with  what  the  world 
affords  us  daily  examples  of.  Nay,  if  there  were  any 
force  at  all  in  the  objection,  it  would  be  stijpnger  in 
one  respect  against  natural  providence  than  against 
Christianity  ;  because  under  the  former  we  are  in 
many  cases  commanded,  and  even  necessitated  wheth- 
er we  will  or  not,  to  suffer  for  the  faults  of  others — 
whereas  the  sufferings  of  Christ  were  voluntary.  The 
world's  being  under  the  righteous  government  of  God 
does  indeed  imply  that,  finally  and  upon  the  whole, 
every  one  shall  receive  according  to  his  personal  de- 
serts ;  and  the  general  doctrine  of  the  whole  Scripture 
is,  that  this  shall  be  the  completion  of  the  divine  gov- 
ernment. But  during  the  progress,  and  for  aught  we 
know  even  in  order  to  the  completion  of  this  moral 
scheme,  vicarious  punishments  may  be  fit,  and  abso- 
lutely necessary.  Men  by  their  follies  run  themselves 
into  extreme  distress,  into  difficulties  which  would  be 
absolutely  fatal  to  them,  were  it  not  for  the  interposi- 
tion and  assistance  of  others.  God  commands  by 
the  law  of  nature,  that  we  afford  them  this  assistance* 


Chap.  V.        a  Mediator  and  Redeemer.  285 

in  many  cases  where  we  cannot  do  it  without  very- 
great  pains,  and  labour,  and  sufferings  to  ourselves. 
And  we  see  in  what  variety  of  ways  one  person's  suf- 
ferings contribute  to  the  relief  of  another  ;  and  how, 
or  by  what  particular  means,  this  comes  to  pass  or  fol- 
lows, from  the  con  titution  and  laws  of  nature  which 
come  under  our  notice  ;  and  being  familiarized  to  it 
men  are  not  shocked  with  it.  So  that  the  reason  of 
their  insisting  upon  objections  of  the  foregoing  kind 
against  the  satisfaction  of  Christ,  is,  either  that  they 
do  not.  consider  God's  settled  and  uniform  appoint- 
ments as  his  appointments  at  all,  or  else  they  forget 
that  vicarious  punishment  is  a  providential  appoint- 
ment of  every  day's  experience  ;  and  then,  from  their 
being  unacquainted  with  the  more  general  laws  of  na- 
ture Gr  divine  government  over  the  world,  and  not  see- 
ing how  the  sufferings  of  Christ  could  contribute  to 
the  redemption  of  it,  unless  by  arbitrary  and  tyranni- 
cal will. — they  conclude  his  sufferings  could  not  con- 
tribute to  it  any  other  way.  And  yet,  what  has  been 
often  alleged  in  justification  of  this  doctrine,  even  from 
the  apparent  natural  tendency  of  this  method  of  our 
redemption  ;  its  tendency  to  vindicate  the  authority 
of  God's  law.;,  and  deter  his  creatures  from  sin, — this 
has  never  yet  been  answered,  and  is  I  think  plainly  un- 
answerable, though  I  am  far  from  thinking  it  an  ac- 
count of  the  whole  of  the  case.  But  without  taking 
this  into  consideration,  it  abundantly  appears  from  the 
observations  above  made,  that  this  objection  is  not  an 
objection  against  Christianity,  but  against  the  whole 
general  constitution  of  nature.  And  if  it  were  to  be 
considered  as  an  objection  against  Christianity,  or  con- 
sidering it  as  it  is,  an  objection  against  the  constitu- 
tion of  nature, — it  amounts  to  no  more  in  conclusion 
than  this,  that  a  divine  appointment  cannot  be  neces- 


286  The  Appointment  of  Part  Ii. 

sary  or  expedient,  because  the  objector  does  not  dis- 
cern it  tc  be  so,  though  he  must  own  that  the  nature 
of  the  case  is  such,  as  renders  him  uncapable  of  judging 
whether  it  be  so  or  not,  or  of  seeing  it  to  be  necessary, 
though  it  were  so. 

It  is  indeed  a  matter  of  great  patience  to  reasonable 
men,  to  find  people  arguing  in  this  manner,  objecting 
against  the  credibility  of  such  particular  things  revealed 
in  Scripture,  that  they  do  not  see  the  necessity  or  expe- 
diency of  them.  For  though  it  is  highly  right,  and 
the  most  pious  exercise  of  our  understanding,  to  in- 
quire with  due  reverence  into  the  ends  and  reasons  of 
God's  dispensations, — yet  when  those  reasons  are  con- 
cealed, to  argue  from  our  ignorance  that  such  dispen- 
sations cannot  be  from  God,  is  infinitely  absurd.  The 
presumption  of  this  kind  of  objections  seems  almost 
lost  in  the  folly  of  them.  And  the  folly  of  them  is 
yet  greater,  when  they  are  urged,  as  usually  they  are, 
against  things  in  Christianity  analogous  or  like  to  those 
natural  dispensations  of  Providence  which  are  matter 
of  experience.  Let  reason  be  kept  to  ;  and  if  any 
part  of  the  scripture  account  of  the  redemption  of  the 
world  by  Christ  can  be  shewn  to  be  really  contrary  to 
it,  let  the  Scripture,  in  the  name  of  God,  be  given  up  ; 
but  let  not  such  poor  creatures  as  we,  go  on  objecting 
against  an  infinite  scheme,  that  we  do  not  see  the  ne- 
cessity or  usefulness  of  all  its  parts,  and  call  this  rea- 
soning ;  and,  which  still  farther  heightens  the  absurd- 
ity in  the  present  case,  parts  which  we  are  not  actively 
concerned  in.     For  it  may  be  worth  mentioning, 

Lastly,  that  not  only  the  reason  of  the  thing,  but 
the  whole  analogy  of  nature,  should  teach  us  not  to 
expect  to  have  the  like  information  concerning  the 
divine  conduct  as  concerning  our  own  duty.  God 
instructs    us  by  experience,  (for  it  is  not  reason,    but 


Chap.  V.         a  Mediator  and  Redeemer,  287 

experience  which  instructs  us)  what  good  or  bad  con* 
sequences  will  follow  from  our  acting  in  such  and  such 
manners ;  and  by  this  he  directs  us  how  we  are  to  be- 
have ourselves.  But,  though  we  are  sufficiently  in- 
structed  for  the  common  purposes  of  life,  yet  it  is  but 
an  almost  infinitely  small  part  of  natural  providence 
which  we  are  at  all  let  into.  The  case  is  the  same 
with  regard  to  revelation.  The  doctrine  of  a  mediator 
between  God  and  man,  against  which  it  is  objected 
that  the  expediency  of  some  things  in  it  is  not  under- 
stood, relates  only  to  what  was  done  on  God's  part  in 
the  appointment,  and  on  the  Mediator's  in  the  exe- 
cution of  it.  For  what  is  required  of  us,  in  conse- 
quence of  this  gracious  dispensation,  is  another  sub- 
ject in  which  none  can  complain  for  want  of  informa- 
tion. The  constitution  of  the  world,  and  God's  nat- 
ural government  over  it,  is  all  mystery,  as  much  as  the 
Christian  dispensation.  Yet  under  the  first  he  has 
given  men  all  things  pertaining  to  life,  and  under  the 
other  all  things  pertaining  unto  godliness.  And  it 
may  be  added,  that  there  is  nothing  hard  to  be  ac- 
counted for  in  any  of  the  common  precepts  of  Chris- 
tianity; though  if  there  were,  surely  a  divine  command 
is  abundantly  sufficient  to  lay  us  under  the  strongest 
obligations  to  obedience.  But  the  fact  is,  that  the 
reasons  of  all  the  Christian  precepts  are  evident.  Posi- 
tive institutions  are  manifestly  necessary  to  keep  up 
and  propagate  religion  amongst  mankind.  And  our 
duty  to  Christ,  the  internal  and  external  worship  of 
him  ;  this  part  of  the  religion  of  the  Gospel  manifest- 
ly arises  out  of  what  he  has  done  and  suffered,  his  au- 
thority and  dominion,  and  the  relation  which  he  is 
revealed  to  stand  in  to  us.* 

*  P.  223,  &c. 


28 S  Revelation  not   universal:         Part  II. 


CHAP.  VI. 

Of  the  want  of  Universality  in  Revelation  ;  and  of  the 
supposed  Deficiency  in  the  Proof  of  it. 

It  has  been  thought  by  some  persons,  that  if  the  ev- 
idence of  revelation  appears  doubtful,  this  itself  turns 
into  a  positive  argument  against  it,  because  it  cannot 
be  supposed  that  if  it  were  true  it  would  be  left  to  sub- 
sist upon  doubtful  evidence.  And  the  objection  against 
revelation  from  its  not  being  universal  is  often  insisted 
upon  as  of  great  weight. 

Now  the  weakness  of  these  opinions  may  be  shewn, 
by  observing  the  suppositions  on  which  they  are  foun- 
ded, which  are  really  such  as  these, — that  it  cannot  be 
thought  God  would  have  bestowed  any  favour  at  all 
upon  us,  unless  in  the  degree  which  we  think  he  might, 
and  which  we  imagine  would  be  most  to  our  particu- 
lar advantage  ;  and  also  that  it  cannot  be  thought  he 
would  bestow  a  favour  upon  any  unless  he  bestowed 
the  same  upon  all  ;  suppositions  which  we  find  contra- 
dicted not  by  a  few  instances  in  God's  natural  govern- 
ment of  the  world,  but  by  the  general  analogy  of  na- 
ture together. 

Persons  who  speak  of  the  evidence  of  religion  as 
doubtful,  and  of  this  supposed  doubtfulness  as  a  posi- 
tive argument  against  it,  should  be  put  upon  consid- 
ering what  that  evidence  indeed  is,  which  they  act  up- 
on with  regard  to  their  temporal  interests.  For,  it  is 
not  only  extremely  difficult,  but,  in  many  cases,  abso- 
lutely impossible,  to  balance  pleasure  and  pain,  satis- 


Chap.  VI.     Supposed  Deficiency  in  its  Proof.         289 

faction  and  uneasiness,  so  as  to  be  able  to  say  on  which 
side  the  overplus  is.  There  are  the  like  difficulties  and 
im possibilities  in  making  the  due  allowances  for  a 
change  of  temper  and  taste,  for  satiety,  disgusts,  ill 
health  ;  any  of  which  render  men  incapable  of  enjoy, 
ing,  after  they  have  obtained,  what  they  most  eagerly 
desired.  Numberless  too  are  the  accidents,  besides 
that  one  of  untimely  death,  which  may  even  probably 
disappoint  the  best  concerted  schemes  ;  and  strong  ob- 
jections are  often  seen  to  lie  against  them,  not  to  be  re- 
moved or  answered,  but  which  seem  overbalanced  by 
reasons  on  the  other  side  ;  so  as  that  the  certain  dif- 
ficulties and  dangers  of  the  pursuit  are,  by  every  one, 
thought  justly  disregarded,  upon  account  of  the  ap- 
pearing greater  advantages  in  case  of  success,  though 
there  be  but  little  probability  of  it.  Lastly,  every  one 
observes  our  liableness,  if  we  be  not  upon  our  guard, 
to  be  deceived  by  the  falsehood  of  men,  and  the  false 
appearances  of  things ;  and  this  danger  must  be  greatly 
increased,  if  there  be  a  strong  bias  within,  suppose 
from  indulged  passion,  to  favour  the  deceit.  Hence 
arises  that  great  uncertainty  and  doubtfulness  of  proof, 
wherein  our  temporal  interest  really  consists,  what  are 
the  most  probable  means  of  attaining  it,  and  whether 
those  means  will  eventually  be  successful.  And  num- 
berless instances  there  are,  in  the  daily  course  of  life, 
in  which  all  men  think  it  reasonable  to  engage  in  pur* 
suits,  though  the  probability  is  greatly  against  suc- 
ceeding, and  to  make  such  provision  for  themselves, 
as  it  is  supposable  they  may  have  occasion  for,  though 
the  plain  acknowledged  probability  is  that  they  never 
shall.  Then  those  who  think  the  objection  against 
revelation,  from  its  light  not  being  universal,  to  be  of 
weight,  should  observe,  that  the  Author  of  nature,  in 
numberless  instances,  bestows  that  upon  some  which 

o  o 


290  Revelation  not  universal :         Part  II, 

he  does  not  upon  others  who  seem  equally  to  stand  in 
need  of  it.  Indeed  he  appears  to  bestow  all  his  gifts 
with  the  most  promiscuous  variety  among  creatures 
of  the  same  species ;  health  and  strength,  capacities 
of  prudence  and  of  knowledge,  means  of  improvement, 
riches,  and  all  external  advantages.  And  as  there  are 
not  any  two  men  found  of  exactly  like  shape  and  fea- 
tures, so  it  is  probable  there  are  not  any  two  of  an  ex- 
actly like  constitution,  temper  and  situation,  with  re- 
gard to  the  goods  and  evils  of  life.  Yet,  notwithstand- 
ing these  uncertainties  and  varieties.,  God  does  exercise 
a  natural  government  over  the  world,  and  there  is  such 
a  thing  as  a  prudent  and  imprudent  institution  of  life,, 
with  regard  to  our  health  and  our  affairs,  under  that 
his  natural  government. 

As  neither  the  Jewish  nor  Christian^revelation  have 
been  universal,  and  as  they  have  been  afforded  to  a 
greater  or  less  part  of  the  world,  at  different  times, 
so  likewise  at  different  times  both  revelations  have  had 
different  degrees  of  evidence.  The  Jews  who  lived 
during  the  succession  of  prophets,  that  is,  from  Moses 
till  after  the  captivity,  had  higher  evidence  of  the 
truth  of  their  religion,  than  those  had,  who  lived  in 
the  interval  between  the  last  mentioned  period  and 
the  coming  of  Christ.  And  the  first  Christians  had 
higher  evidence  of  the  miracles  wrought  in  attestation 
of  Christianity  than  what  we  have  now.  They  had 
also  a  strong  presumptive  proof  of  the  truth  of  it,  per- 
haps of  much  greater  force,  in  way  of  argument,  than 
many  think,  of  which  we  have  very  little  remaining  ; 
I  mean  the  presumptive  proof  of  its  truth,  from  the 
influence  which  it  had  upon  the  lives  of  the  generality 
of  its  professors.  And  we,  or  future  ages,  may  possi- 
bly have  a  proof  oh  it,  which  they  could  not  have, 
from  the  conformity  between  the  prophetick  history 


Chap.  VI.     Supposed  Deficiency  in  its  Proof.         291 

and  the  state  of  the  world  and  of  Christianity.     And 
farther,  if  we  were  to  suppose  the  evidence  which  some 
have  of  religion  to  amount  to  little  more  than  seeing 
that  it  may  be  true,  but  that   they  remain  in  great 
doubts  and  uncertainties  about  both  its  evidence  and 
its  nature,  and  great  perplexities  concerning  the  rule 
of  life  ;  others  to  have  a  full  conviction  of  the  truth 
of  religion,  with  a  distinct  knowledge  of  their  duty  ; 
and  others  severally  to  have  all  the  intermediate  de- 
grees of  religious  light  and  evidence,   which  lie  be- 
tween these  two, — if  we  put  the  case,  that  for  the  pres- 
ent it  was  intended  revelation  should  be  no  more  than 
a  small   light,  in  the  midst  of  a  world  greatly  over- 
spread, notwithstanding  it,  with  ignorance  and  dark- 
ness  ;  that  certain  glimmerings  of  this  light  should  ex- 
tend and  be   directed  to  remote  distances,  in  such  a 
manner  as  that  those  who  really  partook  of  it  should 
not  discern  from  whence  it  originally  came  ;  that  some 
in  a  nearer  situation  to  it  should  haye  its  light  obscur- 
ed,  and  in  different  ways  and  degrees  intercepted  ; 
and  that  others  should  be  placed  within  its  clearer  in- 
fluence, and  be  much  more  enlivened,  cheered  and  di- 
rected by  it ;  but  yet  that  even  to  these  it  should  be 
no  more  than  a  light  shining  in  a  dark  place  ; — all  this 
would  be  perfectly  uniform  and  of  a  piece  with  the 
conduct  of  Providence  in  the  distribution  of  its  other 
blessings.     If  the  fact  of  the  case  really  were,  that  some 
have  received  no  light  at  all  from  the  Scripture,  as 
many  ages  and  countries  in  the  heathen  world  ;  that 
others,  though  they  have  by  means  of  it  had  essential 
or  natural  religion  enforced  upon  their  consciences, 
yet  have  never  had  the  genuine  scripture  revelation 
with  its  real  evidence  proposed  to  their  consideration, 
and  the  ancient  Persians  and  modern  Mahometans  may 
possibly  be  instances  of  people  in  a  situation  somewhat 


292  Revelation  not  universal :  Part  II, 

like  to  this ;  that  others,  though  they  have  had  the 
Scripture  laid  before  them  as  of  divine  revelation,  yet 
have  had  it  with  the  system  and  evidence  of  Christianity 
so  interpolated,  the  system  so  corrupted,  the  evidence 
so  blended  with  false  miracles,  as  to  leave  the  mind  in 
the  utmost  doubtfulness  and  uncertainty  about  the 
whole  ;  which  may  be  the  state  of  some  thoughtful 
men,  in  most  of  those  nations  who  call  themselves 
Christian.  And  lastly,  that  others  have  had  Chris- 
tianity offered  to  them  in  its  genuine  simplicity,  and 
with  its  proper  evidence,  as  persons  in  countries  and 
churches  of  civil  and  of  Christian  liberty  ;  but  how- 
ever that  even  these  persons  are  left  in  great  ignorance 
in  many  respects,  and  have  by  no  means  light  afforded 
them  enough  to  satisfy  their  curiosity,  but  only  to 
regulate  their  life,  to  teach  them  their  duty,  and  en- 
courage them  in  the  careful  discharge  of  it :  I  say,  if 
we  were  to  suppose  this  somewhat  of  a  general  true 
account  of  the  degrees  of  moral  and  religious  light 
£nd  evidence,  which  were  intended  to  be  afforded 
mankind,  and  of  what  has  actually  been  and  is  their 
situation,  in  their  moral  and  religious  capacity,  there 
would  be  nothing  in  all  this  ignorance,  doubtfulness 
and  uncertainty,  in  all  these  varieties,  and  supposed 
disadvantages  of  some  in  comparison  of  others,  respect- 
ing religion,  but  may  be  paralleled  by  manifest  anal- 
ogies in  the  natural  dispensations  of  Providence  at 
present,  and  considering  ourselves  merely  in  our  tem- 
poral capacity. 

Nor  is  there  any  thing  shocking  in  all  this,  or  which 
would  seem  to  bear  hard  upon  the  moral  administra- 
tion in  nature,  if  we  would  really  keep  in  mind  that 
every  one  shall  be  dealt  equitably  with,  instead  of  for- 
getting this,  or  explaining  it  away,  after  it  is  acknowl- 
edged in  words.     All  shadow  of  injustice,  and  indee4 


Chap.  VI.     Supposed  Deficiency  in  its  Proof,         293 

all  harsh  appearances,  in  this  various  economy  of 
Providence,  would  be  lost,  if  we  would  keep  in  mind 
that  every  merciful  allowance  shall  be  made,  and  no 
more  be  required  of  any  one  than  what  might  have  been 
equitably  expected  of  him,  from  the  circumstances  in 
which  he  was  placed,  and  not  what  might  have  been 
expected  had  he  been  placed  in  other  circumstances  ; 
i.  e.  in  Scripture  language,  that  every  man  shall  be 
accepted  according  to  what  he  had,  not  according  to  what 
he  had  not*  This  however  doth  not  by  any  means 
imply  that  all  persons'  condition  here  is  equally  ad- 
vantageous with  respect,  to  futurity.  And  Provi- 
dence's designing  to  place  some  in  greater  darkness 
with  respect  to  religious  knowledge,  is  no  more  a  rea« 
son  why  they  should  not  endeavour  to  get  out  of  that 
darkness,  and  others  to  bring  them  out  of  it,  than 
why  ignorant  and  slow  people  in  matters  of  other 
knowledge  should  not  endeavour  to  learn,  or  should 
not  be  instructed. 

It  is  not  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  the  same  wise 
and  good  principle,  whatever  it  was,  which  disposed 
the  Author  of  nature  to  make  different  kinds  and  or- 
ders of  creatures,  disposed  him  also  to  place  creatures 
of  like  kinds  in  different  situations ;  and  that  the  same 
principle  which  disposed  him  to  make  creatures  of  dif- 
ferent moral  capacities,  disposed  him  also  to  place 
creatures  of  like  moral  capacities  in  different  religious 
situations,  and  even  the  same  creatures  in  different  pe- 
riods of  their  being.  And  the  account  or  rea  on  of 
this  is  also  most  probably  the  account,  why  the  con- 
stitution of  things  is  such,  as  that  creatures  of  moral 
natures  or  capacities,  for  a  considerable  part  of  that  du- 
ration in  which  they  are  living  agents,  are  not  at  all 
subjects  of  morality  and  religion,  but  grow  up  to  be 

*  2  Cor.  viii.  12. 


294  Revelation  not  universal :  Part  IL 

so,  and  grow  up  to  be  so  more  and  more,  gradually 
from  childhood  to  mature  age. 

What,  in  particular,  is  the  account  or  reason  of 
these  things,  we  must  be  greatly  in  the  dark,  were  it 
only  that  we  know  so  very  little  even  of  our  own  case. 
Our  present  state  may  possibly  be  the  consequence  of 
somewhat  past  which  we  are  wholly  ignorant  of,  as  it 
has  a  reference  to  somewhat  to  come,  of  which  we 
know  scarce  any  more  than  is  necessary  for  practice. 
A  system  or  constitution,  in  its  notion,  implies  varie- 
ty ;  and  so  complicated  an  one  as  this  world,  very 
great  variety.  So  that  were  revelation  universal,  yet 
from  men's  different  capacities  of  understanding,  from 
the  different  lengths  ot  their  lives,  their  different  edu- 
cations and  other  external  circumstances,  and  from 
their  difference  of  temper  and  bodily  constitution, — 
their  religious  situations  would  be  widely  different, 
and  the  disadvantage  of  some  in  comparison  of  others, 
perhaps,  altogether  as  much  as  at  present.  And  the 
true  account,  whatever  it  be,  why  mankind,  or  such  a 
part  of  mankind,  are  placed  in  this  condition  of  igno- 
rance, must  be  supposed  also  the  true  account  of  our 
farther  ignorance,  in  not  knowing  the  reasons  why  or 
whence  it  is  that  they  are  placed  in  this  condition. 
But  the  following  practical  reflections  may  deserve  the 
serious  consideration  of  those  persons  who  think  the 
circumstances  of  mankind  or  their  own,  in  the  fore- 
mentioned  respects,  aground  of  complaint. 

First,  the  evidence  of  religion  not  appearing  ob- 
vious, may  constitute  one  particular  part  of  some  men's 
trial  in  the  religious  sense,  as  it  gives  scope  for  a  virtu- 
ous exercise  or  vicious  neglect  of  their  understanding, 
m  examining  or  not  examining  into  that  evidence. 
There  seems  no  possible  reason  to  be  given,  why  we 
may  not  be  in  a  state  of  moral  probation,  with  regard 


Chap.  VL     Supposed  Deficiency  in  its  Proof.  295 

to  the  exercise  of  our  understanding  upon  the  subject 
of  religion,  as  we  are  with  regard  to  our  behaviour  in 
common  affairs.  The  former  is  as  much  a  thing 
within  our  power  and  choice  as  the  latter.  And  I 
suppose  it  is  to  be  laid  down  for  certain,  that  the  same 
character,  the  same  inward  principle,  which,  after  a 
man  i  convinced  of  the  truth  of  religion,  renders  him 
obedient  to  the  precepts  of  it,  would,  were  he  not  thus 
convinced,  set  him  about  an  examination  of  it,  upon 
its  system  and  evidence  being  offered  to  his  thoughts  j 
and  that  in  the  latter  state  his  examination  would  be 
with  an  impartiality,  seriousness  and  solicitude  pro- 
portionable to  what  his  obedience  is  in  the  former. 
And  as  inattention,  negligence,  want  of  all  serious 
concern  about  a  matter  of  such  a  nature  and  such  im- 
portance, when  offered  to  men's  consideration,  is,  be- 
fore a  distinct  conviction  of  its  truth,  as  real  immoral 
depravity  and  dissoluteness,  as  neglect  of  religious  prac- 
tice after  such  conviction, — so  active  solicitude  about 
it,  and  fair  impartial  consideration  of  its  evidence  be- 
fore such  conviction,  is  as  really  an  exercise  of  a  morally 
right  temper  as  is  religious  practice  after.  Thus,  that 
religion  is  not  intuitively  true,  but  a  matter  of  deduc- 
tion and  inference  ;  that  a  conviction  of  its  truth  is 
not  forced  upon  every  one,  but  left  to  be,  by  some, 
collected  with  heedful  attention  to  premises  ;  this  as 
much  constitutes  religious  probation,  as  much  affords 
sphere,  scope,  opportunity,  for  right  and  wrong  behav- 
iour, as  any  thing  whatever  does.  And  their  man 
ner  of  treating  this  subject  when  laid  before  them, 
shews  what  is  in  their  heart,  and  is  an  exertion  of  it. 

Secondly,  it  appears  to  be  a  thing  as  evident,  though 
it  is  not  so  much  attended  to,  that  if  upon  considera- 
tion of  religion  the  evidence  of  it  should  seem  to  any 
persons  doubtful,  in  the  highest  supposable  degree. 


296  Revelation  not  universal :         Part  11. 

even  this  doubtful  evidence  will,  however,  put  them 
into  a  general  state  of  probation  in  the  moral  and  relig- 
ious sense.  For,  suppose  a  man  to  be  really  in  doubt 
whether  such  a  person  had  not  done  him  the  greatest 
favour,  or  whether  his  whole  temporal  interest  did  not 
depend  upon  that  person, — no  one,  who  had  any  sense 
of  gratitude  and  of  prudence,  could  possibly  consider 
himself  in  the  same  situation  with  regard  to  such  per- 
son, as  if  he  had  no  such  doubt.  In  truth,  it  is  as  just 
to  say  that  certainty  and  doubt  are  the  same,  as  to  say, 
the  situations  now  mentioned  would  leave  a  man  as  en- 
tirely at  liberty  in  point  of  gratitude  or  prudence,  as 
he  would  be  were  he  certain  he  had  received  no  favour 
from  such  person,  or  that  he  no  way  depended  upon 
him.  And  thus,  though  the  evidence  of  religion 
which  is  afforded  to  some  men  should  be  little  more 
than  that  they  are  given  to  see  the  system  of  Christian- 
ity, or  religion  in  general,  to  be  supposable  and  credi- 
ble,— this  ought  in  all  reason  to  beget  a  serious  prac- 
tical apprehension  that  it  may  be  true.  And  even  this 
will  afford  matter  of  exercise  for  religious  suspense  and 
deliberation,  for  moral  resolution  and  self  government, 
because  the  apprehension  that  religion  may  be  true, 
does  as  really  lay  men  under  obligations  as  a  full  con- 
viction that  it  is  true.  It  gives  occasion  and  motives 
to  consider  farther  the  important  subject,  to  preserve 
attentively  upon  their  minds  a  general  implicit  sense 
that  they  may  be  under  divine  moral  government,  an 
awful  solicitude  about  religion,  whether  natural  or  re- 
vealed. Such  apprehension  ought  to  turn  men's  eyes 
to  every  degree  of  nuw  light  which  may  be  had,  from 
whatever  side  it  comes,  and  induce  them  to  refrain  in 
the  mean  time  from  all  immoralities,  and  live  in  the 
conscientious  practice  of  every  common  virtue.  Es- 
pecially are  they  bound  to  keep  at  the  greatest  distance 


Chap.  VI.     Supposed  Deficiency  in  its  Proof.         29? 

from  all  dissolute  profaneness  j  for  this  the  very  nature 
of  the  case  forbids  ;  and  to  treat  with  highest  rever- 
ence a  matter,  upon  which  their  own  whole  interest 
and  being,  and  the  fate  of  nature  depends.  This  be- 
haviour, and  an  active  endeavour  to  maintain  within 
themselves  this  temper,  is  the  business,  the  duty,  and 
the  wisdom  of  those  persons,  who  complain  of  the 
doubtfulness  of  religion  ;  is  what  they  are  under*  the 
most  proper  obligations  to.  And  such  behaviour  is 
an  exertion  of,  and  has-  a  tendency  to  improve  in 
them  that  character,  which  the  practice  of  all  the  sev- 
eral duties  of  religion,  from  a  full  conviction  of  its' 
truth,  is  an  exertion  of,  and  has  a  tendency  to  improve 
in  others ;  others,  I  say,  to  whom  God  has  afforded 
such  conviction.  Nay,  considering  the  infinite  im- 
portance of  religion,  revealed  as  well  as  natural,  I  think 
it  may  be  said  in  general,  that  whoever  will  weigh  the 
matter  thoroughly  may  see  there  is  not  near  so  much 
difference  as  is  commonly  imagined,  between  what 
ought  in  reason  to  be  the  rule  of  life,  to  those  persons 
who  are  fully  convinced  of  its  truth,  and  to  those 
who  have  only  a  serious  doubting  apprehension  that 
it  may  be  true.  Their  hopes,  and  fears,  and  oh  liga- 
tions will  be  in  various  degrees;  but,  as  the  subject 
matter  of  their  hopes  and  fears  is  the  same,  so  the 
subject  matter  of  their  obligations,  what  they  are 
bound  to  do  and  to  refrain  from,  is  not  so  very  unlike. 
It  is  to  be  observed  farther,  thit  from  a  character 
of  understanding,  or  a  situation  of  influence  in  the 
world,  some  persons  have  it  in  their  power  to  do  infi- 
nitely more  harm  or  good,  by  setting  an  example  of 
profaneness  and  avowed  disregard  to  all  religion,  or, 
on  the  contrary,  of  a  serious,  though  perhaps  doubt- 
ing apprehension  of  its  truth,  and  of  a  reverend  re- 
gard to  it  under  this  doubtfulness,  than  they  can  dp, 
p  p 


•298  Revelation  not  universal :  Part  II. 

by  acting  well  or  III  in  all  the  common  intercourses 
amongst  mankind.  And  consequently  they  are  most 
highly  accountable  for  a  behaviour,  which  they  may 
easily  foresee  is  of  such  importance,  and  in  which 
there  is  most  plainly  a  right  and  a  wrong,  even  ad- 
mitting the  evidence  of  religion  to  be  as  doubtful  as 
is  pretended. 

Tn?  ground  of  these  observations,  and  that  which 
renders  them  just  and  true,  is,  that  doubting  necessa- 
rily implies  some  degree  of  evidence  for  that  of  which 
we  doubt.  For  no  person  would  be  in  doubt  con- 
cerning the  truth  of  a  number  of  facts  so  and  so  cir- 
cumstanced, which  should  accidentally  come  into  his 
thoughts,  and  of  which  he  had  no  evidence  at  all. 
And  though  in  the  case  of  an  even  chance,  and  where 
consequently  we  were  in  doubt,  we  should  in  common 
language  say  that  we  had  no  evidence  at  all  for  either 
side, — yet  that  situation  of  things,  which  renders  it 
an  even  chance  and  no  more,  that  such  an  event  will 
happen,  renders  this  case  equivalent  to  all  others, 
whore  there  is  such  evidence  on  both  sides  of  a  ques- 
tion,* as  leave>  the  mind  in  doubt  concerning  the 
truth.  Indeed  in  all  these  cases,  there  is  no  more  ev- 
idence on  one  side  than  on  the  other  ;  but  there  is 
(what  is  equivalent  to)  much  more  for  either  than 
for  the  truth  of  a  number  of  facts  which  come  into 
one's  thoughts  at  random.  And  thus  in  all  these 
cases  doubt  as  much  presupposes  evidence,  lower  de- 
grees of  evidence,  as  belief  presupposes  higher,  and 
certainty  higher  still.  Any  one  who  will  a  little  attend 
to  the  nature  of  evidence,  will  easily  carry  this  ob- 
servation on,  and  see  that  between  no  evidence  at  all, 
and  that  degree  of  it  which  affords  ground  of 
doubt,  there  are  as  many  intermediate  degrees,  as  there 

*  Introduction, 


Chap.  VI.     Supposed  Deficiency  in  its  Prorf.        299 

are  between  that  degree  which  is  the  ground  of  doubt, 
and  demonstration.  And  though  we  have  not  facul- 
ties to  distinguish  the^e  degrees  of  evidence  with  any 
sort  of  exactness,  yet  in  proportion  as  they  are  discern- 
ed they  ought  to  influence  our  practice.  *  For  it  is  as 
real  an  imperfection  in  the  moral  character,  not  to  be 
influenced  in  practice  by  a  lower  degree  of  evidence 
whrn  discerned,  as  it  is  in  the  understanding  not  to 
discern  it.  And  as  in  all  subjects  which  men  consider, 
they  discern  the  lower  as  well  as  higher  degrees  of  evi- 
dence,, proportionably  to  their  capacity  of  understand- 
ing,— so  in  practical  subjects  they  are  influenced  in 
practice,  by  the  lower  as  well  as  higher  degree>  of  it, 
proportionably  to  their  fairness  and  honesty.  And  as, 
in  proportion  to  defects  in  the  understanding,  men 
are  unapt  to  see  lower  degrees  of  evidence,  are  in  dan- 
ger of  overlooking  evidence  when  it  is  not  glaring, 
and  are  easily  imposed  upon  in  such  cases, — so  in  pro- 
portion to  the  corruption  of  the  heart,  they  seem  ca- 
pable of  satisfying  themselves  with  having  no  regard 
in  practice  to  evidence  acknowledged  real,  if  it  be  not 
overbearing.  From  these  things  it  must  follow,  that 
doubting  concerning  religion  implies  such  a  degree  of 
evidence  for  it  as,  joined  with  the  consideration  of  its 
importance,  unquestionably  lays  men  under  the  obli- 
gations before  mentioned  to  have  a  dutiful  regard  to 
it  in  all  their  behaviour.  n 

Thirdly,  the  difficulties  in  which  the  evidence  of 
religion  is  involved,  which  some  complain  of,  is  no 
more  a  just  ground  of  complaint,  than  the  external 
circumstances  of  temptation  which  others  are  placed 
in,  or  than  difficulties  in  the  practice  of  it  after  a 
full  conviction  of  its  truth.  Temptations  render  our 
state  a  more  improving  state  of  discipline*  than  it 

*  Part  I.  Chap.  v. 


300  Revelation  not  universal*  Part  II, 

would  be  otherwise,  as  they  give  occasion  for  a  more 
attentive  exercise  of  the  virtuous  principle,  which 
confirms  and  strengthens  it  more  than  an  easier  or  less 
attentive  exercise  of  it  could.  Now  speculative  diffi- 
culties are,  in  this  respect,  of  the  very  same  nature  with 
these  external  temptations.  For  the  evidence  of  reli- 
gion not  appearing  obvious,  is  to  some  persons  a  temp- 
tation to  reject  it,  without  any  consideration  at  all ;  and 
therefore  requires  such  an  attentive  exercise  of  the  vir- 
tuous principle,  seriously  to  consider  that  evidence,  as 
there  would  be  no  occasion  for  but  for  such  temptation. 
And  the  supposed  doubtfulness  of  its  evidence,  after 
it  has  been  in  some  sort  considered,  affords  opportu- 
nity to  an  unfair  minctof  explaining  away,  and  deceit- 
fully hiding  from  itself,  that  evidence  which  it  might 
see,  and  also  for  men's  encouraging  themselves  in  vice 
from  hopes  of  impunity,  though  they  do  clearly  see 
thus  much  at  least  that  these  hopes  are  uncertain ;  in 
like  manner  as  the  common  temptation  to  many  in- 
stances of  folly,  which  end  in  temporal  infamy  and 
ruin,  is  the  ground  for  hope  of  not  being  detected, 
and  of  escaping  with  impunity  ;  i.  e.  the  doubtful- 
ness of  the  proof  beforehand,  that  such  foolish  behav- 
iour will  thus  end  in  infamy  and  ruin.  On  the  con- 
trary, supposed  doubtfulness  in  the  evidence  of  re- 
ligion calls  for  a  more  careful  and  attentive  exercise  of 
the  virtuous  principle,  in  fairly  yielding  themselves  up 
to  the  proper  influence  of  any  real  evidence,  though 
doubtful,  and  in  practising  conscientiously  all  virtue, 
though  under  some  uncertainty  whether  the  govern- 
ment in  the  universe  may  not  possibly  be  such,  as 
that  vice  may  escape  with  impunity.  And  in  general, 
temptation,  meaning  by  this  word  the  lesser  allure- 
ments to  wrong  and  difficulties  in  the  discharge  of 
our  duly,  as  well  as  the  greater  ones— temptation,  I 


Chap,  VI.     Supposed  Deficiency  in  its  Proof.         301 

say,  as  such,  and  of  every  kind  and  degree,  as  it  calls 
forth  some  virtuous  efforts,  additional  to  what  would 
otherwise  have  been  wanting,  cannot  but  be  an  ad- 
ditional discipline  and  improvement  of  virtue,  as  well 
as  probation  of  it  in  the  other  senses  of  that  word.* 
So  that  the  very  same  account  is  to  be  given  why  the 
evidence  of  religion  should  be  left  in  such  a  manner, 
as  to  require  in  some  an  attentive,  solicitous  perhaps 
painful  exercise  of  their  understanding  about  it,  as  why 
others  should  be  placed  in  such  circumstances  as  that 
the  practice  of  its  common  duties,  after  a  full  convic- 
tion of  the  truth  of  it,  should  require  attention,  solici- 
tude and  pains ;  or,  why  appearing  doubtfulness 
should  be  permitted  to  afford  matter  of  temptation  to 
some,  as  why  external  difficulties  and  allurements 
should  be  permitted  to  afford  matter  of  temptation  to 
others.  The  same  account  also  is  to  be  given  why 
some  should  be  exercised  with  temptations  of  both 
these  kinds,  as  why  others  should  be  exercised  with 
the  latter  in  such  very  high  degrees  as  some  have  been, 
particularly  as  the  primitive  Christians  were. 

Nor  does  there  appear  any  absurdity  in  supposing, 
that  the  speculative  difficulties  in  which  the  evidence 
of  religion  is  involved,  may  make  even  the  principal 
part  of  some  persons'  trial.  For,  as  the  chief  tempta- 
tions of  the  generality  of  the  world  are,  the  ordinary 
motives  to  injustice  or  unrestrained  pleasure,  or  to  live 
in  the  neglect  of  religion,  from  that  frame  of  mind 
which  renders  many  persons  almost  without  feeling  as 
to  any  thing  distant,  or  which  is  not  the  object  of  their 
senses, — so  there  are  other  persons  without  this  shal- 
lowness of  temper,  persons  of  a  deeper  sense  as  to  what 
is  invisible  and  future  ;  who  not  only  see,  but  have  a 
general  practical  feeling,  that  what  is  to  come  will  be 

*  Part  I.  Chap.   v.  and  p.  174. 


302  Revelation  not  universal :  Part  IL 

present,  and  that  things  are  not  less  real  for  their  not 
being  the  objects  of  sense  ;  and  who,  from  their  nat- 
ural constitution  of  body  and  of  temper,  and  from 
their  external  condition,  may  have  small  temptations 
to  behave  ill,  small  difficulty  in  behaving  well  in  the 
common  course  of  life.  Now  when  these  latter  per- 
sons have  a  distinct  full  conviction  of  the  truth  of  re- 
ligion, without  any  possible  doubts  or  difficulties,  the 
practice  of  it  is  to  them  unavoidable,  unless  they  will 
do  a  constant  violence  to  their  own  minds  ;  and  re- 
ligion is  scarce  any  more  a  discipline  to  them  than  it 
rs  to  creatures  in  a  state  of  perfection.  Yet  these  per- 
sons may  possibly  stand  in  need  of  moral  discipline  and 
exercise  in  a  higher  degree,  than  they  would  have  by 
such  an  easy  practice  of  religion.  Or  it  may  be  requi- 
site for  reasons  unknown  to  us,  that  they  should  give 
some  firther  manifestation*  what  is  their  moral  char- 
acter, to  the  creation  of  God,  than  such  a  practice  of 
it  would  be.  Thus  in  the  great  variety  of  religious 
situations  in  which  men  are  placed,  what  constitutes, 
what  chiefly  and  peculiarly  constitutes  the  probation, 
in  all  senses,  of  some  persons,  may  be  the  difficulties  in 
which  the  evidence  of  religion  is  involved  -,  and  their 
prL  cipal  and  distinguished  trial  may  be,  how  they  will 
behave  under  and  with  respect  to  these  difficulties. 
Circumstances  in  men's  situation  in  their  temporal  ca- 
pacity, analogous  in  good  measure  to  this  respecting 
religion,  are  to  be  observed.  We  find  some  persons  are 
placed  in  such  a  situation  in  the  world,  as  that  their 
chief  difficulty  with  regard  to  conduct,  is  not  the  do- 
ing what  is  prudent  when  it  is  known,  for  this  in  num- 
berless cases  is  as  easy  as  the  contrary,  but  to  some  the 
principal  exercise  is,  recollection  and  being  upon  their 
guard  against  deceits,  the  deceits  suppose  of  those  about 

•  P.  174. 


Chap.  VI.     Supposed  Deficiency  in  its  Proof.         303 

them,  against  false  appearances  of  reason  and  prudence. 
To  persons  in  some  situations  the  principal  exercise 
with  respect  to  conduct  is,  attention  in  order  to  inform 
themselves  what  is  proper,  what  is  really  the  reasona- 
ble and  prudent  part  to  act. 

But  as  I  have  hitherto  gone  upon  supposition,  that 
men's  dissatisfaction  with  the  evidence  of  religion  is  not 
owing  to  their  neglects  or  prejudices,  it  must  be  added 
on  the  other  hand,  in  all  common  reason,  and  as  what 
the  truth  of  the  case  plainly  requires  should  be  added, 
that  such  dissatisfaction  possibly  may  be  owing  to  those, 
possibly  may  be  men's  own  fault.     For, 

If  there  are  any  persons  who  never  set  themselves 
heartily  and  in  earnest  to  be  informed  in  religion ;  if 
there  are  any  who  secretly  wish  it  may  not  prove  true, 
and  are  less  attentive  to  evidence  than  to  difficulties, 
and  more  to  objections  than  to  what  is  said  in  answer 
to  them, — these  persons  will  scarce  be  thought  in  a 
likely  way  of  seeing  the  evidence  of  religion,  though  it 
were  most  certainly  true,  and  capable  of  being  ever  so 
fully  proved.  If  any  accustom  themselves  to  consider 
this  subject  usually  in  the  way  of  mirth  and  sport ;  if 
they  attend  to  forms  and  representations,  and  inade- 
quate manners  of  expression,  instead  of  the  real  things 
intended  by  them  ;  (for  signs  often  can  be  no  more 
than  inadequately  expressive  of  the  things  signified)  or 
if  they  substitute  human  errors  in  the  room  of  divine 
truth, — why  may  not  all,  or  any  of  these  things,  hin- 
der some  men  from  seeing  that  evidence  which  really 
is  seen  by  others,  as  a  like  turn  of  mind  with  respect 
to  matters  of  common  speculation  and  practice,  does, 
we  find  by  experience,  hinder  them  from  attaining  that 
knowledge  and  right  understanding,  in  matters  of  com- 
mon speculation  and  practice,  which  more  fair  and  at- 
tentive minds  attain  to  ?  And  the  effect  will  be  the 


304  Revelation  not  universal:  Part  II. 

same,  whether  their  neglect  of  seriously  considering  the 
evidence  of  religion,  and  their  indirect  behaviour  with 
regard  to  it,  proceed  from  mere  carelessness,  or  from 
the  grosser  vices  ;  or  whether   it  be  owing    to  this, 
that  forms  and  figurative  manners  of  expression,  as 
well  as  errors,  administer  occasions  of  ridicule,  when 
the  things  intended  and   the  truth  itself  would  not. 
Men  may  indulge  a  ludicrous  turn  so  far  as  to  lose  all 
sense  of  conduct  and  prudence  in  worldly  affairs,  and 
even  as  it  seems   to  impair  their  faculty    of  reason. 
And  in  general,  levity,  carelessness,  passion  and  preju- 
dice do  hinder  us  from  being  rightly  informed  with 
respect  to  common  things ;  and  they  may  in  like  man- 
ner, and  perhaps  in  some  farther  providential  manner, 
with  respect  to  moral  and  religious  subjects  ;  may  hin- 
der evidence  from  being  laid  before  us,  and  from  be- 
ing seen  when  it  is.     The  Scripture*  does  declare  that 
every  one  shall  not  understand.     And  it  makes  no  dif- 
ference by  what  prov  dential   conduct  this  comes   to 
pass  ;  whether  the  evidence  of   Christianity  was,  ori- 
ginally and  with  design,  put  and  left  so  as  that  those 
who  are  desirous  of  evading  moral  obligations  should 
not  see  it,  and  that  honest  minded  persons  should  ;  or 
whether  it  comes  to  pass  by  any  other  means. 

Farther,  the  general  proof  of  natural  religion  and 
of  Christianity,  does,  I  think,  lie  level  to  common 
men  ;  even  those,  the  greatest  part  of  whose  time, 
from  childhood  to  old  age,  is  taken  up  with  providing 

•  Dan.  xii.  10.  See  also  Isai.  xxix.  13,14.  Matth.  vi.  23,  and  xi.  25, 
and  xiii  II,  12.  Joh.  iii.  19.  Joh.  v  44.  1  Cor.  ii.  14,  and  2  Cor.  i v.  4. 
S  Tim.  iii.  IS,  and  that  affectionate,  as  well  as  authoritative  admonition,  so 
very  many  times  inculcated,  He  that  bath  ears  to  bear,  let  bim  bear.  Croiius 
saw  so  strongly  the  thing  intended  in  these  and  other  passages  of  Scripture 
of  the  like  sense,  as  to  say  that  the  proof  given  us  of  Christianity  was  less 
than  it  might  have  l>een,  for  this  very  purpose  :  Ut  Ha  scrmo  Evaiigetti  tan- 
quj'u  lapis  esst-t  LyJius  ad  quern  ingenia  sanabilia  exflorarentur.  De  Ver.  R.  C 
L.  2,  towards  the  end. 


Chap.  VI.     Supposed  Deficiency  in  its  Proof.         S03 

for  themselves  and  their  families  the  common  conven- 
iences, perhapN  necessaries  of  life  ;  those  I  mean  of 
this  rank,  who  ever  think  at  all  of  asking  after  proof  or 
attending  to  it.  Common  men,  were  they  as  much 
in  earnest  about  religion  as  about  their  temporal  af- 
fairs, are  capable  of  being  convinced  upon  real  evi- 
dence, that  there  is  a  God  who  governs  the  world  ; 
and  they  feel  themselves  to  be  of  a  moral  nature,  and 
accountable  creatures.  And  as  Christianity  entirely 
falls  in  with  this  their  natural  sense  of  things,  so  they 
are  capable,  not  only  of  being  persuaded,  but  of  being 
made  to  see,  that  there  is  evidence  of  miracles  wrought 
in  attestation  of  it,  and  many  appearing  completions 
of  prophecy*  But  though  this  proof  is  real  and  con- 
clusive, yet  it  is  liable  to  objections,  and  may  be  run 
up  into  difficulties  ;  which,  however,  persons  who  are 
capable  not  only  of  talking  of,  but  of  really  seeing,  are 
capable  also  of  seeing  through  ;  i.  e.  not  of  clearing  up 
and  answering  them  so  as  to  satisfy  their  curiosity,  for 
of  such  knowledge  we  are  not  capable  with  respect  to 
any  one  thing  in  nature,  but  capable  of  seeing  that  the 
proof  is  not  lost  in  these  difficulties,  or  destroyed  by 
these  objections.  But  then  a  thorough  examination 
into  religion  with  regard  to  these  objections,  which 
cannot  be  the  business  of  every  man,  is  a  matter  of 
pretty  large  compass,  and  from  the  nature  of  it  requires 
some  knowledge,  as  well  as  time  and  attention,  to  see 
how  the  evidence  comes  out  upon  balancing  one  thing 
with  another,  and  what  upon  the  whole  is  the  amount 
of  it.  Now  if  persons  who  have  picked  up  these  ob- 
jections from  others,  and  take  for  granted  they  are 
of  weight,  upon  the  word  of  those  from  whom  they 
received  them,  or  by  often  retailing  of  them  come  to 
see  or  fancy  they  see  them  to  be  of  weight,  will  not 
prepare  themselves  for  such   an  examination  with  a 

QQ 


306  Revelation  not  universal :         Part  II. 

competent  degree  of  knowledge,  or  will  not  give  that 
time  and  attention  to  the  subject,  which  from  the  na- 
ture of  it  is  necessary  for  attaining  such  information, — 
in  this  case  they  must  remain  in  doubtfulness,  igno- 
rance or  error,  in  the  same  way  as  they  must  with  re- 
gard to  common  sciences,  and  matters  of  common  life, 
if  they  neglect  the  necessary  means  of  being  informed 
in  them. 

But  stiil  perhaps  it  will  be  objected,  that  if  a  prince 
or  common  master  were  to  send  directions  to  a  ser> 
vant,  he  would  take  care  that  they  should  always  bear 
the  certain  marks  who  they  came  from,  and  that  their 
sense  should  be  always  plain,  so  as  that  there  should  be 
no  possible  doubt,  if  he  could  help  it,  concerning  the 
authority  or  meaning  of  them.     Now  the  proper  an- 
swer to  all  this  kind  of  objections  is,  that,  wherever 
the  fallacy  lies,  it  is  even  certain  we  cannot  argue  thus 
with  respect  to  him  who  is  the  governor  of  the  world  ; 
and  particularly  that  he  does  not   afford  us  such  in- 
formation with  respect  to  our  temporal  affairs  and  in- 
terests, as  experience  abundantly    shews.     However, 
there  is  a  full  answer  to  this  objection  from  the  very 
nature  of  religion.     For,  the  reason  why  a  prince 
would  give  his  directions  in   this   plain  manner,  is, 
that  he   absolutely  desires   such  an   external   action 
should  be  done,  without  concerning  himself  with  the 
motive  or  principle  upon  which  it  is  done  ;  i.  e.  he 
regards  only  the  external  event,  or  the  thing's  being 
done,  and  not  at  all,   properly  speaking,   the  doing  of 
it,  or  the  action.     Whereas  the  whole  of  morality  and 
religion  consisting  merely  in  action  itself,    there  is  no 
sort  of  parallel  between  the  cases.     But  if  the   prince 
be  supposed  to  regard  only  the  action,  i.  e.  only  to  de- 
sire to  exercise  or  in  any  sense  prove  the  understanding 
or  loyalty  of  a  servant,  he  would  not  always   give  his 


Chap.  VI.     Supposed  Deficiency  in  its  Proof.         307 

orders  in  such  a  plain  manner.  It  may  be  proper  to 
add,  that  the  will  of  God  respecting  morality  and  re- 
ligion may  be  considered  either  as  absolute  or  as  only 
conditional.  If  it  be  absolute,  it  can  only  be  thus, 
that  we  should  act  virtuously  in  such  given  circum- 
stances ;  not  that  we  should  be  brought  to  act  so  by 
his  changing  of  our  circumstances.  And.  if  God's 
will  be  thus  absolute,  then  it  is  in  our  power,  in  the 
highest  and  strictest  sense,  to  do  or  to  contradict  his 
will,  which  is  a  most  weighty  consideration.  Or  his 
will  may  be  considered  only  as  conditional,  that  if  we 
act  so  and  so  we  shall  be  rewarded  ;  if  otherwise,  pun- 
ished ;  of  which  conditional  will  of  the  Author  of  na- 
ture the  whole  constitution  of  it  affords  most  certain 
instances. 

Upon  the  whole — that  we  are  in  a  state  of  religion 
necessarily  implies  that  we  are  in  a  state  of  probation  ; 
and  the  credibility  of  our  being  at  all  in  such  a  state 
being  admitted,  there  seems  no  peculiar  difficulty  in 
supposing  our  probation  to  be  just  as  it  is  in  those  re- 
spects which  are  above  objected  against.  There  seems 
no  pretence,  from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  to  say,  that  the 
trial  cannot  equitably  be  any  thing,  but  whether  per- 
sons will  act  suitably  to  certain  information,  or  such  as 
admits  no  room  for  doubt ;  so  as  that  there  can  be  no 
danger  of  miscarriage,  but  either  from  their  not  at- 
tending to  what  they  certainly  know,  or  from  over- 
bearing passion  hurrying  them  on  to  act  contrary  to 
it.  For,  since  ignorance  and  doubt  afford  scope  for 
probation  in  all  senses,  as  really  as  intuitive  conviction 
or  certainty,  and  since  the  two  former  are  to  be  put 
to  the  same  account  as  difficulties  in  practice, — men's 
moral  probation  may  also  be,  whether  they  will  take 
due  care  to  inform  themselves  by  impartial  considera- 
tion, and   afterwards  whether  they  will  act  as  the  case 


308  Revelation  not  universal :  Part  II. 

requires,  upon  the  evidence  which  they  have,  however 
doubtful.     And    this,  we  find  by   experience,  is  fre- 
quently our    probation,*   in  our  temporal  capacity* 
For,  the  information  which  we  want  with   regard  to 
our  worldly  interests  is  by  no  means  always  given    us 
of  course,  without  any  care  of  our  own.     And  we  are 
greatly  liable  to  self  deceit  from  inward  secret   preju- 
dices, and  also  to  the  deceits  of  others.     So  that  to  be 
able  to  judge  what  is  the  prudent  part,  often  requires 
much    and  difficult    consideration.      Then   after    we 
have  judged  the  very  best  we  can,  the  evidence  upon 
which  we  must  act,  if  we  will  live  and  act  at  all,  is  per- 
petually doubtful    to  a  very  high    degree.     And   the 
constitution  and  course  of  the  world  in  fact  is  such,  as 
that  want  of  impartial  consideration   what  we  have  to 
do,  and  venturing   upon  extravagant    courses  because 
it  is  doubtful  what  will  be  the  consequence,  are  often 
naturally,  i.  e.  providentially,  altogether  as   fatal   as 
misconduct    occasioned    by  heedless    inattention   to 
what  we  certainly  know,  or  disregarding  it  from  over- 
bearing passion. 

Several  of  the  observations  here  made  may  well 
seem  strange,  perhaps  unintelligible,  to  many  good 
men.  But  if  the  persons  for  whose  sake  they  are  made 
think  so — persons  who  object  as  above,  and  throw  off 
all  regard  to  religion  under  pretence  of  want  of  evi- 
dence,— I  desire  them  to  consider  again  whether  their 
thinking  so  be  owing  to  any  thing  unintelligible  in 
these  observations,  or  to  their  own  not  having  such  a 
sense  of  religion  and  serious  solicitude  about  it  as  even 
their  state  of  scepticism  does  in  all  reason  require.  It 
ought  to  be  forced  upon  the  reflection  of  these  per- 
sons, that  our  nature  and  condition  necessarily  require 

*   P.   107,  299,  302,  303. 


Chap.  VI.     Supposed  Deficiency  in  its  Proof.  309 

us,  in  the  daily  course  of  life,  to  act  upon  evidence 
much  lower  than  what  is  commonly  called  probable  ; 
to  guard  not  only  against  what  we  fully  believe  will, 
but  also  against  what  we  think  it  supposable  may, 
happen  ;  and  to  engage  in  pursuits  when  the  proba- 
bility is  greatly  against  success,  if  it  be  credible  that 
possibly  we  may  succeed  in  them. 


310  Of  the  particular  Evidence        Part  II. 


CHAP.  VIT. 

Of  the  particular   Evidence  for  Christianity, 

The  presumptions  against  revelation,  and  objections 
against  the  general  scheme  of  Christianity  and  partic- 
ular things  relating  to  it,  being  removed,  there  remains 
to  be  considered  what  positive  evidence  we  have  for 
the  truth  of  it,  chiefly  in  order  to  see  what  the  analogy 
of  nature  suggests  with  regard  to  that  evidence  and  the 
objections  against  it,  or  to  see  what  is,  and  is  allowed 
to  be,  the  plain  natural  rule  of  judgment  and  of  action* 
in  our  temporal  concerns,  in  cases  where  we  have  the 
same  kind  of  evidence  and  the  same  kind  of  objections 
against  it  that  we  have  in  the  case  before  us. 

Now  in  the  evidence  of  Christianity  there  seem  to 
be  several  things  of  great  weight,  not  reducible  to  the 
head  either  of  miracles  or  the  completion  of  prophecy, 
in  the  common  acceptation  of  the  words.  But  these 
two  are  its  direct  and  fundamental  proofs,  and  those 
other  things,  however  considerable  they  are,  yet  ought 
never  to  be  urged  apart  from  its  direct  proofs,  but  al- 
ways to  be  joined  with  them.  Thus  the  evidence  of 
Christianity  will  be  a  long  series  of  things,  reaching, 
as  it  seems,  from  the  beginning  of  the  world  to  the 
present  time,  of  great  variety  and  compass,  taking  in 
both  the  direct  and  also  the  collateral  proofs,  and 
making  up,  all  of  them  together,  one  argument  ;  the 
conviction  arising  from  which  kind  of  proof  may  be 
compared  to  what  we  call  the  effect  in  architecture  or 
other  works  of  art,  a  result  from  a  great  number    of 


Chap.  VII.  for  Christianity.  311 

things  so  and  so  disposed,  and  taken  into  one  view. 
I  shall  therefore,  first,  make  some  observations  re- 
lating to  miracles  and  the  appearing  completions  of 
prophecy,  and  consider  what  analogy  suggests  in  an- 
swer to  the  objections  brought  against  this  evidence. 
And,  secondly,  I  shall  endeavour  to  give  some  ac- 
count of  the  general  argument  now  mentioned,  con- 
sisting both  of  the  direct  and  collateral  evidence,  con- 
sidered as  making  up  one  argument ;  this  being  the 
kind  of  proof  upon  which  we  determine  most  questions 
of  difficulty,  concerning  common  facts,  alleged  to  have 
happened  or  seeming  likely  to  happen,  especially  ques- 
tions relating  to  conduct. 

First,  I  shall  make  some  observations  upon  the  di- 
rect proof  of  Christianity  from  miracles  and  prophecy, 
and  upon  the  objections  alleged  against  it. 

I.  Now  the  following  observations  relating  to  the 
historical  evidence  of  miracles  wrought  in  attestation 
of  Christianity  appear  to  be  of  great  weight. 

1 .  The  Old  Testament  affords  us  the  same  historic- 
al evidence  of  the  miracles  of  Moses  and  of  the  proph- 
ets, as  of  the  common  civil  history  of  Moses  and  the 
kings  of  Israel,  or  as  of  the  affairs  of  the  Jewish  nation. 
And  the  Gospels  and  the  Acts  afford  us  the  same  his- 
torical evidence  of  the  miracles  of  Christ  and  the  apos- 
tles, as  of  the  common  matters  related  in  them.  This 
indeed  could  not  have  been  affirmed  by  any  reasonable 
man,  if  the  authors  of  these  books,  like  many  other 
historians,  had  appeared  to  make  an  entertaining  man- 
ner of  writing  their  aim,  though  they  had  interspersed 
miracles  in  their  works,  at  proper  distances  and  upon 
proper  occasions.  These  might  have  animated  a  dull 
relation,  amused  the  reader,  and  engaged  his  atten- 
tion. And  the  same  account  would  naturally  have 
been  given  of  them  as  of  the  speeches  and  description- 


3l2  Of  the  particular  Evidence       Part  1L 

of  such  authors  ;  the  same  account,  in  a  manner,  as  is 
to  be  given  why  the  poets  make  use  of  wonders  and 
prodigies.     But  the  facts,  both  miraculous  and  natu- 
ral, in  Scripture,  are  related  in  plain  unadorned  narra- 
tives, and  both  of  them  appear,  in  all  respects,  to  stand 
upon  the  same  foot  of  historical  evidence.     Farther — 
some  parts  of  Scripture,  containing  an  account  of  mir- 
acles fully  sufficient  to  prove  the  truth  of  Christianity, 
are    quoted  as  genuine,  from    the  age  in  which  they 
are  said  to  be  written,  down  to  the  present ;  and  no 
other  parts  of  them,  material  in  the  present  question, 
are  omitted  to  be  quoted  in  such  manner  as  to  afford 
any  sort  of  proof  of  their  not  being  genuine.     And  as 
common  history,  when  called  in  question  in  any  in- 
stance, may    often  be  greatly  confirmed  by  cotempo- 
rary  or  subsequent  events  more  known  and  acknowl- 
edged, and  as  the  common  scripture  history,  like  many 
others,  is  thus  confirmed, — so  likewise  is  the  miracu- 
lous history  of  it,  not  only  in  particular  instances,  but 
in  general.     For  the  establishment  of  the  Jewish  and 
Christian    religions,  which   were  events  cotemporary 
with   the  miracles  related  to  be  wrought  in  attesta- 
tion  of  both,  or  subsequent    to  them,  these  events 
are  just  what  we  should  have  expected,  upon  supposi- 
tion such  miracles  were   really  wrought   to  attest  the 
truth  of  those  religions.     These   miracles   are  a  satis- 
factory account  of  those  events ;  of  which  no  other 
satisfactory  account  can  be  given,  nor  any  account  at 
all  but   what  is    imaginary  merely  and  invented.     It 
is  to  be  added,  that  the  most  obvious,    the  most  easy 
and  direct  account  of  this  history,   how  it  came  to  be 
written  and  to  be  received  in  the  world,  as  a  true  his- 
tory, is,  that  it  really  is  so  ;  nor  can  any  other  account 
of   it  be  easy  and   direct.     Now,  though  an  account 
not  at  all  obvious,  but  very   far  fetched  and  indirect, 


Chap.  VIL  for  Christianity.  313 

may  indeed  be,  and  often  is,  the  true  account  of  a  mat- 
ter,— >yet  it  cannot  be  admitted  on  the  authority  of  its 
being  asserted.  Mere  guess,  supposition,  and  possibil* 
ity,  when  opposed  to  historical  evidence,  prove  nothing 
but  that  historical  evidence  is  not  demonstrative. 

Now  the  just  consequence  from  all  this,  I  tjiink,  is, 
that  the  scripture  history  in  general  is  to  be  admitted 
as  an  authentick  genuine  history,  till  somewhat  posi* 
tive  be  alleged  sufficient  to  invalidate  it.  But  no  man 
will  deny  the  consequence  to  be,  that  it  cannot  be 
rejected,  or  thrown  by  as  of  no  authority,  till  it  can 
be  proved  to  be  of  none  ;  even  though  the  evidence 
now  mentioned  for  its  authority  were  doubtful.  This 
evidence  may  be  confronted  by  historical  evidence  on 
the  other  side,  if  there  be  any  ;  or  general  incredibility 
in  the  things  related,  or  inconsistence  in  the  general 
turn  of  the  history,  would  prove  it  to  be  of  no  author- 
ity. But  since,  upon  the  face  of  the  matter,  upon  a 
first  and  general  view,  the  appearance  is  that  it  is  an 
authentick  history,  it  cannot  be  determined  to  be  fic- 
titious without  some  proof  that  it  is  so.  And  the  fol- 
lowing  observations,  in  support  of  these  and  coincident 
with  them,  will  greatly  confirm  the  historical  evidence 
for  the  truth  of  Christianity. 

2.  The  epistles  of  St.  Paul,  from  the  nature  of 
epistolary  writing,  and  moreover  from  several  of  them 
being  written,  not  to  particular  persons,  but  to  church- 
es, carry  in  them  evidences  of  their  being  genuine, 
beyond  what  can  be  in  a  mere  histbrical  narrative,  left 
to  the  world  at  large.  This  evidence,  joined  with  that 
which  they  have  in  common  with  the  rest  of  the  New 
Testament,  seems  not  to  leave  so  much  as  any  particu- 
lar pretence  for  denying  their  genuineness,  considered 
as  an  ordinary  matter  of  fact,  or  of  criticism  ;  I  say 
particular  pretence  for  denying  it,  because  any  single 

R    R 


314  Of  the  particular  Evidence         Part  IL 

fact,  of  such  a  kind  and  such  antiquity,  may  have  gen* 
eral  doubts  raised  concerning  it,  fr^m  the  very  nature 
of  human  affairs  and  human  testimony.  There  u  also 
to  be  mentioned,  a  distinct  and  particular  evidence  of 
the  genuineness  of  the  epistle  chiefly  referred  to  here, 
the  firsLto  the  Corinthians,  from  the  manner  in  which 
it  is  quoted  by  Clemens  Romanus,  in  an  epistle  of  his 
own  to  that  church.*  Now  these  epistles  afford  a 
proof  of  Christianity,,  detached  from  all  others,  which 
is,  I  think,  a  thing  of  weight,  and  also  a  proof  of  a  na- 
ture and  kind  peculiar  to  itself.     For, 

In  them  the  author  declares,  that  he  received  the 
Gospel  in  general,  and  the  institution  of  the  Commu- 
nion in  particular,  not  from  the  rest  of  the  apostles,  or 
jointly  together  with  them,  but  alone,  from  Christ 
himself,  whom  he  declares  likewise,  conformably  to 
the  h^tory  in  the  Jets,  that  he  saw  after  his  ascen- 
sion t  So  that  the  testimony  of  St.  Paul  is  to  be 
considered  as  detached  from  that  of  the  rest  of  the 
apostles. 

And  he  declares  farther,  that  he  was  endued  with  a 
power  of  working  miracles,  as  what  was  publickly 
known  to  those  very  people — speaks  of  frequent  and 
great  variety  of  miraculous  gifts,  as  then  subsisting  in 
those  very  churches  to  which  he  was  writing,  which  he 
was  reproving  for  several  irregularities,  and  where  he 
had  personal  oppo  ers  ;  he  mentions  these  gifts  inci- 
dentally, in  the  most  easy  manner  and  without  effort, 
by  way  of  reproof  to  those  who  had  them,  for  their 
indecent  u-e  of  them,  and  by  way  of  depreciating 
them,  in  comparison  of  moral  virtues  ;  in  short,  he 
speaks  to  these  churches,  of  these  miraculous  powers, 
in  the  manner  any  one  would  speak  to  another  of  a 
thing,  which  was  as  familiar  and  as  much  known  in 

*  Clem.  Rom.  Ep. J.  c.  47.         f  Gal.  i.     1  Cor.  xi.  23,   &c.     1  Cor.  xv.8. 


Chap.  VII.  for  Cbrisfjamty.  315 

common  to  them  both,  as  any  thing  in  the  world.* 
And  this,  as  hath  been  observed  by  several  persons,  is 
surely  a  very  considerable  thing. 

3.     It  is  an    acknowledged    historical    fact,    that 
Christianity  offered  itself  to  the  world,  and  demanded 
to  be  received,  upon  the  allegation,  i.  e.  as  unbeliev- 
ers would  speak,  upon  the  pretence  of  miracles,  pub- 
lickly  wrought  to  attest  the  truth  of  it  in  such  an  age, 
and  that  it  was  actually  received  by  great  numbers  in 
that  very  age,  and  upon  the  professed  belief  of  the  re- 
ality of  these  miracles.     And  Christianity,  including 
the  dispensation  of  the  Old  Testament,  seems   distin- 
guished by  this  from  all  other  religions.     1  mean,  that 
this  does  not  appear  to  be  the  case  with  regard  to  any 
other ;  for  surely  it  will  not  be  supposed  to  lie  upon 
any  person,  to  prove  by  positive  historical  evidence  that 
it  was  not.     It  does  in  no  sort  appear  that  Mahomet- 
anism  was  first  received  in  the  world  upon  the  foot  of 
supposed  miracles,!  i.  e.  publick  ones  ;  for,  as  revela- 
tion is  itself  miraculous,  all  pretence  to  it  must  neces- 
sarily imply  some  pretence   of  miracles.     And  it  is  a 
known  fact  that  it  was  immediately,  at  the  very  first, 
propagated  by  other  means.     And  as  particular  insti- 
tutions, whether  in  paganism  or  popery,  said  to  be 
confirmed  by  miracles  after  those  institutions  had  ob- 
tained, are  not  to  the  purpose, — so  were  there  what 
might  be  called  historical  proof,  that  any  cf  them  were 
introduced   by  a  supposed  divine  command,  believed 
to  be  atte  ted  by  miracles, — these  would  not  be  in  any 
wise  parallel.     For  single  things  of  this  sort  are  easy  to 
be  accounted  for,  after  parties  are  formed   and  have 
power  in  their  hands,  and  the  leaders  of  them  are  in 

*  Rom.  xv.  19.     1  Cor.  xii.  8,  9,  10—28,  &c.   and  ch.  xiii,  1,  2,  8,  and 
the  whole  xivth  ch.     2  Cor.  xii.  12,  13.     Gal.  iii.  2,   5. 
f  See  the  Koran,  c.  xiii.  and  c.  xvii. 


316  Of  the  particular  Evidence         Part  II. 

veneration  with  the  multitude,  and  political  interests 
are  blended  with  religious  claims  and  religious  distinc- 
tions. But  before  any  thing  of  this  kind,  for  a  few 
persons,  and  those  of  the  lowest  rank,  all  at  once  to 
bring  over  such  great  numbers  to  a  new  religion,  and 
get  it  to  be  received  upon  the  particular  evidence  of 
miracles, — this  is  quite  another  thing.  And  I  think 
it  will  be  allowed  by  any  fair  adversary,  that  the  fact 
now  mentioned,  taking  in  all  the  circumstances  of  it, 
is  peculiar  to  the  Christian  religion.  However,  the 
fact  itself  is  allowed  that  Christianity  obtained,  i.  e. 
was  professed  to  be  received  in  the  world,  upon  the  be- 
lief of  miracles,  immediately  in  the  age  in  which  it  is 
said  those  miracles  were  wrought ;  or  that  this  is  what 
its  first  converts  would  have  alleged,  as  the  reason  for 
their  embracing  it.  Now  certainly  it  is  not  to  be  sup- 
posed, that  such  numbers  of  men,  in  the  most  distant 
parts  of  the  world,  should  forsake  the  religion  of  their 
country  in  which  they  had  been  educated,  separate 
themselves  from  their  friends,  particularly  in  their  fes- 
tival shows  and  solemnities,  to  which  the  common 
people  are  so  greatly  addicted,  and  which  were  of  a  na- 
ture to  engage  them  much  more  than  any  thing  of 
that  sort  amongst  us,  and  embrace  a  religion  which 
could  not  but  expose  them  to  many  inconveniences, 
and  indeed  must  have  been  a  giving  up  the  world  in  a 
great  degree,  even  from  the  very  first,  and  before  the 
empire  engaged  in  form  against  them, — it  cannot  be 
supposed  that  such  numbers  should  make  so  great, 
and,  to  say  the  least,  so  inconvenient  a  change  in  their 
whole  institution  of  life,  unless  they  were  really  con- 
vinced of  the  truth  of  those  miracles,  upon  the  knowl- 
edge or  belief  of  which  they  professed  to  make  it. 
And  it  will,  I  suppose,  readily  be  acknowledged,  that 
the  generality  of  the  first  converts  to  Christianity  must 


Chap.  VII.  for  Christianity.  317 

have  believed  them  ;  that  as  by  becoming  Christians 
th.7  declared  to  the  world  they  were  satisfied  of  the 
truth  of  those  miracles, — so  this  declaration  was  to  be 
credited.  And  this  their  testimony  is  the  same  kind 
of  evidence  for  those  miracles  as  if  they  had  put  it  in 
writing,  and  these  writings  had  come  down  to  u?. 
And  it  is  real  evidence,  because  it  is  of  facts  which 
they  had  capacity  and  full  opportunity  to  inform 
themselves  of.  It  is  also  distinct  from  the  direct  or 
express  historical  evidence,  though  it  is  of  the  same 
kind  ;  and  it  would  be  allowed  to  be  distinct  in  all 
cases.  For  were  a  fact  expres  ly  related  by  one  or 
more  ancient  historians,  ?nd  disputed  in  after  ages; 
that  this  fact  is  acknowledged  to  have  been  believed 
by  great  numbers  of  the  age  in  which  the  historian 
says  it  was  done,  would  be  allowed  an  additional  proof 
of  >uch  fact,  quite  distinct  from  the  express  testimony 
of  the  historian.  The  credulity  of  mankind  is  ac- 
knowledged, and  the  suspicions  of  mankind  ought  to 
be  acknowledged  too,  and  their  backwardness  even  to 
believe,  and  greater  still  to  practise,  what  makes  against 
their  interest.  And  it  must  particularly  be  remember- 
ed, that  education,  and  prejudice,  and  authority,  were 
against  Christianity,  in  the  age  I  am  speaking  of.  So 
that  the  immediate  conversion  of  such  numbers,  is  a 
real  presumption  of  somewhat  more  than  human  in 
this  matter  ;  I  say  presumption,  for  it  is  not  alleged  as 
a  proof  alone  and  by  itself.  Nor  need  any  one  of  the 
things  mentioned  in  this  chapter  be  considered  as  a 
proof  by  itself ;  and  yet  all  of  them  together  may  be 
one  of  the  strongest. 

Upon  the  whole — as  there  is  large  historical  evi- 
dence, both  direct  and  circumstantial,  of  miracles 
wrought  in  attestation  of  Christianity,  collected  by 
those  who  have  writ  upon  the  subject, — it  lies  upon 


318  Of  the  particular  Evidence        Part  II. 

unbelievers  to  shew,  why  this  evidence  is  not  to  be 
credited.  This  way  of  speaking  is,  1  think,  just,  and 
what  persons  who  write  in  defence  of  religion  naturally 
fall  into.  Yet,  in  a  matter  of  such  unspeakable  im- 
portance, the  proper  question  is,  not  whom  it  lies  up- 
on, according  to  the  rules  of  argument,  to  maintain 
or  confute  objections,  but  whether  there  really  are  any 
against  this  evidence,  sufficient  in  reason  to  destroy  the 
credit  of  it.  However,  unbelievers  seem  to  take  upon 
them  the  part  of  shewing  that  there  are. 

They  allege,  that  numberless  enthusiastick  people, 
in  different  ages  and  countries,  expose  themselves  to 
the  same  difficulties  which  the  primitive  Christians 
did,  and  are  ready  to  give  up  their  lives  for  the  most 
idle  follies  imaginable.  But  it  is  not  very  clear  to  what 
purpose  this  objection  is  brought.  For  every  one 
surely,  in  every  case,  must  distinguish  between  opinions 
and  facts.  And  though  testimony  is  no  proof  of  en- 
thusiastick opinions,  or  of  any  opinions  at  all,  yet  it  is 
allowed  in  all  other  cases  to  be  a  proof  of  facts.  And 
a  person's  laying  down  his  life  in  attestation  of  facts  or 
of  opinions,  is  the  strongest  proof  of  his  believing  them. 
And  if  the  apostles  and  their  cotemporaries  did  believe 
the  facts,  in  attestation  of  which  they  exposed  them- 
selves to  sufferings  and  death,  this  their  belief  or  rather 
knowledge,  must  be  a  proof  of  those  facts  ;  for  they 
were  such  as  came  under  the  observation  of  their  sen- 
ses. And  though  it  is  not  of  equal  weight,  yet  it  is  of 
weight  that  the  martyrs  of  the  next  age,  notwithstand- 
ing they  were  not  eye  witnesses  of  those  facts,  as  were 
the  apostles  and  their  cotemporaries,  had,  however, 
full  opportunity  to  inform  themselves  whether  they  were 
true  or  not,  and  gave  equal  proof  of  their  believing 
them  to  be  true. 

But  enthusiasm,  it  is  said,  greatly  weakens  the  evj- 


Chap.  VII.  for  Christianity.  319 

dence  of  testimony  even  for  facts,  in  matters  relating 
to  religion  ;  some  seem  to  think  it  totally  and  abso- 
lutely destroys  the  evidence  of  testimony  upon  this 
subject.  And  indeed  the  poweft  of  enthusiasm,  and 
of  diseases  too  which  operate  in  a  like  manner,  are  very 
wonderful  in  particular  instances.  But  if  great  num- 
bers of  men,  not  appearing  in  any  peculiar  degree  weak, 
nor  under  any  peculiar  suspicion  of  negligence,  affirm 
that  they  saw  and  heard  such  things  plainly  with  their 
eyes  and  their  ears,  and  are  admitted  to  be  in  earnest, — 
such  testimony  is  evidence  of  the  strongest  kind  we  can 
have  for  any  matter  of  fact.  Yet  possibly  it  may  be 
overcome,  strong  as  it  is,  by  incredibility  in  the  things 
thus  attested,  or  by  contrary  testimony.  And  in  an 
instance  where  one  thought  it  was  so  overcome,  it 
might  be  just  to  consider,  how  far  such  evidence  could 
be  accounted  for  by  enthusiasm  ;  for  it  seems  as  if 
no  other  imaginable  account  were  to  be  given  of  it. 
But  until  such  incredibility  be  shewn,  or  contrary  testi- 
mony produced,  it  cannot  surely  be  expected,  that  so 
far  fetched,  so  indirect  and  wonderful  an  account  of 
such  testimony  as  that  of  enthusiasm  must  be  ;  an  ac- 
count so  strange,  that  the  generality  of  mankind  can 
scarce  be  made  to  understand  what  is  meant  by  it ;  it 
cannot,  I  say,  be  expected  that  such  account  will  be 
admitted  of  such  evidence,  when  there  is  this  direct, 
easy  and  obvious  account  of  it,  that  people  really  saw 
and  heard  a  thing  not  incredible,  which  they  affirm 
sincerely  and  with  full  assurance  they  did  see  and  hear. 
Granting  then  that  enthusiasm  is  not  (strictly  speak- 
ing) an  absurd  but  a  possible  account  of  such  testi- 
mony, it  is  manifest  that  the  very  mention  of  it  goes 
upon  the  previous  supposition  that  the  things  so  at- 
tested are  incredible,  and  therefore  need  not  be  consid- 
ered until  they  are  shewn  to  be  so.     Much  less  need  it 


320  Of  the  particular  Evidence         Part  II. 

be  considered  after  the  contrary  has  been  proved* 
And  I  think  it  has  been  proved  to  full  satisfaction, 
that  there  is  no  incredibility  in  a  revelation  in  general, 
or  in  such  an  one*as  the  Christian  in  particular. 
However,  as  religion  is  supposed  peculiarly  liable  to 
enthusiasm,  it  may  just  be  observed,  that  prejudices 
almost  without  number  and  without  name,  romance, 
affectation,  humour,  a  desire  to  engage  attention  or 
to  surprize,  the  party  spirit,  custom,  little  competi- 
tions, unaccountable  likings  and  dislikings,— these  in- 
fluence men  strongly  in  common  matters.  And  as 
these  prejudices  are  often  scarce  known  or  reflected 
upon  by  the  persons  themselves  who  are  influenced  by 
them,  they  are  to  be  considered  as  influences  of  a  like 
kind  to  enthusiasm.  Yet  human  testimony  in  com- 
mon matters  is  naturally  and  justly  believed  notwith- 
standing. 

It  is  intimated  farther,  in  a  more  refined  way  of  ob- 
servation, that  though  it  should  be  proved  that  the 
apostles  and  first  Christians  could  not,  in  some  re- 
spects, be  deceived  themselves,  and  in  other  respects 
cannot  be  thought  to  have  intended  to  impose  upon 
the  world, — yet  it  will  not  follow  that  their  general 
testimony  is  to  be  believed,  though  truly  handed  down 
to  us  ;  because  they  might  still  in  part,  i.  e.  in  other  re- 
spects, be  deceived  themselves,  and  in  part  also  design- 
edly impose  upon  others  ;  which,  it  is  added,  is  a  thing 
very  credible,  from  that  mixture  of  real  enthusiasm 
and  real  knavery  to  be  met  with  in  the  same  characters. 
And  I  must  confess  I  think  the  matter  of  fact,  con- 
tained in  this  observation  upon  mankind,  is  not  to  be 
denied  ;  and  that  somewhat  very  much  a-kin  to  it,  is 
often  supposed  in  Scripture  as  a  very  common  case, 
and  most  severely  reproved.  But  it  were  to  have  been 
expected,  that  persons  capable  of  applying  this  obser- 


GttAP.   VII.  for  Christianity.  321 

vation  as  applied  in  the  objection,  might  also  fre- 
quently have  met  with  the  like  mixed  character,  in  in- 
stances where  religion  was  quit  s  out  oft!  ease.  The 
thing  plainly  is,  that  mankind  are  naturally  endued 
with  reason,  or  a  capacity  of  distinguishing  between 
truth  and  falsehood  ;  and  as  naturally  they  ar-  endued 
with  veracity,  or  a  regard  to  truth  in  what  they  say; 
but  from  many  occasions,  they  are  liable  to  be  preju- 
diced and  biassed  and  deceived  themselves*  and  capa- 
ble of  intending  to  deceive  others,  in  every  different 
degree— insomuch  that  as  we  are  all  liable  to  be  de- 
ceived by  prejudice,  so  likewise  it  seems  to  be  ad!  an 
uncommon  thing  for  persons,  who  from  their  regard 
to  truth  would  not  invent  a  lie  entirely  without  anv 
foundation  at  all,  to  propagate  it  with  heightening 
circumstances,  after  it  is  once  invented  and  set  agoing. 
And  others,  though  they  would  not  propagate  a  lie 
yet,  which  is  a  lower  degree  of  falsehood,  will  let  it  pass 
without  contradiction.  But  notwithstanding  all  this, 
human  testimony  remains  still  a  natural  ground  of  as- 
sent, and  this  assent  a  natural  principle  of  action. 

It  is  objected  farther,  that  however  it  has  happened 
the  fact  is,  that  mankind  have,  in  different  ages',  been 
strangely  deluded  with  pretences  to  miracles  ancl  won- 
ders. But  it  is  by  no  means  to  be  admitted  that  they 
have  been  oftener,  or  are  at  all  more  liable  to  be  de- 
ceived by  these  pretences  than  by  others. 

It  is  added,  that  there  is  a  very  considerable  degree 
of  historical  evidence  for  miracles,  which  are  on  all 
hands  acknowledged  to  be  fabulous.  But  suppose 
there  were  even  the  like  historical  evidence  for  these, 
to  what  there  is  for  those  alleged  in  proof  of  Chris- 
tianity, which  vet  is  in  no  wise  allowed,  but  suppose 
this, — the  consequence  would  not  be,  that  the  evi- 
dence of  the  latter  is  not  to   be   admitted.     Nor  is 


322  Of  the  particular  Evidence        Part  II.  ■ 

there  a  man  in  the  world  who,  in  common  cases,  would 
conclude  thus.  For  what  wou'«d  such  a  conclusion 
really  amount  to  but  this,  that  evidence  confuted  by 
contrary  evidence,  or  any  way  overbalanced,  destroys 
the  credibility  of  other  evidence,  neither  confuted  nor 
overbalanced  ?  To  argue  that  because  there  is,  if  there 
were,  like  evidence  from  testimony  for  miracles  ac- 
knowledged false,  as  for  those  in  attestation  of  Chris- 
tianity, therefore  the  evidence  in  the  latter  case  is  not 
to  be  credited, — this  is  the  same  as  to  argue,  that  if 
two  men  of  equally  good  reputation  had  given  evi- 
dence in  different  cases  no  way  connected,  and  one  of 
them  had  been  convicted  of  perjury,  this  confuted  the 
testimony  of  the  other. 

Upon  the  whole  then,  the  general  observation  that 
human  creatures  are  so  liable  to  be  deceived,  from  en- 
thusiasm in  religion,  and  principles  equivalent  to  en- 
thusiasm in  common  matters,  and  in  both  from  neg- 
ligence ;  and  that  they  are  so  capable  of  dishonestly 
endeavouring  to  deceive  others, — this  does  indeed 
weaken  the  evidence  of  testimony  in  all  cases,  but  does 
not  destroy  it  in  any.  And  these  things  will  appear, 
to  different  men,  to  weaken  the  evidence  of  testimony 
in  different  degrees  ;  in  degrees  proportionable  to  the 
observations  they  have  made,  or  the  notions  they  have 
any  way  taken  up,  concerning  the  weakness  and  neg- 
ligence and  dishonesty  of  mankind,  or  concerning  the 
powers  of  enthusiasm,  and  prejudices  equivalent  to  it. 
But  it  seems  to  me  that  people  do  not  know  what  they 
say,  who  affirm  these  things  to  destroy  the  evidence 
from  testimony,  which  we  have  of  the  truth  of  Chris- 
tianity. Nothing  can  destroy  the  evidence  of  testimony 
in  any  case,  but  a  proof  or  probability  that  persons 
are  not  competent  judges  of  the  facts  to  which  they 
give  testimony,  or  that  they  are  actually  under  some 


Chap.  VII.  for  Christianity.  S£3 

indirect  influence  in  giving*  in  such  particular  case. 
Until  this  be  made  out,  the  natural  laws  of  human 
actions  require  that  testimony  be  admitted.  It  can 
never  be  sufficient  to  overthrow  direct  historical  evi- 
dence, indolently  to  say,  that  there  are  so  many  princi- 
ples from  whence  men  are  liable  to  be  deceived  them- 
selves, and  disposed  to  deceive  others,  especially  in 
matters  of  religion,  that  one  know*  not  what  to  believe. 
And  it  is  surprizing  persons  can  help  reflecting,  that 
this  very  manner  of  speaking  supposes  they  are  not 
satisfied  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  evidence  of  which 
they  speak  thus  ;  or  that  they  can  avoid  observing,  if 
they  do  make  this  reflection,  that  it  is  on  such  a  sub- 
ject a  very  material  one.* 

And  over  against  all  these  objections  is  to  be  set  the 
importance  of  Christianity,  as  what  must  have  engaged 
the  attention  of  its  first  converts,  so  as  to  have  render- 
ed them  less  liable  to  be  deceived  from  carelessness  than 
they  would  in  common  matters ;  and  likewise  the 
strong  obligations  to  veracity  which  their  religion  laid 
them  under  ;  so  that  the  first  and  most  obvious  pre- 
sumption is,  that  they  could  not  be  deceived  them- 
selves, nor  would  deceive  others.  And  this  presump- 
tion in  this  degree  is  peculiar  to  the  testimony  we  have 
been  considering. 

In  argument,  assertions  are  nothing  in"  themselves, 
and  have  an  air  of  positiveness  which  sometimes  is 
not  very  easy  ;  yet  they  are  necessary,  and  necessary 
to  be  repeated,  in  order  to  connect  a  discourse,  and 
distinctly  to  lay  before  the  view  of  the  reader  what  is 
proposed  to  be  proved,  and  what  is  left  as  proved. 
Now  the  conclusion  from  the  foregoing  observations 
is,  I  think,  beyond  all  doubt,  this — that  unbelievers 
must  be  forced  to  admit   the  external  evidence  for 

*  See  the  foregoing  chapter. 


324  Of  the  particular  Evidence         Part   fl, 

Christianity,  i.  e.  the  pr#of  of  miracles  wrought  to  at- 
tes  :tr  to  be  of  real  weight  and  very  considerable, 
though  they  cannot  allow  it  to  be  sufficient  to  con- 
vince them  of  the  reality  of  those  miracles.  And  as 
they  must  in  all  reason  admit  this,  so  it  seems  to  me, 
thai  upon  consideration  they  would  in  fact  admit  it ; 
those  of  them,  I  mean,  who  know  aay  thing  at  all  of 
the  matter  ;  in  like  manner  as  persons,  in.  many  cases, 
own  they  see  strong  evidence  from  testimony  for  the 
truth  of  things,  which  yet  they  cannot  be  convinced 
are  true— cases,  suppose,  where  there  is  contrary  testi- 
mony, or  things  which  they  think,  whether  with  or 
without  reason,  to  be  incredible.  But  there  is  no  tes- 
timony contrary  to  that  which  we  have  been  consider- 
ing ;  and  it  has  been  fully  proved  that  there  is  no  in- 
credibility in  Christianity  in  general,  or  in  any  part 
of  it. 

II.  As  to  the  evidence  for  Christianity  from  proph- 
ecy, I  shall  only  make  some  few  general  observations 
which  are  suggested  by  the  analogy  of  nature,  i.  e,  by 
the  acknowledged  natural  rules  of  judging  in  com* 
mon  matters,  concerning  evidence  of  a  like  kind  to 
this  from  prophecy. 

1 .  The  obscurity  or  unintelligibleness  of  one  part 
of  a  prophecy  does  not,  in  any  degree,  invalidate  the 
proof  for  fof  esight,  arising  from  the  appearing  comple- 
tion of  those  other  parts  which  are  understood.  For 
the  case  is  evidently  the  same  as  if  those  parts,  which 
are  not  understood,  were  lost  or  not  written  at  all,  or 
written  in  an  unknown  tongue.  Whether  this  observa- 
tion be  commonly  attended  to  or  not,  it  is  so  evident, 
that  one  can  scarce  bring  one's  self  to  set  down  an  in- 
stance in  common  matters  to  exemplify  it.  How- 
ever, suppose  a  writing,  partly  in  cypher,  and  partly  in 
plain  words  at  length,  and  that  in  the  part  one  un- 


Chap.  VII  for  Christianity.  SQ5 

derstood  there  appeared  mention  of  several  known 
facts,  it  would  never  come  into  any  man's  thoughts  to 
imagine,  that  if  he  understood  the  whole,  perhaps  he 
might  find  that  those  facts  were  not  in  reality  ki  own 
by  the  writer.  Indeed,  both  in  :h> <  example  and 
the  thing  intended  to  be  exemplified  by  it,  ou:  iot 
understanding  the  whole  (the  whole  suppose  of  a 
sentence  or  a  paragraph)  might  sometimes  occasion 
a  doubt,  whether  one  understood  the  litera!  meaning 
of  such  a  part  ;  but  this  comes  under  another  con- 
sideration. 

For  the  same  reason,  though  a  man  should  be  in- 
capable, for  want  of  learning  or  opportunities  of  in- 
quiry, or  from  not  having  turned  his  studies  this  way, 
even  so  much  as  to  judge,  whether  particular  prophe- 
cies have  been  throughout  completely  fulfilled, — yet 
he  may  see  in  general,  that  they  have  been  fulfilled  to 
such  a  degree  as,  upon  very  good  ground,  to  be  con- 
vinced of  foresight  more  than  human  in  such  prophe- 
cies, and  of  such  events  being  intended  by  them.  For 
the  same  reason  also,  though  by  means  of  the  deficien- 
cies in  civil  history,  and^the  different  accounts  of  his- 
torians, the  most  learned  should  not  be  able  to^make 
out  to  satisfaction,  that  such  parts  of  the  prophetick 
history  have  been  minutely  and  throughout  fulfilled, — 
yet  a  very  strong  proof  of  foresight  may  arise  from  that 
general  completion  of  them  which  is  made  out ;  as 
much  proof  of  foresight,  perhaps,  as  the  Giver  of 
prophecy  intended  should  ever  be  afforded  by  such 
parts  of  prophecy. 

2.  A  long  series  of  prophecy  being  applicable  to 
«uch  and  such  events,  is  itself  a  proof  that  it  was  in- 
tended of  them  ;  as  the  rules  by  which  we  naturally 
judge  and  determine  in  common  cases  parallel  to  this 
will  shew.     This  observation  I  make  in  answer  to  the 


526  Of  the  particular  Evidence  Part  11= 

common  objection  against  the  application  of  the 
prophecies,  that  considering  each  of  them  distinctly  by 
itself,  it  does  not  at  all  appear,  that  they  were  intend- 
ed of  those  particular  events  to  which  they  are  appli- 
ed by  Christians  ;  and  therefore  it  is  to  be  supposed 
that,  if  they  meant  any  thing,  they  were  intended  of 
other  events  unknown  to  us,  and  not  of  these  at  all. 

Now  there  are  two  kinds  of  writing  which  bear  a 
great  resemblance  to  prophecy,  with  respect  to  the 
matter  before  us  ;  the  mythological,  and  the  satirical, 
where  the  satire  is  to  a  certain  degree  concealed.  And 
a  man  might  be  assured,  that  he  understood  what  an 
author  intended  by  a  fable  or  parable,  related  without 
any  application  or  moral,  merely  from  seeing  it  to  be 
easily  capable  of  such  application,  and  that  such  a 
moral  might  naturally  be  deduced  from  it.  And  he 
might  be  fully  assured,  that  such  person*  and  events 
were  intended  in  a  satirical  writing,  merely  from  its  be- 
ing applicable  to  them.  And,  agreeably  to  the  last 
observation,  he  might  be  in  a  good  measure  satisfied 
of  it,  though  he  were  not  enough  informed  in  affairs, 
or  in  the  story  of  such  persons,  to  understand  half  the 
satire.  For,  his  satisfaction  that  he  understood  the 
meaning,  the  intended  meaning  of  these  writings, 
would  be  greater  or  less,  in  proportion  as  he  saw  the 
general  turn  of  them  to  be  capable  of  such  application, 
and  in  proportion  to  the  number  of  particular  things 
capable  of  it.  And  thus,  if  a  long  series  of  prophecy 
is  applicable  to  the  present  state  of  the  church,  and  to 
the  political  situations  of  the  kingdoms  of  the  world, 
^ome  thousand  years  after  these  prophecies  were  deliv- 
ered, and  a  long  series  of  prophecy  delivered  before 
the  coming  of  Christ  is  applicable  to  him, — these 
things  are  in  themselves  a  proof,  that  the  prophetick 
history  was  intended  of  him,  and   of  those  events  ;  in 


Chap.  VII.  for  Christianity.  S27 

proportion  as  the  general  turn  of  it  is  capable  of  such 
application,  and  to  the  number  and  variety  of  partic- 
ular prophecies  capable  of  it.  And,  though  in  all  just 
way  of  consideration,  the  appearing  completion  of 
prophecies  is  to  be  allowed  to  be  thus  explanatory  of, 
and  to  determine  their  meaning, — yet  it  is  to  be  re- 
membered farther,  that  the  ancient  Jews  applied  the 
prophecies  to  a  Messiah  before  his  coming,  in  much 
the  same  manner  as  Christians  do  now  ;  and  that  the 
primitive  Christians  interpreted  the  prophecies  respect- 
ing the  state  of  the  church  and  of  the  world  in  the  last 
ages,  in  the  sense  which  the  event  seems  to  confirm 
and  verify.  And  from  these  things  it  may  be  made 
appear, 

3.  That  the  shewing  even  to  a  high  probability,  if 
that  could  be,  that  the  prophets  thought  of  some 
other  events  in  such  and  such  predictions,  and  not 
those  at  all  which  Christians  allege  to  be  completions 
of  those  predictions  ;  or  that  such  and  such  prophecies 
are  capable  of  being  applied  to  other  events,  than  those 
to  which  Christians  apply  them, — that  this  would  not 
confute  or  destroy  the  force  of  the  argument  from 
prophecy,  even  with  regard  to  those  very  instances. 
For,  observe  how  this  matter  really  is.  If  one  knew 
such  a  person  to  be  the  sole  author  of  such  a  book, 
and  was  certainly  assured,  or  satisfied  to  any  degree2 
that  one  knew  the  whole  of  what  he  intended  in  it, — 
one  should  be  assured  or  satisfied  to  such  a  degree,  that 
one  knew  the  whole  meaning  of  that  book  ;  for  the 
meaning  of  a  book  is  nothing  but  the  meaning  of  the 
author.  But  if  one  knew  a  person  to  have  compiled 
a  book  out  of  memoirs,  which  he  received  from  anoth- 
er of  vastly  superior  knowledge  in  the  subject  of  it, 
especially  if  it  were  a  book  full  of  great  intricacies  and 
difficulties, — it  would  in  no  wise  follow  that  one  knew 


528  Of  the  particular  Evidence       Part  IL 

the  whole  meaning  of  the  book,  from  knowing  the 
w  :ole  meaning  of  the  compiler  ;  for  the  original  mem- 
oi  s,  i.  e.  the  author  of  them,  might  have,  and  there 
would  be  no  degree  of  presumption  in  many  cases 
against  supposing  him  to  have,  some  farther  meaning 
than  the  compiler  saw.  To  say  then  that  the  Scrip- 
tures, and  the  things  contained  in  them,  can  have  no 
otner  or  farther  meaning  than  those  persons  thought 
or  had,  who  first  recited  or  wrote  them,  is  evidently 
saying  that  those  persons  were  the  original,  proper,  and 
sole  authors  of  those  books,  i.  e.  that  they  are  not  in- 
spired ;  which  is  absurd,  whilst  the  authority  of  these 
books  is  under  examination,  i.e.  until  you  have  de- 
termined they  are  of  no  divine  authority  at  all.  Un- 
til this  be  determined,  it  must  in  all  reason  be  suppo- 
sed, not  indeed  that  they  have,  for  this  is  taking  for 
granted  that  they  are  inspired,  but  that  they  may 
have  some  farther  meaning  than  what  the  compilers 
savv  or  understood.  And  upon  this  supposition  it  is 
supposable  also,  that  this  farther  meaning  may  be  ful- 
filled. Now  event-  corresponding  to  prophecies,  in- 
terpreted in  a  different  meaning  from  that  in  which 
the  prophets  are  supposed  to  have  understood  them, 
this  affords  ir  a  manner  the  same  proof,  that  this  dif- 
ferent sense  was  originally  intended,  as  it  would  have 
afforded  if  the  prophets  had  not  understood  their  pre- 
dictions  in  the  sense  it  is  supposed  they  did  ;  because 
there  is  no  presumption  of  their  sense  of  them  being 
the  whole  sense  of  them.  And  it  has  been  already 
shewn,  that  the  apparent  completions  of  prophecy 
must  be  allowed  to  be  explanatory  of  its  meaning. 
So  that  the  question  is,  whether  a  series  of  prophecy 
has  been  fulfilled,  in  a  natural  or  proper,  i.  e.  in  any 
real  sense  of  the  words  of  it.  For  such  completion  is 
equally  a  proof  of  foresight  more  than  human,  wheth- 


fclHAfr.  VII.  for  Christianity.  $2$ 

er  the  prophets  are  or  are  not  supposed  to  have  under- 
stood it  in  a  different  sense.  I  say,  supposed  ;  for, 
though  I  think  it  clear  that  the  prophets  did  not  un- 
der tand  the  full  meaning  of  their  predictions,  it  is 
another  question  how  far  they  thought  they  did,  and 
in  what  sense  they  understood  them. 

Hence  may  be  seen  to  how  little  purpose  those  per- 
sons busy  them -elves,  who  endeavour  to  prove  that  the 
prophetick  history  is  applicable  to  events  of  the  age 
in  which  it  was  written,  or  of  ages  before  it.     Indeed 
to  have   proved   this  before  there  was  any  appearance 
of  a  farther  completion  of  it,  might  have  answered 
some  purpose  ;  for  it  might    have  prevented  the  ex- 
pectation of  any  such  farther  completion.    Thus,  could 
Porphyry  have  shewn  that  some  principal  parts  of  the 
book  of  Daniel,  for  instance,  the  seventh  verse  of  the 
seventh  chapter,  which  the  Christians   interpreted  of 
the  latter  ages,  was  applicable  to  events  which  hap- 
pened before  or  about  the  age  of  Antiochus  Epiphanes,— 
this  might  have  prevented  them  from  expecting  any 
farther  completion  of  it.     And,  unless  there  was  then* 
as  I  think  there  must  have  been,  external  evidence  con- 
cerning that  book  more  than  is  come  down  to    us, 
such  a  discovery  might  have  been  a  stumbling  block 
in  the  way  of  Christianity  itself  ;  considering   the  au- 
thority which  our  Saviour  has  given  to  the  book  of 
Daniel,  and  how  much  the  general  scheme  of  Christ- 
ianity presupposes  the   truth  of  it,     But  even   this 
discovery,  had  there  been  any  such,*  would  be  of  ve* 

*  It  appears  that  Porphyry  did  nothing  worth  mentioning  in  this  way. 
For  Jerom  on  the  place  says  Duas  posteriores  bestias—in  uno  Macedonum  regno 
fitnit.  And  as  to  the  ten  kings,  Decern  reges  enumerat,  qui  fuerunt  stvissimi  .« 
ipsosque  reges  non  uniusponit  regni,  verbi  gratia,  Macedonia,  Syria,  Asia  et 
JEgyptia  ;  sed  de  dhersis  regnis  unum  efficit  regnum  ordinem.  And  in  this  way  Of 
interpretation  any  thing  may  be  made  of  any  thing. 

T    T 


330  Of  the  particular  Evidence         Part  II. 

ry  little  weight  with  reasonable  men.  Now,  this  pas- 
sage, thus  applicable  to  events  before  the  age  of  Por- 
phyry^ appears  to  be  applicable  also  to  events  which 
succeeded  the  dissolution  of  the  Roman  empire.  I 
mention  this,  not  at  all  as  intending  to  insinuate,  that 
the  division  of  this  empire  into  ten  parts,  for  it  plainly 
was  divided  into  about  that  number,  were,  alone  and 
by  itself,  of  any  moment  in  verifying  the  prophetick 
history  ;  but  only  as  an  example  of  the  thing  I  am 
speaking  of.  And  thus  upon  the  whole,  the  matter 
of  inquiry  evidently  must  be,  as  above  put,  whether 
the  prophecies  are  applicable  to  Christ,  and  to  the 
present  state  of  the  world  and  of  the  church,  appli- 
cable in  such  a  degree  as  to  imply  foresight ;  not 
whether  they  are  capable  of  any  other  application, 
though  I  know  no  pretence  for  saying  the  general  turn 
of  them  is  capable  of  any  other. 

These  observations  are,  I  think,  just,  and  the  evi- 
dence referred  to  in  them  real,  though  there  may  be 
people  who  will  not  accept  of  such  imperfect  informa- 
tion from  scripture.  Some  too  have  not  integrity  and 
regard  enough  to  truth,  to  attend  to  evidence  which 
ke  p^  the  mind  in  doubt,  perhaps  perplexity,  and 
which  is  much  of  a  different  sort  from  what  they  ex- 
pected. And  it  plainly  requires  a  degree  of  modesty 
and  fairness,  beyond  what  every  one  has,  for  a  man  to 
say,  not  to  the  world,  but  to  himself,  that  there  is  a 
real  appearance  of  somewhat  of  great  weight  in  this 
matter,  though  he  is  not  able  thoroughly  to  satisfy 
himself  about  it  ;  but  it  shall  have  its  influence  upon 
him,  in  proportion  to  its  appearing  reality  and  weight. 
It  is  much  more  easy,  and  more  falls  in  with  the  neg- 
li  *ence,  presumption  and  wilfulness  of  the  generality, 
to  determine  at  once,  with  a  decissive  air,  there  is 
nothing  in  it.     The  prejudices  arising  from  that  abso* 


Chap.  VII.  for  Christianity.  331 

lute  contempt  and  scorn  with  which  this  evidence  is 
treated  in  the  world,  I  do  not  mention.  For  what 
indeed  can  be  said  to  persons,  who  are  weak  enough 
in  their  understanding  to  think  this  any  presumption 
against  it,  or  if  they  do  not,  are  yet  weak  enough  in 
their  temper  to  be  influenced  by  such  prejudices,  up- 
on such  a  subject  ? 

I   shall  now,  secondly,  endeavour   to   give   some 
account  of  the  general  argument  for  the   truth    of 
Christianity,  consisting  both  of  the  direct  and  circum- 
stantial evidence,  considered  as  making  up  one  argu- 
ment.    Indeed  to  state  and  examine  this  argument 
fully,  would  be  a  work  much  beyond  the  compass  of 
this  whole  treatise  ;  nor  is  so  much  as  a  proper  abridg- 
ment of  it  to  be  expected  here.     Yet  the  present  sub- 
ject requires  to  have  some  brief  account  of  it  given. 
For  it  is  the  kind  of  evidence,  upon  which  most  ques- 
tions of  difficulty  in  common  practice  are  determined  ; 
evidence  arisi:  g  from  various  coincidences  which  sup- 
port and  confirm  each  other,  and  in  this  manner  prove, 
with  more  or  less  certainty,  the  point  under  consider- 
ation.    And  I  choose  to  do  it  also  :     First,  because  it 
seems  to  be  of  the  greatest  importance,  and  not  duly 
attended  to  by  every  one,  that  the  proof  of  revelation 
is,  not  some  direct  and  express  things  only,  but  a  great 
variety  of  circumstantial  things  also  ;  and  that  though 
each  of  these  direct  and    circumstantial  things  is   in- 
deed to  be  considered    separately,  yet  they    are  after- 
wards to  be  joined  together ;  for  that  the  proper  force 
of  the  evidence  consists  in  the  result  of  those  several 
things,  considered  in  their  respects  to  each  other,  and 
united  into  one  view.     And  in  the  next  place,  because 
it  seems  to  me,  that  the  matters  of  fact  here  set  down, 
which  are  acknowledged  by  unbelievers,  must  be  ac- 
knowledged by  them  sjso   to  contain  together  a  de- 


332  Of  the  particular  Evidence        Part  II. 

gree  of  evidence  of  great  weight,  if  they  could  he 
brought  to  lay  these  several  things  before  themselves 
distinctly,  and  then  with  attention  consider  them  to-, 
gether,  instead  of  that  cursory  thought  of  them  to 
which  we  are  familiarized.  For  being  familiarized 
to  the  cursory  thought  of  things,  as  really  hinders 
the  weight  of  them  from  being  seen,  as  from  having 
its  due  influence  upon  practice. 

The  thing  asserted,  and  the  truth  of  which  is  to  be 
inquired  into,  is  this,  that  over  and  above  our  reason 
and  affections,  which  God  has  given  us  for  the  infor- 
mation of  our  judgment  and  the  conduct  of  our  lives, 
he  has  also,  by  external  revelation,  given  us  an  ac- 
count of  himself  and  his  moral  government  over  the 
world,  implying  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punish- 
ments ;  i.  e.  hath  revealed  the  system  of  natural  reli- 
gion ;  for  natural  religion  may  be  externally*  revealed 
by  God,  as  the  ignorant  may  be  taught  it  by  mankind 
their  fellow  creatures — that  God,  I  say,  has  given 
us  the  evidence  of  revelation,  as  well  as  the  evidence 
of  reason,  to  ascertain  this  moral  system ;  together 
with  an  account  of  a  particular  dispensation  of  Provi- 
dence, which  reason  could  noway  have  discovered,  and 
a  particular  institution  of  religion  founded  on  it,  for 
the  recovery  of  mankind  out  of  their  present  wretch- 
ed condition,  and  raising  them  to  the  perfection  and 
final  happiness  of  their  nature. 

This  revelation,  whether  real  or  supposed,  may  be 
considered  as  wholly  historical.  For  prophecy  is  noth- 
ing but  the  history  of  events  before  they  come  to  pass ; 
doctrines  also  are  matters  of  fact ;  and  precepts  come 
under  the  same  notion.  And  the  general  design  of 
Scripture,  which  contains  in  it  this  revelation,  thus 
considered  as  historical,  may  be  said  to  be  to  give  us 

*  P.  216,  &c,  * 


Chap.  VII.  for  Christianity.  333 

an  account  of  the  world,  in  this  one  single  view,  as 
God's  world  ;  by  which  it  appears  essentially  distin- 
guished from  all  other  books,  so  far  as  I  have  found, 
except  such  as  are  copied  from  it.  It  begins  with  an 
account  of  God's  creation  of  the  world,  in  order  to  as- 
certain and  distinguish  from  all  others  who  is  the  ob- 
ject of  our  worship,  by  what  he  has  done  ;  in  order  to 
ascertain  who  he  is,  concerning  whose  providence, 
commands,  promises  and  threatenings,  this  sacred  book 
all  along  treats  ,  the  Maker  and  Proprietor  of  the 
world,  he  whose  creatures  we  are,  the  God  of  nature ; 
in  order  likewise  to  distinguish  him  from  the  idols  of 
the  nations,  which  are  either  imaginary  beings,  i.  e.  no 
beings  at  all,  or  else  part  of  that  creation,  the  histor- 
ical relation  of  which  is  here  given.  And  St.  John, 
not  improbably  with  an  eye  to  this  Mosaick  account 
of  the  creation,  begins  his  gospel  with  an  account 
of  our  Saviour's  preexistence,  and  that  all  things  were 
made  by  him,  and  without  him  was  not  any  thing  made 
that  was  made  ;*  agreeably  to  the  doctrine  of  St.  Paul, 
that  God  created  all  things  by  Jesus  Christ.f  This  be- 
ing premised,  the  Scripture,  taken  together,  seems  to 
profess  to  contain  a  kind  of  an  abridgment  of  the  his- 
tory of  the  world,  in  the  view  just  now  mentioned  ; 
that  is,  a  general  account  of  the  condition  of  religion 
and  its  professors,  during  the  continuance  of  that  apos- 
tacy  from  God,  and  state  of  wickedness,  which  it  every 
where  supposes  the  world  to  lie  in.  And  this  account 
of  the  state  of  religion  carries  with  it  some  brief  ac- 
count of  the  political  state  of  things,  as  religion  is  af- 
fected by  it.  Revelation  indeed  considers  the  com- 
mon affairs  of  this  world,  and  what  is  going  on  in  it, 
as  a  mere  scene  of  distraction,  and  cannot  be  supposed 
£o  concern  itself  with  foretelling  at  what  time  Ro?ne 

*  Joh.  i.  3.  f  Eph.  iii.  9. 


334?  Of  the  particular  Evidence         Part  II. 

or  Babylon  or  Greece,  or  any  particular  place,  should 
be  the  most  conspicuous  seat  of  that  tyranny  and  dis- 
soluteness, which  all  places  equally  aspire  to  be  ;  can- 
not, I  -ay,  be  supposed  to  give  any  account  of  this  wild 
scene  for  its  own  sake.  But  it  seems  to  contain  some 
very  general  account  of  the  chief  governments  of  the 
world,  as  the  general  state  of  religion  has  been,  is,  or 
shall  be,  affected  by  them,  from  the  first  transgression, 
and  during  the  whole  interval  of  the  world's  continu- 
ing in  its  present  state,  to  a  certain  future  period,  spok- 
en of  both  in  the  Old  and  New  Testament,  very  dis- 
tinctly and  in  great  variety  of  expression  :  The  times  of 
the  restitution  of  all  things  :*  when  the  mystery  of  God 
shall  be  finished,  as  he  hath  declared  to  his  servants  the 
prophets  :t  when  the  God  of  heaven  shall  set  up  a  king- 
do?)!,  which  shall  never  be  destroyed  :  and  the  kingdom 
shall  not  be  left  to  other  people, \  as  it  is  represented  to  be 
during  this  apostacy,  but  judgment  shall  be  given  to  the 
saints ,§  and  they  shall  reign  :\\  and  the  kingdom  and  do- 
minion, and  the  greatness  of  the  kingdom  under  the  whole 
heaven,  shall  be  given  to  the  people  of  the  saints  of  the 
Most  High  % 

Upon  this  general  view  of  the  Scripture,  I  would  re- 
mark how  great  a  length  of  time  the  whole  relation 
takes  up,  near  ^ix  thousand  years  of  which  are  past  -9 
and  how  great  a  variety  of  things  it  treats  of ;  the  nat- 
ural and  moral  system  or  history  of  the  world,  in- 
cluding the  time  when  it  was  formed,  all  contained 
in  the  very  first  book,  and  evidently  written  in  a  rude 
and  unlearned  age  ;  and  in  subsequent  books,  the  va- 
rious common  and  prophetick  history,  and  the  partic- 
ular dispensation  of  Christianity.  Now  all  this  to- 
gether gives  the  largest  scope  for  criticism  ;  and  for 

•  Acts  iii  21.  f  Rev.  x.  7.  \  Dan.  ii. 

§  Dan.  vii.  22.  |)  Rev.  1  Dan.  x\i 


Chap.  VII.  for  Christianity.  335 

confutation  of  what  is  capable  of  being  confuted,  ei- 
ther from  reason,  or  from  common  history,  or  from 
any  inconsistence  in  its  several  parts.  And  it  is  a  thing 
which  deserves,  I  think,  to  be  mentioned,  that  where- 
as some  imagine  the  supposed  doubtfulness  of  the  evi- 
dence for  revelation  implies  a  positive  argument  that 
it  is  not  true,  it  appears,  on  the  contrary,  to  imply  a 
positive  argument  that  it  is  true.  For,  could  any 
common  relation,  of  such  antiquity,  extent  and  variety 
(for  in  these  things  the  stress  of  what  I  am  now  observ- 
ing lies)  be  proposed  to  the  examination  of  the  world  ; 
that  it  could  not,  in  an  age  of  knowledge  and  liberty, 
be  confuted,  or  shewn  to  have  nothing  in  it,  to  the  sat- 
isfaction of  reasonable  men,  this  would  be  thought  a 
strong  presumptive  proof  of  its  truth.  And  indeed  it 
must  be  a  proof  of  it,  just  in  proportion  to  the  proba- 
bility, that  if  it  were  false,  it  might  be  shewn  to  be  so ; 
and  this,  I  think,  is  scarce  pretended  to  be  shewn  but 
upon  principles  and  in  ways  of  arguing,  which  have 
been  clearly  obviated.*  Nor  does  it  at  all  appear,  that 
any  set  of  men  who  believe  natural  religion,  are  of  the 
opinion  that  Christianity  has  been  thus  confuted.  Bur 
to  proceed  : 

Together  with  the  moral  system  of  the  world,  the 
Old  Testament  contains  a  chronological  account  of 
the  beginning  of  it,  and  from  thence  an  unbroken 
genealogy  of  mankind  for  many  ages  before  common 
history  begins  ;  and  carried  on  as  much  farther,  as  to 
make  up  a  continued  thread  of  history  of  the  length 
of  between  three  and  four  thousand  years.  It  con- 
tains an  account  of  God's  making  a  covenant  with  a 
particular  nation,  that  they  should  be  his  people,  and 
he  would  be  their  God,  in  a  peculiar  sense  ;  of  his  of- 
ten interposing  miraculously  in  their  affairs  ;  giving 

*  Ch.  ii.  iii.  Sea 


336  Of  the  particular  Evidence        Part  IL 

them  the  promise,  and  long  after  the  possession,  of  a 
particular  country  ;  assuring  them  of  the  greatest  na- 
tional prosperity  in  it,  if  they  would  worship  him,  in  op- 
position  to  the  idols  which  the  rest  of  the  world  wor- 
shipped, and  obey  his  commands*  and  threatening  them 
with  unexampled  punishments,  if  they  disobeyed  him, 
and  fell  into  the  general  idolatry ;  insomuch  that  this 
one  nation  should  continue  to  be  the  observation  and 
the  wonder  of  all  the  world.     It  declares  particularly, 
that  God  would  scatter  them  among  all  people,  from  one  end 
of  the  earth  unto  the  other  ;  but  that  when  they  should 
return  unto  the  Lord  their  God,  he  would  have  compas- 
sion upon  them,  and  gather  them  from  all  the  nations 
whither  he  had  scattered  them  ;  that  Israel  should  be  sav- 
ed in  the  Lord  with  an  everlasting  salvation,  and  not  be 
ashamed  or  confounded  world  without  end.     And  as  some 
of  these  promises  are  conditional,  others  are  as  abso- 
lute as  any  thing  can  be  expressed  ;  that  the  time 
should  come,  when  the  people  should  be  all  righteous, 
and  inherit  the  land  for  ever  ;  that  though  God  would 
make  a  full  end  of  all  nations  whither  he  had  scattered 
them,  yet  would  he  not  make  a  full  end  of  them  ;  that  he 
would  bring  again  the  captivity  of  his  people  Israel,  and 
plant  them  upon  their  land,  and  they  should  be  no  more 
pulled  up  out  of  their  land  ;  that  the  seed  of  Israel  should 
not  cease  from  being  a  nation  for  ever.*     It  foretells, 
that  God  would  raise  them  up  a  particular  person,  in 
whom  all  his  promises  should  finally  be  fulfilled  ;  tire 
Messiah,  who  should  be  in  an  high  and  eminent  sense, 
their  anointed  Prince  and   Saviour.     This  was  fore- 
told in  such  a  manner,  as  raised  a  general  expectation 
of  such  a  person  in  the  nation,  as  appears  from  the 
New  Testament,  and  is  an  acknowledged  fact ;  an  ex- 

'   Deut.  xxviii.  64.     Ch.  xxx.  2,  ?,.     Isai.  xlv.  17.     Cli.  !x.  21,     Jer.xxx. 
\\.     Ch.  x!vi.  28.     Amosix.  15.     Jer.  xxxi,  'M>. 


Chap.  VIL  for  Christianity.  £37 

pectation  of  his  coming  at  such  a  particular  time*  be- 
fore  any  one  appeared  claiming  to  be  that  person,  and 
when  there  was  no  ground  for  such  an  expectation, 
but  from  the  prophecies  ;  which  expectation  therefore 
must  in  all  reason  be  presumed  to  be  explanatory  of 
those  prophecies,  if  there  were  any  doubt  about  their 
meaning.  It  seems  moreover  to  foretell,  that  this 
person  should  be  rejected  by  that  nation,  to  whom 
he  had  been  so  long  promised,  and  though  he  was  so 
much  desired  by  them.*  And  it  expressly  foretells, 
that  he  should  be  the  Saviour  of  the  Gentiles  ;  and 
even  that  the  completion  of  the  scheme,  contained 
in  this  book,  and  then  begun,  and  in  its  progress, 
should  be  somewhat  so  great,  that,  in  comparison 
with  it,  the  restoration  of  the  Jews  alone  would  be  but 
of  small  account.  //  is  a  light  thing  that  thou  shouldest 
be  my  servant  to  raise  up  the  tribes  of  Jacob,  and  to  re- 
store the  preserved  of  Israel :  I  will  also  give  thee  for  a 
light  to  the  Gentiles,  that  thou  mayest  be  for  salvation  unto 
the  end  of  the  earth.  And,  In  the  last  days,  the  moun- 
tain of  the  Lord's  house  shall  be  established  in  the  top  of 
the  mountains,  and  shall  be  exalted  above  the  hills  ;  and 

all  nations  shall  flow  into  it for  out  of Z ion  shall  go 

forth  the  law,  and  the  word  of  the  Lord  from  Jerusalem. 

And  he  shall  judge  among  the  nations and  the  Lord 

alone  shall  be  exalted  in  that  day,  and  the  idols  he  shall  ut- 
terly abolish. \  The  Scripture  farther  contains  an  ac- 
count, that  at  the  time  the  Messiah  was  expected,  a 
person  rose  up,  in  this  nation,  claiming  to  be  that  Mes- 
siah, to  be  the  person  whom  all  the  prophecies  refer- 

*  Isai.  viii.   14,  15.     Ch.  xlix.  5      Ch.  liii.     Mai.  i.  10,  11,  and  Ch.  iir. 

}  Isai.  xlix.  6.     Ch.  ii.     Ch.xi.  Ch.  lvi.  7.     Mai.  i.  11.    To  which  must 
be  added  the  other  prophecies  of  the  like  kind,-  several  in  the  New  Testa- 
ment, and  very  many  in  the  Old  ;  which  describe  what  shall  be  the  co  rs 
nl^lon  of  the  revealed  phn  of  Providence. 

U  U 


338  Of  the  particular  Evidence         Part  IL 

red  to,  and  in  whom  they  should  center  ;  that  he  spent 
some  years  in  a  continued  course  of  miraculous  works, 
and  endued  his  immediate  disciples  and  followers 
with  a  power  of  doing  the  same,  as  a  proof  of  the 
truth  of  that  religion  which  he  commissioned  them  to 
publish  ;  that,  invested  with  this  authority  and  power, 
they  made  numerous  converts  in  the  remotest  coun- 
tries, and  settled  and  established  his  religion  in  the 
world,  to  the  end  of  which  the  Scripture  professes  to 
give  a  prophetick  account  of  the  state  of  this  religion 
amongst  mankind. 

Let  us  now  suppose  a  person  utterly  ignorant  of  his- 
tory, to  have  all  this  related  to  him  out  of  the  Scrip- 
ture. Or  suppose  such  an  one,  having  the  Scripture 
put  into  his  hands,  to  remark  these  things  in  it,  not 
knowing  but  that  the  whole,  even  its  civil  history,  as 
well  as  the  other  parts  of  it  might  be  from  beginning 
to  end  an  entire  invention,  and  to  ask,  what  truth 
was  in  it,  and  whether  the  revelation  here  related  was 
real  or  a  fiction  ?  And  instead  of  a  direct  answer,  sup» 
pose  him,  all  at  once,  to  be  told  the  following  confest 
facts,  and  then  to  unite  them  into  one  view. 

Let  him  first  be  told  in  how  great  a  degree  the  pro- 
fession and  establishment  of  natural  religion,  the  be- 
fief  that  there  is  one  God  to  be  worshipped,  that  virtue 
is  his  law,  and  that  mankind  shall  be  rewarded  and  pun- 
ished hereafter,  as  they  obey  and  disobey  it  here  ;  in 
how  very  great  a  degree,  I  say,  the  profession  and  estab- 
lishment of  this  moral  system  in  the  world  is  owing  to 
the  revelation,  whether  real  or  supposed,  contained  in 
this  book  ;  the  establishment  of  this  moral  system, even 
in  those  countries  which  do  not  acknowledge  the  prop- 
er authority  of  the  Scripture.*  Let  him  be  told  also 
what  number  of  nations  do  acknowledge  its  proper 

•  P.  291. 


Chap.  VII.  for  Christianity.  339 

authority.  Let  him  then  take  in  the  consideration  of 
what  importance  religion  is  to  mankind.  And  upon 
these  things  he  might,  I  think,  truly  observe,  that  this 
supposed  revelation's  obtaining  and  being  received  in 
the  world,  with  all  the  circumstances  and  effects  of  it, 
considered  together  as  one  event,  is  the  most  conspicu- 
ous and  important  event  in  the  story  of  mankind  ; 
that  a  fcook  of  this  nature,  and  thus  promulged  and 
recommended  to  our  consideration,  demands,  as  if  by 
a  voice  from  heaven,  to  have  its  claims  most  seriously 
examined  into  ;  and  that,  before  such  examination,  to 
treat  it  with  any  kind  of  scoffing  and  ridicule,  is  an  of- 
fence against  natural  piety.  But  it  is  to  be  remember- 
ed, that  how  much  soever  the  establishment  of  natural 
religion  in  the  world  is  owing  to  the  scripture  revela- 
tion, this  does  not  destroy  the  proof  of  religion  from 
reason,  any  more  than  the  proof  of  Euclid's  Elements 
is  destroyed  by  a  man's  knowing  or  thinking  that  he 
should  never  have  seen  the  truth  of  the  several  propo- 
sitions contained  in  it,  nor  had  those  propositions  come 
into  his  thoughts,  but  for  that  mathematician. 

Let  such  a  person  as  we  are  peaking  of  be,  in  the 
next  place,  informed  of  the  acknowledged  antiquity 
of  the  first  parts  of  this  book,  and  that  its  chronology, 
its  account  of  the  time  when  the  earth  and  the  several 
parts  of  it  were  first  peopled  with  human  creatures  is 
no  way  contradicted,  but  is  really  confirmed,  by  the 
natural  and  civil  history  of  the  world,  collected  from 
common  historians,  from  the  state  of  the  earth,  and 
from  the  late  invention  of  arts  and  sciences.  And  as 
the  Scripture  contains  an  unbroken  thread  of  common 
and  civil  history,  from  the  creation  to  the  captivity,  for 
between  three  and  four  thousand  years,  let  the  person 
we  are  speaking  of  be  told  in'the  next  place  that  this 
general  history,  as  it  is  not  contradicted  but  is  confirmed 


340  Of  the  particular  Evidence  Part  II. 

by  profane  history  as  much  as  there  would  be  reason  to 
expect,  upon  supposition  of  its  truth, — so  there  is  noth- 
ing  in  the  whole  history  itself \  to  give  any  reasonable 
ground  of  suspicion  of  its  not  being,  in  the  general,  a 
faithful  and  literally  true  genealogy  of  men,  and  se- 
ries  of  things.     I  speak  here  only  of  the  common 
scripture  history,  or  of  the  course  of  ordinary  events 
related  in  it,  a*  distinguished  from  miracles  and  from 
the  prophetick  history.    In  all  the  scripture  narrations 
of  this  kind,  following  events  arise  out  of  foregoing 
ones,  as  in  all  other  histories.     There  appears  nothing 
related  as  done  in  any  age,  not  conformable  to  the 
manners  of  that  age  j  nothing  in  the  account  of  a  suc- 
ceeding age  which,  one  would  say,  could  not  be  true, 
or  was  improbable,  from  the  account  of  things  in  the 
preceding  one.     There  is  nothing  in   the  characters 
which  would  raise  a  thought  of  their  being  feigned  ; 
but  all  the  internal  marks  imaginable  of  their  being 
real.     It  is  to  be  added  also,  that  mere  genealogies, 
bare  narratives  of  the  number  of  years  which  persons 
called  by  such  and  such  names  lived,  do  not  carry  the 
face  of  fiction,  perhaps  do  carry  some  presumption  of 
veracity ;  and  all  unadorned  narratives,  which  have 
nothing  to  surprize,  may  be  thought  to  carry  some- 
what of  the  like  presumption  too.     And  the  domes- 
tick    and    the  political  history  is    plainly    credible. 
There  may  be  incidents  in  Scripture,   which  taken 
alone  in  the  naked  way  they   are  told,  may  appear 
strange,  especially  to  persons  of  other  manners,  tem* 
per,  education ;  but  there  are  also   incidents  of  un- 
doubted truth,  in  many  or  most  persons'  lives,  which, 
in  the  same  circumstances,  would  appear  to  the  full 
as  strange.     There  may  be  mistakes  of  transcribers, 
there  may  be  other  real  or  seeming  mistakes  not  easy 
to  be  particularly  accounted  for  ;  but  there  are  cer- 


Chap.  VII.  for  Christianity.  341 

tainly  no  more  things  of  this  kind  in  the  Scripture,  than 
what  were  to  have  been  expected  in  books  of  such  an- 
tiquity, and  nothing  in  any  wise  sufficient  to  discredit 
the  general  narrative.  Now,  that  a  history  claiming 
to  commence  from  the  creation,  and  extending  in  one 
continued  series  through  so  great  a  length  of  time  and 
variety  of  events;  should  have  such  appearances  of  re- 
ality and  truth  in  its  whole  contexture,  is  surely  a  ve- 
ry remarkable  circumstance  in  its  favour.  And  as  all 
this  is  applicable  to  the  common  history  of  the  New 
Testament,  so  there  is  a  farther  credibility,  and  a  very 
high  one,  given  to  it  by  profane  authors ;  many  of 
these  writing  of  the  same  times,  and  confirming  the 
truth  of  customs  and  events  which  are  incidentally  as 
well  as  more  purposely  mentioned  in  it.  And  this 
credibility  of  the  common  Scripture  history,  gives  some 
credibility  to  its  miraculou*  history  ;  especially  as  this  is 
interwoven  with  the  common,  so  as  that  they  imply 
each  other,  and  both  together  make  up  one  relation. 
Let  it  then  be  more  particularly  observed  to  this 
person,  that  it  is  an  acknowledged  matter  of  fact,  which 
is  indeed  implied  in  the  foregoing  observation,  that 
there  was  such  a  nation  as  the  Jews,  of  the  greatest 
antiquity,  whose  government  and  general  polity  was 
founded  on  the  law  here  related  to  be  given  them  by 
Moses  as  from  heaven  ;  that  natural  religion,  though 
with  rites  additional,  yet  no  way  contrary  to  it,  was 
their  established  religion,  which  cannot  be  said  of  the 
Gentile  world  ;  and  that  their  very  being  as  a  nation 
depended  upon  their  acknowledgment  of  one  God, 
the  God  of  the  universe.  For,  suppose  in  their  cap 
tivity  in  Babylon,  they  had  gone  over  to  the  religion 
of  their  conquerors,  there  would  have  remained  no 
bond  of  union  to  keep  them  a  distinct  people.  And 
whilst,  they  were  under  their  own  kings,  in  their  own 


342  Of  the  particular  Evidence      Part  II. 

country,  a  total  apostacy  from  God  would  have  been 
the  dissolution  of  their  whole  government.  They,  in 
such  a  sense,  nationally  acknowledged  and  worshipped 
the  Maker  of  heaven  and  earth,  when  the  re-t  of  the 
world  were  sunk  in  idolatry,  as  rendered  them,  in  fact, 
the  peculiar  people  of  God.  And  this  so  remarkable 
an  establishment  and  preservation  of  natural  religion 
amongst  them,  seems  to  add  some  peculiar  credibility 
to  the  historical  evidence  for  the  miracles  of  Moses  and 
the  prophets  ;  because  these  miracles  are  a  full  satisfac- 
tory account  of  this  event,  which  plainly  wants  to  be 
accounted  for,  and  cannot  otherwise. 

Let  this  person,  supposed  wholly  ignorant  of  history, 
be  acquainted  farther,  that  one  claiming  to  be  the 
Messiah,  of  Jewish  extraction,  rose  up  at  the  time 
when  this  nation,  from  the  prophecies  above  mention- 
ed, expected  the  Messiah  ;  that  he  was  rejected,  a*  it 
seemed  to  have  been  foretold  he  should,  by  the  body 
of  the  people,  under  the  direction  of  their  rulers  ; 
that  in  the  course  of  a  very  few  years  he  was  believed 
on  and  acknowledged  as  the  promised  Messiah,  by 
great  numbers  among  the  Gentiles,  agreeably  to  the 
prophecies  of  Scripture,  yet  not  upon  the  evidence  of 
prophecy,  but  of  miracles,*  of  which  miracles  we  have 
also  strong  historical  evidence  ;  (by  which  I  mean  here 
no  more  than  must  be  acknowleged  by  unbelievers, 
for  let  pious  frauds  and  follies  be  admitted  to  weaken, 
it  is  ab-urd  to  say  they  destroy,  our  evidence  of  mira- 
cles wrought  in  proof  of  Christianity!)  that  this  reli- 
gion, approving  itself  to  the  reason  of  mankind,  and 
carrying  its  own  evidence  with  it,  so  far  as  reason  is  a 
judge  of  its  system,  and  being  no  way  contrary  to  rea- 
son in  those  parts  of  it  which  require  to  be  believed 
upon  the  mere  authority  of  its  Author, — that  this  re- 

•  P.  314,  &c.  f  P.  321,  &c. 


Chap.  VII.  for  Christianity.  34S 

Jigion,  I  say,  gradually  spread  and  supported  itself,  for 
some  hundred  years,  not  only  without  any  assistance 
from  temporal  power,  but  under  constant  discourage- 
ments, and  often  the  bitterest  persecutions  from  it,  and 
then  became  the  religion  of  the  world  y  that  in  the 
mean  time  the  Jewish  nation  and  government  were 
destroyed,  in  a  very  remarkable  manner,  and  the  peo- 
ple carried  away  captive  and  dispersed  through  the 
most  distant  countries,  in  which  state  of  dispersion 
they  have  remained  fifteen  hundred  years ;  and  that 
they  remain  a  numerous  people,  united  amongst  them- 
selves, and  distinguished  from  the  rest  of  the  world,  as 
they  were  in  the  days  of  Moses,  by  the  profession  of 
his  law,  and  every  where  looked  upon  in  a  manner 
which  one  scarce  knows  how  distinctly  to  express,  but 
in  the  words  of  the  prophetick  account  of  it,  given  so 
many  ages  before  it  came  to  pass — Thou  shalt  become  an 
astonishment,  a  proverb,  and  a  byword,  among  all  nations 
whither  the  Lord  shall  lead  thee* 

The  appearance  of  a  standing  miracle,  in  the  Jews 
remaining  a  distinct  people  in  their  dispersion,  and  the 
confirmation  which  this  event  appears  to  give  to  the 
truth  of  revelation,  may  be  thought  to  be  answered  by 
their  religion's  forbidding  them  intermarriages  with 
those  of  any  other,  and  prescribing  them  a  great  many 
peculiarities  in  their  food,  by  which  they  are  debarred 
from  the  means  of  incorporating  with  the  people  in 
whose  countries  they  live.  This  is  not,  I  think,  a  sat- 
isfactory account  of  that  which  it  pretends  to  account 
for.  But  what  does  it  pretend  to  account  for  ?  The 
correspondence  between  this  event  and  the  prophecies ; 
or  the  coincidence  of  both,  with  a  long  dispensation 
of  Providence  of  a  peculiar  nature,  towards  that  peo- 
ple formerly  ?  No.     It  is  only  the  event  itself  which  is 

*  Deut.  xxviii.  37. 


344  Of  the  particular  Evidence        Part  II. 

offered  to  be  thus  accounted  for,  which  single  event 
taken  alone,  abstracted  from  all  such  correspondence 
and  coincidence,  perhaps  would  not  have  appeared 
miraculous ;  but  that  correspondence  and  coincidence 
may  be  so,  though  the  event  itself  be  supposed  not. 
Thus  the  concurrence  of  our  Saviour's  being  born  at 
Bethlehem,  with  a  long  foregoing  series  of  prophecy 
and  other  coincidences,  is  doubtless  miraculous,  the 
series  of  prophecy,  and  other  coincidences,  and  the 
event,  being  admitted  j  though  the  event  itself,  his 
birth  at  that  place,  appears  to  have  been  brought 
about  in  a  natural  way  j  of  which,  however,  no  one 
can  be  certain. 

And  as  several  f  these  events  seem  in  some  degree 
expressly  to  have  verified  the  prophetick  history  alrea- 
dy, so  likewise  they  may  be  considered  farther  as 
having  a  peculiar  aspect  towards  the  full  completion 
of  it,  as  affording  some  presumption  that  the  whole  of 
it  shall,  one  time  or  other,  be  fulfilled.  Thus,  that 
the  Jews  have  been  so  wonderfully  preserved  in  their 
long  and  wide  dispersion,  which  is  indeed  the  direct 
fulfilling  of  some  prophecies,  but  is  now  mentioned 
only  as  looking  forward  to  somewhat  yet  to  come ; 
that  natural  religion  came  forth  from  Judea,  and 
spread  in  the  degree  it  has  done  over  the  world,  before 
lost  in  idolatry,  which  together  with  some  other  things 
have  distinguished  that  very  place,  in  like  manner  as 
the  people  of  it  are  distinguished ;  that  this  great 
change  of  religion  over  the  earth,  was  brought  about 
under  the  profession  and  acknowledgment  that  Jesus 
was  the  promised  Messiah  ;  things  of  thi>  kind  natu- 
rally turn  the  thoughts  of  serious  men  towards  the  full 
completion  of  the  prophetick  history,  concerning  the 
final  restoration  of  that  people,  concerning  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  everlasting  kingdom  among  them,  the 


Chap.  VII.  for  Christianity.  345 

kingdom  of  the  Messiah,  and  the  future  state  of  the 
world  under  this  sacred  government.  Such  circum* 
stances  and  events  compared  with  these  prophecies, 
though  no  completions  of  them,  yet  would  not,  I  think* 
be  spoken  of  as  nothing  in  the  argument,  by  a  person 
upon  his  first  being  informed  of  them.  They  fall  in 
with  the  prophetick  history  of  things  still  further  give 
it  some  additional  credibility,  have  the  appearance  of 
being  somewhat  in  order  to  the  full  completion  of  it. 

Indeed  it  requires  a  good  degree  of  knowledge,  and 
great  calmness  and  consideration,  to  be  able  to  judge 
thoroughly  of  the  evidence  for  the  truth  of  Christ- 
ianity, from  that  part  of  the  prophetick  history  which 
relates  to  the  situation  of  the  kingdoms  of  the  world, 
and  to  the  state  of  the  church,  from  the  establish- 
ment of  Christianity  to  the  present  time.  But  it  ap- 
pears, from  a  general  view  of  it,  to  be  very  material. 
And  those  persons  who  have  thoroughly  examined  it* 
and  some  of  them  were  men  of  the  coolest  tempers, 
greatest  capaciries,  and  least  liable  to  imputations  of 
prejudice,  insist  upon  it  as  determinately  conclusive. 

Suppose  now  a  person  quite  ignorant  of  history,  first 
to  recollect  the  passages  abovementioned  out  of  Scrip- 
ture, without  knowing  but  that  the  whole  was  a  late 
fiction,  then  to  be  informed  of  the  correspondent  facts 
now  mentioned,  and  to  unite  them  all  into  one  view  ; 
that  the  profession  and  establishment  of  natural  reli- 
gion in  the  world  is  greatly  owing,  in  different  ways,  to 
this  book,  and  the  supposed  revelation  which  it  con- 
tains ;  that  it  is  acknowledged  to  be  of  the  earliest  an- 
tiquity ;  that  its  chronology  and  common  history  are 
entirely  credible  ;  that  this  ancient  nation,  the  Jews,  of 
whom  it  chiefly  treats,  appear  to  have  been  in  fact  the 
people  of  God  in  a  distinguished  sense  ;  that,  as  there 
was  a  national  expectation  amongst  them,  raised  from 

x  x 


346  Of  the  particular  Evidence         Part  II. 

the  prophecies,  of  a  Messiah  to  appear  at  such  a  time,  so 
one  at  this  time  appeared  claiming  to  be  that  Messiah  ; 
that  he  was  rejected  by  this  nation,  but  received  by  the. 
Gentiles,  not  upon  the  evidence  of  prophecy,  but   of 
miracles  ;  that  the  religion  he  taught  supported  itself 
un!er  the  greatest  difficulties,   gained   gound,   and   at 
length  became  the  religion  of  the  world  ;  that  in  the 
mean  time  the  Jewish  polity  was  utterly  destroyed,  and 
the  nation  dispersed  over  the  face  of  the  earth  ;  that 
notwithstanding  this,  they  have  remained  a  distinct  nu- 
merous people  for  so  many  centuries,  even  to  this  day, 
which  not  only  appears  to  be  the  express  completion  of 
several  prophecies  concerning  them,  but  also  renders 
it,  as  one  may  speak,  a  visible  and  ea^y  possibility  that 
the  promises  made  to  them  as  a  nation  may  yet  be  ful- 
filled ;  and  to  these  acknowledged  truths,  let  the  per- 
son we  have  been  supposing  add,  as  I  thii  k  he  ought, 
whether  every  one  will  allow  it  or  not,  the  obvious  ap- 
pearances which  there  are,  of  the  state  of  the  world,  in 
other  respects  besides  what  relates  to  the  Jews,  and  of 
the  Christian  Church,  having  so  long  answered  and 
still   answering  to  the  prophetick  history  ; — suppose, 
I  say,  these  facts  set  over  against  the  things  before  men- 
tioned   out  of  the  Scripture,  and  seriously  compared 
with  them, — the  joint  view  of  both   together  must, 
I  think,  appear  of  very  great  weight    to  a  considerate 
reasonable  person  ;  of  much  greater  indeed,  upon  hav- 
ing them  first  laid  before  him,  than  is  easy  for  us  who 
are  so  familiarized  to  them  to  conceive,  without  some 
particular  attention  for  that  purpose. 

All  these  things,  and  the  several  particulars  contain- 
ed under  them,  require  to  be  distinctly  and  most  thor- 
oughly examined  into,  that  the  weight  of  each  may  be 
judged  of  upon  such  examination,  and  such  conclusion 
drawn  as  results  from  their  united  force.     But  this  has 


Chap.  VII.  for  Christianity.  347 

not  been  attempted  here.  I  have  gone  no  farther  than 
to  show,  that  the  general  imperfect  view  of  them  now 
given,  tru-  confest  historical  evidence  for  miracles,  and 
the  many  obvious  appearing  completions  of  prophecy, 
tog-:  ther  with  the  collateral  things*  here  mentioned, 
and  there  are  several  others  of  the  like  sort  ;  that  all 
this  together,  which  being  fact  must  be  acknowledged 
by  unbelievers,  amounts  to  real  evidence  of  somewhat 
more  than  human  in  this  matter  ;  evidence  much 
more  important  than  careless  men,  who  have  been  ac- 
customed only  to  transient  and  partial  views  of  it,  can 
imagine,  and  indeed  abundantly  sufficient  to  act  upon. 
And  these  things,  I  apprehend,  must  be  acknowledged 
by  unbelievers.  For  though  they  may  say,  that  the 
historical  evidence  of  miracles,  wrought  in  attestation 
of  Christianity,  is  not  sufficient  to  convince  them  that 
such  miracles  were  really  wrought,  they  cannot  deny 
that  there  is  such  historical  evidence,  it  being  a  known 
matter  of  fact  that  there  is.  They  may  say,  the  con- 
formity between  the  prophecies  and  events  is  by  acci- 
dent ;  but  there  are  many  instances  in  which  such  con- 
formity itself  cannot  be  denied.  They  may  say,  with 
regard  to  such  kind  of  collateral  things  as  those  above- 
mentioned,  that  any  odd  accidental  events,  without 
meaning,  will  have  a  meaning  found  in  them  by  fanciful 
people  ;  and  that  such  as  are  fanciful  in  any  one  cer- 
tain way,  will  make  out  a  thousand  coincidences  which 
seem  to  favour  their  peculiar  follies.  Men,  I  say,  may 
talk  thus  j  but  no  one  who  is  serious  can  possibly 
think  these  things  to  be  nothing,  if  he  considers  the 
importance  of  collateral  things,  and  even  of  lesser  cir- 
cumstances, in  the  evidence  of  probability,  as  distin- 

*  All  the  particular  things  mentioned    in  this  chapter,  not  reducible   to 
the    head  of  certain    miracles,  or  determinate   completions  of  pr  ophtcy. 
See  p.  310,  311. 


348  Of  the  particular  Evidence  Part  II. 

guished  in  nature  from  the  evidence  of  demonstration. 
In  many  cases  indeed  it  seems  to  require  the  truest 
judgment,  to  determine  with  exactness  the  weight  of 
circumstantial  evidence  ;  but  it  is  very  often  altogeth- 
er as  convincing,  as  that  which  is  the  most  express  and 
direct. 

This  general  view  of  the  evidence  for  Christianity, 
considered  as  making  one  argument,  may  also  serve  to 
recommend  to  serious  persons,  to  set  down  every  thi  g 
which  they  think  may  be  of  any  real  weight  at  all  in 
proof  of  it,  and   particularly  the  many  seeming  com- 
pletions of  prophecy  ;  and  they  will  find  that,  judging 
by  the  natural  rules  by  which  we  judge  of  probable 
evidence  in  common  matters,  they  amount  to  a  much 
higher  degree  of  proof,  upon  such  a  joint  review,  than 
could  be  supposed  upon    considering  them  separately 
at  different  times,  how  strong  soever  the  proof  might 
before  appear  to  them  upon  such  separate  views  of  it. 
For  probable  proofs,   by  being  added,  not  only  in- 
crease the  evidence,   but  multiply  it.     Nor  should    I 
dissuade  any  one  from  setting  down  what  he  thought 
made  for  the  contrary  side.     But  th^n  it  is  to  be  re- 
membered, not  in   order  to  influence  his  judgment, 
but  his   practice,  that  a  mistake  on  one  side  may  be, 
in  its  consequences,  much  more  dangerous  than  a  mis- 
take on  the  other.     And  what  course  is  most  safe,  and 
what  most  dangerous,  is  a  consideration   thought  very 
material,  when  we  deliberate,  not   concerning  events, 
but  concerning  conduct  in  our  temporal  affairs.     To 
be  influenced  by  this  consideration  in  our  judgment, 
to  believe  or  disbelieve  upon  it,  is  indeed  as  much  prej- 
udice as  any  thing  whatever.     And,  like    other  prej- 
udices, it  operates    contrary  ways,  in  different    men. 
For  some  are  inclined  to  believe  what  they  hope,  an4 
others  what  they  fear.     And  it  is  manifest  unreason^ 


Chap.  VII.  for  Christianity.  349 

bleness,   to  apply  to  men's  passions  in  order  to  gain 
their  assent.    But  in  deliberations  concerning  conduct, 
there  is  nothing  which  reason  more  requires  to  be  tak- 
en into  the  account,  than  the  importance  of  it.     For, 
suppose  it  doubtful  what  would  be  the  consequence  of 
acting  in  this,  or  in  a  contrary  manner,   still  that  tak- 
ing one  side  could  be  attended   with  little  or  no  bad 
consequence,  and  taking  the  other  might  be  attended 
with  tne  greatest,  must  appear  to  unprejudiced  reason 
of  the  highest  moment  towards  determining  howr  we 
are  to  act.     But  the  truth   of  our  religion,  like  the 
truth  of  common  matters,  is  to  be  judged  of  by  all 
the  evidence  taken  together.     And  unless  the  whole 
series  of  things  which  may  be  alleged  in  this  argu- 
ment, and  every  particular  thing  in  it,  can  reasonably 
be  supposed  to  have  been  by  accident,  (for  here  the 
stress  of  the  argument  for  Christianity  lies)  then  is  the 
truth  of  it  proved  ;  in  like  manner  as  if  in  any  common 
case,  numerous  events  acknowledged,  were  to  be  al- 
leged in  proof  of  any  other  event  disputed,  the  truth  of 
the  disputed  event  would  be  proved,  not  only  if  any 
one  of  the  acknon  ledged  ones  did  of  itself  clearly  im- 
ply it,  but,  though  no  one  of  them  singly  did  so,  if  the 
whole  of  the  acknowledged  events,  taken  together, 
could  not  in  reason  be  supposed  to  have  happened,  un- 
less the  disputed  one  were  true. 

It  is  obvious  how  much  advantage  the  nature  of 
this  evidence  gives  to  those  persons  who  attack  Chris- 
tianity, especially  in  conversation.  For  it  is  easy  to 
shew,  in  a  short  and  lively  manner,  that  such  and  such 
things  are  liable  to  objection,  that  this  and  another 
thing  is  of  little  weight  in  itself ;  but  impossible  to 
shew,  in  like  manner,  the  united  force  of  the  whole 
argument  in  one  view. 


350  Evidence  for  Christianity*        Part  II. 

However,  lastly,  as  it  has  been  made  appear  that 
there  is  no  presumption  against  a  revelation  as  mirac- 
ulous ;  that  the  general  scheme  of  Christianity,  and 
the  principal  parts  of  it,  are  conformable  to  the  expe* 
rienced  constitution  of  things,  and  the  whole  perfectly 
credible, — so  the  account  now  given  of  the  positive  ev- 
idence for  it,  shews  that  this  evidence  is  such,  as  from 
the  nature  of  it  cannot  be  destroyed,  though  it  should 
be  lessened. 


Chap,  VIII.   Objections  against  the  Analogy,  &V.     351 


CHAP.  VIII. 

Of  the  Objections  which  may  be  made  against  arguing 
from  the  Analogy  of  Nature  to  Religion. 

If  every  one  would  consider,  with  such  attention  as 
they  are  bound  even  in  point  of  morality  to  consider, 
what  they  judge  and  give  characters  of,  the  occasion  of 
this  chapter  would  be,  in  some  good  measure  at  least* 
superseded.  But  since  this  is  not  to  be  expected,  for 
some  we  find  do  not  concern  themselves  to  understand 
even  what  they  write  against ;  since  this  treatise,  in 
common  with  most  others,  lies  open  to  objections 
which  may  appear  very  material  to  thoughtful  men  at 
first  sight ;  and,  besides  that,  seems  peculiarly  liable  to 
the  objections  of  such  as  can  judge  without  thinking, 
and  of  such  as  can  censure  without  judging, — it  may 
not  be  amiss  to  set  down  the  chief  of  these  objections 
which  occur  to  me,  and  consider  them  to  their  hands. 
And  they  are  such  as  these  ; 

"  That  it  is  a  poor  thing  to  solve  difficulties  in  rev- 
elation, by  saying  that  there  are  the  same  in  natural 
religion,  when  what  is  wanting  is  to  clear  both  of  them 
of  the?e  their  common,  as  well  as  other  their  respec- 
tive, difficulties ;  but  that  it  is  a  strange  way  indeed 
of  convincing  men  of  the  obligations  of  religion,  to 
shew  them  that  they  have  as  little  reason  for  their 
worldly  pursuits  ;  and  a  strange  way  of  vindicating 
the  justice  and  goodness  of  the  Author  of  nature,  and 
of  removing  the  objections  against  both,  to  which  the 
system  of  religion  lies  open,  to  shew  that  the  like  ob- 
jections lie  against  natural  providence  j  a  way  of  an- 


352  Objections  against  the  Analogy       Part  IL 

swering  objections  against  religion,  without  so  much, 
as  pretending  to  make  out  that  the  system  of  it,  or  the 
particular  things  in  it  objected  against,  are  reasonable ; 
especially,  perhaps  some  may  be  inattentive  enough  to 
add,  must  this  be  thought  strange,  when  it  is  confes- 
sed that  analogy  is  no  answer  to  such  objections ;  that 
when  this  sort  of  reasoning  is  carried  to  the  utmost 
length  it  can  be  imagined  capable  of,  it  will  yet  leave 
the  mind  in  a  very  unsatisfied  state  ;  and  that  it  must 
be  unaccountable  ignorance  of  mankind,  to  imagine 
they  will  be  prevailed  with  to  forego  their  present  in- 
terests and  pleasures,  from  regard  to  religion,  upon 
doubtful  evidence." 

Now,  as  plausible  as  this  way  of  talking  may  ap- 
pear, that  appearance  will  be  found  in  a  great  measure 
owing  to  half  views,  which  shew  but  part  of  an  object, 
yet  shew  that  indistinctly,  and  to  undeterminate  Ian- 
guage.  By  these  means  weak  men  are  often  deceived 
by  others,  and  ludicrous  men  by  themselves.  And 
even  those  who  are  serious  and  considerate,  cannot  al- 
ways readily  disentangle,  and  at  once  clearly  see 
through  the  perplexities  in  which  subjects  themselves 
are  involved,  and  which  are  heightened  by  the  defi- 
ciencies and  the  abuse  of  words.  To  this  latter  sort  of 
persons,  the  following  reply  to  each  part  of  this  objec- 
tion severally  may  be  of  some  assistance,  as  it  may  also 
tend  a  little  to  stop  and  silence  others. 

First,  the  thing  wanted,  i.  e.  what  men  require,  is 
to  have  all  difficulties  cleared.  And  this  is,  or  at  least 
for  any  thing  we  know  to  the  contrary  it  may  be,  the 
same  as  requiring  to  comprehend  the  Divine  Nature, 
and  the  whole  plan  of  Providence,  from  everlasting  to 
everlasting.  But  it  hath  always  been  allowed  to  argue 
from  what  is  acknowledged  to  what  is  disputed  ;  and 
it  is  in  no  other  sense  a  poor  thing  to  argue  from  natu- 


CftAP.  VIII.  of  Nature  to  Religion.  233 

ral  religion  to  revealed,  in  the  manner  found  fault  with, 
than  it  is  to  argue  in  numberless  other  ways  of  proba- 
ble deduction  and  inference,  in  matters  of  conduct, 
which  we  ar-j  continually  reduced  to  the  necessity  of 
doing  Indeed  the  epithet  poor,  may  be  applied,  I  fear 
as  properly,  to  great  part,  or  the  whole,  of  human 
life,  as  it  is  to  the  things  mentioned  in  the  objection.  Is 
it  not  a  poor  thing,  for  a  physician  to  have  so  little 
knowledge  in  the  cure  of  diseases  as  even  the  most 
eminent  have  ?  To  act  upon  conjecture  and  guess, 
where  the  life  of  man  is  concerned  ?  Undoubtedly  it 
is  ;  but  not  in  comparison  of  having  no  skill  at  all  in 
that  useful  art,  and  being  obliged  to  act  wholly  in  the 
dark. 

Further — since  it  is  as  unreasonable  as  it  is  common, 
to  urge  objections  against  revelation  which  are  of  equal 
weight  against  natural  religion  ;  and  those  who  do 
this,  if  they  are  not  confused  themselves,  deal  unfairly 
with  others,  in  making  it  seem  that  they  are  arguing 
only  against  revelation,  or  particular  doctrines  of  it, 
when  in  reality  they  are  arguing  against  moral  provi- 
dence,—^ is  a  thing  of  consequence  to  show  that  such 
objections  are  as  much  levelled  against  natural  religion, 
as  against  revealed.  And  objections,  which  are  equal- 
ly applicable  to  both,  are  properly  speaking  answered, 
by  its  being  shown  that  they  are  so,  provided  the  form- 
er be  admitted  to  be  true.  And  without  taking  in 
the  consideration  how  distinctly  this  is  admitted,  it  is 
plainly  very  material  to  observe,  that  as  the  things  ob- 
jected against  in  natural  religion,  are  of  the  same  kind 
with  what  is  certain  matter  of  experience  in  the  course 
of  Providence,  and  in  the  information  which  God  af- 
fords us  concerning  our  temporal  interest  under  his 
government, — so  the  objections  against  the  system  of 
Christianity  and  the  evidence  of  it,  are  of  the  very  same 
y  v 


354  Objections  against  the  Analogy       Part  II. 

kind  with  those  which  are  made  against  the  system  and 
evidence  of  natural  religion.  However,  the  reader 
upon  review  may  see,  that  most  of  the  analogies  insist- 
ed upon,  even  in  the  latter  part  of  this  treatise,  do  not 
necessarily  require  to  have  more  taken  for  granted  than 
i  in  the  former  ;  that  there  is  an  Author  of  nature,  or 
natural  Governor  of  the  world  ;  and  Christianity  is 
vindicated,  not  from  its  analogy  to  natural  religion, 
but  chiefly  from  its  analogy  to  the  experienced  con- 
stitution of  nature. 

Secondly,  religion  is  a  practical  thing,  and  consists 
in  such  a  determinate  course  of  life,  as  bejng  what 
there  is  reason  to  think  i-  commanded  by  the  Author 
of  nature,  and  will  upon  the  whole  be  our  happiness 
under  hi*  government.  Now  if  men  can  be  convinced 
that  rhey  have  the  like  reason  to  believe  this,  as  to 
believe  that  taking  care  of  their  temporal  affairs  will 
be  to  their  advantage,— such  conviction  cannot  but 
be  an  argument  to  them  for  the  practice  of  religion. 
And  if  th^re  be  really  any  reason  for  believing  one  of 
the^e,  and  endeavouring  to  preserve  life,  and  secure 
ourselves  the  necessaries  and  conveniences  of  it, — then 
there  is  reason  also  for  believing  the  other,  and  endeav- 
ouring to  secure  the  interest  it  proposes  to  us.  And 
if  the  interest  which  religion  proposes  to  us  be  infinite- 
ly greater  than  our  whole  temporal  interest,  then  there 
must  be  proportionably  greater  reason  for  endeavour- 
ing to  secure  one  than  the  other  ;  since  by  the  suppo- 
sition, the  probability  of  our  securing  one,  is  equal  to 
the  probability  of  our  securing  the  other.  This  seems 
plainly  unanswerable,  and  has  a  tendency  to  influence 
fair  minds,  who  consider  what  our  condition  really  is, 
or  upon  what  evidence  we  are  naturally  appointed  to 
act  ;  and  who  are  disposed  to  acquiesce  in  the  terms 
upon  which  we  live,  and  attend  to  and  follow  that 


Chap.  VIII.  of  Nature  to  Religion.  35 5 

practical  instruction,  whatever  it  be,  which  is  afford- 
ed us. 

But  the  chief  and  proper  force  of  the  argument  re- 
ferred to  in  the  objection  lies  in  another  place.     For, 
it  is  said  that  the  proof  of  religion  Ls  involved  in  such 
inextricable  difficulties  as   to  render  it  doubtful,  and 
that  it  cannot  be  supposed  that  if  it  were  true  it  would 
be  left  upon  doubtful  evidence.     Here  then,  over  and 
above  the  force  of  each  particular  difficulty  or  objec- 
tion, these  difficulties  and  objections,  taken  together, 
are  turned  into  a  positive  argument  against  the  truth 
of  religion  ;   which  argument  would    stand  thus.     If 
religion  were  true  it  would  not  be  left  doubtful,  and 
open  to  objections  to  the  degree  in  which  it  is  ;  there- 
fore that  it  is  thus  left,  not  only  renders  the  evidence 
of  it  weak,  and  lessens  its  force  in  proportion  to  the 
weight  of  such  objections,  but  also  shews  it  to  be  false, 
or  is  a  general  presumption  of  its  being  so.     Now  the 
observation,  that  from  the    natural  constitution  and 
course  of  things,  we  must  in  our  temporal  concerns, 
almost  continually,  and    in   matters   of  great  conse- 
quence, act  upon  evidence  of  a  like  kind   and  degree 
to  the  evidence  of  religion,  is  an  answer  to  this  argu- 
ment ;  because  it  shews  that  it  is  according  to  the  con- 
duct and  character  of  the  Author  of  nature  to  appoint 
we  should  act  upon  evidence  like  to  that  which  this  ar- 
gument presumes  he  cannot  be  supposed  to  appoint  we 
should  act  upon  ;  it  is  an  instance,  a  general  one  made 
up  of  numerous   particular  ones,  of  somewhat  in  his 
dealing  with  us  similar  to  what  is  said  to  be  incredible. 
And  as  the  force  of  this  answer  lies  merely  in  the  par- 
allel which  there  is  between  the  evidence  for  religion 
and  for  our  temporal  conduct,  the  answer  is  equally 
just  and  conclusive,  whether  the  parallel  be  made  out 


356  Objections  against  the  Analogy         Part  IL 

by  shewing  the  evidence  of  the  former  to  be  higher,  or 
the  evidence  of  the  latter  to  be  lower. 

Thirdly,  the  design  of  this  treatise  is  not  to  vindi- 
cate the  character  of  God,  but  to  shew  the  obligations 
of  men  ;  it  is  not  to  justify  his  providence,  but  to  shv^w 
what  belongs  to  us  to  do.     These  are  two    subjects, 
and  ought  not  to  be  confounded.     And  though  they 
may  at  length  run  up  into  each  other,  yet  observations 
may  immediately  tend  to  make  out  the  latter,  which 
do  not   appear  by  any  immediate  connexion   to  the 
purpose  of  the  former ;  which  is  less  our  concern  than 
many  seem  to  think.     For,  1st,  it  is  not  necessary  we 
should  justify  the  dispensations  of  Providence  against 
objections,  any  farther  than  to  shew  that  the  things  ob- 
jected against  may,  for  aught  we  know,   be  consistent 
with  justice  and  goodness.     Suppose  then,  that  there 
are  things  in  the  system  of  this  world,  and  plan  of  Prov- 
idence relating  to  it,  which  taken  alone  would  be  un- 
just,— yet  it  has  been  shewn  unanswerably,  that  if  we 
could  take  in  the  reference  which  these  things  may 
have  to  other  things  present,  past  and  to  come,  to  the 
whole  scheme  which  the  things  objected  against  are 
parts  of, — these  very  things  might,  for  aught  we  know, 
be  found  to  be  not  only  consistent  with  justice,  but  in- 
stances of  it.     Indeed  it  has  been  shewn,  by  the  anal- 
ogy of  what  we  see,  not  only  possible  that  this  maybe 
the  case,  but   credible  that  it  is.     And   thus  objec- 
tions drawn  from  such  things  are  answered,  and  Prov- 
idence is  vindicated,  as  far  as  religion  makes  its  vindi- 
cation necessary.     Hence  it  appears,  2dly,  that  objec- 
tions against  the  divine  justice  and  goodness  are  not 
endeavoured  to  be  removed,  by  shewing  that  the  like 
objections,  allowed  to  be  really  conclusive,  lie  against 
natural  providence  ;  but  those  objections  being  sup» 
posed  and  shewn  not  to  be  conclusive,  the  things  ob* 


Chap.  VIII.      of  Nature  to  Religion.  357 

jected  against,  considered  as  matters  of  fact,  are  farther 
shewn  to  be  credible  from  their  conformity  to  the  con- 
stitution of  nature  ;  for  instance,  that  God  will  reward 
and  punish  men  for  their  actions  hereafter,  from  the 
observation  that  he  does  reward  and  punish  them  for 
their  actions  here.  And  this  I  apprehend  is  of  weight. 
And  I  add,  3dly,  it  would  be  of  weight,  even  though 
those  objections  were  not  answered.  For,  there  being 
the  proof  of  religion  above  set  down,  and  religion  im- 
plying several  facts,  for  instance  again,  the  fact  last 
mentioned,  that  God  will  reward  and  punish  men  for 
their  actions  hereafter, — the  observation  that  his  pres- 
ent method  of  government  is  by  rewards  and  punish- 
ments, shews  that  future  fact  not  to  be  incredible ; 
whatever  objections  men  may  think  they  have  against 
it,  as  unjust  or  unmerciful,  according  to  their  notions 
of  ju  tice  and  mercy,  or  as  improbable  from  their  be- 
lier  of  necessity.  1  say,  as  improbable ;  for  it  is  evident 
no  objection  against  it,  as  unjust,  can  be  urged  from 
necessity,  since  this  notion  as  much  destroys  injustice 
as  it  does  justice.  Then  4thly,  though  objections 
against  the  reasonableness  of  the  system  of  religion, 
cannot  indeed  be  answered  without  entering  into  con- 
sideration of  its  reasonableness,  yet  objections  against 
the  credibility  or  truth  of  it  may.  Because  the  system 
of  it  is  reducible  into  what  is  properly  matter  of  fact ; 
and  the  truth  the  probable  truth  of  facts,  may  be  shewn 
without  consideration  of  their  reasonableness.  Nor  is 
it  necessary,  though  in  some  cases  and  respects  it  is 
highly  useful  and  proper,  yet  it  is  not  necessary,  to  give 
a  proof  of  the  reasonableness  of  every  precept  enjoined 
us,  and  of  every  particular  dispensation  of  Providence 
which  comes  into  the  system  of  religion.  Indeed  the 
more  thoroughly  a  person  of  a  right  disposition  is  con- 
vinced of  the  perfection  of  the  divine  nature  and  con- 


258  Objections  against  the  Analogy      Part  II. 

duct,  the  farther  he  will  advance  towards  that  perfec- 
tion of  religion  which  St.  John*  speaks  of.  But  the 
general  obligations  of  religion  are  fully  made  out,  by 
proving  the  reasonableness  of  the  practice  of  it.  And 
that  the  practice  of  religion  is  reasonable  may  be  shewn, 
though  no  more  could  be  proved  than  that  the  system, 
of  it  may  be  so,  for  aught  we  know  to  the  contrary ;  and 
even  without  entering  into  the  distinct  consideration 
of  this.  And  from  hence,  5thly,  it  is  easy  to  see,  that 
though  the  analogy  of  nature  is  not  an  immediate  an- 
swer to  objections  against  the  wisdom  the  Justice  or 
goodness  of  any  doctrine  or  precept  of  religion. — yet 
it  may  be,  as  it  is,  an  immediate  and  direct  answer  to 
what  is  really  intended  by  such  objections,  which  is  to 
shew  that  the  things  objected  against  ate  incredible. 

Fourthly,  it  is  most  readily  acknowledged  that  the 
foregoing  treatise  is  by  no  means  satisfactory,  very  far 
indeed  from  it ;  but  so  would  any  natural  institution 
of  life  appear,  if  reduced  into  a  system,  together  with 
its  evidence.  Leaving  religion  out  of  the  case,  men 
are  divided  in  their  opinions  whether  our  pleasures 
overbalance  our  pains  ;  and  whether  it  be,  or  be  not, 
eligible  to  live  in  this  world.  And  were  all  ^uch  con- 
troversies settled,  which  perhaps  in  speculation  would 
be  found  involved  in  great  difficulties,  and  were  it  de- 
termined uoon  the  evidence  of  reason,  as  nature  has 
determined  it  to  our  hands,  that  life  is  to  be  preserv- 
ed,—yet  still  the  rules  which  God  has  been  pleased  to 
afford  us,  for  escaping  the  miseries  of  it  and  obtaining 
its  satisfactions,  the  rules,  for  instance,  of  preserving 
health,  and  recovering  it  when  lost,  are  not  only  falli- 
ble and  precarious,  but  very  far  from  being  exact. 
Nor  are  we  informed  by  nature  in  future  contingencies 
and  accidents,  so  as  to  render  it  at  all  certain  what  is 

*  1   Joh.  iv.  18. 


Chap.  VIII.         cf  Nature  to  Religion.  359 

the  be>t  method  of  managing  our  affairs.  What 
will  be  the  success  of  our  temporal  pursuits  in  the 
common  sense  of  the  word  success,  is  highly  doubtful. 
And  what  will  be  the  success  of  them  in  the  proper 
sense  of  the  word,  i.  e.  what  happiness  or  enjoyment 
w  shall  obtain  by  them,  is  doubtful  in  a  much  higher 
degree.  Indeed  the  un; satisfactory  nature  of  the  evi- 
dence with  which  we  are  obliged  to  take  up,  in  the 
daily  course  of  life,  is  scarce  to  be  expressed.  Yet 
men  do  not  throw  away  life,  or  disregard  the  interests 
of  it,  upon  account  of  this  doubtfulness.  The  evidence 
of  religion  then  being  admitted  real,  those  who  object 
against  it  as  not  satisfactory,  i.  e.  as  not  being  what 
they  wish  it,  plainly  forget  the  very  condition  of  our 
being  ;  for  satisfaction  in  this  sense  does  not  belong  to 
such  a  creature  as  man.  And,  which  is  more  mate- 
rial, they  forget  also  the  very  nature  of  religion.  For 
religion  presupposes,  in  all  those  who  will  embrace  it, 
a  certain  degree  of  integrity  and  honesty,  which  it  was 
intended  to  try  whether  men  have  or  not,  and  to  ex- 
ercise  in  such  as  have  it,  in  order  to  its  improvement. 
Religion  presupposes  this  as  much,  and  in  the  same 
sense,  as  speaking  to  a  man  presupposes  he  understands 
the  language  in  which  you  speak,  or  as  warning  a  man 
of  any  danger  presupposes  that  he  hath  such  a  regard 
to  himself  as  that  he  will  endeavour  to  avoid  it.  And 
therefore  the  question  is  not  at  all,  whether  the  evi- 
dence of  religion  be  satisfactory,  but,  whether  it  be 
in  reason  sufficient  to  prove  and  discipline  that  virtue, 
which  it  presupposes.  Now  the  evidence  of  it  is  fully 
sufficient  for  all  those  purposes  of  probation,  how  far 
soever  it  is  from  being  satisfactory  as  to  the  purposes 
of  curiosity,  or  any  other  ;  and  indeed  it  answers  the 
purposes  of  the  former  in  several  respects,  which  h 
would  not  do  if  it  were  as  overbearing  as  is  required. 


360  Objections  against  the  Analogy       Part  IL 

One  might  add  farther,  that  whether  the  motives  or 
the  evidence  for  any  coarse  of  action  be  satisfactory, 
meaning  here  by  that  word,  what  satisfies  a  man,  that 
such  a  course  of  action  will  in  event  be  for  his  good, — 
this  need  never  be,  and  I  think  strictly  speaking  never 
is,  the  practical  question  in  common  matters.  But 
the  practical  question  in  all  cases  is,  whether  the  evi- 
dence for  a  course  of  action  be  such  as,  taking  in  all 
circumstances,  makes  the  faculty  within  us  which  is 
the  guide  and  judge  of  conduct,*  determine  that 
course  of  action  to  be  prudent.  Indeed  satisfaction 
that  it  will  be  for  our  interest  or  happiness,  abundant- 
ly determines  an  action  to  be  prudent  ;  but  evidence 
almost  infinitely  lower  than  this  determines  actions  to 
be  so  too,  even  in  the  conduct  of  every  day. 

Fifthly,  as  to  the  objection  concerning  the  influ- 
ence which  this  argument,  or  any  part  of  it,  may  or 
may  not  be  expected  to  have  upon  men, — I  observe  as 
above,  that  religion  being  intended  for  a  trial  and  ex- 
ercise of  the  morality  of  every  person's  character  who 
is  a  subject  of  it,  and  there  being,  as  I  have  shewn, 
such  evidence  for  it  as  is  sufficient  in  reason  to  influ- 
ence men  to  embrace  it, — to  object  that  it  is  not  to 
be  imagined  mankind  will  be  influenced  by  such  evi- 
dence, is  nothing  to  the  purpose  of  the  foregoing  trea- 
tise. For  the  purpose  of  it  is  not  to  inquire  what  sort 
of  creatures  mankind  are,  but  what  the  light  and 
knowledge  which  is  afforded  them  requires  they  should 
be  ;  to  shew  how  in  reason  they  ought  to  behave,  not 
how  in  fact  they  will  behave.  This  depends  upon 
rhemselves,  and  is  their  own  concern,  the  personal 
concern  of  each  man  in  particular.  And  how  little 
regard  the  generality  have  to  it,  experience  indeed  does 
too  fully  shew.     But  religion,  considered  as  a  proba 

*  Sep  Dissertation  H. 


Chap.  VIII.  of  Nature  to  Religion.  361 

tion,  has  had  its  end  upon  all  persons,  to  whom  it  has 
been  proposed  with  evidence  sufficient  in  reason  to  in- 
fluence their  practice ;  for  by  this  means  they  have 
been  put  into  a  state  of  probation,  let  them  behave  as 
they  will  in  it.  And  thus,  not  only  revelation,  but 
reason  also,  teaches  us  that  by  the  evidence  of  religion 
being  laid  before  men,  the  designs  of  Providence  are 
carrying  on,  not  only  with  regard  to  those  who  will, 
but  likewise  with  regard  to  those  who  will  not,  be  in- 
fluenced by  it.  However,  lastly,  the  objection  here 
referred  to  allows  the  things  insisted  upon  in  this  trea- 
tise to  be  of  some  wreight ;  and  if  so,  it  may  be  hoped 
it  will  have  some  influence.  And  if  there  be  a  proba- 
bility that  it  will  have  any  at  all,  there  is  the  same  rea- 
son in  kind,  though  not  in  degree,  to  lay  it  before  men, 
as  there  would  be  if  it  were  likely  to  have  a  greater  in- 
fluence. 

And  farther,  I  desire  it  may  be  considered,  with  re« 
spect  to  the  whole  of  the  foregoing  objections,  that  in 
this  treatise  I  have  argued  upon  the  principles  of  others,* 
not  my  own  j  and  have  omitted  what  I  think  true* 
and  of  the  utmost  importance,  because  by  others 
thought  unintelligible,  or  not  true.  Thus  I  have  ar- 
gued upon  the  principles  of  the  fatalists,  which  I  do 
not  believe  ;  and  have  omitted  a  thing  of  the  utmost 
importance  which  I  do  believe,  the  moral  fitness  and 
unfitness  of  actions,  prior  to  all  will  whatever  ;  which 
I  apprehend  as  certainly  to  determine  the  divine  con- 
duct, as  speculative  truth  and  falsehood  necessarily  de- 
termine the  divine  judgment.  Indeed  the  principle 
of  liberty  and  that  of  moral  fitness  so  force  themselves 


*  By  arguing  upon  the  principles  of  others,  the  reader  will  observe  is  meant5 
not  proving  any  thing  from  those  principles,  but  notwithstanding  them.  Thus 
religion  is  proved,  not  from  the  opinion  of  necessity,  which  is  absurd,  but 
notwithstanding  or  even  though  that  opinion  were  admitted  to  be  true, 

Z    Z 


1S62  Objections  against  the  Analogy       Part  IL 

upon  the  mind,  that  moralists,  the  ancients  as  well  as 
moderns,  have  formed  their  language  upon  it.     And 
probably  it  may  appear  in  mine,  though  I  have  endeav- 
oured to  avoid  it,  and  in  order  to  avoid  it,  have  some- 
time- been  obliged  to  express  myself  in  a  manner  which 
will  appear  strange  to  such  as  do  not  observe  the  reason 
for  it  ;  but  the  general  argument  here  pursued   does 
not  at   all  suppose  or  proceed  upon   these  principles. 
Now,  these  two  abstract  principles  of  liberty  and  mor- 
al fitness  being  omitted,  religion  can  be  considered  in 
no  other  view  than    merely  as  a  question  of  fact ;  and 
in  this  view  it  is  here  considered.     It  is  obvious  that 
Christianity,  and  the  proof  of  it,   are  both  historical. 
And  even  natural  religion  is,  properly,  a  matter  of  fact ; 
for,  that  there  is  a  righteous  Governor  of  the  world, 
is  so  ;  and  this  proposition  contains  the  general  system 
of  natural  religion.     But  then,  several  abstract  truths, 
and  in  particular  those  two  principles,  are  usually  taken 
into  consideration  in  the  proof  of  it,  whereas  it  is  here 
treated  of  only  a<  a  matter  of  fact.     To  explain  this  ; 
that  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to  two  right 
ones,  is  an  abstract  truth  ;  but  that  they  appear  so  to 
our  mind,  is  only  a  matter  of  fact.     And  this  last  must 
have  been  admitted,  if  any  thing  was,  by  those  ancient 
scepticks   who  would  not  have  admitted  the  former  ; 
but  pretended  to  doubt,  whether  there  were  any  such 
thing  as  truth,  or,  whether  we  could  certainly  depend 
upon  our  faculties  of  understanding  for  the  knowledge 
of  it  in  any  case.    So  likewise  that  there  is,  in  the  nature 
of  things,  an  original  standard  of  right  and  wrong  in 
actions,  independent  upon  all  will,  but  which  unalter- 
ably determines  the  will  of  God  to  exercise  that  moral 
government  over  the  world  which  religion    teaches, 
i.  e.   finally  and  upon  the  whole  to  reward  and  punish 
men  respectively  as  they  act  right  or  wrong, — this  as- 


Chap,  VIII.  of  Nature  to  Religion.  363 

sertion  contains  an  abstract  truth,  as  well  as  matter  of 
fact.    But  suppose  in  the  present  state  every  man,  with- 
out exception,  was  rewarded  and  punished  inexact  pro- 
portion as  he  followed  or  transgressed  thatsense  of  right 
and  wrong,  which  God  has  implanted  in  the  nature  of 
every  man, — this  would  not  be  at  all  an  abstract  truth, 
but  only  a  matter  of  fact.     And  though  this  fact  were 
aknowledged  by  every  one,  yet  the  very  same  difficul- 
ties might  be  raised  as  are  now,  concerning  the  abstract 
questions  of  liberty  and  moral  fitness  ;  and  we  should 
have  a  proof,  even  the  certain  one  of  experience,  that 
the  government  of  the  world  was  perfectly  moral, 
without  taking  in  the  consideration  of  those  questions ; 
and  this  proof  would  remain,  in  what  way  soever  they 
were  determined.     And  thus,  God  having  given  man- 
kind a  moral  faculty,  the  object  of  which  is  actions, 
and  which  naturally  approves  some  actions  as  right  and 
of  good  desert,  and  condemns  others  as  wrong  and  of 
ill  desert ;  that  he  will,   finally  and  upon  the  whole, 
reward  the  former  and  punish  the  latter,  is  not  an  as- 
sertion of  an  abstract  truth,  but  of  what  is  as  mere  a 
fact  as  his  doing  so  at  present  would  be.     This  future 
fact  I  have,  not  indeed   proved  with  the  force  with 
which  it  might  be  proved,   from  the  principles  of  lib- 
erty and  moral  fitness,  but  without  them  have  given 
a  really  conclusive  practical  proof  of  it,  which  is  greatly 
strengthened  by  the  general  analogy  of  nature  ;  a  proof 
easily  cavilled  at,  easily  shewn  not  to  be  demonstrative, 
for  it  is  not  offered  as  such  ;  but  impossible,  I   think, 
to  be  evaded  or  answered.     And  thus  the  obligations 
of  religion  are  made  out,  exclusively  of  the  questions 
concerning  liberty  and  moral  fitness,  which  have  been 
perplexed  with  difficulties  and  abstruse  reasonings,  as 
every  thing  may. 

Hence  therefore  may  be  observed  distinctly  what  is 


364       Objections  against  the  Analogy,  &V.    Part  II* 

the  force  of  this  treatise.  It  will  be,  to  such  as  are  con- 
vinced of  religion  upon  the  proof  arising  out  of  the  two 
last  mentioned  principles,  an  additional  proof  and  a 
confirmation  of  it  ;  to  such  as  do  not  admit  those 
principles,  an  original  proof  of  it,*  and  a  confirmation 
of  that  proof.  Those  who  believe,  will  here  find  the 
scheme  of  Christianity  cleared  of  objections,  and  the 
evidence  of  it  in  a  peculiar  manner  strengthened;  those 
who  do  not  believe,  will  at  least  be  shewn  the  absurd- 
ity of  all  attempts  to  prove  Christianity  false,  the  plain 
undoubted  credibility  of  it  ;  and,  I  hope,  a  good  deal 
more. 

And  thus,  though  some  perhaps  may  seriously  think 
that  analogy,  as  here  urged,  has  too  great  stress  laid 
upon  it ;  and  ridicule,  unanswerable  ridicule,  may  be 
applied,  to  shew  the  argument  from  it  in  a  disadvanta- 
geous light,— yet  there  can  be  no  question  but  that  it  is 
a  real  one.  For  religion,  both  natural  and  revealed, 
implying  in  it  numerous  facts,  analogy  being  a  con- 
firmation of  all  facts  to  which  it  can  be  applied,  as  it  is 
the  only  proof  of  most,  cannot  but  be  admitted  by  every 
one  to  be  a  material  thing,  and  truly  of  weight  on  the 
side  of  religion,  both  natural  and  revealed  ;  and  it 
ought  to  be  particularly  regarded  by  such  as  profess  to 
follow  nature,  and  to  be  less  satisfied  with  abstract 
reasonings. 

*  P.  184.  &c, 


CONCLUSION. 


XX  hatever  account  may  be  given  of  the  strange 
inattention  and  disregard,  in  some  ages  and  coun- 
tries, to  a  matter  of  such  importance  as  religion,  it 
would,  before  experience,  be  incredible  that  there 
should  be  the  like  disregard  in  those  who  have  had  the 
moral  system  of  the  world  laid  before  them,  as  it  is  by 
Christianity,  and  often  inculcated  upon  them  ;  because 
this  moral  system  carries  in  it  a  good  degree  of  evidence 
for  its  truth,  upon  its  being  barely  proposed  to  our 
thoughts.  There  is  no  need  of  abstruse  reasonings  and 
distinctions,  to  convince  an  unprejudiced  understanding 
that  there  is  a  God  who  made  and  governs  the  world, 
and  will  judge  it  in  righteousness,  though  they  may  be 
necessary  to  answer  abstruse  difficulties,  when  once 
such  are  raised  ;  when  the  very  meaning  of  those 
words  which  express  most  intelligibly  the  general  doc- 
trine  of  religion,  is  pretended  to  be  uncertain,  and  the 
clear  truth  of  the  thing  itself  is  obscured  by  the  intri- 
cacies of  speculation.  But  to  an  unprejudiced  mind, 
ten  thousand  thousand  instances  of  design  cannot  but 
prove  a  designer.  And  it  is  intuitively  manifest,  that 
creatures  ought  to  live  under  a  dutiful  sense  of  their 
Maker,  and  that  justice  and  charity  must  be  his  laws, 
to  creatures  whom  he  has  made  social  and  placed  in 
society.  Indeed  the  truth  of  revealed  religion,  pecu- 
liarly so  called,  is  not  selfevident,  but  requires  external 
proof  in  order  to  its  being  received.  Yet  inattention 
among  us  to  revealed  religion,  will  be  found  to  imply 
ihe^  same  dissolute  immoral  temper  of  mind  as  inatten- 


$66  Conclusion.  Part  IL 

tion  to  natural  religion ;  because,  when  both  are  laid 
before  us  in  the  manner  they  are  in  Christian  countries 
of  liberty,  our  obligations  to  inquire  into  both,  and  to 
embrace  both  upon  suppoition  of  their  truth,  are 
obligations  of  the  same  nature.  For,  revelation  claims 
to  be  the  voice  of  God  ;  and  our  obligation  to  attend 
to  hi>  voice  is  surely  moral  in  all  cases.  And  as  it  is 
insisted  that  it*  evidence  is  conclusive,  upon  thorough 
consideration  of  it,  so  it  offers  h>elf  to  us  with  manifest 
obvious  appearances  of  having  something  more  than 
human  in  it,  and  therefore  in  all  reason  requires  to  have 
its  claims  most  seriously  examined  into.  It  is  to  be 
added,  that  though  light  and  knowledge,  in  what  man- 
ner soever  afforded  us,  is  equally  from  God,  yet  a  mi- 
raculous revelation  has  a  peculiar  tendency,  from  the 
first  principles  of  our  nature,  to  awaken  mankind,  and 
inspire  them  with  reverence  and  awe  ;  and  this  is  a  pe- 
culiar obligation  to  attend  to  what  claims  to  be  so  with 
such  appearances  of  truth.  It  is  therefore  most  cer- 
tain that  our  obligations  to  inquire  seriously  into  the 
evidence  of  Christianity,  and  upon  supposition  of  its 
truth  to  embrace  it,  are  of  the  utmost  importance,  and 
moral  in  the  highest  and  most  proper  sense.  Let  us 
then  suppose  that  the  evidence  of  religion  in  general, 
and  of  Christianity,  has  been  seriously  inquired  into  by 
all  reasonable  men  among  us.  Yet  we  find  many 
professedly  to  reject  both,  upon  speculative  princi- 
ples of  infidelity  And  all  of  them  do  not  content 
themselves  with  a  bare  neglect  of  religion,  and  en* 
joying  their  imaginary  freedom  from  its  restraints. 
Some  go  much  beyond  this.  They  deride  God's  moral 
government  over  the  world.  They  renounce  his 
protection,  and  defy  his  justice.  They  ridicule  and 
vilify  Christianity,  and  blaspheme  the  Author  of  it; 
and  take   all  occasions  to  manifest  a  scorn   and  con- 


Pa&t  II.  Conclusion.  367 

tempt  of  revelation.  This  amounts  to  an  active  set- 
ting themselves  against  religion,  to  what  may  be 
considered  as  a  positive  principle  of  irreligion  ;  which 
they  cultivate  within  themselves,  and,  whether 
they  intend  this  effect  or  not,  render  habitual,  as  a 
good  man  does  the  contrary  principle.  And  others, 
who  are  not  chargeable  with  all  this  profligateness,  yet 
are  in  avowed  opposition  to  religion,  as  if  discovered 
to  be  groundless.  Now  admitting,  which  is  the  sup- 
position we  go  upon,  that  these  persons  act  upon  what 
they  think  principles  of  reason,  and  otherwise  they  are 
not  to  be  argued  with,  it  is  really  inconceivable  that 
they  should  imagine  they  clearly  see  the  whole  evidence 
of  it,  considered  in  itself,  to  be  nothing  at  all  ;  nor  do 
they  pretend  this.  They  are  far  indeed  from  having 
a  just  notion  of  its  evidence  ;  but  they  would  not  say 
its  evidence  was  nothing,  if  they  thought  the  system 
of  it,  with  all  its  circumstances,  were  credible,  like  oth- 
er matters  of  science  or  history.  So  that  their  manner 
of  treating  it  must  proceed,  either  from  such  kind  of 
objections  against  all  religion  as  have  been  answered 
or  obviated  in  the  former  part  of  this  treatise,  or  else 
from  objections  and  difficulties  supposed  more  peculiar 
to  Christianity.  Thus,  they  entertain  prejudices  against 
the  whole  notion  of  a  revelation  and  miraculous  in- 
terpositions. They  find  things  in  Scripture,  whether 
in  incidental  passages  or  in  the  general  scheme  of  it, 
which  appear  to  them  unreasonable.  They  take  for 
granted  that  if  Christianity  were  true,  the  light  of  it 
must  have  been  more  general,  and  the  evidence  of  i\ 
more  satisfactory,  or  rather  overbearing  ;  that  it  must 
and  would  have  been,  in  some  way,  otherwise  put  and 
left  than  it  is.  Now  this  is  not  imagining  they  see  th? 
evidence  itself  to  be  nothing  or  inconsiderable,  but 
quite  another  thing.     It  is  being  fortified  against   the 


368  Conclusion,  Part  If, 

evidence  in  some  degree  acknowledged,  by  thinking 
they  see  the  system  of  Christianity,  or  somewhat  which 
appears  to  them  necessarily  connected  with  it,  to  be  in- 
credible or  false  ;  fortified  against  that  evidence  which 
might  otherwise  make  great  impression  upon  them. 
Or,  lastly,  if  any  of  these  persons  are,  upon  the  whole, 
in  doubt  concerning  the  truth  of  Christianity,  their 
behaviour  seems  owing  to  their  taking  for  granted, 
through  strange  inattention,  that  such  doubting  is, 
in  a  manner,  the  same  thing  as  being  certain  against  it. 
To  these  persons,  and  to  this  state  of  opinion  con- 
cerning religion,  the  foregoing  treatise  is  adapted. 
For,  all  the  general  objections  against  the  moral  system 
of  nature  having  been  obviated,  it  is  shewn  that  there 
is  not  any  peculiar  presumption  at  all  against  Christ- 
ianity, either  considered  as  not  discoverable  by  reason, 
or  as  unlike  to  what  is  so  discovered  ;  nor  any  worth 
mentioning  against  it  as  miraculous,  if  any  at  all ; 
none  certainly  which  can  render  it  in  the  least  incred- 
ible. It  is  shewn  that  upon  supposition  of  a  divine 
revelation,  the  analogy  of  nature  renders  it  beforehand 
highly  credible,  I  think  probable,  that  many  things 
in  it  must  appear  liable  to  great  objections  ;  and  that 
we  must  be  incompetent  judges  of  it  to  a  great  de- 
gree. This  observation  is,  I  think,  unquestionably 
true,  and  of  the  very  utmost  importance  ;  but  it  is 
urged,  as  I  hope  it  will  be  understood,  with  great  cau- 
tion of  not  vilifying  the  faculty  of  reason,  which  is 
the  candle  of  the  Lord  within  us  ;*  though  it  can  af- 
ford no  light  where  it  does  not  shine,  nor  judge  where 
it  has  no  principles  to  judge  upon.  The  objections 
here  spoken  of,  being  first  answered  in  the  view  of  ob- 
jections against  Chi  istianity  as  a  matter  of  fact,  are  in 
the  next  place  considered  as  urged   more  immediately 

*  Prov,  xx,  27, 


Part  II.  Conclusion.  369 

against  the  wisdom,  justice  and  goodness  of  the  Christ- 
ian dispensation.  And  it  is  fully  made  out  that  they 
admit  of  exactly  the  like  answer,  in  every  respect,  to 
what  the  like  objections  against  the  constitution  of  na- 
ture admit  of;  that,  as  partial  views  give  the  appear- 
ance of  wrong  to  things,  which  upon  farther  considera- 
tion and  knowledge  of  their  relations  to  other  things  are 
found  just  and  good,  so  it  is  perfectly  credible  that  the 
things  objected,  against  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  the 
Christian  dispensation,  may  be  rendered  instances  of 
wisdom  and  goodness  by  their  reference  to  other  things, 
beyond  our  view  ;  because  Christianity  is  a  scheme  as 
much  above  our  comprehension,  as  that  of  nature,  and 
like  that,  a  scheme  in  which  means  are  made  use  of  to 
accomplish  ends,  and  which,  as  is  most  credible,  may- 
be carried  on  by  general  laws.  And  it  ought  to  be 
attended  to,  that  this  is  not  an  answer  taken  merely 
or  chiefly  from  our  ignorance,  but  from  somewhat 
positive  which  our  observation  shews  us.  For,  to  like 
objections  the  like  answer  is  experienced  to  be  just, 
in  numberless  parallel  cases.  The  objections  against 
the  Christian  dispensation,  and  the  method  by  which 
it  is  carried  on,  having  been  thus  obviated  in  general 
and  together,  the  chief  of  them  are  considered  distinct- 
ly,  and  the  particular  things  objected  to  are  shewn 
credible,  by  their  perfect  analogy,  each  apart,  to  the 
constitution  of  nature.  Thus,  if  man  be  fallen  from 
his  primitive  state,  and  to  be  restored,  and  infinite 
wisdom  and  power  engages  in  accomplishing  our  re- 
covery, it  were  to  have  been  expected,  it  is  said,  that 
this  should  have  been  effected  at  once,  and  not  by- 
such  a  long  series  of  means,  and  such  a  various  econ- 
omy of  persons  and  things  ;  one  dispensation  prepar- 
atory to  another,  this  to  a  farther  one,  and  so  on 
through  an  indefinite  number  of  ages,  before  the  emU- 

A  A  A 


370  Conclusion.  Part  II. 

of  the  scheme  proposed  can  be  completely  accom- 
plished ;  a  scheme  conducted  by  infinite  wisdom,  and 
executed  by  almighty  power.  But  now  on  the  con- 
trary, our  finding  that  every  thing  in  the  constitution 
and  course  of  nature  is  thus  carried  on>  shews  such  ex- 
pectations concerning  revelation  to  be  highly  unrea- 
sonable, and  is  a  satisfactory  answer  to  them,  when 
urged  as  objections  against  the  credibility  that  the 
great  scheme  of  Providence  in  the  redemption  of  the 
world  may  be  of  this  kind,  and  to  be  accomplished  in 
this  manner.  As  to  the  particular  method  of  our  re- 
demption, the  appuintment  of  a  Mediator  between 
God  and  man,  this  has  been  shewn  to  be  most  obvi- 
ously analogous  to  the  general  conduct  of  nature,  i.  e. 
the  God  of  nature  in  appointing  others  to  be  the  in- 
struments of  his  mercy,  as  we  experience  in  the  daily 
course  of  Providence.  The  condition  of  this  world, 
which  the  doctrine  of  our  redemption  by  Christ  pre- 
supposes, so  much  falls  in  with  natural  appearances, 
that  heathen  moralists  inferred  it  rom  those  appear- 
ances ;  inferred  that  human  nature  was  fallen  from 
its  original  rectitude,  and  in  consequence  of  this  de- 
graded from  its  primitive  happiness.  Or,  however 
this  opinion  came  into  the  world,  these  appearances 
must  have  kept  up  the  tradition  and  confirmed  the 
belief  of  it.  And  as  it  was  the  general  opinion  un- 
der the  light  of  nature  that  repentance  and  reforma- 
tion, alone  and  by  itself,  was  not  sufficient  to  do  away 
sin,  and  procure  a  full  remission  of  the  penalties  an- 
nexed to  it,  and  as  the  reason  of  the  thing  does  not 
ut  all  lead  to  any  such  conclusion. — so  every  day's  ex- 
perience shews  us  that  reformation  is  not,  in  any  sort, 
sufficient  to  prevent  the  present  disadvantages  and 
miseries  which,  in  the  natural  course  of  things,  God 
has  annexed  to   folly  and  extravagance.     Yet  there 


Part  II.  Conclusion.  371 

may  be  ground  to  think  that  the  punishments,  which 
by  the  general  laws  of  divine  government  are  annexed 
to  vice,  may  be  prevented ;  that  provision  may  have 
been  even  originally  made,  that  they  should  be  pre- 
vented by  some  means  or  other,  though  they  could 
not  by  reformation  alone.  For  we  have  daily  instances 
of  such  mercy i  in  the  general  conduct  of  nature ;  com- 
passion provided  for  misery,*  medicine >  for  diseases, 
friends  against  enemies.  There  is  provision  made,  in 
the  original  constitution  of  the  world,  that  much  of 
the  natural  bad  consequences  of  our  follies,  which 
persons  themselves  alone  cannot  prevent,  may  be  pre- 
vented by  the  a  distance  of  others  ;  assistance  which 
nature  enables,  and  disposes,  and  appoints  them  to  af- 
ford. By  a  method  of  goodness  analogous  to  this, 
when  the  world  lay  in  wickedness  and  consequently  in 
ruin,  God  so  loved  the  worlds  that  he  gave  his  only  begot- 
ten Son  to  -ave  it ;  and  he  being  made  perfect  by  suffer- 
ings became  the  author  of  eternal  salvation  to  all  them  that 
obey  him.*  Indeed  neither  reason  nor  analogy  would 
lead  us  to  think,  in  particular,  that  the  interposition 
of  Christ,  in  the  maimer  in  which  he  did  interpose, 
would  be  of  that  efficacy  for  recovery  of  the  world 
which  the  Scripture  teaches  us  it  was ;  but  neither 
would  reason  nor  analogy  lead  us  to  think,  that  other 
particular  means  would  be  of  the  efficacy  which  expe- 
rience shews  they  are,  in  numberless  instances.  And 
ther  fore,  as  the  case  before  us  does  not  admit  of  ex- 
perience, so  that  neither  reason  nor  analogy  can  shew 
how,  or  in  what  particular  way,  the  interposition  of 
Christ,  as  revealed  in  Scripture,  is  of  that  efficacy  which 
it  is  there  represented  to  be, — this  is  no  kind  nor  de- 
gree of  presumption  against  its  being  really  of  that 

*  Serm.  at  the  Rolls,  p.   106. 

*  Joh.  iii.  16.     Heb.  v.  9. 


372  Conclusion.  Part  II, 

efficacy.     Farther^-the  objections  against  Christianity, 
from  the  light  of  it  not  being  universal,  nor  its  evi- 
dence so  strong  as  might  possibly  be  given  us,  have 
been  answered   by    the  general    analogy   of  nature. 
That   God  has   made  such  variety  of  creatures,  is  in- 
deed an  answer  to  the  former ;  but  that  he  dispenses 
his  gifts   in  such  variety,  both  of  degrees  and  kinds, 
amongst  creatures  of  the  same  species,  and  even  to  the 
same  individuals  at  different  times,  is  a  more  obvious 
and  full  answer  to  it.     And  it  is  so  far  from  being  the 
method  of  Providence  in  other  cases,  to  afford  us  such 
overbearing  evidence  as  some  require  in  proof  of  Chris- 
tianity, that  on  the  contrary,  the  evidence  upon  which 
we  are  naturally  appointed  to  act  in  common  mat- 
ters, throughout  a  very  great  part  of  life,  is  doubtful 
in  a  high  degree.     And  admitting  the  fact,  that  God 
has  afforded  to  some  no  more  than  doubtful  evidence 
of  religion,  the  same  account  may  be  given  of  it  as  of 
difficulties  and  temptations    with  regard   to   practice. 
But  as  it  is  not  impossible,*  surely,  that  this  alleged 
doubtfulness  may  be  men's  own  fault,  it  deserves  their 
most  serious  consideration  whether  it  be  not  so.     How- 
ever, it  is  certain  that    doubting  implies  a  degree  of 
evidence  for  that  of  which  we  doubt  ;  and  that  this 
degree  of  evidence  as  really  lays  us  under  obligations, 
as  demonstrative  evidence. 

The  whole  then  of  religion  is  throughout  credible  j 
nor  is  there,  I  think,  any  thing  relating  to  the  revealed 
dispensation  of  things,  more  different  from  the  expe- 
rienced constitution  and  course  of  nature,  than  some 
parts  of  the  comtitutiori  of  nature  are  from  other  parts 
of  it.  And  if  so,  the  only  question  which  remains  is, 
what  po:itive  evidence  can  be  alleged  for  the  truth  of 
Christianity.     This  too  in  general  has  been  considered, 

*  P.  303,  &C. 


Part  II.  Conclusion.  37$ 

and  the  objections  against  it  estimated.     Deduct  there- 
fore what  is  to  be  deducted  from  that  evidence,  upon 
account  of  any  weight  which  may  be  thought  to  re- 
main  in  these  objections,  after  what  the  analogy   of 
nature  has  suggested  in  answer  to  them,  and  then  con- 
sider what  are  the  practical  consequences  from  all  this, 
upon  the  most  sceptical  principles  one  can  argue  upon, 
(for  I  am  writing  to  persons  who  entertain  these  prin- 
ciple)  and  upon  such  consideration  it  will  be  obvious 
that  immorality,  as  little  excuse  as  it  admits  of  in  it- 
self, is  greatly   aggravated  in  persons  who  have  been 
made  acquainted  with  Christianity,  whether  they  be- 
lieve it  or  not ;  because  the  moral  system  of  nature,  or 
natural  religion,  which  Christianity  lays  before  us,  ap- 
proves itself,   almost  intuitively,  to  a  reasonable  mind 
upon  seeing  it  proposed.     In  the  next  place,  with  re* 
gard  to  Christianity  it  will  be  observed,  that  there  is  a 
middle  between   a  full  satisfaction  of  the  truth  of  it, 
and  a  satisfaction  of  the  contrary.     The  middle  state 
of  mind  between  these  two,  consists  in  a  serious  appre- 
hension that  it  may  be  true,  joined  with  doubt  whether 
it  be  so.     And  this,  upon  the  best  judgment  I  am  able 
to  make,  is  as  far  towards  speculative  infidelity  as  any 
sceptick  can  at  all  be  supposed  to  go,  who  has  had 
true  Christianity,  with  the  proper  evidence  of  it,  laid 
before  him,  and  has  in  any  tolerable  measure  consid- 
ered them.     For  I  would  not  be  mistaken  to  compre- 
hend all  who  have  ever  heard  of  it ;  because  it  seems 
evident  that  in  many  countries,  called  Christian,  nei- 
ther Christianity  nor  its  evidence  are  fairly  laid  before 
men.     And  in  places  where  both  are,  there  appear  to 
be  some  who  have  very  little  attended  to  either,  and 
who  reject  Christianity  with  a  scorn  proportionate  to 
their  inattention,    and  yet  are  by  no    means  without 
understanding  in  other  matters.     Now  it  has  been 


374  Conclusion.  Part  IL 

shewn  that  a  serious  apprehension  that  Christianity 
may  be  true,  lays  persons  under  the  strictest  obliga- 
tions of  a  serious  regard  to  it  throughout  the  whole  of 
their  life  ;  a  regard  not  the  same  exactly,  but  in  many 
respects  nearly  the  same,  with  what  a  full  conviction  of 
its  truth  would  lay  them  under.  Lastly,  it  will  ap- 
pear that  blasphemy  and  profaneness,  I  mean  with  re- 
gard to  Christianity,  are  absolutely  without  excuse. 
For  there  is  no  temptation  to  it  but  from  the  wan- 
tonness of  vanity  or  mirth  ;  and  these,  considering  the 
infinite  importance  of  the  subject,  are  no  such  tempta- 
tions as  to  afford  any  excuse  for  it.  if  this  be  a  just 
account  of  things,  and  yet  men  can  go  on  to  vilify  or 
disregard  Christianity,  which  is  to  talk  and  act  as  if 
they  had  a  demonstration  of  its  falsehood,  there  is  no 
reason  to  think  they  would  alter  their  behaviour  to 
any  purpose,  though  there  were  a  demonstration  of 
its  truth. 


TWO  BRIEF 


DISSERTATIONS. 


I.     Of  Personal  Identity. 
II.     Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue. 


ADVERTISEMENT. 

In  the  first  copy  of  these  papers,  I  had  inserted  the 
two  following  Dissertations  into  the  chapters,  Of  a 
future  Life,  and,  Of  the  Moral  Government  of  God> 
with  which  they  are  closely  connected.  But  as  they 
do  not  directly  fall  under  the  title  of  the  foregoing 
Treatise,  and  would  have  kept  the  subject  of  it  too 
long  out  of  sight,  it  seemed  more  proper  to  place 
fhem  bv  themselves. 


DISSERTATION  I, 


Of  Personal  Identity. 


Whether  we  are  to  live  in  a  future  state,  as  it  is 
the  most  important  question  which  can  possibly  be  ask- 
ed, so  it  is  the  most  intelligible  one  which  can  be  ex- 
pressed in  language.  Yet  strange  perplexities  have 
been  raised  about  the  meaning  of  that  identity  or  same- 
ness of  person,  which  is  implied  in  the  notion  of  our 
living  now  and  hereafter,  or  in  any  two  successive  mo- 
ments. And  the  solution  of  these  difficulties  hath  been 
stronger  than  the  difficulties  themselves.  For,  person- 
al identity  has  been  explained  so  by  some,  as  to  render 
the  inquiry  concerning  a  future  life  of  no  consequence 
at  all  to  us,  the  persons  who  are  making  it.  And 
though  few  men  can  be  misled  by  such  subtleties,  yet 
it  may  be  proper  a  little  to  consider  them. 

Now,  when  it  is  asked  wherein  personal  identity 
consists,  the  answer  should  be  the  same  as  if  it  were 
asked  wherein  consists  similitude  or  equality  ;  that  all 
attempts  to  define  would  but  perplex  it.  Yet  there 
is  no  difficulty  at  all  in  ascertaining  the  idea.  For  as, 
upon  two  triangles  being  compared  or  viewed  togeth- 
er, there  arises  to  the  mind  the  idea  of  similitude,  or 
upon  twice  two  and  four,  tli^M%i  of  equality, — so 
likewise,  upon  comparing  the  consciousnesses  of  one's 
self  or  one's  own  existence  in  any  two  moments,  there 
as  immediately  arises  to  the, mind  the  idea  of  personal 


BBfi 


378  Personal  Identity.  Diss,  I. 

identity.  And  as  the  two  former  comparisons  not 
only  give  us  the  ideas  of  simlitude  and  equality,  but 
also  shew  us  that  two  triangles  are  alike,  and  twice 
two  and  four  are  equal, — so  the  latter  comparison  not 
only  gives  us  the  idea  of  personal  identity,  but  also 
shews  us  the  identity  of  ourselves  in  those  two  mo- 
ments ;  the  present,  suppose,  and  that  immediately 
past ;  or  the  present,  and  that,  a  month,  a  year,  or 
twenty  years  past.  Or  in  other  words,  by  reflecting 
upon  that  which  is  my  self  now,  and  that  which  was 
my  self  twenty  years  ago,  I  discern  they  are  not  two, 
but  one  and  the  same  self. 

But  though  consciousness  of  what  is  past  does  thus 
ascertain  our  personal  identity  to  ourselves,  yet  to  say 
that  it  makes  personal  identity,  or  is  necessary  to  our 
being  the  same  persons,  is  to  say  that  a  person  has  not 
existed  a  single  moment,  nor  done  one  action,  but 
what  he  can  remember ;  indeed  none  but  what  he  re- 
flects upon.  And  one  should  really  think  it  selfevi- 
dent,  that  consciousness  of  personal  identity  presup- 
poses, and  therefore  cannot  constitute,  personal  iden- 
tity, any  more  than  knowledge  in  any  other  case  can 
constitute  truth,  which  it  presupposes. 

This  wonderful  mistake  may  possibly  have  arisen 
from  hence,  that  to  be  endued  with  consciousness  is 
inseparable  from  the  idea  of  a  person  or  intelligent  be- 
ing. !For,  this  might  be  expressed  inaccurately  thus, 
that  consciousness  makes  personality,  and  from  hence 
-it  might  be  concluded  to  make  personal  indentity.  But 
though  present  consciousness  of  what  we  at  present  do 
and  feel  is  necessary  to  our  being  the  persons  we  now 
are,  yet  present  consciousness  of  past  actions  or  feelings 
is  not  necessary  to  our  being  the  same  persons,  who 
performed  those  actions  or  had  those  feelings. 

The  inquiry,  what  makes  vegetables  the  same  in  the 


Diss.  I.  Personal  Identity.  379 

common  acceptation  of  the  word,  does  not  appear  to 
have  any  relation  to  this  of  personal  identity,  because 
the  word  same,  when  applied  to  them  and  to  person,  is 
not  only  applied  to  different  subjects,  but  it  is  also 
used  in  different  senses.  For  when  a  man  swears  to' 
the  same  tree  as  having  stood  fifty  years  in  the  same 
place,  he  means  only  the  same  as  to  all  the  purposes  of 
property  and  uses  of  common  life,  and  not  that  the 
tree  has  been  all  that  time  the  same  in  the  strict  phi- 
losophical  sense  of  the  word.  For  he  does  not  know, 
whether  any  one  particle  of  the  present  tree  be  the 
same  with  any  one  particle  of  the  tree  which  stood  11* 
the  same  place  fifty  years  ago.  And  if  they  have  not 
one  common  particle  of  matter,  they  cannot  be  the 
same  tree  in  the  proper  philosophick  sense  of  the  word 
same  ;  it  being  evidently  a  contradiction  in  terms  to 
say  they  are,  when  no  part  of  their  substance  and  no 
one  of  their  properties  is  the  same  ;  no  part  of  their 
substance,  by  the  supposition  ;  no  one  of  their  prbp. 
erties,  because  it  is  allowed  that  the  same  property  canV 
not  be  transferred  from  one  substance  to  another.  And 
therefore  when  we  say  the  identity  or  sameness  of  a 
plant  consists  in  a  continuation,  of  the  same  life,  com- 
municated  under  the  same  organization  to  a  number 
of  particles  oj*  matter,  whether  the  same  or  not,— the 
word  same,  when  applied  to  life  and  to  organization, 
cannot  possibly  be  understood  to  signify  what  it  signi- 
fies in  this  very  sentence  when  applied  to  matter.  In 
a  loose  and  popular  sense  then,  the  life  and  the  organ- 
ization and  the  plant  are  justly  said  to  be  the  same, 
notwithstanding  the  perpetual  change  of  the  parts. 
But  in  a  strict  and  philosophical  manner  of  speech,  no 
man,  no  being,  no  mode  of  being,  no  any  thing,  can 
be  the  same  with  that  with  which  it  hath  indeed  noth- 
ing the  same.     Now  sameness  is  used  in  this  latter 


ago  Personal  Identity.  Diss.  I, 

sense  when  applied  to  persons.  The  identity  of  these, 
therefore,  cannot  subsist  with  diversity  of  substance. 
The  thing  here  considered,  and  demonstratively,  as 
I  think,  determined,  is  proposed  by  Mr.  Locke  in  these 
words,  whether  it,  i.  e.  the  same  self  or  person,  be  the 
same  identical  substance  ?  And  he  has  suggested  what  is 
a  much  better  answer  to  the  question  than  that  which 
he  gives  it  in  form.  For  he  defines  person,  a  thinking 
intelligent  being,  &c.  and  personal  identity,  the  sameness 
of  a  rational  being.*  The  question  then  is,  whether 
the  same  rational  being  is  the  same  substance  ;  which 
needs  no  answer,  because  being  and  sub  stance  in  this 
place  stand  for  the  same  idea.  The  ground  of  the 
doubt,  whether  the  same  person  be  the  same  substance, 
is  said  to  be  this,  that  the  consciousness  of  our  own 
existence  in  youth  and  in  old  age,  or  in  any  two  joint 
successive  moments,  is  not  the  same  individual  action^ 
i.  e.  not  the  same  consciousness,  but  different  suc- 
cessive consciousnesses.  Now  it  is  strange  that  this 
should  have  occasioned  such  perplexities.  For  it  is 
surely  conceivable  that  a  person  may  have  a  capacity 
of  knowing  some  object  or  other  to  be  the  same  now, 
which  it  was  when  he  contemplated  it  formerly  ;  yet 
in  this  case,  where  by  the  supposition  the  object  is  per- 
ceived to  be  the  same,  the  perception  of  it  in  any  two 
moments  cannot  be  one  and  the  same  perception.  And 
thus,  though  the  successive  consciousnesses  which  we 
have  of  our  own  existence  are  not  the  same,  yet  are  they 
consciousnesses  of  one  and  the  same  thing  or  object  ; 
of  the  same  person,  self,  or  living  agent.  The  person 
of  whose  existence  the  consciousness  is  felt  now,  and 
was  felt  an  hour  or  a  year  ago,  is  discerned  to  be,  not 
two  persons,  but  one  and  the  same  person  ;  and  there- 
fore is  one  and  the  same. 

*  Locke's  Works,  vol.  I.  p.  146.  f  Locke,  p.  146,  147. 


Diss.  I.  Pereonal  Identity.  381 

Mr.  Locke's  observations  upon  this  subject  appear 
hasty  ;  and  he  seems  to  profess  himself  dissatisfied 
with  suppositions  which  he  has  made  relating  to  it.* 
But  some  of  those  hasty  observations  have  been  carried 
to  a  strange  length  by  others,  whose  notion,  when  tra- 
ced and  examined  to  the  bottom,  amounts,  I  think, 
to  this  :f  "  That  personality  is  not  a  permanent,  but 
a  transient  thing ;  that  it  lives  and  dies,  begins  and 
ends  continually  ;  that  no  one  can  any  more  remain 
one  and  the  same  person  two  moments  together,  than 
two  successive  moments  can  be  one  and  the  same  mo- 
ment ;  that  our  substance  is  indeed  continually  chang- 
ing ;  but  whether  this  be  so  or  not,  is,  it  seems,  noth- 
ing to  the  purpose,  since  it  is  not  substance,  but  con- 
sciousness alone,  which  constitutes  personality,  which 
consciousness  being  successive  cannot  be  the  same  in 
any  two  moments,  nor  consequently  the  personality 
constituted  by  it."  And  from  hence  it  must  follow, 
that  it  is  a  fallacy  upon  ourselves  to  charge  our  present 
selves  with  any  thing  we  did,  or  to  imagine  our  present 
selves  interested  in  any  thing  which  befel  us  yesterday, 
or  that  our  present  self  will  be  interested  in  what  will 
befal  us  tomorrow;  since  our  present  self  is  not,  in  real- 
ity, the  same  with  the  self  of  yesterday,  but  another 
like  self  or  person  coming  in  its  room,  and  mistaken 
for  it ;  to  which  another  self  will  succeed  tomorrow* 
This,  I  say,  must  follow  ;  for  if  the  self  or  person  of  to- 
day, and  that  of  tomorrow,  are  not  the  same, '  but  on- 
ly like  persons,  the  person  of  today  is  really  no  more 
interested  in  what  will  befal  the  person  of  tomorrow, 
than  in  what  will  befal  any  other  person.  It  may 
be  thought  perhaps,  that  this  is  not  a  just  representa- 
tion of  the  opinion  we  are  speaking  of ;  because  those 

*  Locke,  p.  152. 

f  See  an  answer  to   Dr.  Clarke's  third  defence  of  his  letter  to  M*  Dod- 
•rtr//,  2d  edit.  p.  44,  56,  &c. 


$&2  Personal  Identity.  Diss.  L 

who  maintain  it  allow,  that  a  person  is  the  same  as  far 
back  as  his  remembrance  reaches.  And  indeed  they 
do  use  the  words  identity  and  same  person.  Nor  will 
language  permit  these  words  to  be  laid  aside  ;  since  if 
they  were,  there  must  be,  I  know  not  what  ridiculous 
periphrasis  substituted  in  the  room  of  them.  But 
they  cannot,  consistently  with  themselves,  mean  that 
the  person  is  really  the  same.  For,it  is  selfevident  that 
the  personality  cannot  be  really  the  same,  if,  as  they 
expressly  assert,  that  in  which  it  consists  is  not  the 
same.  And  as,  consistently  with  themselves,  they  can- 
not, so  I  think  it  appears  they  do  not,  mean  that  the 
person  is  really  the  same,  but  only  that  he  is  so  in  a 
fictitious  sense  ;  in  such  a  sense  only  as  they  assert,  for 
this  they  do  assert,  that  any  number  of  persons  what- 
ever may  be  the  same  person.  The  bare  unfolding 
this  notion,  and  laying  it  thus  naked  and  open,  seems 
the  best  confutation  of  it.  However,  since  great  stress 
is  said  to  be  put  upon  it,  I  add  the  following  things. 

First,  this  notion  is  absolutely  contradictory  to 
th?.t  certain  conviction  which  necessarily  and  every 
moment  rises  within  us,  when  we  turn  our  thoughts 
upon  ourselves,  when  we  reflect  upon  what  is  past,  and 
look  forward  upon  what  is  to  come.  All  imagination 
of  a  daily  change  of  that  living  agent  which  each  man 
calls  himself,  for  another,  or  of  any  such  change 
throughout  our  whole  present  life,  is  entirely  borne 
down  by  our  natural  sense  of  things.  Nor  is  it  possible 
for  a  person  in  his  wits  to  alter  his  cQnduct,  with  re- 
gard to  his  health  or  affairs,  from  a  suspicion  that 
though  he  should  live  tomorrow,  he  should  not,  how- 
ever, be  the  same  person  he  is  today.  And  yet,  if  it 
be  reasonable  to  act,  with  respect  to  a  future  life,  up- 
on this  notion  that  personality  is  transient,  it  is  reason- 
able to  act  upon  it  with  respect  to  the  present.     Here 


Diss.  I.  Personal  Identity.  $$$ 

then  is  a  notion  equally  applicable  to  religion  and  to 
our  temporal  concerns,  and  every  one  sees  and  feels  the 
inexpressible  absurdity  of  it  in  the  latter  case ;  if  there- 
fore any  can  take  up  with  it  in  the  former,  this  cannot 
proceed  from  the  reason  of  the  thing,  but  must  be 
owing  to  an  inward  unfairness  and  secret  corruption  of 
heart. 

Secondly,  it  is  not  an  idea,  or  abstract  notion,  or 
quality,  but  a  being  only,  which  is  capable  of  life  and 
action,  of  happiness  and  misery.  Now  all  beings  con- 
fessedly continue  the  same,  during  the  whole  time  of 
their  existence.  Consider  then  a  living  being  now 
existing,  and  which  has  existed  for  any  time  alive  ; 
this  living  being  must  have  done  and  suffered  and 
enjoyed,  what  it  has  done  and  suffered  and  enjoyed 
formerly,  (this  living  being,  I  say,  and  not  another)  as 
really  as  it  does  and  suffers  and  enjoys,  what  it  does 
and  suffers  and  enjoys  this  instant.  All  these  succes- 
sive actions,  enjoyments  and  sufferings,  are  actions,  en- 
joyments and  sufferings  of  the  same  living  being.  And 
they  are  so,  prior  to  all  consideration  of  its  remember- 
ing or  forgetting  ;  since  remembering  or  forgetting 
can  make  no  alteration  in  the  truth  of  past  matter  of 
fact.  And  suppose  this  being  endued  with  limited 
powers  of  knowledge  and  memory,  there  is  no  more 
difficulty  in  conceiving  it  to  have  a  power  of  knowing 
itself  to  be  the  same  living  being  which  it  was  some 
time  ago,  of  remembering  some  of  its  actions,  suffer- 
ings and  enjoyments,  and  forgetting  others,  than  in  con- 
ceiving it  to  know  or  remember  or  forget  any  thing  else. 

Thirdly,  every  person  is  conscious  that  he  is  now 
the  same  person  or  self  he  was  as  far  back  as  his  re- 
membrance reaches ;  since  when  any  one  reflects  upon 
a  past  action  of  his  own,  he  is  just  as  certain  of  the  per- 
son who  did  that  action,  namelv,  himself,  the  person 


384?  Personal  Identity,  Diss,  h 

who  now  reflects  upon  it,  as  he  is  certain  that  the  ac- 
tion was  at  all  done.  Nay,  very  often  a  person's  assur- 
ance of  an  action  having  been  done,  of  which  he  is  ab- 
solutely assured,  arises  wholly  from  the  consciousness 
that  he  himself  did  it.  And  this  he,  person,  or  self, 
must  either  be  a  substance,  or  the  property  of  some 
substance.  If  he,  if  person,  be  a  substance,  then  con- 
sciousness that  he  is  the  same  person,  is  consciousness 
that  he  is  the  same  substance.  If  the  person,  or  he, 
be  the  property  of  a  substance,  still  consciousness  that 
he  is  thesame  property  is  as  certain  aproof  that  his  sub- 
stance remains  the  same,  as  consciousness  that  he  re- 
mains the  same  substance  would  be  ;  since  the  same 
property  cannot  be  transferred  from  one  substance  to 
another. 

But  though  we  are  thus  certain  that  we  are  the 
same  agents,  living  beings,  or  substances  now,  which 
we  were  as  far  back  as  our  remembrance  reaches,  yet 
it  is  asked  whether  we  may  not  possibly  be  deceived 
in  it  ?  And  this  question  may  be  asked  at  the  end  of. 
any  demonstration  whatever  ;  because  it  is  a  question 
concerning  the  truth  of  perception  by  memory.  And 
he  who  can  doubt  whether  perception  by  memory  can 
in  this  case  be  depended  upon,  may  doubt  also  whether 
perception  by  deduction  and  reasoning,  which  also  in- 
clude memory,  or  indeed  whether  intuitive  perception 
can.  Here  then  we  can  go  no  farther,  for  it  is  ri- 
diculous to  attempt  to  prove  the  truth  of  those  per- 
ceptions, whose  truth  we  can  no  otherwise  prove  than 
by  other  perceptions  of  exactly  the  same  kind  with 
them,  and  which  there  is  just  the  same  ground  to  sus- 
pect ;  or  to  attempt  to  prove  the  truth  of  our  facul- 
ties, which  can  no  otherwise  be  proved  than  by  the 
use  or  means  of  those  very  suspected  faculties  them- 
selves. 


DISSERTATION    II. 


Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue. 

1  hat  which  renders  beings  capable  of  moral 
government,  is  their  having  a  moral  nature  and  mor- 
al faculties  of  perception  and  of  action.  Brute 
creatures  are  impressed  and  actuated  by  various  in- 
stincts and  propensions ;  so  also  are  we.  But  addi- 
tional to  this,  we  have  a  capacity  of  reflecting  upon 
actions  and  characters,  and  making  them  an  object  to 
our  thought ;  and  on  doing  this,  we  naturally  and 
unavoidably  approve  some  actions,  under  the  peculiar 
view  of  their  being  virtuous  and  of  good  desert,  and 
disapprove  others,  as  vicious  and  of  ill  desert.  That 
we  have  this  moral  approving  and  disapproving*  fac- 
ulty, is  certain  from  our  experiencing  it  in  ourselves, 
and  recognizing  it  in  each  other.  It  appears  from 
our  exercising  it  unavoidably,  in  the  approbation  and 
disapprobation  even  of  feigned  characters  ;  from  the 

*  This  way  of  Speaking  is  taken  from  Epictetm,  [a]  and  is  made  use  of  as 
seeming  the  most  full,and  least  liable  to  cavil.  And  the  moral  faculty  may  be 
understood  to  have  these  two  epithets,  JW/mjutt/jo*  and  aLTroJoKi/uzntw, 
upon  a  double  account ;  because,  upon  a  survey  of  actions,  whether  before 
or  after  they  are  done,  it  determines  them  to  be  good  or  evil ;  and  also  be- 
cause it  determines  itself  to  be  the  guide  of  action  and  of  life,  in  contradis- 
tinction from  all  other  faculties,  or  natural  principles  of  action ;  in  the  very 
same  manner  as  speculative  reason  directly  and  naturally  judges  of  speculative 
truth  and  falsehood,  and  at  the  same  time  is  attended  with  a  consciousness 
upon  refection,  that  the  natural  right  to  judge  of  them  belongs  to  it. 

[a]  Art.  Epkt.  I.  1.  c  1. 

c  c  c 


386  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  Diss.  II. 

words,  right  and  wrong,  odious  and  amiable,  base 
and  worthy,  with  many  others  of  like  signification  in 
all  languages,  applied  to  actions  and  characters ;  from 
the  many  written  systems  of  morals  which  suppose  it, 
since  it  cannot  be  imagined  that  all  these  authors, 
throughout  all  these  treatises,  had  absolutely  no  mean- 
ing at  all  to  their  word^,  or  a  meaning  merely  chimer- 
ical ;  from  our  natural  sense  of  gratitude,  which  im- 
plies a  distinction  between  merely  being  the  instrument 
of  good  and  intending  it ;  from  the  like  distinction 
every  one  makes  between  injury  and  mere  harm,  which, 
Hobbs  says,  is  peculiar  to  mankind  ;  and  between  in- 
jury and  just  punishment,  a  distinction  plainly  natural, 
prior  to  the  consideration  of  human  laws.  It  is  man- 
ifest great  part  of  common  language,  and  of  common 
behaviour  over  the  world,  is  formed  upon  supposition 
of  such  a  moral  faculty,  whether  called  conscience, 
moral  reason,  moral  sense,  or  divine  reason  ;  whether 
considered  as  a  sentiment  of  the  understanding,  or  as 
a  perception  of  the  heart,  or,  which  seems  the  truth, 
as  including  both.  Nor  is  it  at  all  doubtful  in  the 
general  what  course  of  action  this  faculty  or  practical 
discerning  power  within  us  approves,  and  what  it  dis- 
approves. For,  as  much  as  it  has  been  disputed 
wherein  virtue  consists,  or  whatever  ground  for  doubt 
there  may  be  about  particulars, — yet,  in  general,  there 
is  in  reality  an  universally  acknowledged  standard  of 
it.  It  is  that  which  all  ages  and  all  countries  have 
made  profession  of  in  publick  ;  it  is  that  which  every 
man  you  meet  puts  on  the  show  of ;  it  is  that  which 
the  primary  and  fundamental  laws  of  all  civil  consti* 
tutions,  over  the  face  of  the  earth,  make  it  their  busi- 
ness and  endeavour  to  enforce  the  practice  of  upon 
mankind ;  namely,  justice,  veracity,  and  regard  to 
common  good.     It  being  manifest  then,  in  general. 


Diss,  IL  Of  the  Nature  tf  Virtue.  387 

that  we  have  such  a  faculty  or  discernment  as  this,  it 
may  be  of  use  to  remark  some  things  more  distinctly 
concerning  it. 

First,  it  ought  to  be  observed  that  the  object  of 
this  faculty  is  actions,*  comprehending  under  that 
name  active  or  practical  principles  ;  those  principles 
from  which  men  would  act  if  occasions  and  circum- 
stances gave  them  power,  and  which,  when  fixed  and 
habitual  in  any  person,  we  call  his  character.  It  does 
not  appear  that  brutes  have  the  least  reflex  sense  of 
actions  as  distinguished  from  events,  or  that  will  and 
de*ign,  which  constitute  the  very  nature  of  actions,  as 
such,  are  at  all  an  object  of  their  perception.  But  to 
ours  they  are  ;  and  they  are  the  object,  and  the  only 
one,  of  the  approving  and  disapproving  faculty.  Act- 
ing, conduct,  behaviour,  abstracted  from  all  regard  to 
what  is,  in  fact  and  event,  the  consequence  of  it,  is  it- 
self the  natural  object  of  the  moral  discernment,  as 
speculative  truth  and  falsehood  is  of  speculative  reason. 
Intention  of  such  and  such  consequences,  indeed,  is  al- 
ways included,  for  it  is  part  of  the  action  itself  ;  but 
though  the  intended  good  or  bad  consequences  do  not 
follow,  we  have  exactly  the  same  sense  of  the  action  as 
if  they  did.  In  like  manner  we  think  well  or  ill  of 
characters,  abstracted  from  all  consideration  of  the 
good  or  the  evil  which  persons  of  such  characters  have 
it  actually  in  their  power  to  do.  We  never,  in  the 
moral  way,  applaud  or  blame  either  ourselves  or  others 
for  what  we  enjoy  or  what  we  suffer,  or  for  having  im- 
pressions made  upon  us  which  we  consider  as  altogether 
out  of  our  power  ;  but  only  for  what  we  do,  or  would 
have  done,  had  it  been  in  our  power,  or  for  what  we 


*  ov$e  *)  oipcTq  xoi)   xxKia — Iv  5re<W<  «A>,«  evcpyetx.      M.  Anton.   1. 
IV  16.    Virtutii  laus  omnis  in  actione  consistit.    Cic.  Off.  I.  1.  c,  6. 


388  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  Diss.  II. 

leave  undone  which  we  might  have  done,  or  would 
have  left  undone  though  we  could  have  done  it. 

Secondly,  our  sense  or  discernment  of  actions  as 
morally  good  or  evil,  implies  in  it  a  sense  or  discern- 
ment of  them  as  of  good  or  ill  desert.     It  may  be  dif- 
ficult to  explain  this  perception,  so  as  to  answer  all  the 
questions  which  may  be  asked  concerning  it  ;  but  ev- 
ery one    peaks  of  such  and  such  actions  as  deserving 
punishment,  and  it  is  not,  I  suppose,   pretended  that 
they  have  absolutely  no  meaning  at  all  to  the  expres- 
sion*    Now  the  meaning  plainly  is  not,  that  we  con- 
ceive it  for  the  good  of  society  that  the  doer   of  such 
actions  should  be  made  to  suffer.     For  if  unhappily  it 
were  resolved  that  a  man,  who  by  some   innocent  ac- 
tion was  infected  with  the  plague,   should  be  left  to 
perish,  lest  by  other  people's  coming  near  him  the  in- 
fection should  spread, — no  one  would  say  he  deserved 
this  treatment.     Innocence  and  ill  desert  are  inconsist- 
ent ideas.     Ill  desert  always  supposes  guilt ;  and  if  one 
be  not  part  of  the  other,   yet  they  are  evidently  and 
naturally  connected  in  our  mind.     The  sight  of  a  man 
in  misery  raises  our  compassion  towards  him  ;  and  if 
this  misery  be  inflicted  on  him  by  another,  our  indig- 
nation against  the  author  of  it.     But  when  we  are  in- 
formed that  the  sufferer  is  a  villain,  and  is  punished 
only  for  his  treachery  or  cruelty,  our  compassion  ex- 
ceedingly lessens,  and  in  many  instances  our  indigna- 
tion wholly  subsides.     Now  what  produces  this  effect, 
is  the  conception  of  that  in  the  sufferer  which  we  call 
ill  desert.     Upon  considering  then,  or  viewing  togeth- 
er,  our  notion  of  vice  and  that  of  misery,  there  results 
a  third,   that  of  ill  desert.  And  thus  there  is  in  hu- 
man creatures  an  association  of  the  two  ideas,  natural 
and  moral  evil,  wickedness  and  punishment.     If  this 
association  were  merely  artificial  or  accidental,  it  were 
nothing  \  but  being  most  unquestionably  natural,  it 


D„iss.  II.  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  389 

greatly  concerns  us  to  attend  to  it,  instead  of  endeav- 
ouring to  explain  it  away. 

It  may  be  observed  farther,  concerning  our  percep- 
tion of  good  and  of  ill  desert,  that  the  former  is  very 
weak  with  respect  to  common  instances  of  virtue  ; 
one  reason  of  which  may  be,  that  it  does  not  appear 
to  a  spectator  how  far  such  instances  of  virtue  proceed 
from  a  virtuous  principle,  or  in  what  degree  this  prin- 
ciple is  prevalent,  since  a  very  weak  regard  to  virtue 
may  be  sufficient  to  make  men  act  well  in  many  com- 
mon instances.  And  on  the  other  hand,  our  perception 
of  ill  desert  in  vicious  actions  lessens,  in  proportion  to 
the  temptations  men  are  thought  to  have  had  to  such 
vices.  For,  vice  in  human  creatures  consisting  chiefly 
in  the  absence  or  want  of  the  virtuous  principle,  though 
a  man  be  overcome,  suppose,  by  tortures,  it  does  not 
from  thence  appear  to  what  degree  the  virtuous  prin- 
ciple was  wanting.  All  that  appears  is,  that  he  had  it 
not  in  such  a  degree  as  to  prevail  over  the  temptation  ; 
but  possibly  he  had  it  in  a  degree  which  would  have 
rendered  him  proof  against  common  temptations. 

Thirdly,  our  perception  of  vice  and  ill  desert  arises 
from,  and  is  the  result  of,  a  comparison  of  actions  with 
the  nature  and  capacities  of  the  agent.  For,  the  mere 
neglect  of  doing  what  we  ought  to  do,  would  in  many 
cases  be  determined  by  all  men  to  be  in  the  highest 
degree  vicious.  And  this  determination  must  arise 
from  such  comparison,  and  be  the  result  of  it,  be- 
cause such  neglect  would  not  be  vicious  in  creatures 
of  other  natures  and  capacities,  as  brutes.  And  it 
is  the  same  also  with  respect'  to  positive  vices,  or 
such  as  consist  in  doing  what  we  ought  not.  For, 
every  one  has  a  different  sense  of  harm  done  by  an 
idiot,  madman,  or  child,  and  by  one  of  mature  and 
common  understanding,  though  the  action  of  both. 


390  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  Diss.  il. 

including  the  intention  which  is  part  of  the  action,  be 
the  same  ;  as  it  may  be,  since  idiots  and  madmen,  as 
well  as  children,  are  capable  not  only  of  doing  mis- 
chief, but  also  of  intending  it.  Now  this  difference 
must  arise  from  somewhat  discerned  in  the  nature  or 
capacities  of  one,  which  renders  the  action  vicious, 
and  the  want  of  which  in  the  other,  renders  the  same 
action  innocent  or  les?  vicious  ;  and  this  plainly  sup- 
poses a  comparison,  whether  reflected  upon  or  not, 
between  the  action  and  capacities  of  the  agent,  previ- 
ous to  our  determining  an  action  to  be  vicious.  And 
hence  arises  a  proper  application  of  the  epithets, 
incongruous,  unsuitable,  disproportionate,  unfit,  to 
actions  which  our  moral  faculty  determines  to  be 
vicious. 

Fourthly,  it  deserves  to  be  considered  whether  men 
are  more  at  liberty,  in  point  of  morals,  to  make  them- 
selves miserable  without  reason,  than  to  make  other 
people  so  ;  or  dissolutely  to  neglect  their  own  greater 
good,  for  the  sake  of  a  present  lesser  gratification,  than 
they  are  to  neglect  the  good  of  others,  whom  nature 
has  committed  to  their  care.  It  should  seem,  that  a 
due  concern  about  our  own  interest  or  happiness,  and 
a  reasonable  endeavour  to  secure  and  promote  it, 
which  is,  1  think,  very  much  the  meaning  of  the 
word  prudence,  in  our  language, — it  should  seem, 
that  this  is  virtue,  and  the  contrary  behaviour  faulty 
and  blameable  ;  since,  in  the  calmest  way  of  re- 
flection, we  approve  of  the  first,  and  condemn  the 
other  conduct,  both  in  ourselves  and  others.  This 
approbation  and  disapprobation  are  altogether  differ- 
ent from  mere  desire  of  our  own,  or  of  their  happiness, 
and  from  sorrow  upon  missing  it.  For  the  object  or 
occasion  of  this  last  kind  of  perception  is  satisfaction 
or  uneasiness  ;  whereas  the  object  of  the  first  is  active 


Diss.  II.         Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  391 

behaviour.     In  one  case,  what  our  thoughts  fix  upon 
is  our   condition  ;  in  the  other  our  conduct.     It  is 
true  indeed,  that  nature  has  not  given  u ;  so  sensible 
a  disapprobation  of  imprudence  and  folly,  either  in 
ourselves  or  others,  as  of  falsehood,  injustice  and  cruel- 
ty ;  I  suppose,  because  that  constant  habitual  sence  of 
private  interest  and  good,  which  we  always  carry  about 
with  us,  renders  such    sensible  disapprobation   less 
necessary,  less  wanting,  to  keep  us  from  imprudently 
neglecting  our  own  happiness,  and  foolishly  injuring 
ourselves,  than  it  is  necessary  and  wanting  to  keep  us 
from  injuring  others,  to  whose  good  we  cannot  have  so 
strong  and  constant  a  regard  ;  and  also  because  im- 
prudence and  folly,  appearing  to  bring  its  own  punish- 
ment more  immediately  and  constantly  than  injurious 
behaviour,  it  less   needs  the   additional  punishment 
which  would  be  inflicted  upon  it  by  others,  had  they 
the  same  sensible  indignation  against  it  as  against  in- 
justice and  fraud  and  cruelty.     Besides,  unhappiness 
being  in  itself  the  natural  object  of  compassion,  the 
unhappiness  which   people   bring   upon   themselves, 
though  it  be  wilfully,  excites  in  us  some  pity  for  them  • 
and  this  of  course  lessens  our  displeasure  against  them. 
But  still  it  is  matter  of  experience,  that  we  are  form- 
ed so  as  to  reflect  very  severely  upon  the  greater  in- 
stances of  imprudent  neglects    and    foolish  rashness 
both   in  ourselves  and  others.     In  instances   of  this 
kind,  men  often  say  of  themselves  with  remorse,  and 
of  others  with  some  indignation,  that  they  deserved 
to  suffer  such  calamities,  because  they  brought  them 
upon  themselves,  and  would  not  take  warning.     Par- 
ticularly when  persons  come  to  poverty  and  distress  by 
a  long  course  of  extravagance,  and  after  frequent  ad- 
monitions, though  without  falsehood  or  injustice  ;  we 
plainly  do  not  regard  such  people,  as  alike  objects  of 


392  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  Diss.  IL 

compassion  with  those  who  are  brought  into  the  same 
condition  by  unavoidable  accidents.  From  these 
things  it  appears,  that  prudence  is  a  species  of  virtue,, 
and  folly  of  vice  ;  meaning  by  folly  somewhat  quite 
different  from  mere  incapacity ;  a  thoughtless  want 
of  that  regard  and  attention  to  our  own  happiness 
which  we  hnd  capacity  for.  And  this  the  word  prop- 
erly includes,  and,  as  it  seems,  in  its  usual  accep- 
tation ;  for  we  scarce  apply  it  to  brute  creatures. 

However,  if  any  person  be  disposed  to  dispute  the 
matter,  I  shall  very  willingly  give  him  up  the  words 
virtue  and  vice,  as  not  applicable  to  prudence  and 
folly  ;  but  must  beg  leave  to  insist,  that  the  faculty 
within  us,  which  is  the  judge  of  actions,  approves  of 
prudent  actions,  and  disapproves  imprudent  ones  ;  I 
say  prudent  and  imprudent  actions,  as  such,  and  con- 
sidered distinctly  from  the  happiness  or  misery  which 
they  occasion.  And  by  the  way,  this  observation 
may  help  to  determine  what  justness  there  is  in  that 
objection  against  religion,  that  it  teaches  us  to  be  in- 
terested and  selfish. 

Fifthly,  without  inquiring  how  far  and  in  what 
sense  virtue  is  resolvable  into  benevolence,  and  vice 
into  the  want  of  it,  it  may  be  proper  to  observe,  that 
benevolence  and  the  want  of  it,  singly  considered,  are 
in  no  sort  the  whole  of  virtue  and  vice.  For  if  this 
were  the  case,  in  the  review  of  one's  own  character  or 
that  of  others,  our  moral  understanding  and  moral 
sense  would  be  indifferent  to  every  thing  but  the  de- 
grees in  which  benevolence  prevailed,  and  the  degrees 
in  which  it  was  wanting.  That  is,  we  should  neither 
approve  of  benevolence  to  some  persons  rather  than  to 
others,  nor  disapprove  injustice  and  falsehood  upon 
any  other  account  than  merely  as  an  overbalance  of 
happiness  was  foreseen  likely  to  be  produced  by  the 


Diss.  II.  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  S93 

first,  and  of  misery  by  the  second.  But  now  on  the 
contrary,  suppose  two  men  competitors  for  any  thing 
whatever  which  would  be  of  equal  advantage  to  each 
of  them,  though  nothing  indeed  would  be  more  im- 
pertinent than  for  a  stranger  to  busy  himself  to  get  one 
of  them  preferred  to  the  other,  yet  such  endeavour 
would  be  virtue  in  behalf  of  a  friend  or  benefactor, 
abstracted  from  all  consideration  of  distant  conse- 
quences ;  as  that  examples  of  gratitude  and  the  cul- 
tivation of  friendship  would  be  of  general  good  to  the 
world.  Again,  suppose  one  man  should,  by  fraud  or 
violence,  take  from  another  the  fruit  of  his  labour, 
with  intent  to  give  it  to  a  third,  who,  he  thought, 
would  have  as  much  pleasure  from  it  as  would  bal- 
ance the  pleasure  which  the  first  possessor  would  have 
had  in  the  enjoyment  and  his  vexation  in  the  loss  of 
it ;  suppose  also  that  no  bad  consequences  would  fol- 
low ;  yet  such  an  action  would  surely  be  vicious. 
Nay  farther,  were  treachery,  violence  and  injustice  no 
otherwise  vicious  than  as  foreseen  likely  to  produce  an 
overbalance  of  misery  to  society,  then,  if  in  any  case 
a  man  could  procure  to  himself  as  great  advantage  by 
an  act  of  injustice  as  the  whole  foreseen  inconvenience 
likely  to  be  brought  upon  others  by  it  would  amount 
tOj  such  a  piece  of  injustice  would  not  be  faulty  or 
vicious  at  all,  because  it  would  be  no  more  than,  in 
any  other  case,  for  a  man  to  prefer  his  own  satisfac- 
tion to  another's  in  equal  degrees.  The  fact  then  ap- 
pears to  be,  that  we  are  constituted  so  as  to  condemn 
falsehood,  unprovoked  violence,  injustice,  and  to  ap- 
prove of  benevolence  to  some  preferably  to  others,  ab- 
stracted from  all  consideration  which  conduct  is  like- 
liest to  produce  an  overbalance  of  happiness  or  misery. 
And  therefore,  were  the  Author  of  nature  to  propose 
nothing  to  himself  as  an  end  but  the  production  of 

D  D  D 


394  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.         Diss.  II. 

happiness,  were  his  moral  character  merely  that  of  be- 
nevolence, yet  ours  is  not  so.  Upon  that  supposition 
indeed,  the  only  reason  of  his  giving  us  the  above- 
mentioned  approbation  of  benevolence  to  some  per- 
sons rather  than  others,  and  disapprobation  of  false- 
hood, unprovoked  violence,  and  injustice,  must  be, 
that  he  foresaw  this  constitution  of  our  nature  would 
produce  more  happiness  than  forming  us  with  a  tem- 
per of  more  general  benevolence.  But  still,  since  this 
is  our  constitution,  falsehood,  violence,  injustice,  must 
be  vice  in  us,  and  benevolence  to  some  preferably  to 
others,  virtue,  abstracted  from  all  consideration  of  the 
overbalance  of  evil  or  good  which  they  may  appear 
likely  to  produce. 

Now  if  human  creatures  are  endued  with  such  a 
moral  nature  as  we  have  been  explaining,  or  with  a 
moral  faculty  the  natural  object  of  which  is  actions,— 
moral  government  must  consist  in  rendering  them  hap- 
py and  unhappy,  in  rewarding  and  punishing  them, 
as  they  follow,  neglect,  or  depart  from,  the  moral  rule 
of  action  interwoven  in  their  nature,  or  suggested  and 
enforced  by  this  moral  faculty  ;#  in  rewarding  and 
punishing  them  upon  account  of  their  so  doing. 

I  am  not  sensible  that  I  have,  in  this  fifth  observa- 
tion, contradicted  what  any  author  designed  to  assert. 
But  some  of  great  and  distinguished  merit  have,  I 
think,  expressed  themselves  in  a  manner  which  may 
occasion  some  danger  to  careless  readers,  of  imagin- 
ing the  whole  of  virtue  to  consist  in  singly  aiming,  ac- 
cording to  the  best  of  their  judgment,  at  promoting 
the  happiness  of  mankind  in  the  present  state  j  and 
the  whole  of  vice,  in  doing  what  they  foresee,  or 
might  foresee,  is  likely  to  produce  an  overbalance  of 
unhappiness  in  it  •,  than  which  mistakes,  none  can  be 

•  P.   189. 


Diss.  II.  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.  395 

conceived  more  terrible.  For  it  is  certain  that  some 
of  the  most  shocking  instances  of  injustice,  adultery, 
murder,  perjury,  and  even  of  persecution,  may,  in 
many  supposable  cases,  not  have  the  appearance  of  be- 
ing likely  to  produce  an  overbalance  of  misery  in  the 
present  state ;  perhaps  sometimes  may  have  the  con- 
trary appearance.     For  this  reflection  might  easily  be 

carried  on,  but  I  forbear The  happiness  of  the 

world  is  the  concern  of  him,  who  is  the  lord  and  the 
proprietor  of  it ;  nor  do  we  know  what  we  are  about, 
when  we  endeavour  to  promote  the  good  of  man- 
kind in  any  ways  but  those  which  he  has  directed, 
that  is  indeed  in  all  ways  not  contrary  to  veracity  and 
justice.  I  speak  thus  upon  supposition  of  persons  re- 
ally endeavouring,  in  some  sort,  to  do  good  without 
regard  to  these.  But  the  truth  seems  to  be,  that  such 
supposed  endeavours  proceed,  almost  always,  from  am- 
bition, the  spirit  of  party,  or  some  indirect  principle, 
concealed  perhaps  in  great  measure  from  persons 
themselves.  And  though  it  is  our  business  and  our 
duty  to  endeavour,  within  the  bounds  of  veracity  and 
justice,  to  contribute  to  the  ease,  convenience,  and 
even  cheerfulness  and  diversion  of  our  fellow  crea- 
tures,— yet  from  our  short  views,  it  is  greatly  uncertain 
when  this  endeavour  will,  in  particular  instances, 
produce  an  overbalance  of  happiness  upon  the  whole, 
since  so  many  and  distant  things  must  come  into  the 
account.  And  that  which  makes  it  our  duty,  is,  that 
there  is  some  appearance  that  it  will,  and  no  posi- 
tive appearance  sufficient  to  balance  this  on  the  con- 
trary side  ;  and  also  that  such  benevolent  endeavour 
is  a  cultivation  of  that  most  excellent  of  all  virtuous 
principles,  the  active  principle  of  benevolence. 

However,  though  veracity  as  well  as  justice  is  to  be 
our  rule  of  life,  it  must  be  added,  otherwise  a  snare 


396  Of  the  Nature  of  Virtue.         Diss.  II, 

will  be  laid  in  the  way  of  some  plain  men,  that  the 
use  of  common  forms  of  speech  generally  understood, 
cannot  be  falsehood,  and,  in  general,  that  there  can  be 
no  designed  falsehood  without  designing  to  deceive. 
It  must  likewise  be  observed,  that  in  numberless  cases 
a  man  may  be  under  the  strictest  obligations  to  what 
he  foresees  will  deceive,  without  his  intending  it. 
For  it  is  impossible  not  to  foresee  that  the  words  and 
actions  of  men  in  different  ranks  and  employments, 
and  of  different  educations,  will  perpetually  be  mis- 
taken by  each  other  ;  and  it  cannot  but  be  so  whilst 
they  will  judge  with  the  utmost  carelessness,  as  they 
daily  do,  of  what  they  are  not,  perhaps,  enough  in- 
formed to  be  competent  judges  of,  even  though  they 
considered  it  with  great  attention. 


CHARGE 

DELIVERED   TO 

THE    CLERGY 

AT   TH$ 

PRIMARY   VISITATION    OF   THE    DIOCESE   OF    DURHAM,    IN    THE 
YEAR     1751  J 

BY  THE  RIGHT  REVEREND  FATHER  IN  GOD 

JOSEPH  BUTLER,  LL.  D. 

THEN    LORD    BISHOP   OF    THAT    PIOCESE. 

WITH  NOTES, 

CONTAINING  A  DEFENCE    OF  THE  CHARGE  AGAINST   THE   OBJEC- 
TIONS   OF   AN    ANONYMOUS   WRITER. 

BY  THE  EDITOR 


CHARGE 

DELIVERED    TO 

THE    CLERGY,   &c* 


It  is  impossible  for  me,  my  brethren,  upon  our 
first  meeting  of  this  kind,  to  forbear  lamenting  with 
you  the  general  decay  of  religion  in  this  nation  ; 
which  is  now  observed  by  every  one,  and  has  been 
for  some  time  the  complaint  of  all  serious  persons. 
The  influence  of  it  is  more  and  more  wearing  out  of 
the  minds  of  men,  even  of  those  who  do  not  pretend  to 
enter  into  speculations  upon  the  subject ;  but  the  num- 
ber of  those  who  do,  and  who  profess  themselves  unbe- 
lievers, increases,  and  with  their  numbers  their  zeal. 
Zeal,  it  is  natural  to  ask — for  what  ?  Why  truly  for 
nothing,  but  against  every  thing  that  is  good  and  sa- 
cred amongst  us. 

Indeed,  whatever  efforts  are  made  against  our  reli- 

*  The  publication  of  Bishop  Butler's  Charge,  in  the  year  1751,  was 
followed  by  a  pamphlet,  printed  in  1752,  entitled,  A  Serious  Inquiry/  into  the 
Use  and  Importance  of  External  Religion,  occasioned  by  some  Passages  in  the  Right 
Reverend  the  Lord  Bishop  tf  Durham  s  Charge  to  the  Clergy  of  thai  Diocett,  &c, 
humbly  addressed  to  his  Lordship.  This  pamphlet  has  been  reprinted  in  a  mis- 
cellaneous work  ;  such  parts  of  it  as  seemed  most  worthy  of  observation,  the 
reader  will  fiud  in  the  Notes  subjoined  to  those  passages  of  the  Charge,  to 
which  the  pamphlet  refers. 


400  Charge  to  the 

gion,  no  Christian  can  possibly  despair  of  it.  For  He, 
who  has  all  power  in  heaven  and  earth,  has  promised 
that  he  will  be  with  us  to  the  end  of  the  world.  Nor 
can  the  present  decline  of  it  be  any  stumbling  block 
to  such  as  are  considerate  ;  since  he  himself  has  so 
strongly  expressed  what  is  so  remarkably  predicted  in 
other  passages  of  Scripture,  the  great  defection  from 
his  religion  which  should  be  in  the  latter  days,  by  that 
prophetick  question,  when  the  Son  of  Man  cometh,  shall 
he  find  faith  upon  the  earth  ?  How  near  this  time  is, 
God  only  knows  ;  but  this  kind  of  scripture  signs  of 
it  is  too  apparent.  For  as  different  ages  have  been 
distinguished  by  different  sorts  of  particular  errors 
and  vices,  the  deplorable  distinction  of  ours  is  an  avow- 
ed scorn  of  religion  in  some,  and  a  growing  disregard 
to  it  in  the  generality. 

As  to  the  professed  enemies  of  religion,  I  know 
not  how  often  they  may  come  in  your  way ;  but  often 
enough,  I  fear,  in  the  way  of  some  at  least  amongst 
you,  to  require  consideration  what  is  the  proper  behav- 
iour towards  them.  One  would,  to  be  sure,  avoid 
great  familiarities  with  these  persons ;  especially  if  they 
affect  to  be  licentious  and  profane  in  their  common- 
talk.  Yet  if  you  fall  into  their  company,  treat  them 
with  the  regards  which  belong  to  their  rank  ;  for  so 
we  must  people  who  are  vicious  in  any  other  respect. 
We  should  study  what  St.  James,  with  wonderful  ele- 
gance and  expressiveness,  calls  meekness  of  wisdom,  in 
our  behaviour  towards  all  men,  but  more  especially 
towards  these  men  ;  not  so  much  as  being  what  we 
«we  to  them,  but  to  ourselves  and  our  religion,  that 
we  may  adorn  the  doctrine  of  God  our  Saviour,  in  our 
carriage  towards  those  who  labour  to  vilify  it. 

For  discourse  with  them,  the  caution  commonly 
given,  not  to  attempt  answering  objections  which  we 


Clergy  of  Durham,  1751.  401 

have  not  considered,  is  certainly  just.  Nor  need  any 
one  in  a  particular  case  be  ashamed  frankly  to  ac- 
knowledge his  ignorance,  provided  it  be  not  general. 
And  though  it  were,  to  talk  of  what  he  is  not  ac- 
quainted with,  is  a  dangerous  method  of  endeavour- 
ing to  conceal  it.  But  a  considerate  person,  however 
qualified  he  be  to  defend  his  religion,  and  answer  the 
objections  he  hears  made  against  it,  may  sometimes 
see  cause  to  decline  that  office.  Sceptical  and  profane 
men  are  extremely  apt  to  bring  up  this  subject  at 
meetings  of  entertainment,  and  such  as  are  of  the  freer 
sort ;  innocent  ones,  I  mean,  otherwise  I  should  not 
suppose  you  would  be  present  at  them.  Now  religion 
is  by  far  too  serious  a  matter  to  be  the  hackney  sub- 
ject upon  these  occasions.  And  by  preventing  its  being 
made  so,  you  will  better  >ecure  the  reverence  which  is 
due  to  it,  than  by  entering  into  its  defence.  Every  one 
observes,  that  men's  having  examples  of  vice  often  be- 
fore their  eyes,  familiarizes  it  to  the  mind,  and  has 
a  tendency  to  take  off  that  just  abhorrence  of  it  which 
the  innocent  at  first  felt,  even  though  it  should  not 
alter  their  judgment  of  vice,  or  make  them  really  be- 
lieve it  to  be  less  evil  or  dangerous.  In  like  manner, 
the  hearing  religion  often  disputed  about  in  light  fa- 
miliar conversation,  has  a  tendency  to  lessen  that  sa- 
cred regard  to  it,  which  a  good  man  would  endeavour 
always  to  keep  up,  both  in  himself  and  others.  But 
this  is  not  all  ;  people  are  too  apt  inconsiderately  to 
take  for  granted  that  things  are  really  questionable,  be- 
cause they  hear  them  often  disputed.  This  indeed 
is  so  far  from  being  a  consequence,  that  we  know  de- 
monstrated truths  have  been  disputed,  and  even  mat- 
ters of  fact,  the  objects  of  our  senses.  But  were  it  a 
consequence,  were  the  evidence  of  religion  no  more 
than  doubtful,  then  it  ought  not  to  be  concluded  false 

EEE 


402  Charge  to  the 

any  more  than  true,  nor  denied  any  more  than  affirm* 
ed  ;  for  suspense  would  be  the  reasonable  state  of  mind 
with  regard  to  it.     And   then  it  ought  in   all  reason, 
considering  its  infinite  importance,  to  have  nearly  the 
same  influence  upon  practice,  as  if  it  were  thoroughly 
believed.     For  would  it  not  be  madness  for  a  man  to 
forsake  a  safe  road,  and  prefer  to  it  one  in  which    he 
acknowledges  there  is  an  even  chance  he  should  lose 
his  life,  though  there  were  an  even  chance  likewise  of 
his  getting  safe  through  it  ?     Yet  there  are  people  ab- 
surd enough  to  take  the  supposed  doubtfulness  of  re- 
ligion for  the   same  thing  as  a  proof  of  its  falsehood, 
after  they  have  concluded  it  doubtful  from   hearing 
it  often  called  in  question.     This  shews  how  infinitely 
unreasonable  sceptical  men  are,  with  regard  to  religion, 
and  that  they  really  lay  aside  their   reason  upon  this 
subject  as  much  as  the  most  extravagant  enthusiasts* 
But  further,  cavilling  and  objecting  upon  any  subject 
is  much  easier  than  clearing  up  difficulties  ;  and  this 
last  part  will  always  be  put  upon  the  defenders  of  re- 
ligion.    Now  a  man  may  be  fully   convinced    of  the- 
truth  of  a  matter,  and  upon  the  strongest  reasons,  and 
yet  not  be  able  to  answer  all  the  difficulties  which  may 
be  raised  upon  it. 

Then  again,  the  general  evidence  of  religion  is 
complex  and  various.  It  consists  of  a  long  series  of 
things,  one  preparatory  to  and  confirming  another, 
from  the  veiy  beginning  of  the  world  to  the  present 
time.  And  it  is  easy  to  see  how  impossible  it  must 
be,  in  a  cursory  conversation,  to  unite  all  this  into 
one  argument,  and  represent  it  as  it  ought ;  and  could 
it  be  done,  how  utterly  indisposed  people  would  be  to 
attend  to  it — 1  say  in  a  cursory  conversation  ;  where- 
as unconnected  objections  are  thown  out  in  a  few 
words,  and  are  easily  apprehended,  without  more  ati 


Clergy -of  Durham,    1751.  403 

Mention  than  is  usual  in  common  talk.  So  that,  not- 
withstanding we  have  the  best  cause  in  the  world,  and 
though  a  man  were  very  capable  of  defending  it,  yet 
I  know  not  why  he  should  be  forward  to  undertake  it 
upon  so  great  a  disadvantage,  and  to  so  little  good  ef- 
fect, as  it  must  be  done  amidst  the  gaiety  and  careless- 
ness of  common  conversation. 

But  then  it  will  be  necessary  to  be  very  particularly 
upon  your  guard,  that  you  may  not  seem,  by  way  of 
compliance,  to  join  in  with  any  levity  of  discourse 
respecting  religion.  Nor  would  one  let  any  pretend- 
ed argument  against  it  pass  entirely  without  notice  ; 
nor  any  gross  ribalaVy  upon  it,  without  expressing  our 
thorough  disapprobation.  This  last  may  sometimes 
be  done  by  silence  ;  for  silence  sometimes  is  very  ex- 
pressive ;  as  was  that  of  our  blessed  Saviour  before 
the  Sanhedrim,  and  before  Pilate,  Or  it  may  be  done 
by  observing  mildly,  that  religion  deserves  another  sort 
of  treatment,  or  a  more  thorough  consideration  than 
such  a  time,  or  such  circumstances  admit.  However, 
as  it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  we  take  care,  by  dil- 
igent reading  and  study,  to  be  always  prepared,  to  be 
ready  always  to  give  an  answer  to  every  man  that  asketh 
a  reason  of  the  hope  that  is  in  us, — so  there  may  be  oc- 
casions when  it  will  highly  become  us  to  do  it.  And 
then  we  must  take  care  to  do  it  in  the  spirit  which  the 
apostle  requires,  with  meekness  and  fear  :*  meekness  to- 
wards those  who  give  occasions  for  entering  into  the 
defence  of  our  religion  ;  and  "with  fear,  not  of  them, 
but  of  God  ;  with  that  reverential  fear  which  the  na- 
ture of  religion  requires,  and  which  is  so  far  from  be- 
ing inconsistent  with,  that  it  will  inspire  proper  cour- 
age towards  men.  Now  this  reverent^  fear  will 
lead  us  to  insist  strongly  upon  the  infinite  greatness  of 
God's  scheme  of  government,  both  in  extent  anddu- 

*  1  Pet.  iii.  15. 


404  Charge  to  the 

ration,  together  with  the  wise  connexion  of  its  parts, 
and  the  impossibility  of  accounting  fully  for  the  seve- 
ral parts,  without  seeing  the  whole  plan  of  Providence 
to  which  they  relate ;  which  is  beyond  the  utmost 
stretch  of  our  understanding.  And  to  all  this  must  be 
added  the  necessary  deficiency  of  human  language, 
when  things  divine  are  the  subject  of  it.  These  ob- 
servations are  a  proper  full  answer  to  many  objections, 
and  very  material  with  regard  to  all. 

But  your  standing  business,  and  which  requires  con- 
stant attention,  is  with  the  body  of  the  people  ;  to  re- 
vive in  them  the  spirit  of  religion  which    is  so  much  - 
declining.     And  it  may  seem,    that  whatever  reason 
there  be  for  caution   as  to  entering  into    any   argu- 
mentative  defence  of  religion  in  common  conversation^ 
yet  that  it  is  necessary  to  do  this/n?/;*  the  pulpit ^  in  or- 
der to  guard  the  people  against  being  corrupted,  how- 
ever in   some  places.     But   then  surely   it  should  be 
done  in  a  manner  as    little  controversial    as  possible. 
For  though  such  as  are  capable  of  seeing  the  force  of 
objections  are  capable  also  of  seeing   the  force  of  the 
answers  which  are  given  to  them,  yet  the  truth  is,  the 
people  will  not  competently  attend  to  either.     But 
it  is  easy  to  see  which  they  will  attend  to  most.     And 
to  hear  religion  treated  of,  as  what  many  deny,  and 
which  has  much  said  against  it  as  well  as  for  it,  this 
cannot  but  have  a  tendency  to  give  them  ill  impres- 
sions   at  any  time  ;  and  seems  particularly  improper 
for  all  persons  at  a  time  of  devotion,  even  for  such  as 
are  arrived  at  the  most  settled  state  of  piety  ; — I  say 
at  a  time  of  devotion,  when  we  are  assembled  to  yield 
ourselves  up  to  the  full  influence  of  the  Divine  Pres- 
ence,  and  to  call  forth  into  actual  exercise  every  pi- 
ous affection  of  heart.     For  it  is  to  be  repeated,  that 
the  heart  and  course  of  affections  may  be  disturbed 


Clergy  of  Durham,   1751.  405 

when  there  is  no  alteration  of  judgment.  Now  the 
evidence  of  religion  may  be  laid  before  men  without 
any  air  of  controversy.  The  proof  of  the  being  of 
God,  from  final  causes,  or  the  design  and  wisdom  which 
appears  in  every  part  of  nature,  together  with  the  law 
of  virtue    written  upon    our  hearts  ;*  the    proof  of 

*  The  law  of  virtue  written  upon  our  heart?.]  The  author  of  the 
Inquiry,  mentioned  above,informs  OS  in  his  Postscript,  that  "  the  certain 
consequence  of  referring  mankind  to  a  law  of  nature  or  'virtue  written 
upont  heir  hearts  is  their  having  recourse  to  their  own  sense  of  things 
on  all  occasions  ;  which  being,  in  a  great  majority,  no  better  than 
family  uperstition,  party  prejudice,  or  self  interested  artifice,  (perhaps 
a  compound  of  ail)  will  be  too  apt  to  overrule  the  plain  precepts  of 
the  Gospel."  And  he  declares.,  he  has  «  no  better  opinion  of  the 
clearness^,  certainty,  uniformity,  universality ,  &c.  of  this  law,  than"  he 
has  "  of  the  importance  of  external  religion"  What  then  must  we  say 
to  St.  Paul,  who  not  only  asserts,  in  the  strongest  terms,  the  reality  of 
such  a  law,  but  speaks  of  its  obligation  as  extending  to  all  mankind  ; 
blaming  some  among  the  Gentiles  as  without  excuse,  for  not  adverting 
to  and  obeying  it ;  and  commending  others  for  doing  by  nature  (in  con- 
tradiction to  revelation)  the  things  contained  in  the  law,  thus  shewing 
the  work  of  the  law  written  in  their  hearts.  If,  because  "  natural  re- 
ligion is  liable  to  be  mistaken,  it  is  high  time  to  have  done  with  it  in 
the  pulpit,"  how  comes  it  that  the  same  apostle  refers  the  Philippians 
to  the  study  of  this  religion,  to  whatsoever  things  are  true,  honest,  just, 
lovely  and  of  good  report  ?  And  yet  without  such  a  study  or  knowl- 
edge of  the  moral  law  must  always  remain  imperfect ;  for  a  complete 
system  of  morality  is  certainly  no  where  to  be  found  either  in  the  Old 
or  New  Testa  merit. [a]  When  a  Christian  minister  is  enforcing  the 
duties  or  doctrines  of  revealed  religion,  he  may  perhaps  do  well  to 
"  tell  his  people  he  has  no  other  proof  of  the  original,  truth,  obliga- 
tions, present  benefits  and  future  rewards  of  religion  to  lay  before 
them,  than  what  is  contained  in  the  Scriptures."  But  what  if  his  pur- 
pose be  to  inculcate  some  moral  virtue  ?  Will  it  not  be  useful  here,  be- 
sides observing  that  the  practice  of  that  virtue  is  enjoined  by  a  divine 
command,  to  recommend  it  still  further  to  his  hearers,  by  shewing  that 
it  approves  itself  to  our  inward  sense  and  perception,  and  accord,  with 
the  native  sentiments  and  suggestions  of  our  minds?  Metaphysicians 
may  say  what  they  will  of  our  feelings  of  this  sort  being  all  illusive, 
liable  to  be  perverted  by  education  and  habit,  and  judged  of  by  men's 
own  sense  of  things  ;  they  whose  understandings  are  yet  unspoiled  by 
philosophy  and  vain  deceit  will  be  little  disposed  to  listen  to  such  as- 
sertions. Nor  are  there  wanting  arguments  which  prove,  and,  as 
fa]  Seethe  second  of  Dr.  Balguy  s  Charges. 


406  Charge  to  the 

Christianity  from  miracles,  and  the  accomplishment 
of  prophecies  ;  and  the  confirmation  which  the  nat- 
ural and  civil  history  of  the  world  give  to  the  scripture 
account  of  things  ; — these  evidences  of  religion  might 
properly  be  insisted  on  in  a  way  to  affect  and  influence 
the  heart,  though  there  were  no  profes>ed  unbelievers 
in  the  world  ;  and  therefore  may  be  masted  on  with- 
out taking  much  notice  that  there  are  such.  And 
even  their  particular  objections  may  be  obviated  with- 
out a  formal  mention  of  them.  Be.  ides,  as  to  religion 
in  general,  it  is  a  practical  thing,  and  no  otherwise 
a  matter  of  speculation,  than  common  prudence  in 
the  management  of  our  worldly  affairs  is  so.  And 
if  one  were  endeavouring  to  bring  a  plain  man  to  be 
more  careful  with  regard  to  this  last,  it  would  be 
thought  a  strange  method  of  doing  it,  to  perplex  him 
with  stating  formally  the  several  objections  which  men 
of  gaiety  or  speculation  have  made  against  prudence, 
and  the  advantages  which  they  pleasantly  tell  us  folly 
has  over  it,  though  one  could  answer  those  objections 
ever  so  fully. 

should  seem,  to  the  sati  faction  of  every  reasonable  inquirer,  that  the 
great  and  leading  principles  of  moral  duties  have  in  all  age-  been  the 
same  ;  that  such  virtue-  as  benevolence,  justice,  compassion,  gratitude, 
accidental  obstacles  removed,  and  when  the  precise  meaning  of  the 
words  ha  been  once  explained,  are  instinctively  known  and  approved 
by  all  men;  and  that  our  approbation  of  these  is  as  much  a  part 
of  our  nature  implanted  ii.  us  by  God,  and  as  little  liable  to  caprice 
and  fashion,  as  the  sense  of  seeing,  given  us  also  by  Him,  by  which  all 
bodie  appear  to  us  in  an  erect,  and  not  an  inverted  position. [b]  Mr. 
Locke's  authority  ha-  been  generally  looked  up  to  as  decisive  on  such 
quetion->,  and  his  sentiments  have  been  embraced  implicitly  and  with- 
out examination.  That  great  and  good  man,  however,  is  not  to  be 
charged  with  the  pernicious  consequences  which  other-;  have  drawn 
from  his  opinion  ;  con  equences  which  have  been  carried  to  such  a 
length,  as  to  destroy  all  moral  difference  of  human  actions  :  making 
virtue  and  vice  altogether  arbitrary  ;  calling  evil  good,  and  good  evil ; 
putting  darknesi  for  light,  and  light  for  darkness  j  putting  bitter  fat 
sweet,  and  sweet  for  bitter. 

[b]  Set  the  ttird  of  Bishop  Hurfs  Sermons,  Vol.  /, 


Clergy  of  Durham,  1751.  407 

Nor  ^oes  the  want  of  religion  in  the  generality  of 
the  common  people,  appear  owing  to  a  speculative 
disbelief  or  denial  of  it,  but  chiefly  to  thoughtlessness 
and  the  common  temptations  of  life.  Your  chief 
business,  therefore,  is  to  endeavour  to  beget  a  practical 
sense  of  it  upon  their  hearts,  as  what  they  acknowl- 
edge their  belief  of,  and  profess  they  ought  to  con- 
form themselves  to.  And  this  is  to  be  done  by  keep- 
ing up,  as  well  as  we  are  able,  the  form  and  face  of  re- 
ligion with  decency  and  reverence,  and  in  such  a  de- 
gree as  to  bring  the  thoughts  of  religion  often  to  their 
minds  ;*  and  then  endeavouring  to  make  this  form 
more  and  more  subservient  to  promote  the  reality  and 
power  of  it.  The  form  of  religion  may  indeed  be 
where  there  is  little  of  the  thing  itself ;  but  the  thing 
itself  cannot  be  preserved  amongst  mankind  without 

*  By  keeping  up  the  form  and  face  of  religion  in  such  a  degree  as  to 
bring  the  thoughts  of  religion  often  to  their  minds.]  To  this  it  is  said 
by  our  Inquirer,  that  "  the  Clergy  of  the  Church  of  England  have  no 
way  of  keeping  up  the  form  and  face  of  religion  any  oftener,  or  in  any 
ether  degree,  than  is  directed  by  the  prescribed  order  of  the  Church." 
As  if  the  whole  duty  of  a  parish  priest  consisted  in  reading  prayers 
and  a  sermon  on  Sundays,  and  performing  the  occasional  offices  ap- 
pointed in  the  liturgy !  One  would  think  the  writer  who  madethisobjec- 
tion  had  never  read  more  of  the  Charge  than  the  four  pages  he  has  par- 
ticularly selected  for  the  subject  of  his  animadversions.  Had  he  look- 
ed farther,  he  would  have  found  other  methods  recommended  to  the 
Clergy  of  introducing  a  sence  of  religion  into  the  minds  of  their  par- 
ishioners, which  occur  much  oftener  than  the  times  allotted  for  the 
publick  services  of  the  Church  ;  such  as  family  prayers ;  acknowl- 
edging the  divine  bounty  at  our  meals  ;  pergonal  applications  from 
ministers  of  parishes  to  individual  under  their  care,  on  particular  oc* 
casions  and  circumstances,  as  at  the  time  of  confirmation,  at  fir.-t  re- 
ceiving the  holy  communion,  on  recovery  from  sickness,  and  the  like; 
none  of  which  are  prescribed  in  our  established  ritual,  any  more  than 
those  others  so  ludicrously  mentioned  by  this  writer,  "  bowing  to  the 
east,  turning  the  face  to  that  quarter  in  repeating  the  creeds,  dipping 
the  finger  in  water,  and  therewith  crossing  the  child's  forehead  in  bap. 
tka." 


408  Charge  to  the 

the  form.*  And  this  form  frequently  occuring  in 
some  instance  or  other  of  it,  will  be  a  frequent  admo- 
nition! to  bad  men  to  repent,  and  to  good  men  to 
grow  better  ;  and  also  be  the  means  of  their  doing  so. 
That  which  men  have  accounted  religion  in  the 
several  countries  of  the  world,  generally  speaking,  has 

*  The  thing  itself  cannot  be  preserved  amongst  mankind  without 
the  form.]  The  Quaker  reject  all  forms,  even  the  two  of  Christ's 
own  institution  ;  will  it  be  *aid  that  "  these  men  have  no  religion  pre- 
served among  them  r"  It  will  neither  be  said  nor  insinuated.  The 
Quakers,  though  they  have  not  the  form,  are  careful  to  keep  up  the 
face  of  religion  ;  as  appears  not  only  from  the  custom  of  assembling 
themselves  for  the  purposes  of  publick  worship  on  the  Lord's  day, 
but  from  their  silent  meetings  on  other  days  of  the  week.  And  that 
they  are  equally  sensible  of  the  importance  of  maintaining  the  influ- 
ence of  religion  on  their  mind-.-,  is  manifest  from  the  practice  of  what 
they  call  inward  prayer,  in  conformity  to  the  direction  of  Scripture  to 
pray  continually  :  "  Which,"  saith  Robert  Barclay,  "  cannot  be  under- 
stood of  outward  prayer,  because  it  were  impossible  that  men  should 
be  always  upon  their  knees,expressing  the  words  of  prayer,  which  would 
hinder  them  from  the  exercise  of  those  duties  no  less  positively  com. 
manded."     Apology  for  the  Quakers.     Prop.  xi.     Of  Worship. 

\  This  form  frequently  occurring  in  some  instance  or  other  of  it, 
will  be  a  frequent  admonition,  &c]  Here  it  has  been  objected,  that 
■:i  the  number,  variety,  and  frequent  occurrence  of  forms  in  religion  are 
too  apt  to  be  considered  by  the  generality  a-;  commutations  for  their 
vices,  as  something  substituted  in  lieu  of  repentance,  and  a i  loads  and 
incumbrances  upon  true  Christian  edification."  This  way  of  arguing 
against  the  use  of  a  thing  from  the  abuse  of  it,  instead  of  arguing  from 
the  nature  of  the  thing  itself,  is  the  master  sophism  that  pervades  the 
whole  performance  we  are  here  examining.  What  reasonable  man  ev- 
er denied  that  the  pomp  of  outward  worship  has  been  sometimes  mis- 
taken for  inward  piety  I  That  positive  institutions  when  rested  in  as 
ends  instead  of  being  applied  as  means  are  hurtful  to  the  interests  of 
true  religion  ?  Not  Bishop  Butler  certainly,  who  blames  the  obser- 
vances of  the  papists  on  this  account;  some  of  them  as  being  "in 
themselves  wrong  and  superstitious ;"  and  others,  as  being  "made 
sub  ervient  to  the  purposes  of  uper  tition,"  and  for  this  reason  "  abol- 
;  hed  by  our  reformers."  In  the  meanwhile  it  will  still  be  true,  that 
bodily  worship  is  by  no  means  to  be  discarded,  as  unuseful  in  exciting 
spiritual  devotion;  on  the  contrary,  that  they  mutually  a^i  t  and 
strengthen  eacn  other  ;  and  that  a  incremental  intercourse  with  God, 
and  a  religious  service  purely  intellectual,  is  altogether  unsuitable  to 
such  a  creature  a.;  man,  during  his  present  state  on  earth. 


Clergy  of  Durham,  1751.  409 

had  a  great  and  conspicuous  part  in  all  publick  appear- 
ances, and  the  face  of  it  been  kept  up  with  great  rev- 
erence throughout  all  ranks  from  the  highest  to  the 
lowest  ;  not  only  upon  occasional  solemnities,  but  al- 
so in  the  daily  course  of  behaviour.  In  the  heathen 
world,  their  superstition  was  the  chief  subject  of  statu- 
ary, sculpture,  parting  and  poetry.  It  mixed  itself 
with  business,  civil  forms,  diversions,  domestick  enter- 
tainments, and  every  part  of  common  life.  The  Ma- 
hometans are  obliged  to  short  devotions  five  times  be- 
tween morning  and  evening.  In  Roman  Catholick 
countries,  people  cannot  pass  a  day  without  having 
religion  recalled  to  their  thoughts,  by  some  or  other 
memorial  of  it,  by  some  ceremony  or  publick  relig- 
ious form  occurring  in  ther  way  ;*  besides  their  fre- 

*  In  Roman  Catholick  countries,  people  cannot  pass  a  day  without 
having  religion  recalled  to  their  thoughts,  by  some  ceremony  or  publick 
religious  form  occurring  in  their  way.]  "  What  in  the  former  period" 
/when  speaking  of  the  heathen  world)  wa>  "  called  superstition,  be- 
comes in  this"  (when  speaking  of  Roman  Catholicks)  "  religion  and  reli- 
gious forms;  which  the  papists  pretending  to  connect  with  Christianity, 
and  the  Charge  giving  no  hint  that  this  is  no  more  than  a  pretence,  a  plain 
reader  must  needs  take  this  as  spoken  of  the  means  and  memorials  of 
true  religion,  and  will  accordingly  consider  these  as  recommended 
to  his  practice  and  imitation."  If  a  plain  reader,  at  first  view  of  the 
passage  alluded  to,  should  inadvertently  fall  into  such  a  mistake,  he 
would  find  that  mistake  immediately  corrected  by  the  very  next  sen- 
tence that  follows,  where  the  religion  of  the  Roman  Catholicks  and 
their  superstition  are  distinguished  from  each  other  in  express  words. 
But  the  terms  in  question  are  used  with  the  strictest  propriety.  The 
design  of  the  Bishop,  in  this  part  of  his  Charge,  is  to  consider  religion, 
not  under  the  notion  of  its  being  true,  but  as  it  affects  the  senses  and 
imaginations ©f  the  multitude.  For  so  the  paragraph  begins.  «  That 
which  men  have  accounted  religion  in  the  several  countries  of  the., 
world,"  (whether  the  religion  be  true  or  false  is  beside  his  present  ar- 
gument) "generally  speaking,  has  a  great  and  conspicuous  part  in  all 
publick  appearances.' ■  This  portion  he  illustrate*  by  three  example?, 
the  Heathen,  the  Mahometan,  and  the  Roman  Catholick  religions. 
The  two  first  of  these,  having  little  or  nothing  of  true  religion  belong. 
ing  to  them,  may  well  enough  be  characterized  under  the  common  name 
of  superstition ;  the  last  contains  a  mixture  of  both,  which  thereforethe 

F  F  F 


410  Charge  to  the 

quent  holidays,  the  short  prayers  they  are  daily  call- 
ed to,  and  the  occasional  devotions  enjoined  by  con- 
fessors.    By  these  means  their  superstition  sinks  deep 
into  the   minds   of  the   people,    and   their    religion 
also  into  the  minds  of  such  among  them  as  are  serious 
and  well  disposed.     Our  reformers,  considering  that 
some  of  these  observances  were  in  themselves  wrong 
and   superstitious,  and  others  of  them  made  subservi- 
ent to  the  purposes  of  superstition,  abolished  them, 
reduced  the  form  of  religion  to  great  simplicity,  and  en- 
joined no  more  particular  rules,  nor  left  any  thing  more 
of  what  was  external  in  religion  than  was,  in  a  man- 
ner, necessary  to  preserve  a  sense  of  religion  itself  up- 
on the  minds  of  the  people.     But  a  great  part  of  this 
is  neglected  by  the  generality  amongst  us -,  for  instance, 
the  service  of  the  Church,  not   only  upon  common 
days,  but  also  upon  saints'   days ;  and  several  other 
things  might  be  mentioned.     Thus  they  have  no  cus- 
tomary admonition,  no   publick  call  to   recollect  the 
thoughts  of  God  and  Religion  from  one  Sunday  to 
another. 

It  was  far  otherwise  under  the  Law.  These  words, 
says  Moses  to  the  children  of  Israel,  which  I  com- 
mand thee,  shall  be  in  thine  heart  ;  and  thou  shah  teach 
them  diligently  unto  thy  children,  and  shah  talk  of  them 

Buhop,  like  a  good  write*  as  well  as  a  just  reasoner,  is  careful  to  dis- 
tinguish. In  Roman  Catholick  countries  a  man  can  hardly  travel  a 
mile  without  passing  a  crucifix  erected  on  the  road  side  ;  he  may  ei- 
ther stop  to  worship  the  image  represented  on  the  cross,  or  he  may  sim- 
ply be  reminded  by  it  of  his  own  relation  to  Christ  crucified  ;  thus  by 
one  and  the  same  outward  sign  "religion  may  be  recalled  to. his 
thoughts,"  or  superstition  may  take  possession  of  his  mind.  In  the 
celebration  of  the  eucharist,  the  elements  of  bread  and  wine  aie  regard- 
ed by  a  papi.-t  as  the  very  body  and  blood  of  Christ — to  a  protestant 
they  appear  only  as  symbols  and  memorials  of  that  body  and  blood  ; 
what  in  one  is  an  act  of  rational  devotion,  becomes  in  the  other  an  in  - 
stance  of  the  grossest  superstition,  if  not  idolatry. 


Clergy  of  Durham,  1751.  411 

whan  thou  sittest  in  thine  house,  and  when  thou  walk- 
est  by  the  way,  and  when  thou  liest  down,  and  when  thou 
rise  st  up*     And  as  they  were  commanded  this,  so  it 

*  And  when  thou  rhest  up.]  Allowing  that  "  what  Moses  in  this 
passage  wanted  to  have  effected  was  obedience  to  the  moral  law," 
nothing  sure  could  be  of  greater  use  in  securing  that  obedience  than 
the  practice  here  enjoined.  Our  Inquirer  however  is  of  a  different  o- 
pinion  ;  and  "  very  much  questions  whether  his  Lordship  could  have 
fallen  upon  any  passage  in  the  Old  Testament,  which  relates  at  all  to 
his  subject,  that  would  have  been  less  favourable  to  his  argument.'' 

Who  shall  decide  ?  &c. The  Bishop  goes  on,  "  As  they  (the  Jews) 

were  commanded  this,  so  it  is  obvious  how  much  the  constitution  of 
their  law  was  adapted  to  effect  it,  and  keep  religion  ever  in  view." 
Upon  which  the  Inquirer  remarks,  *'  It  was  then  very  ill,  or  at  least 
very  unwisely  done,  to  abrogate  that  law,  whose  constitution  was  a- 
dapted  to  so  excellent  a  purpose."  Let  us  first  see  what  may  be  of- 
fered in  defence  of  the  Bishop,  and  then  consider  what  is  to  be  said  in 
answertohis  opponent.  The  purposefor  which  the  Mosaick constitution 
was  established  was  this,to  preserve,  amidst  a  world  universally  addicted 
to  polytheism  and  idolatry,  the  great  doctrine  of  the  Unity  of  the  Divine 
Nature,  till  the  seed  should  come  to  whom  the  promise  was  made.  As  a 
means  to  this  end,  the  Israelites  were  not  only  to  be  kept  separate  from 
every  other  nation,  but,  the  better  to  ensure  such  separation,  they  were 
to  be  constantly  employed  in  a  multifarious  ritual,  which  left  them 
neither  time  nor  opportunity  for  deviating  into  the  superstitious  ob- 
servances of  their  pagan  neighbours.  And  this,  I  suppose,  may  suffice 
for  vindicating  the  Bishop's  assertion,  that  "the  constitution  of  the 
Jewish  law  was  adapted  to  keep  religion  ever  in  view."  But  the  Jew- 
ish law  was  not  only  adapted  t  o  this  end  ;  we  are  next  to  observe  that 
the  end  itself  was  actually  gained.  For  though  it  be  too  notorious  to 
be  denied,  that  the  Jews  did  not  always  confine  their  religious  homage 
to  the  God  of  Israel,  but  polluted  the  service,  due  to  Him  alone,  with 
foreign  worship, — yet,  even  in  their  worst  defections,  it  should  be  re- 
membered, they  never  totally  rejected  the  true  Jehovah  ;  and  after 
their  return  from  captivity,  they  were  so  thoroughly  cured  of  all  re- 
maining propensity  to  the  idolatrous  rites  of  heathenism,  as  never  a- 
gain  to  violate  their  allegiance  to  the  God  of  their  fathers.  It  appears* 
then  that,  in  consequence  of  the  Jewish  separation,  the  principle  of 
the  Unity  was  in  fact  preserved  inviolate  among  that  people  till  the 
coming  of  Christ.  When  the  Mosaick  constitution  had  thus  attained 
its  end,  and  mankind  were  now  prepared  for  the  reception  of  a  better 
covenant^  the  law  expired  of  course  ;  the  partition  wall  that  had  divided 
the  Jew  from  the  Gentile  was  taken  down,  and  all  distinction  between 
them  lost  under  the  common  name  of  Christians,    And  this  may  suf- 


412  Charge  to  the 

is  obvious  how  much  the  constitution  of  that  law  was 
adapted  to  effect  it,  and  keep  religion  ever  in  view. 
And  without  somewhat  of  this  nature,  piety  will  grow 
languid  even  among  the  better  sort  of  men  ;  and  the 
worst  will  go  on  quietly  in  an  abandoned  course,  with 
fewer  interruptions  from  within  than  they  would  have, 
were  religious  reflections  forced  oftener  upon  their 
minds,*  and  consequently  with  less  probability  of  their 
amendment.  Indeed  in  most  ages  of  the  church,  the 
care  of  reasonable  men  has  been,  as  there  has  been  for 
the  most  part  occasion,  to  draw  the  people  off  from 
laying  too  great  weight  upon  external  things  ;  upon 
formal  acts  of  piety.  But  the  state  of  matters  is  quite 
changed  now  with  us.  These  things  are  neglected  to 
a  degree  which  is,  and  cannot  but  be,  attended  with  a 
decay  of  all  that  is  good.  It  is  highly  seasonable  now 
to  instruct  the  people  in  the  importance  of  external 
religion.! 

fice  to  shew,  in  opposition  to  our  Inquirer,  that  it  was  both  very  well 
and  very  wisely  done  to  abrogate  a  law,  when  the  purpose  for  which 
the  law  had  been  enacted  was  accomplished. 

*  Were  religious  reflections  forced  oftener  upon  their  minds.]  "  Ac- 
cording to  the  Bishop's  doctrine,  then,"  says  the  Inquirer,  "  it  should 
be  not  only  good  policy,  but  wholesome  discipline  to  force  men  in 
England  to  come  to  church,  and  in  France  to  go  to  mass."  And  again, 
"  If  externals  have  this  virtue  to  enforce  religious  reflections,  it  must  be 
right  to  compel  those  who  are  indisposed  to  such  reflections  to  attend 
these  memorials."  Yes  ;  granting  that  the  sense  of  the  passage  in  the 
Charge  is  not  shamefully  perverted,  and  that  we  are  to  understand  the 
Bishop  here  to  speak  of  external  force  and  compulsion.  Whereas  by 
"  religious  reflections  forced"  is  plainly  meant  no  more  than  religious 
reflections  oftener  thrown  in  men's  way,  brought  more  frequently  into 
their  thoughts,  so  as  to  produce  an  habitual  recollection  that  they  are  al- 
ways in  the  divine  presence. 

■\  To  instruct  the  people  in  the  importance  of  external  religion] 
4<  The  importance  of  external  religion,"  the  Inquirer  remark  ,  "  is  the 
grand  engine  of  the  papists,  which  they  play  with  the  greatest  effect 
upon  our  common  people,  who  are  always  soonest  taken  and  ensnared 


Clergy  of  Durham,  1751.  415 

And  doubtless  under  this  head  must  come  into 
consideration  a  proper  regard  to  the  structures  which 
are  consecrated  to  the  service  of  God.  In  the  present 
turn  of  the  age,  one  may  observe  a  wonderful  frugali- 
ty in  every  thing  which  has  respect  to  religion,  and  ex- 
travagance in  every  thing  else.  But  amidst  the  ap- 
pearances of  opulence  and  improvement  in  all  common 
things,  which  are  now  seen  in  most  places,  it  would 
be  hard  to  find  a  reason  why  these  monuments  of  an- 
cient piety  should  not  be  preserved  in  their  original 
beauty  and  magnificence.  But  in  the  least  opulent 
places  they  must  be  preserved  in  becoming  repair  ; 
and  every  thing  relating  to  the  divine  service  be,  how- 
ever, decent  and  clean  ;  otherwise  we  shall  vilify  the 
face  of  religion  whilst  we  keep  it  up.  All  this  is  in- 
deed principally  the  duty  of  others.  Yours  is  to  press 
strongly  upon  them  what  is  their  duty  in  this  respect* 
and  admonish  them  of  it  often,  if  they  are  negligent 

But  then  you  must  be  sure  to  take  care  and  not 
neglect  that  part  of  the  sacred  fabrick  which  belongs 
to  you  to  maintain  in  repair  and  decency.  Such  neg- 
lect would  be  great  impiety  in  you,  and  of  most  per- 
nicious example  to  others.     Nor  could  you,  with  any 

by  form  and  jhew  ;  and,  so  far  as  we  concur  with  them  in  the  princi- 
ple, we  are  doing  their  work  ;  since  if  externals,  as  such,  are  important, 
the  plain  natural  consequence  is,  the  more  of  them  the  better."  He 
had  the  same  reflection  once  before — "  If  true  religion  cannot  be  pre- 
served among  men  without  formj,  the  consequence  must  be  that  the 
Romish  religion,  having— -more  frequent  occurrences  of  forms,  is  better 
than  other  religions  which  have  fewer  of  these—- occurrences"  To 
this  argument  I  reply,  Nego  conseqttentiam.  There  may  be  too  much 
of  form  in  religion,  as  well  as  too  litUe  j  the  one  leads  to  enthusiasm, 
the  other  degenerates  into  superstition  ;  one  is  puritanism,  the  other 
popery— whereas  the  rational  worship  of  God  is  equally  removed 
from  either  extreme-  Did  the  Inquirer  never  hear  of  the  possibility  of 
having  too  much  of  a  good  thing  ?  Or  does  he  suppose,  with  the  late 
historian  of  Great  Britain,  that  all  religion  is  divided  into  two  species, 
the  superstitious  and  the  fanatical ;  and  that  whatever  is  not  one  of 
these  must  of  necessity  be  the  other  ? 


414  Charge  to  the 

success,  or  any  propriety,  urge  upon  them  their  duty 
in  a  regard  in  which  you  yourselves  should  be  openly 
neglectful  of  it. 

Bishop  Fleetwood  has  observed,*  that  unless  the 
good  pub  lick  spirit  of  building,  repairing,  and  adorning 
churches  prevails  a  great  deal  more  among  us,  and  be 
more  encouraged,  an  hundred  years  will  bring  to  the 
ground  an  huge  number  of  our  churches.  This  excellent 
prelate  made  this  observation  forty  year.*  ago  ;  and  no 
one,  I  believe,  will  imagine  that  the  good  >pirit  he  has 
recommended  prevails  more  at  present  than  it  did 
then. 

*  But  if  these  appendages  of  the  divine  service  are  to 
be  regarded,  doubtless  the  divine  service  itself  is  more 
to  be  regarded  ;  and  the  conscientious  attendance  up- 
on it  ought  often  to  be  inculcated  upon  the  people, 
as  a  plain  precept  of  the  Gospel,  as  the  means  of  grace, 
and  what  has  peculiar  promises  annexed  to  it.  But 
external  acts  of  piety  and  devotion,  and  the  frequent 
returns  of  them  are,  moreover,  necessary  to  keep  up  a 
sense  of  religion,  which  the  affairs  of  the  world  will 
otherwise  wear  out  of  men's  hearts.  And  the  fre- 
quent returns,  whether  of  publick  devotions,  or  of 
any  thing  else,  to  introduce  religion  into  men's  seri- 
ous thoughts,  will  have  an  influence  upon  them  in 
proportion  as  they  are  susceptible  of  religion,  and  not 
given  over  to  a  reprobate  mind.  For  this  reason,  be- 
sides others,  the  service  of  the  church  ought  to  be 
celebrated  as  often  as  you  can  have  a  congregation  to 
attend  it. 

But  since  the  body  of  the  people,  especially  in 
country  places,  cannot  be  brought  to  attend  it  often- 
er  than  one  day  in  a  week,  and  since  this  is  in  no  sort 
enough  to  keep  up  in  them  a  due  sense  of  religion,  it 

*  Charge  to  the  Clergy  of  St.  Asaph,  1710 


Clergy  of  Durham,  1751.  415 

were  greatly  to  be  wished  they  could  be  persuaded  to 
any  thing  which  might,  in  some  measure,  supply  the 
want  of  more  frequent  publick  devotions,  or  serve  the 
like  purposes.  Family  prayers,  regularly  kept  up  in 
every  house,  would  have  a  great  good  effect. 

Secret  prayer,  as  expressly  as  it  is  commanded  by 
our  Saviour,  and  as  evidently  as  it  is  implied  in  the 
notion  of  piety,  will  yet,  I  fear,  be  grievously  forgot- 
ten  by  the  generality,  until  they  can  be  brought  to  fix 
for  themsel  ves  certain  times  of  the  day  for  it ;  since 
this  is  not  done  to  their  hands,  as  it  was  in  the  Jew- 
ish Church  by  custom  or  authority.  Indeed,  custom, 
as  well  as  the  manifest  propriety  of  the  thing,  and  ex- 
amples of  good  men  in  Scripture,  justify  us  in  insisting, 
that  none  omit  their  prayers  morning  or  evening,  who 
have  not  thrown  off  all  regards  to  piety.  But  secret 
prayer  comprehends  not  only  devotions  before  men 
begin  and  after  they  have  ended  the  business  of  the 
day,  but  such  also  as  may  be  performed  while  they  are 
employed  in  it,  or  even  in  company.  4nd  truly,  if 
besides  our  more  set  devotions,  morning  and  evening, 
all  of  us  would  fix  upon  certain  times  of  the  day,  so 
that  the  return  of  the  hour  should  remind  us  to  say 
short  prayers,  or  exercise  our  thoughts  in  a  way  equiv- 
alent to  this,  perhaps  there  are  few  persons  in  so  high 
and  habitual  a  state  of  piety,  as  not  to  find  the  benefit 
of  it.  If  it  took  up  no  more  than  a  minute  or  two, 
or  even  less  time  than  that,  it  would  serve  the  end  I 
am  proposing  ;  it  would  be  a  recollection  that  we  are 
in  the  Divine  Presence,  and  contribute  to  our  being  in 
the  fear  of  the  Lord  all  the  day  long, 

A  duty  of  the  like  kind,  and  serving  to  the  same 
purpose,  is  the  particular  acknowledgement  of  God 
when  we  are  partaking  of  his  bounty  at  our  meals. 
The  neglect  of  this  is  said  to  have  been  scandalous  tQ  a 


416  Charge  to  the 

proverb  in  the  heathen  world;*  but  it  is  without 
;;hame  laid  aside  at  the  tables  of  the  highest  and  the 
lowest  rank  among  us. 

And  as  parents  should  be  admonished,  and  it  should 
be  pressed  upon  their  consciences,  to  teach  their  chil- 
dren their  prayers  and  chatechism,  it  being  what  they 
are  obliged  to  upon  all  accounts,  so  it  is  proper  to  be 
mentioned  here,  as  a  means  by  which  they  will  bring 
the  principles  of  Christianity  often  to  their  own  minds, 
instead  of  laying  aside  all  thoughts  of  it  from  week's 
end  to  week's  end. 

General  exhortations  to  piety,  abstracted  from  the 
particular  circumstances  of  it,  are  of  great  use  to  such 
as  are  already  got  into  a  religious  course  of  life  ;  but 
such  as  are  not,  though  they  be  touched  with  them, 
yet  when  they  go  away  from  church  they  scarce  know 
where  to  begin,  or  how  to  set  about  what  they  are 
exhorted  to.  And  it  is  with  respect  to  religion  as 
in  the  common  affairs  of  life,  in  which  many  things  of 
preat  consequence  intended  are  yet  never  done  at  all, 
because  they  may  be  done  at  any  time,  and  in  any 
manner  ;  which  would  not  be,  were  some  determin- 
ate time  and  manner  voluntarily  fixed  upon  for  the 
doing  of  them.  Particular  rules  and  directions,  then, 
concerning  the  times  and  circumstances  of  perform- 
ing acknowledged  duties,  bring  religion  nearer  to  prac- 
tice ;  and  such  as  are  really  proper,  and  cannot  well 
be  mistaken,  and  are  easily  observed.  Such  particu- 
lar rules  in  religion,  prudently  recommended,  would 
have  an  influence  upon  the  people. 

All  this  indeed  may  be  called  form,  as  every  thing 
external  in  religion  may  be  merely  so.  And  there- 
fore whilst  we  endeavour  in  these,  and  other  like  in- 

*  Cudworth  on  the  Lord's  Supper,  p.   8.    Casaub.  in  Athenaeum,  L.  i.  c. 
zi.  p.  22.    Duport.  Prael.  in  Theophrastum  Ed.  Ncedham.  C  ix.  p.  335,  &c. 


Clergy  of  Durham,  1751.  4 1  ?  ■ 

stances,  to  keep  up  the  form  of  godliness*  amongst 
those  who  are  our  care,  and  over  whom  we  have  any 
influence,  we  must  endeavour  also  that  this  form  be 
made  more  and  more  subservient  to  promote  ihe  power 
of  it.*  Admonish  them  to  take  heed  that  they  mean 
what  they  say  in  their  prayers,  that  their  thoughts  and 
intentions  go  along  with  their  words,  that  they  really 
in  their  hearts  exert  and  exercise  before  God  the  af- 
fections they  express  with  their  mouth.  Teach  them, 
not  that  external  religion  is  nothing,  for  this  is  not 
true  in  any  sense  ;  it  being  scarce  possible  but  that 
it  will  lay  some  sort  of  restraint  upon  a  man's  morals ; 
and  it  is  moreover  of  good  effect  with  respect  to  the 
world  about  him.  But  teach  them  that  regard  to 
one  duty  will  in  no  sort  atone  for  the  neglect  of  any 
other.  Endeavour  to  raise  in  their  hearts  such  a  sense 
of  God  as  shall  be  an  habitual,  ready  principle  of 
reverence,  love,  gratitude,  hope,  trust,  resignation  and 
obedience.  Exhort  them  to  make  use  of  every  cir- 
cumstance which  brings  the  subject  of  religion  at  all 
before  them  ;  to  turn  their  hearts  habitually  to  him  ; 
to  recollect  seriously  the  thoughts  of  his  presence  in 
whom  they  live  and  move  and  have  their  being,  and  by 
a  short  act  of  their  mind  devote  themselves  to  his  ser- 
vice. If,  for  instance,  persons  would  accustom  them- 
selves to  be  thus  admonished  by  the  very  sight  of  a 
church,  could  it  be  called  superstition  ?  Enforce  up- 
on them  the  necessity  of  making  religion  their  principal 
concern,  as  what  is  the  express  condition  of  the  gospel 
covenant,  and  what  the  very  nature  of  the  thing  re- 
quires. Explain  to  them  the  terms  of  that  covenant 
of  mercy,  founded  in  the  incarnation,  sacrifice  and  in- 
tercession of  Christ,  together  with  the  promised  as- 
sistance of  the  Holy  Ghost,  not  to  supersede  our  own 

<*  *  2  Tim.  ill.  5. 

G      G      O 


418  Charge  to  the         % 

endeavours,  but  to  render  them  effectual.     The  great- 
er festivals  of  the  church  being  instituted   for  com- 
memorating the  several  parts  of  the  gospel  history,  of 
course  lead  you  to  explain  these  its  several  doctrines, 
and  shew  the    Christian  practice  which  arises  out  of 
them.     And  the  more  occasional  solemnities  of  relig- 
ion, as  well  as  these  festivals,  will  often  afford  you  the 
fairest    opportunities  of  enforcing  all  these  things  in 
familiar  conversation.     Indeed  all  affectation  of  talk- 
ing piously  is  quite  nauseous  ;  and  though  there  be 
nothing  of  this,  yet  men  will  easily  be  disgusted  at 
the  too  great  frequency  or  length  of  these  occasional 
admonitions.     But  a  word  of  God  and  Religion 
dropped  sometimes  in  conversation  gently,  and  with- 
out any  thing  severe  or  forbidding  in  the  manner  of  it, 
this  is  not  unacceptable.     It  leaves    an  impression,  is 
repeated  again  by  the  hearers,  and  often  remembered 
by  plain  well  disposed  persons  longer  than  one  would 
think.      Particular  circumstances  too  which  render 
men  more  apt  to  receive  instruction,   should  be  laid 
hold  of  to  talk  seriously  to  their  consciences.     For  in- 
stance, after  a  man's  recovery  from  a  dangerous  sick- 
ness, how  proper  is  it  to  advise  him  to  recollect   and 
ever  bear  in  mind,  what  were  his  hopes  or  fears,  his 
wishes  and  resolutions  when  under  the  apprehension  of 
death,  in  order  to  bring  him  to  repentance,  or  confirm 
him  in  a  course  of  piety,  according  as  his  life  and  char- 
acter has  been.  So  likewise  the  terrible  accidents  which 
often   happen  from  riot  and  debauchery,  and  indeed 
almost  every  vice,  are  occasions  providentially  thrown 
in  your  way  to  discourse  against  these  vices  in  common 
conversation,  as  well  as  from  the  pulpit,  upon  any  such 
accidents  happening  in  your  parish,  or  in  a  neighbour- 
ing one.     Occasions  and  circumstances  of  a  like  kind 
to  some  or  other  of  these  occur  often,  and  ought,  if  1 


Clergy  of  Durham,  1751.  419 

may  so  speak,  to  be  catched  at,  as  opportunities  of  con- 
veying instruction,  both  publick  and  private,  with 
great  force  and  advantage. 

Publick  instruction  is  also  absolutely  necessary,  and 
can  in  no  sort  be  dispensed  with.  But  as  it  is  com- 
mon to  all  who  are  present,  many  persons  strangely 
neglect  to  appropriate  what  they  hear  to  themselves, 
to  their  own  heart  and  life.  Now  the  only  remedy 
for  this  in  our  power  is  a  particular  personal  applica- 
tion. And  a  personal  application  makes  a  very  dif- 
ferent impression  from  a  common,  general  one.  It 
were  therefore  greatly  to  be  wished,  that  every  man 
should  have  the  principles  of  Christianity,  and  his  own 
particular  duty  enforced  upon  his  conscience,  in  a 
manner  suited  to  his  capacity,  in  private.  And  be- 
sides the  occasional  opportunities  of  doing  this,  some 
of  which  have  been  intimated,  there  are  stated  oppor- 
tunities of  doing  it.  Such,  for  instance,  is  confirma- 
tion ;  and  the  usual  age  for  confirmation  is  that  time 
of  life,  from  which  youth  must  become  more  and 
more  their  own  masters,  when  they  are  often  leaving 
their  father's  house,  going  out  into  the  wide  world  and 
all  its  numerous  temptations  ;  against  which  they  par- 
ticularly want  to  be  fortified,  by  having  strong  and 
lively  impressions  of  religion  made  upon  their  minds. 
Now  the  sixty -first  canon  expressly  requires,  that  every 
minister  that  hath  care  of  souls  shall  use  his  best  en- 
deavour to  prepare  and  make  able — as  many  as  he  can 
to  be  confirmed  ;  which  cannot  be  done  as  it  ought 
without  such  personal  application  to  each  candidate  in 
particular  as  I  am  recommending.  Another  opportu- 
nity for  doing  this  is,  when  any  one  of  your  parishioners 
signifies  his  name,  as  intending  for  the* first  time  to  be 
partaker  of  the  communion.  The  rubrick  requires 
that  all  persons,  whenever  they  intend  to  receive,  shall 


420  Charge  to  the 

signify  their  names  beforehand  to  the  minister  ;  which, 
if  it  be  not  insisted  upon  in  all  cases,  ought  absolutely 
to  be  insisted  upon  for  the  first  time.  Now  this  even 
lays  it  in  your  way  to  discourse  with  them  in  private 
upon  the  nature  and  benefits  of  this  sacrament,  and  en- 
force upon  them  the  importance  and  necessity  of  re- 
ligion. However,  I  do  not  mean  to  put  this  upon 
the  same  foot  with  catechising  youth  and  preparing 
them  for  confirmation  ;  these  being  indispensable  ob- 
ligations, and  expressly  commanded  by  our  canons. 
This  private  intercourse  with  your  parishoners  prepar- 
atory to  their  first  communion,  let  it,  if  you  please,  be 
considered  as  a  voluntary  service  to  religion  on  your 
part,  and  a  voluntary  instance  of  docility  on  theirs. 
I  will  only  add  as  to  this  practice,  that  it  is  regularly 
kept  up  by  some  persons,  and  particularly  by  one, 
whose  exemplary  behaviour  in  every  part  of  the  pasto- 
ral office  is  enforced  upon  you  by  his  station  of  author- 
ity and  influence  in  (this  part*  especially  of)  the  dio- 
cese. 

I  am  very  sensible,  my  brethren,  that  some  of  these 
things^  in  places  where  they  are  greatly  wanted,  are  im* 
practicable  from  the  largeness  of  parishes,  suppose. 
And  where  there  is  no  impediment  of  this  sort,  yet  the 
performance  of  them  will  depend  upon  others,  as  well 
as  upon  you.  People  cannot  be  admonished  or  in- 
structed in  private,  unless  they  will  permit  it.  And 
little  will  you  be  able  to  do  in  forming  the  minds  of 
children  to  a  sense  of  religion,  if  their  parents  will  not 
assist  you  in  it ;  and  yet  much  less,  if  they  will  frustrate 
your  endeavours,  by  their  bad  example,  and  giving 
encouragement  to  their  children  to  be  dissolute.  The 
like  is  to  be  sakl  also  of  your  influence  in  reforming 

*  The  Archdeaconry  of  Northumberland. 


Clergy  of  Durba?n,  1751.  421 

the  common  people  in  general,  in  proportion  as  their 
superiors  act  in  like  manner  to  such  parents  ;  and 
whilst  they,  the  lower  people  I  mean,  must  have  such 
numerous  temptations  to  drunkenness  and  riot  every- 
where placed  in  their  way.  And  it  is  cruel  usage  we 
often  meet  with,  in  being  censured  for  not  doing  what 
we  cannot  do,  without,  what  we  cannot  have,  the  con- 
currence of  our  censurers.  Doubtless  very  much  re- 
proach which  now  lights  upon  the  clergy  would  be 
found  to  fall  elsewhere,  if  due  allowances  were  made 
for  things  of  this  kind.  But  then  we,  my  brethren, 
must  take  care  and  not  make  more  than  due  allow- 
ances for  them.  If  others  deal  uncharitably  with  us, 
we  must  deal  impartially  with  ourselves,  as  in  a  matter 
of  conscience,  in  determining  what  good  is  in  our 
power  to  do;  and  not  let  indolence  keep  us  from  set- 
ting about  what  really  is  in  our  power,  nor  any  heat 
of  temper  create  obstacles  in  the  prosecution  of  it,  or 
render  insuperable  such  as  we  find,  when  perhaps  gen- 
tleness and  patience  would  prevent  or  overcome 
them. 

Indeed  all  this  diligence  to  which  I  have  been  ex- 
horting you  and  myself,  for  God  forbid  I  should  not 
consider  myself  as  included  in  all  the  general  admoni- 
tions you  receive  from  me  ;  all  this  diligence  in  these 
things  does  indeed  suppose  that  we  give  ourselves  whol- 
ly to  them.  It  supposes,  not  only  that  we  have  a  real 
sense  of  religion  upon  our  own  minds,  but  also,  that 
to  promote  the  practice  of  it  in  others  is  habitually  up- 
permost in  our  thought  and  intention,  as  the  business 
of  our  lives.  And  this,  my  brethren,  is  the  business 
of  our  lives,  in  every  sense,  and  upon  every  account. 
It  is  the  general  business  of  all  Christians  as  they  have 
opportunity  ;  it  is  our  particular  business.  It  is  so,  as 
we  have  devoted  ourselves  to  it  by  the  most  solemn 


422  Charge  to  the  Clergy  of  Durham. 

engagements  ;  as  according  to  our  Lord's  appointment 
we  live  of  the  Gospel  ;*  and  as  the  preservation  and  ad- 
vancement of  religion,  in  such  and  such  districts,  are, 
in  some  respects,  our  appropriated  trust. 

By  being  faithful  in  the  discharge  of  this  our  trust, 
by  thus  taking  heed  to  the  ministry  we  have  received  in 
the  Lord  that  we  fulfil  *7,t  we  shall  do  our  part  to- 
wards reviving  a  practical  sense  of  religion  amongst  the 
people  committed  to  our  care.  And  this  will  be  the 
securest  barrier  against  the  efforts  of  infidelity  ;  a  great 
source  of  which  plainly  is,  the  endeavour  to  get  rid  of 
religious  restraints.  But  whatever  be  our  success  with 
regard  to  others,  we  shall  have  the  approbation  of  our 
consciences,  and  may  rest  assured  that,  as  to  ourselves 
at  least,  our  labour  is  not  in  vain  in  the  Lorb.J 

*  I  Cor.  ix.  14. 

f  Col.  ir.  17.  |  1   Cor.  xv.  58. 


FINIS. 


Date  Due 

**  /  Y 

NOV  1    i  W 

^^^ 

— i 

, 

($) 

i 

%m 


- 


I 

■ 
SB 

111118 

£SmBllii 


9 


